See also:APPREHENSION (See also:Lat. ad, to; prehendere, to seize)
, in See also:psychology, a See also:term applied to a mode of consciousness in which nothing is affirmed or denied of the See also:object in question, but the mind is merely aware of (" seizes ") it
.
" See also:Judgment " (says See also:Reid, ed
.
See also:- HAMILTON
- HAMILTON (GRAND or ASHUANIPI)
- HAMILTON, ALEXANDER (1757-1804)
- HAMILTON, ANTHONY, or ANTOINE (1646-1720)
- HAMILTON, ELIZABETH (1758–1816)
- HAMILTON, EMMA, LADY (c. 1765-1815)
- HAMILTON, JAMES (1769-1831)
- HAMILTON, JAMES HAMILTON, 1ST DUKE OF (1606-1649)
- HAMILTON, JOHN (c. 1511–1571)
- HAMILTON, MARQUESSES AND DUKES OF
- HAMILTON, PATRICK (1504-1528)
- HAMILTON, ROBERT (1743-1829)
- HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM
- HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM (1730-1803)
- HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM ROWAN (1805-1865)
- HAMILTON, THOMAS (1789-1842)
- HAMILTON, WILLIAM (1704-1754)
- HAMILTON, WILLIAM GERARD (1729-1796)
Hamilton, i. p
.
414) " is an See also:act of the mind specifically different from See also:simple See also:apprehension or the See also:bare conception of a thing "; and again, " Simple apprehension or conception can neither be true nor false." This distinction provides for the large class of See also:mental acts in which we are simply aware of or " take in " a number of See also:familiar See also:objects, about which we in See also:general make no judgment unless our See also:attention is suddenly called by a new feature
.
Or again two alternatives may be apprehended without any resultant judgment as to their respective merits
.
Similarly G
.
F
.
Stout points out that while we have a very vivid See also:idea of a See also:character or an incident in a See also:work of fiction, we can hardly be said in any real sense to have any
belief or to make any judgment as to its existence or truth
.
With this mental See also:state may be compared the purely aesthetic contemplation of See also:music, wherein apart from, say, a false See also:note, the See also:faculty of judgment is for the See also:- TIME (0. Eng. Lima, cf. Icel. timi, Swed. timme, hour, Dan. time; from the root also seen in " tide," properly the time of between the flow and ebb of the sea, cf. O. Eng. getidan, to happen, " even-tide," &c.; it is not directly related to Lat. tempus)
- TIME, MEASUREMENT OF
- TIME, STANDARD
time inoperative
.
To these examples may be added the fact that one can fully understand an See also:argument in all its See also:bearings without in any way judging its validity
.
Without going into the question fully, it
may be pointed out that the distinction
between judgment and apprehension is relative
.
In every See also:kind of thought there is judgment of
some sort in a greater or less degree of
prominence
.
Judgment and thought are in
fact psychologically distinguishable merely as
different, though correlative, activities of See also:con-
sciousness
.
End of Article: