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BACON

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Originally appearing in Volume V03, Page 151 of the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica.
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BACON  , See also:

FRANCIS The See also:series of the See also:literary See also:works is completed by the See also:minor See also:treatises on theological or ecclesiastical questions . Some of the latter, included among the occasional works, are sagacious and prudent and deserve careful study . Of the former, the See also:principal specimens are the Meditationes Sacrae and the See also:Confession of Faith . The Paradoxes (Characters of a believing See also:Christian in paradoxes, and seeming contradictions), which was often and justly suspected, has been conclusively proved by See also:Grosart to be the See also:work of another author . Philosophical Works.—The See also:great See also:mass of Bacon's writings consists of treatises or fragments, which either formed integral parts of his See also:grand comprehensive See also:scheme, or were closely connected with it . More exactly they may be classified under three heads: (A) Writings originally. intended to See also:form parts of the Instauratio, but which were afterwards superseded or thrown aside; (B) Works connected with the Instauratio, but not directly included in its See also:plan; (C) Writings which actually formed See also:part of the Instauratio Magna .. (A) This class contains some important tracts, which certainly contain little, if anything, that is not afterwards taken up and See also:expanded in the more elaborate works, but are not undeserving of See also:attention, from the difference in the point of view and method of treatment . The most valuable of them are: (r) The See also:Advancement of Learning, of which no detailed See also:account need be given, as it is completely worked up into the De Augmentis, and takes. its See also:place as the first part of the Instauratio . (2) See also:Valerius See also:Terminus; a very remarkable piece, composed probably about 16o3, though perhaps retouched at a later See also:period . It contains a brief and somewhat obscure outline of the first two parts in the Instauratio, and is of importance as affording us some insight into the See also:gradual development of the See also:system in Bacon's own mind . (3) Temporis Partus Masculus, another curious fragment, remarkable not only from its contents, but from its See also:style, which is arrogant and offensive, in this respect unlike any other See also:writing of Bacon's . The See also:adjective masculus points to the See also:power of bringing forth See also:fruit possessed by the new See also:philosophy, and perhaps indicates that all previous births of See also:time were to be looked upon as feminine or imperfect.; it is used in a somewhat similar sense in Letters and See also:Life, vi .

183, In verbis masculis, no flourishing or painted words, but such words as are See also:

fit to go before deeds." (4) Redargutio Philosophiarum, a highly finished piece in the form of an oration, composed probably about 16o8 or i6og, and containing in See also:pretty full detail much of what afterwards appears in connexion with the Idola Theatri in See also:book i. of the Novum Organum . (5) Cogitata et 'Visa, perhaps the most important of the minor philosophical writings, dating from 1607 (though possibly the See also:tract in its See also:present form may have been to some extent altered), and containing in weighty and sonorous Latin the substance of the first book of the Organum . (6) The Descriptio Globi Intellectualis, which is to. some extent intermediate between the Advancement and the De Augmentis, goes over in detail the See also:general See also:classification of the sciences, and enters particularly on some points of minor See also:interest . (;) The brief tract De Inter pre/ atione Naturae Sententiae Duodecim is evidently a first See also:sketch of part of the Novum Organum, and in phraseology is almost identical with it . (8) A few smaller pieces, such as the Inquisitio de Motu. the Calor et Frigus, the Historia Soni et Auditus and the Phaenomena Universi, are See also:early specimens of his Natural See also:History, and exhibit the first tentative applications of the new method . (B) The second See also:group consists of treatises on subjects connected with the Instauratio, but not forming part of it . The most interesting, and in many respects the most remarkable, is the philosophic See also:romance, the New See also:Atlantis, a description of an ideal See also:state in which the principles of the new philosophy are carried out by See also:political machinery and under state guidance, and where many of the results contemplated by Bacon are in See also:imagination attained . The work was to have been completed by the addition of a second part, treating of the See also:laws of a See also:model See also:commonwealth, which was never written . Another important tract is the De Principiis clique Originibus secundum Fabulas Cupidinis et Caeli, where, under the disguise of two old mythological stories,. he (in the manner of the Sapientia Veterum) finds the deepest truths Bacon's Works and Philosophy . A See also:complete survey of Bacon's works and an estimate of his place in literature and philosophy are matters fora See also:volume . It is here proposed merely to classify the works, to indicate their general See also:character and to enter somewhat more in detail upon what he himself regarded as his great achievement,—the re-organization of the sciences and the exposition of a new method by which the human mind might proceed with See also:security and certainty towards the true end of all human thought and See also:action . Putting aside the letters and occasional writings, we may conveniently distribute the other works into three classes, Prof essional, Literary, Philosophical .

The Professional works include the See also:

Reading on the See also:Statute of Uses, the See also:Maxims of See also:Law and the See also:treatise (possibly See also:spurious) on the Use of the Law . " I am in See also:good See also:hope," said Bacon himself, "that when See also:Sir See also:Edward See also:Coke's reports and my rules and decisions shall come to posterity, there will be (whatsoever is now thought) question who was the greater lawyer." If Coke's reports show completer mastery of technical details, greater knowledge of precedent, and more of the dogged grasp of the See also:letter than do Bacon's legal writings, there can be no dispute that the latter exhibit an infinitely more comprehensive intelligence of the abstract principles of See also:jurisprudence, with a richness and ethical fulness that more than compensate for their lack of dry legal detail . Bacon seems indeed to have been a lawyer of the first See also:order, with a keen scientific insight into the See also:bearings of isolated facts and a power of generalization which admirably fitted him for the self-imposed task, unfortunately never completed, of digesting or codifying the chaotic mass of the See also:English law . Among the literary works are included all that he himself designated moral and See also:historical pieces, and to these may be added some theological and minor writings, such as the Apophthegms . Of the moral works the most valuable are the Essays, which have been so widely read and universally admired . The See also:matter is of the See also:familiar, See also:practical See also:kind, that " comes See also:home to men's bosoms." The thoughts are weighty, and even when not See also:original have acquired a See also:peculiar and unique See also:tone or See also:cast by passing through the crucible of Bacon's mind . A See also:sentence from the Essays can rarely be mistaken for the See also:production of any other writer . The See also:short, pithy sayings have become popular mottoes and See also:household words . The style is See also:quaint, original, abounding in allusions and witticisms, and See also:rich, even to gorgeousness, with piled-up analogies and metaphors.' The first edition contained only ten essays, but the number was increased in r6r2 to See also:thirty-eight, and in 1625 to fifty-eight . The short tract, See also:Colours of Good and Evil, which' with the Meditationes Sacrae originally accompanied the Essays, was afterwards incorporated with the De Augmentis . Along with these works may be classed the curiously learned piece, De Sapientia Veterum, in which he works out a favourite See also:idea, that the mythological fables of the Greeks were allegorical and concealed the deepest truths of their philosophy . As a scientific explanation of the myths the theory is of no value, but it affords See also:fine See also:scope for the exercise of Bacon's unrivalled power of detecting analogies in things apparently most dissimilar .

The Apophthegms, though hardly deserving See also:

Macaulay's praise of being the best collection of jests in the See also:world, contain a number of those significant anecdotes which Bacon used with such effect in his other writings . Of the historical works, besides a few fragments of the projected history of See also:Britain there remains the History of See also:Henry VII., a valuable work, giving a clear and animated narrative of the reign, and characterizing Henry with great skill . The style is in See also:harmony with the matter, vigorous and flowing, but naturally with less of the quaintness and richness suitable to more thoughtful and original writings . ' The peculiarities of Bacon's style were noticed very early by his contemporaries . (See Letters and Life, i . 268.) See also:Raleigh and See also:Jonson have both recorded their opinions of it, but no one has characterized it more happily than his friend, Sir Tobie See also:Matthews, " A See also:man so rare in knowledge, of so many several kinds, endued with the facility and felicity of expressing it all in so elegant, significant, so abundant, and yet' so choice and ravishing a way of words, of metaphors, of allusions, as perhaps the world hath not seen since it was a world."—'' Address to the Reader" prefixed to Collection of English Letters (166o) . concealed . The tract is unusually interesting, for in it he discusses at some length the limits of See also:science, the origin of things and the nature of See also:primitive matter, giving at the same time full notices of See also:Democritus among the See also:ancient philosophers and of See also:Telesio among the See also:modern . Deserving of attention are also the Cogitationes de Natura Rerum, probably written early, perhaps in 1645; and the treatise on the theory of the tides, De Fluxu et Refluxu Marls, written probably about 1616 . (C) The philosophical works which form part of the Instauratio must of course be classed according to the positions which they respectively hold in that scheme of the sciences . The great work, the reorganization of the sciences, and the restoration of man to that command over nature which he had lost by the fall, consisted in its final form of six divisions . I .

Partitiones Scientiarum, a survey of the sciences, either such as then existed or such as required to be constructed afresh—in fact, an See also:

inventory of all the possessions of the human mind . The famous classification' on which this survey proceeds is based upon an See also:analysis of the faculties and See also:objects of human knowledge . This See also:division is represented by the De Augmentis Scientiarum . II . Interpretatio Naturae.—After the survey of all that has yet been done in the way of See also:discovery or invention, comes the new method, by which the mind of man is to be trained and directed in its progress towards the renovation of science . This division is represented, though only imperfectly, by the Novum Organism, particularly book ii . IV . Scala Intellectus.—It might have been supposed that the new philosophy could now be inaugurated . Materials had been supplied, along with a new method by which they were to be treated, and naturally the next step would be the finished result . But for practical purposes Bacon interposed two divisions between the preliminaries and the philosophy itself . The first was intended to consist of types or examples of investigations conducted by the new method, serviceable for keeping the whole See also:process vividly before the mind, or, as the See also:title indicates, such that the mind could run rapidly up and down the several steps or grades in the process . Of this division there seems to be only one small fragment, the Filum Labyrinthi, consisting of but two or three pages .

V . Prodromi, forerunners of the new philosophy . This part, strictly speaking, is quite extraneous to the general See also:

design . According to the Distributio Operis,2 it was to contain certain speculations of Bacon's own, not formed by the new method, but by the unassisted use of his understanding . These, therefore, form temporary or uncertain anticipations of the new philosophy . There is extant a short See also:preface to this division of the work, and according to See also:Spedding, some of the See also:miscellaneous treatises, such as De Principiis, De Fluxu et Refluxu, Cogitationes de Natura Rerum, may probably have been intended to be included under this See also:head . This supposition receives some support from the manner in which the fifth part is spoken of in the Novum Organum, i . 116 . VI . The new philosophy, which is the work of future ages, and the result of the new method . Bacon's grand See also:motive in his See also:attempt to found the sciences anew was the intense conviction that the knowledge man ' The division of the sciences adopted in the great See also:French Encyclapedie was founded upon this classification of Bacon's . See See also:Diderot's See also:Prospectus ((Fumes, iii.) and d'See also:Alembert's Discours (Uiuvres,i.) The scheme should be compared with later attempts of the same nature by See also:Ampere, Cournoi, See also:Comte and See also:Herbert See also:Spencer .

2 See also " Letter to Fulgentio," Letters and Life, vii . 533.possessed was of little service to him . " The knowledge whereof the world is now possessed, especially that of nature, extendeth not to magnitude and certainty of'works." 3 Man's See also:

sovereignty over nature, which is founded on knowledge alone, had been lost, and instead of the See also:free relation between things and the human mind, there was nothing but vain notions and See also:blind experiments . To restore the original See also:commerce between man and nature, and to recover the imperium hominis, is the grand See also:object of all science . The want of success which had hitherto attended efforts in the same direction had been due to many causes, but chiefly to the want of appreciation of the nature of philosophy and its real aim . Philosophy is not the science of things divine and human; it is not the See also:search after truth . " I find that even those that have sought knowledge for itself, and not for benefit or ostentation, or any practical enablement in the course of their life, have nevertheless propounded to themselves a wrong See also:mark, namely, See also:satisfaction (which men See also:call Truth) and not operation." " Is there any such happiness as for a man's mind to be raised above the confusion of things, where he may have the prospect of the order of nature and See also:error of man ? But is this a view of delight only and not of discovery ? of contentment and not of benefit ? Shall he not as well discern the riches of nature's warehouse as the beauty of her See also:shop ? Is truth ever barren ? Shall he not be able thereby to produce worthy effects, and to endow the life of man with See also:infinite commodities ? " s Philosophy is altogether practical; it is of little matter to the fortunes of humanity what abstract notions one may entertain concerning the nature and the principles of things.6 This truth, however, has never yet been recognized;7 it has not yet been seen that the true aim of all science is " to endow the See also:condition and life of man with new See also:powers or works," 8 or " to extend more widely the limits of the power and greatness of man." 9 Nevertheless, it is not to be imagined that by this being proposed as the great object of search there is thereby excluded all that has hitherto been looked upon as the higher aims of human life, such as the contemplation of truth .

