See also:

• APPREHENSION (Lat. ad, to; prehendere, to seize)

APPREHENSION (See also:

• LAT

Lat. ad, to; prehendere, to seize)  , in See also:

• PSYCHOLOGY
• PSYCHOLOGY (>Guxrl, the mind or soul, and X yos, theory)

psychology, a See also:

• TERM

term applied to a mode of consciousness in which nothing is affirmed or denied of the See also:

• OBJECT

object in question, but the mind is merely aware of (" seizes ") it . " See also:

• JUDGMENT

Judgment " (says See also:

• REID, ROBERT (1862– )
• REID, SIR GEORGE (1841- )
• REID, SIR ROBERT GILLESPIE (184o-19o8)
• REID, SIR WILLIAM (1791-1858)
• REID, THOMAS (1710-1796)
• REID, THOMAS MAYNE (1818-1883)
• REID, WHITELAW (1837- )

Reid, ed . See also:

• HAMILTON
• HAMILTON (GRAND or ASHUANIPI)
• HAMILTON, ALEXANDER (1757-1804)
• HAMILTON, ANTHONY, or ANTOINE (1646-1720)
• HAMILTON, ELIZABETH (1758–1816)
• HAMILTON, EMMA, LADY (c. 1765-1815)
• HAMILTON, JAMES (1769-1831)
• HAMILTON, JAMES HAMILTON, 1ST DUKE OF (1606-1649)
• HAMILTON, JOHN (c. 1511–1571)
• HAMILTON, MARQUESSES AND DUKES OF
• HAMILTON, PATRICK (1504-1528)
• HAMILTON, ROBERT (1743-1829)
• HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM
• HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM (1730-1803)
• HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM ROWAN (1805-1865)
• HAMILTON, THOMAS (1789-1842)
• HAMILTON, WILLIAM (1704-1754)
• HAMILTON, WILLIAM GERARD (1729-1796)

Hamilton, i. p . 414) " is an See also:

• ACT (Lat. actus, actum)

act of the mind specifically different from See also:

• SIMPLE

simple See also:

• APPREHENSION (Lat. ad, to; prehendere, to seize)

apprehension or the See also:

• BARE

bare conception of a thing "; and again, " Simple apprehension or conception can neither be true nor false." This distinction provides for the large class of See also:

• MENTAL

mental acts in which we are simply aware of or " take in " a number of See also:

• FAMILIAR (through the Fr. familier, from Lat. familiaris, of or belonging to the familia, family)

familiar See also:

• OBJECTS

objects, about which we in See also:

• GENERAL
• GENERAL (Lat. generalis, of or relating to a genus, kind or class)

general make no judgment unless our See also:

• ATTENTION (from Lat. ad-tendo, await, expect; the condition of being " stretched " or " tense ")

attention is suddenly called by a new feature . Or again two alternatives may be apprehended without any resultant judgment as to their respective merits . Similarly G . F . Stout points out that while we have a very vivid See also:

• IDEA (Gr. Ibia, connected with i&eiv, to see; cf. Lat. species from specere, to look at)

idea of a See also:

• CHARACTER (Gr. xapareri7p, from xap&crew, to scratch)

character or an incident in a See also:

• WORK

work of fiction, we can hardly be said in any real sense to have any belief or to make any judgment as to its existence or truth . With this mental See also:

• STATE
• STATE, GREAT OFFICERS OF

state may be compared the purely aesthetic contemplation of See also:

• MUSIC

music, wherein apart from, say, a false See also:

• NOTE
• NOTE (Lat. nota, mark, sign, from noscere, to know)

note, the See also:

• FACULTY (through the French, from the Lat. facultas, ability to do anything, from facilis, easy, facere, to do; another form of the word in Lat. facilitas, facility, ease, keeps the original meaning)

faculty of judgment is for the See also:

• TIME (0. Eng. Lima, cf. Icel. timi, Swed. timme, hour, Dan. time; from the root also seen in " tide," properly the time of between the flow and ebb of the sea, cf. O. Eng. getidan, to happen, " even-tide," &c.; it is not directly related to Lat. tempus)
• TIME, MEASUREMENT OF
• TIME, STANDARD

time inoperative . To these examples may be added the fact that one can fully understand an See also:

• ARGUMENT

argument in all its See also:

• BEARINGS

bearings without in any way judging its validity . Without going into the question fully, it may be pointed out that the distinction between judgment and apprehension is relative . In every See also:

• KIND (O. E. ge-cynde, from the same root as is seen in " kin," supra)

kind of thought there is judgment of some sort in a greater or less degree of prominence .

Judgment and thought are in fact psychologically distinguishable merely as different, though correlative, activities of See also:

• CON

con- sciousness .