Not so, but by following the new aim we shall also arrive at a true knowledge of the universe in which we are, for without knowledge there is no power; truth and utility are in ultimate aspect the same; " works themselves are of greater value as pledges of truth than as contributing to the comforts of life."Such was the conception of philosophy with which Bacon started, and in which he See also:

felt himself to be thoroughly original . As his object was new and hitherto unproposed, so the method he intended to employ was different from all modes of investigation hitherto attempted . " It would be," as he says, " an unsound See also:fancy and self-contradictory, to expect that things which have never yet been done can be done except by means which have never yet been tried . 11 There were many obstacles in his way, and he seems always to have felt that the first part of the new scheme must be a pars destruens, a destructive See also:criticism of all other methods . Opposition was to be, expected, not only from previous philosophies, but especially from the human mind itself . In the first place, natural antagonism might be looked for from the two opposed sects, the one of whom, in despair of knowledge, maintained that all science was impossible; while the other, resting on authority and on the learning that had been handed down from the Greeks, declared that science was already completely known, and consequently devoted their energies to methodizing and elaborating it . Secondly, within the domain of science itself, properly so called, there were two " kind of rovers " who must be dismissed . The first were the speculative or logical philosophers, who construe the universe ex analogia hominis, and not ex analogia mundi, who See also:fashion nature according to preconceived ideas, and who employ in their investigations See also:syllogism and abstract reasoning . The second class, who were equally offensive, consisted of those who practised blind experience, which is See also:mere 9 Fil . Lab . ; See also:Cog. et Visa. i . ; of .

Pref. to Ins . Meg . ' Val . Ter . 232 ; cf . N . 0. i . 124 . ' Letters, i . 123 . 6 N . 0. i .

116 . 9 Fit . Lab . 5; cf . N . 0. i . 81; Val . Ter . (Works, iii . 235) ; Advancement, bk. i . (Works, iii . 294) .

8 Fit . Lab . 5; cf . N . 0. i . 81; Val . Ter . (Works, iii . 222 233) ; New Atlantis (Works, in . 156) . 9N . 0. i .

116 . 19 Ibid. i . 124 . " Ibid.i . 6 . groping in the dark (vaga experientia mera palpatio est), who occasionally See also:

hit upon good works or inventions, which, like See also:Atalanta's apples, distracted them from further steady and gradual progress towards universal truth . In place of these straggling efforts of the unassisted human mind, a graduated system of See also:helps was to be supplied, by the use of which the mind, when placed on the right road, would proceed with unerring and See also:mechanical certainty to the invention of new arts and sciences . Such were to be the peculiar functions of the new method, though it has not definitely appeared what that method was, or to what objects it could be applied . But, before proceeding to unfold his method, Bacon found it necessary to enter in considerable detail upon the general subject of the obstacles to progress, and devoted nearly the whole of the first book of the Organum to the examination of them . This discussion, though strictly speaking extraneous to the scheme, has always been looked upon as a most important part of his philosophy, and his name is perhaps as much associated with the See also:doctrine of Idols (Idola) as with the theory of See also:induction or the classification of the sciences . The doctrine of the kinds of fallacies or general classes of errors into which the human mind is prone to fall, appears in many of the works written before the Novum Organum, and the treatment of them varies in some respects . The classification in the Organum, however, not only has the author's See also:sanction, but has received the See also:stamp of historical acceptation; and comparison of the earlier notices, though a point of literary interest, has no important philosophic bearing .

The Idola (Nov . Org . 39)1 false notions of things, or erroneous ways of looking at nature, areof four kinds: the first two innate, pertaining to the very nature of the mind and not to be eradicated; the third creeping insensibly into men's minds, and hence in a sense innate and inseparable; the See also:

fourth imposed from without . The first kind are the Idola Tribus, idols of the tribe, fallacies incident to humanity or the See also:race in general . Of these, the most prominent are—the proneness to suppose in nature greater order and regularity than there actually is; the tendency to support a preconceived See also:opinion by affirmative instances, neglecting all negative or opposed cases; and the tendency to generalize from few observations, or to give reality to mere abstractions, figments of the mind . Manifold errors also result from the weakness of the senses, which affords scope for mere conjecture; from the See also:influence exercised over the understanding by the will and passions; from the restless See also:desire of the mind to penetrate to the ultimate principles of things; and from the belief that " man is the measure of the universe," whereas, in truth, the world is received by us in a distorted and erroneous manner . The second kind are the Idola Specus, idols of the See also:cave, or errors incident to the peculiar See also:mental or bodily constitution of each individual, for according to the state of the individual's mind is his view of things . Errors of this class are innumerable, because there are numberless varieties of disposition; but some very prominent specimens can be indicated . Such are the tendency to make all things subservient to, or take the See also:colour of some favourite subject, the extreme fondness and reverence either for what is ancient or for what is modern, and excess in noting either See also:differences or resemblances amongst things . A practical See also:rule for avoiding these is also given: " In general let every student of nature take this as a rule, that what-ever his mind seizes and dwells upon with particular satisfaction is to be held in suspicion."' The third class are the Idola Pori, idols of the See also:market-place, errors arising from the influence exercised over the mind by mere words . This, according to 'The word Idola is manifestly borrowed from See also:Plato . It is used twice in connexion with the Platonic Ideas (N .

0. i . 23, 124) and is contrasted with them as the false See also:

appearance . The el6wXod with Plato is the fleeting, transient See also:image of the real thing, and the passage evidently referred to by Bacon is that in the See also:Rep. vii . 516 A, Kai FpWTOV /LEV TkS QKLaS av (3, ara KaOoptin, gal /See also:seed roUTo v roil USQ.OL TQ re r&v &vepcSFwz Kai rd r ,v &XXwv e%bwXa, tur€pov Si afiTd . It is explained well in the Advancement, bk. i . (Works, iii . 287) . (For valuable notes on the Idola, see T . See also:Fowler's Nov . Org. i . 38 notes; especially for a comparison of the Idola with See also:Roger Bacon's Offendicula.) Y N . 0. i .

58 . Bacon, is the most troublesome kind of error, and has been especially fatal in philosophy . For words introduce a fallacious mode of looking at things in two ways: first, there are some words that are really merely names for non-existent things, which are yet supposed to exist simply because they have received a name; secondly, there are names hastily and unskilfully abstracted from a few objects and applied recklessly to all that has the faintest See also:

analogy with these objects, thus causing the grossest confusion . The fourth and last class are the Idola Theatri, idols of the See also:theatre, i.e. fallacious modes of thinking resulting from received systems of philosophy and from erroneous methods of demonstration . The criticism of the demonstrations is introduced later in See also:close connexion with Bacon's new method; they are the See also:rival modes of See also:procedure, to which his own is definitely opposed . The philosophies which are " redargued " are divided into three classes, the sophistical, of which the best example is See also:Aristotle, who, according to Bacon, forces nature into his abstract schemata and thinks to explain by See also:definitions; the empirical, which from few and limited experiments leaps at once to general conclusions; and the superstitious, which corrupts philosophy by the introduction of poetical and theological notions . Such are the general causes of the errors that infest the human mind; by their exposure the way is cleared for the introduction of the new method . The nature of this method cannot be understood until it is exactly seen to what it is to be applied . What idea had Bacon of science, and how is his method connected with it ? Now, the science3 which was specially and invariably contemplated by him was natural philosophy, the great See also:mother of all the sciences; it was to him the type of scientific knowledge, and its method was the method of all true science . To discover exactly the characteristics and the object of natural philosophy it is necessary to examine the place it holds in the general scheme furnished in the Advancement or De Augmentis . All human knowledge, it is there laid down, may be referred to man's memory or imagination or See also:reason .

In the first, the See also:

bare facts presented to sense are collected and stored up; the exposition of them is history, which is either natural or See also:civil . In the second, the materials of sense are separated or divided in ways not corresponding to nature but after the mind's own See also:pleasure, and the result is poesy or feigned history . In the third, the materials are worked up after the model or See also:pattern of nature, though we are prone to err in the progress from sense to reason; the result is philosophy, which is concerned either with See also:God, with nature or with man, the second being the most important . Natural philosophy is again divided into speculative or theoretical and operative or practical, according as the end is contemplation or works . Speculative or theoretical natural philosophy has to See also:deal with natural substances and qualities and is subdivided into physics and See also:metaphysics . Physics inquires into the efficient and material causes of things; metaphysics, into the formal and final causes . The principal objects of physics are See also:concrete substances, or abstract though See also:physical qualities . The See also:research into abstract qualities, the fundamental problem of physics, comes near to the metaphysical study of forms, which indeed differs from the first only in being more general, and in having as its results a form strictly so called, i.e. a nature or quality which is a See also:limitation or specific manifestation of some higher and better-known genus.' Natural philosophy is, therefore, in ultimate resort the study of forms, and, consequently, the fundamental problem of philosophy in general is the discovery of these forms . " On a given See also:body to generate or superinduce a new nature or natures, is the work and aim of human power . . . . Of a given nature to discover the form or true specific difference, or nature-engendering nature (nature naturans) or source of See also:emanation (for these are the terms which are nearest to a description cf the thing), is the work and aim of human knowledge." 6 The questions, then, whose answers give the See also:key to the whole Baconian philosophy, may be put briefly thus—What are N . 0. i .

79, 8o, 98, 1o8 . ' On the meaning of the word form in Bacon's theory see also Fowler's N . O. introd . § 8 . 6 N . 0. ii . 1 . forms? and how is it that knowledge of them solves both the theoretical and the practical problem of science ? Bacon himself, as may be seen from the passage quoted above, finds great difficulty in giving an adequate and exact See also:

definition of what he means by a form . As a general description, the following passage from the Novum Organum, ii . 4, may be cited: " The form of a nature is such that given the form the nature infallibly follows . Again, the form is such that if it be taken away the nature infallibly vanishes .

. Lastly, the true form is such that it deduces the given nature from some source of being which is inherent in more natures, and which is better known in the natural order of things than the form itself."' From this it would appear that, since by a nature is meant some sensible quality, superinduced upon, or possessed by, a body, so by a form we are to understand the cause of that nature, which cause is itself a determinate See also:

case or manifestation of some general or abstract quality inherent in a greater number of objects . But all these are mostly marks by which a form may be recognized, and do not explain what the form really is . A further definition is accordingly attempted in Aph . 13: " The form of a thing is the very thing itself, and the thing differs from the form no otherwise than as the apparent differs from the real, or the See also:external from the See also:internal, or the thing in reference to the man from the thing in reference to the universe." This throws a new See also:light on the question, and from it the inference at once follows, that the forms are the permanent causes or substances underlying all visible phenomena, which are merely manifestations of their activity . Are the forms, then, forces ? At times it seems as if Bacon had approximated to this view of the nature of things, for in several passages he identifies forms with laws of activity . Thus, he says "When I speak of forms I mean nothing more than those laws and determinations of See also:absolute actuality which govern and constitute any See also:simple nature, as See also:heat, light, See also:weight, in every kind of matter and subject that is susceptible of them . Thus the form of heat or the form of light is the same thing as the law of heat or the law of light." " Matter rather than forms should be the object of our attention, its configurations and changes of configuration, and simple action, and law of action or See also:motion; for forms are figments of the human mind, unless you will call those laws of action forms." " Forms or true differences of things, which are in fact laws of pure See also:act." ' " For though in nature nothing really exists besides individual bodies; performing pure individual acts according to a fixed law, yet in philosophy this very law, and the investigation, discovery and explanation of it, is the See also:foundation as well of knowledge as of operation . And it is this law, with its clauses, that I mean when I speak of forms." 6 Several important conclusions may be See also:drawn from these passages . In the first place, it is evident that Bacon, like the Atomical school, of whom he highly approved, had a clear See also:perception and a See also:firm grasp of the physical character of natural principles; his forms are no ideas or abstractions, but highly general physical properties . Further, it is hinted that these general qualities may be looked upon as the modes of action of simple bodies . This fruitful conception, however, Bacon does not work out; and though he uses the word cause, and identifies form with formal cause, yet it is perfectly apparent that the modern notions of cause as dynamical, and of nature as in a process of flow or development, are See also:foreign to him, and that in his view of the ultimate problem of science, cause meant causa immanens, or underlying substance, effects were not consequents but manifestations, and nature was regarded in a purely statical aspect .

That this is so appears even more clearly when we examine his general conception of the unity, gradation and See also:

function of the sciences . That the sciences are organically connected is a thought See also:common to him and to his distinguished predecessor Roger Bacon . " I that hold it for a great impediment towards the advancement and further invention of knowledge, that particular arts and sciences have been See also:die-incorporated from general knowledge, do not understand one ' This better known in the order of nature is nowhere satisfactorily explained by Bacon . Like his classification of causes, and in some degree his notion of form itself, it comes from Aristotle . See An . See also:Post . 71 b 33; Topic, 141 b 5; Eth . I095 a 30 . It should be observed that many writers maintain that the phrase should be notion nature ; others, notiora naturae . See Fowler's N . 0. p . 199 See also:note .

s N . 0, it 17 . 5 Ibid. i . 51 . ' Ibid. i . 75 . ' Ibid. ii . 2.and the same thing which See also:

Cicero's discourse and the note and conceit of the Grecians in their word circle learning do intend . For I mean not that use which one science hath of another for See also:ornament or help in practice; but I mean it directly of that use by way of See also:supply of light and See also:information, which the particulars and instances of one science do yield and present for the framing or correcting of the axioms of another science in their very truth and notion." 8 In accordance with this, Bacon placed at the basis of the particular sciences which treat of God, nature and man, one fundamental doctrine, the Prima Philosophia, or first philosophy, the function of which was to display the unity of nature by connecting into one body of truth such of the highest axioms of the subordinate sciences as were not See also:special to one science, but common to several.' This first ,philosophy had also to investigate what are called the See also:adventitious or transcendental conditions of essences, such as Much, Little, Like, Unlike, Possible, Impossible, Being, Nothing, the logical discussion of which certainly belonged rather to the laws of reasoning than to the existence of things, but the physical or real treatment of which might be expected to yield answers to such questions as, why certain substances are numerous, others scarce; or why, if like attracts like, See also:iron does not attract iron . Following this See also:summary philosophy come the sciences proper, rising like a See also:pyramid in successive stages, the lowest See also:floor being occupied by natural history or experience, the second by physics, the third, which is next the See also:peak of unity, by metaphysics.$ The knowledge of the peak, or of the one law which binds nature together, is perhaps denied to man . Of the sciences, physics, as has been already seen, deals with the efficient and material, i.e. with the variable and transient, causes of things . But its inquiries may be directed either towards concrete bodies or towards abstract qualities .

The first kind of investigation rises little above mere natural history; but the other is more important and paves the way for metaphysics . It handles the configurations and the appetites or motions of matter . The configurations, or inner structure of bodies, include dense, rare, heavy, light, hot, See also:

cold, &c.,—in fact, what are elsewhere called simple natures . Motions9 are either simple or See also:compound, the latter being the sum of a number of the former . In physics, however, these matters are treated only as regards their material or efficient causes, and the result of inquiry into any one case gives no general rule, but only facilitates invention in some similar instance . Metaphysics, on the other See also:hand, treats of the formal or final cause10 of these same substances and qualities, and results in a general rule . With regard to forms, the investigation may be directed either towards concrete. bodies or towards qualities . But the forms of substances " are so perplexed and complicated, that it is either vain to inquire into them at all, or such inquiry as is possible should be put off for a time, and not entered upon till forms of a more simple nature have been rightly investigated and discussed."n "To inquire into the form of a See also:lion, of an See also:oak, or See also:gold, See also:nay, even of See also:water or See also:air, is a vain pursuit; but to inquire the form of dense, rare, hot, cold, &c., as well configurations as motions, which in treating of physic I have in 6 Valerius Terminus, iii . 228-229 . 7 Cf . N . 0. ii .

27 . Bacon nowhere enters upon the questions of how such a science is to be constructed, and how it can be expected to possess an See also:

independent method while it remains the mere receptacle for the generalizations of the several sciences, and consequently has a content which varies with their progress . His whole conception of Prima Philosophia should be compared with such a modern work as the First Principles of Herbert Spencer . ° It is to be noticed that this See also:scale of nature corresponds with the scale of ascending axioms . 9 Cf. also for motions, N . O. ii . 48 . '0 The knowledge of final causes does not See also:lead to works, and the See also:consideration of them must be rigidly excluded from physics . Yet there is no opposition between the physical and final causes; in ultimate resort the mind is compelled to think the universe as the work. of reason, to refer facts to God and See also:Providence . The idea of final cause is also fruitful in sciences which have to do with human action . (Cf . De Aug. iii. cc .

Phoenix-squares

4, 5; Nov . Org. i . 48, ii . 2.) " De Aug. iii . 4 . In the Advancement (Works, iii . 355) it is distinctly said that they are not to be inquired into . One can hardly see how the Baconian method could have, applied to concrete substances . great part enumerated (I call them forms of the first class), and which (like the letters of the See also:

alphabet) are not many, and yet make up and sustain the essences and forms of all substances—this, I say, it is which I am attempting, and which constitutes and defines that part of metaphysic of which we are now inquiring." Physics inquires into the same qualities, but does not push its investigations into ultimate reality or reach the more general causes . We thus at last attain a definite conclusion with regard to forms, and it appears clear that in Bacon's belief the true function of science was the search for a few fundamental physical qualities, highly abstract and general, the combinations of which give rise to the simple natures and complex phenomena around us . His general conception of the universe may therefore be called mechanical or statical; the cause of each phenomenon is sup-posed to be actually contained in the phenomenon itself, and by a sufficiently accurate process could be sifted out and brought to light . As soon as the causes are known man regains his power over nature, for " whosoever knows any form, knows also the utmost possibility of superinducing that nature upon every variety of matter, and so is less restrained and tied in operation either to the basis of the matter or to the condition of the efficients." 1 Nature thus presented itself to Bacon's mind as a huge congeries of phenomena, the manifestations of some simple and primitive qualities, which were hid from us by the complexity of the things themselves .

The world was a vast See also:

labyrinth, amid the windings of which we require some See also:clue or See also:thread whereby we may track our way to knowledge and thence to power . This thread, the filum labyrinthi, is the new method of induction . But, as has been frequently pointed out, the new method could not be applied until facts had been observed and collected . This is an indispensable preliminary . " Man, the servant and interpreter of nature, can do and understand so much, and so much only, as he has observed in fact or in thought of the course of nature; beyond this he neither knows anything nor can do anything." The proposition that our knowledge of nature necessarily begins with observation and experience, is common to Bacon and many contemporary reformers of science, but he laid peculiar stress upon it, and gave it a new meaning . What he really meant by observation was a competent natural history or collection of facts . " The firm See also:foundations of a purer natural philosophy are laid in natural history." 2 " First of all we must prepare a natural and experimental history, sufficient and good; and this is the foundation of all." 3 The senses and the memory, which collect and See also:store up facts, must be assisted; there must be a ministration of the senses and another of the memory . For not only are instances required, but these must be arranged in such a manner as not to distract or confuse the mind, i.e. tables and arrangements of instances must be constructed . In the preliminary collection the greatest care must be taken that the mind be absolutely free from preconceived ideas; nature is only to be conquered by obedience; man must be merely receptive . " All depends on keeping the See also:eye steadily fixed upon the facts of nature, and so receiving their images simply as they are; for God forbid that we should give out a See also:dream of our own imagination for a pattern of the world; rather may He graciously See also:grant to us to write an See also:apocalypse or true See also:vision of the footsteps of the Creator imprinted on his creatures." 4 Concealed among the facts presented to sense are the causes or forms, and the problem therefore is so to analyse experience,5 so to break it up into pieces, that we shall with certainty and mechanical ease arrive at a true conclusion . This process, which forms the essence of the new method, may in its entirety, as a ministration to the reason, be called a See also:logic; but it differs widely from the See also:ordinary or school logic in end, method and form . Its aim is to acquire command over nature by knowledge, and to invent new arts, whereas the old logic strove only after See also:dialectic victories and the 1 Thus the last step in the theoretical analysis gives the first means for the practical operation .

Cf . Aristotle, Eth . Nic. iii . 3 . 12, Tb g0xa rov iv Di hvaXt i EL 7rp&See also:

TOP stvai EY en yevicr L . Cf. also Nov . Org. i . 103 . 2 Cogitations (Works, iii . 187) . 3 N . 0. ii. to .

4 Pref. to Instaur . Cf . Valerius See also:

Term . (Works, iii . 224), and N . O. i . 68, 124 . 3 Pref. to Inst.discovery of new arguments . In method the difference is even more fundamental . Hitherto the mode of demonstration had been by the syllogism; but the syllogism is, in many respects, an incompetent weapon . It is compelled to accept its first principles on See also:trust from the science in which it is employed; it cannot See also:cope with the subtlety of nature; and it is radically vitiated by being founded on hastily and inaccurately abstracted notions of things . For a syllogism consists of propositions, propositions of words, and words are the symbols of notions .

Now the first step in accurate progress from sense to reason, or true philosophy, is to See also:

frame a See also:bona notio or accurate conception of the thing; but the received logic never does this . It flies off at once from experience and particulars to the highest and most general propositions, and from these descends, by the use of See also:middle terms, to axioms of See also:lower generality . Such a mode of procedure may be called anticipatio naturae (for in it reason is allowed to prescribe to things), and is opposed to the true method, the inter pretatio naturae, in which reason follows and obeys nature, discovering her secrets by obedience and sub-See also:mission to rule . Lastly, the very form of induction that has been used by logicians in the collection of their instances is a weak and useless thing . It is a mere enumeration of a few known facts, makes no use of exclusions or rejections, concludes precariously, and is always liable to be overthrown by a negative instance.6 In See also: