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IN THE BATTLES AROUND METZ
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IN THE BATTLES AROUND See also:METZ
FRANCO-See also:GERMAN See also:WAR, 1870
1
.
See also:Colombey-Borny (See also:August 14).—The See also:French See also:army under See also:Marshal See also:Bazaine was in and about See also:Metz
.
The German •I. and II. armies, on the See also:
Corps (7 battalions, 4 squadrons, 2 batteries) See also:hearing from a passing officer that the I
.
Corps on his right was preparing to attack, and noting personally signs of retreat in the enemy's lines, determined at 3 p.m. to advance his whole command to the See also:ridge between Colombey and Borny (which was still occupied by French outposts), in See also:order to clear up the situation
.
The ridge was captured with little resistance, but the See also:sound of the firing at once set all the neighbouring troops in See also:motion, and fortunately so, for the French had immediately retaliated on von der Goltz's audacious attack
.
Between 4 and 6 p.m. there was continuous heavy fighting on the front from Borny to Mey, as both sides brought fresh troops into the See also:
Fortunately for the Prussians, Bazaine had issued similar orders to his subordinates, who, having their men better in See also:hand, were able to obey; and as See also:night began to See also:close in the French See also:broke off the See also:action and retired under the guns of the Metz forts, convinced that at last they had " broken the spell " of German success
.
Finding that, in spite of his orders, the firing at the front continued increasing in intensity, Steinmetz at length rode to the front himself
.
See also:Meeting Manteuffel near the Brasserie of Noisseville, he overwhelmed him with reproaches, and at the crisis of this See also:scene the bands struck up " Heil See also:dir See also:im Siegeskranz
In this action the Germans brought 30,500 rifles and 150 guns on to the battlefield only out of more than See also:Ioo,000 with 300 guns which could have been engaged before darkness
.
Bazaine actually deployed 50,700 rifles and 206 guns to oppose them
.
He might, however, had he been so minded, have struck with his whole army—nearly three times this force, and, judging from the course events actually took, we can have little doubt as to the result of such,a See also:blow
.
The losses on either See also:side were in killed and wounded—French about 3600, Germans about 4800
.
The See also:chain of See also:causation in this action is particularly worthy of See also:attention: A See also:young reserve officer, seeing some troops of the I
.
Corps See also:standing to arms, reported to von der Goltz that the corps was standing to arms and about to attack
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Von der Goltz thereupon decided to go forward and discover what was actually going on, and this action unchained the whole battle See also:power of all the troops within call
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When, on the following morning, Steinmetz reported von der Goltz and the commander of the I
.
Corps for disobedience, the See also: The Battle of See also:Vionville—See also:Mars-la-Tour (August z6).—On the following See also:day (15th) the II . German Army approached the Moselle above and below Pont-a-Mousson, with a view to overtaking and heading off Bazaine in his presumed retreat to the See also:Meuse (see FRANCO-GERMAN WAR) . So far, however, from being ahead of the Germans on the road to See also:Verdun, the French were actually, See also:late in the afternoon of the 15th of August, bivouacked on the See also:plateau of Rezonville, and there their outposts were placed, not where they could see the surrounding See also:country, but at the regulation distances of 600 to See also:I000 paces, from the bivouacs . Friendly inhabitants kept Bazaine well informed as to the magnitude of the danger threatening him from the See also:south, and a See also:special telegram from See also:Paris, the true origin of which has never been traced, led him to believe that the I . German Army was See also:crossing the Moselle near Thionville and about to descend on him from the north . This telegram might have exercised the most prejudicial See also:influence on the course of the battle had not Ladmirault (4th Corps), nearer to the seat of the imaginary danger, taken upon himself to disregard the warning transmitted to him by headquarters . At daybreak on the 16th, no Prussians being reported in sight by the outposts, the troops began nonchalantly to prepare for the resumption of the march . On the Prussian side, von See also:Alvensleben's Corps (III.) shortly after daybreak was moving north-westward from the Moselle in two columns, on the right the 5th See also:division, via Gorze and See also:Flavigny on Vionville, on the See also:left the 6th division with corps artillery by Arnaville on Mars-la-Tour, von Alvensleben himself See also:riding a little in advance between the two . The 6th See also:cavalry division from Gorze towards Vionville, whence he could overlook the was ordered to precede the right See also:column and See also:scout towards whole country to the north and west, had met von Rheinbaben Rezonville . No one was aware of the dangerous proximity of (commanding the 5th cavalry division) and had seen the surprise of the French camps . The sound of the heavy firing coming from the eastward convinced him of what had been gradually dawning on him—that with barely 30,000 men he was in the presence of the whole French army, whose attitude at this moment sufficiently indicated their determination to fight . In a few moments his decision was taken . Calling on the X . Corps, away to the south-westward, for support, he determined the French army . About 9 a.m. the 5th cavalry division, reinforced by two See also:horse artillery batteries (flank guard of the X . Corps from Thiancourt), and accompanied by von Caprivi (See also:chief of See also:staff, X . Corps, and afterwards See also:chancellor of the German See also:Empire), were trotting up the western slopes of the ridge which runs between Tronville and Vionville . Reaching its See also:summit they suddenly found themselves in See also:face of at least 40,000 French troops, which were not under arms, but busied with See also:miscellaneous See also:camp duties . The temptation proved too See also:great for the artillery, who promptly fired into the midst of the cavalry camp (Forton's division) which lay nearest to them . The momentary result was a See also:wild panic, especially among the horses; but this panic gave the alarm to the infantry all along the road, and these (Frossard's and Corps) at once stood to arms and moved forward, deployed for attack—one division to the west, another division, from Rezonville, to the south . The latter almost at once en-countered the heads of the 6th cavalry division, at that moment just clearing the See also:defile leading up to the Rezonville plateau from Gorze . The Prussian cavalry promptly See also:bore away to cover to the westward, and reported what they had seen to superior authority, but not to the advanced guard of the 5th infantry division, which, emerging in its turn from the defile, ran right against the deployed French infantry moving to meet them . So sudden was the collision that the Prussian advanced guard See also:battery had to See also:fire See also:case to clear its own front . Meanwhile von Alvensleben himself, riding on the field trackEmsry Walk, . to See also:screen his own weakness by a vigorous attack . By universal consent this is approved as the boldest See also:resolution arrived at by an See also:independent commander throughout the war . Orders were forthwith despatched to the 6th infantry division, at that moment between Puxieux and Tronville, to See also:wheel in to their right and attack, and, their See also:movement being still hidden from the enemy, these troops were formally See also:drawn up for action and sent forward as a whole . The French meanwhile had occupied Vionville and Flavigny, and other troops were moving down the slopes from Rezonville to their support, but the See also:united onset of this whole German division overbore all resistance, and the French began to retire eastward, suffering terribly from the See also:shell fire of the Prussian batteries . Marshal Bazaine had meanwhile arrived on the scene, and ordering forward fresh troops to relieve (not to reinforce) those already engaged, he rode forward with a horse artillery battery to See also:watch the operations . The retreating French troops belonged to Frossard's command, and as they were in considerable See also:con-See also:fusion Frossard called on du Preuil's See also:brigade of the imperial guard cavalry to See also:charge . He gave no See also:objective, and when the brigadier pointed out that the enemy was still beyond the striking See also:radius of his horses, Frossard reiterated the order, which was obeyed to the See also:letter . The result was disastrous . The Prussians, having keen the cavalry whilst yet at a distance, ceased firing, formed their skirmishers into See also:groups, and the closed supports standing in deployed lines, two deep, shattered the cavalry with volleys and See also:file-firing, as with blown and exhausted horses they endeavoured to close with their adversaries . When in addition two See also:hussar regiments struck them in flank they were driven back in wild disorder upon Rezonville . In the dust and confusion of the charge a See also:group of the hussars approached Bazaine and his horse artillery battery, and almost carried off the marshal . Alvensleben, mistaking the withdrawal of the French for the beginning of a retreat, had meanwhile sent orders to the 6th cavalry division to charge in pursuit towards Rezonville; but before it could reach the field the French relieving troops had forced their way through the stragglers and showed such a bold front to the Prussian horsemen that an attack held no promise of success, more especially since they had lost their intervals in E, , YW4{kersq their advance and had no See also:room for a proper deployment .
To steady the young soldiers, the cavalry commander (Carl von See also:Schmidt) halted his men, made them correct their intervals and dressing as in See also:peace, though under a heavy fire from the French infantry, and then withdrew them behind the cover of the nearest See also: Ladmirault, commanding the French 4th Corps had seen, during the afternoon of the 15th, the terrible See also:crowd and confusion prevailing in the defiles leading to See also:Gravelotte, and resolved to disobey his orders and to move direct from his bivouacs by the road from Woippy to St Privat, disregarding altogether the alleged danger from the Prussians supposed to be advancing from Thionville . Thus, about See also:noon on the 16th he reached the high ground between St Privat and Amanvillers, and still without instructions he determined to direct his corps on Bruville and Doncourt, whence he could See also:judge from the See also:drift of the See also:smoke-clouds whether he could fall on the Prussian left . Much time was lost owing to the See also:heat of the day and the fatigue of the troops, but shortly after 3 p.m. he reached a position north of the Tronville copses whence his guns could fire into the left rear of the long line of Prussian guns (6th division and corps artillery) on the heights above Vionville and Flavigny . Their fire threw the latter into serious confusion and he had already decided to attack with his nearest division (de See also:Cissey) in the direction of the See also:steeple of Vionville, when his attention was caught by the outbreak of heavy firing in the copses below him, and the entry of fresh Prussian guns into action . This diversion was brought about by the arrival of the corps artillery of the X . Corps and of the 4oth brigade, which latter had been at once ordered into the Tronville copses to check portions of Tixier's division of the French 3rd Corps, which under cover of these copses had gradually worked See also:round the Prussian flank . Seeing then that the troops before him could hold their own, Ladmirault continued his preparations for his See also:counter-stroke, and Cissey's division had begun to move into its prescribed See also:alignment, facing towards Vionville, when the sudden apparition of a closed See also:mass of Prussian troops detaching itself from the See also:low dust-See also:cloud of a slow-moving infantry column, and forming to the south of Mars-la-Tour, again arrested his attention . Unanimously he and his staff agreed that this fresh enemy could only be the advanced guard of a large Prussian force, possibly, it was suggested, of the See also:crown See also:prince's army, from See also:Alsace and See also:Nancy, and a fresh delay arose while the situation was investigated . Actually this See also:body consisted only of the 38th brigade (von Wedell), forming part of the X . Corps . It had no knowledge of the See also:state of affairs on the battlefield, or in the direction of Bruville, though Prussian cavalry had been observing the approach of Ladmirault's corps for some hours . It was now ordered to deploy and to co-operate with the 4oth brigade in an attack on the Tronville copses .
This meanwhile had been delivered, and had more or less failed
.
The deployment completed, about 4 p.m. the 38th brigade began its advance on the north-west corner of the Tronville copses, this direction taking them diagonally across the frgt?t,
of Cissey's division, still out of their sight but moving due south
.
Hardly had they stepped off when Cissey's first line, catching sight of them, opened a devastating fire upon their left flank, and to meet this fresh danger the Prussians endeavoured to See also:change front half-left whilst still on the move
.
Without pausing to fire, the men raced onward, but the French striking their See also:outer wing rolled up the whole line in See also:succession, the actual collision occurring in and near the Bruville See also:ravine, a deep-cut natural See also:trench which, starting from the Tronville copses, here intersects the plateau from west to east
.
Against the See also:weight of French numbers, nearly three to one, the Prussians were unable to stand, and presently they broke and drifted backwards, completely routed
.
Then the 1st Guard Dragoons (since known as See also:Queen See also:Victoria's See also:regiment), after a brilliant manoeuvre under heavy fire, to get into the best position for delivering a charge, rode down the whole French line of pursuers from left to right, and by their heroic self-sacrifice relieved the remnants of the infantry from further pursuit
.
This was the scene which for the moment held the attention of Prince See also:Frederick See also: Then followed a See also:duel—the one great cavalry duel of the war—between upwards of two thousand horsemen a side . But it was delivered by both sides in a See also:series of regimental charges, and in result was singularly indecisive . For about half an See also:hour great crowds of riders, hidden by dense clouds of dust, drifted aimlessly about the See also:plain, till at length the charge of a single squadron of the See also:Oldenburg Dragoons (who had joined in on their own initiative) delivered on the outer French flank, brought the whole mass into motion north-eastward, and, both sides See also:sounding the rally, the engagement gradually ceased . It was now about 7 p.m. and night was coming on . Seeing the dust-clouds drifting away northward, and noting the lethargy which seemed to have settled over the whole French line, Prince Frederick Charles decided to assert his own independent will to conquer by a final See also:assault along his whole front . Guns, cavalry, infantry, everything that could still stand were to take part in it . Weary as they all were, his indomitable will put fresh See also:life into the whole army . With drums beating and See also:colours flying, every unit within call went forward for the final effort . It was almost dark when the Prussians approached the French position between Rezonville and the woods to the northward, and the troops soon lost direction in the smoke and became involved in the direst confusion; the firing again blazed out for a few moments, only to See also:die away as utter exhaustion at length put an end to the Prussian advance . Then the wearied troops, for the most part, lay down and slept in the positions they had reached . Thus closed the hardest fought battle of the Franco-German War . From 9 a.m. to 3 p.m. only 23,700 rifles, 8roo sabres and 126 guns had been brought into action by the Germans against 59,100 rifles, 6700 sabres, and 300 guns on the French side, and even at the close of the day the former had only deployed 47,100 rifles, 8300 sabres and 222 guns against 83,000 rifles, 8000 sabres and 432 guns including 24 mitrailleuses . The chief characteristic of the day's fighting was the terrible effectiveness of the Prussian artillery, which was handled in masses and not, as on the French side, by batteries . The manceuvring power of the latter attracted the admiration of the Germans, but arriving singly on the field they were generally reduced to silencein a few minutes . Deprived of their support, not all the gallantry of the French infantry could avail anything . Again and again, particularly on their left wing, they chased the German infantry before them, but the moment the retreat of the latter downhill uncovered the pursuing French to the Prussian guns, a See also:tornado of shells shattered their order and compelled them to retreat . Though the cavalry were freely engaged, the training of both was so far beneath the See also:standard of the See also:present day that the most that can be credited to them in respect of results is that they from time to time averted imminent disaster, but failed altogether to achieve such a decision as was well within their potential capacities . 3 . Gravelotte—St Privat (August z8).—The position on to which the French army See also:fell back from the field of Vionville is formed by a ridge some six See also:miles long See also:running from Rozerieulles almost due north to Roncourt, a little See also:village overhanging the steep and wooded See also:banks of the See also:Orne, and connected with the general plateau between the Meuse and Moselle by a gentle See also:saddle running from about Amanvillers nearly due west through the Bois de la Cusse towards Doncourt . North of this saddle the slopes show a slight concavity, but are passable by troops of all arms in close order . To the south the rivulet of the Mance soon forms a formidable obstacle as its See also:bed cuts its way through the See also:sandstone . Scrub and woods with dense undergrowth line both its banks, and, except by the great chaussee from Metz to Verdun, See also:access to the French side becomes impossible to troops in ordered bodies . It does not appear that the position had been systematically examined, or apportioned to the several corps in accordance with any predetermined See also:plan . The army merely swung back-wards, pivoting on its left wing. the corps preserving their relative order as it had been on the 16th, with the .exception that the Imperial Guard was withdrawn to the See also:spur on which Fort Plappeville stands, and the 6th Corps (Marshal Canrobert) crossed the line of march of the 3rd and 4th Corps in order to gain St Privat la Montagne . No lines of march were assigned to the several See also:units, consequently the confusion became so great that though the distance to be traversed in no case exceeded six miles, only the right wing and centre reached their destinations as night was falling . Many of them had so little idea of the general situation that they actually placed outposts to the north and east, whilst the whole of the enemy's army lay to the south and west . No See also:attempt was made to entrench the position systematically, but on the left the 2nd and 3rd Corps made some disconnected shelter trenches and See also:gun-pits, while the 4th Corps in the centre began to improve available cover about an hour before the battle began, and the 6th corps on the right, not yet having received any entrenching tools, could do no more than improvise a few loopholes in the walls of the villages of St Privat and Roncourt with such tools as the sappers could obtain from the inhabitants . Fortunately for the French the Germans were too exhausted by the battle of the 16th to attempt to interfere with these movements . At daybreak on the morning of the 18th the royal headquarters (which now for the first time arrived at the front) still had no certain knowledge as to whether the French See also:main army was in retreat—covered by the force which they could see on the high ground north of the Metz road—or whether they had taken up a position in order to fight . Hence the orders issued overnight on the presumption that the main force of the French was retreating to the north and west were allowed to stand, and the whole II . Army (Prince Frederick Charles) moved off in See also:echelon from left to right, the I. army under Steinmetz, consisting for the day of the I., II. and VII . Corps, being left in observation of the troops visible on their front and of the See also:garrison of Metz itself . The I . Corps was kept back beyond the Moselle on the east side of Metz, the II. was not due to arrive at Rezonville before 4 p.m., hence the VII. only was immediately available if the enemy counter-attacked . But Steinmetz had not ordered, nor had von Zastrow, the corps commander, undertaken, any preparations to meet an emergency . About 10 a.m. the corps had reached the following positions: Shortly after 10 a.m .
See also:Moltke, still under the impression that the French right extended no farther than La Folie (2 M. north of the Metz road), determined to attack with the IX. and VIII
.
Corps whilst the Guard executed a turning movement via Habonville against the French right
.
The IX
.
Corps was to engage, but not to push its attack See also:home until the Guard could co-operate
.
The XII
.
Corps was left to its own devices, but fortunately the crown prince of See also:Saxony, who commanded it, had ridden forward and, seeing the French in force towards Roncourt, had issued orders which in the event proved decisive
.
In pursuance of .his instructions von Manstein, commanding the IX
.
Corps, set his two divisions in motion towards La Folie and the Bois de la Cusse, and advanced to reconnoitre the French position
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From the eastern edge of the above-named copses he suddenly descried the camp of a whole French Corps (the 4th), evidently ignorant of their danger, on the slopes trending west-See also: 
The French infantry ran to their arms, piled along the front of their positions, and moved forward to attack, covering their advance by a See also:hail of bullets . Simultaneously the French artillery also took up the See also:challenge, and from the heights near St Privat the 6th Corps, whose presence had been unsuspected by the Prussians, joined in the fight . In a few minutes the batteries on the extreme Prussian left were completely overwhelmed, and suddenly dense lines of French skirmishers emerged from a See also:fold in the ground upon their flank and front, and the gunners were compelled to resort to case-shot, so imminent was their danger . But at this See also:critical moment the leading companies of the See also:Hessian infantry arrived, re-established the See also:equilibrium (though not before four Prussian batteries had been temporarily overrun by the enemy), and a most obstinate fight ensued . Prince Frederick Charles now rode forward to a point north-east of Verneville, whence the See also:southern boundary of St Privat could be seen . But the See also:northern side of the village and the country towards Roncourt was hidden from his view by the high poplars bordering the Metz-Briey road . Seeing the Hessians hard pressed, he now brought forward the znd division of the Guard to their assistance, sending in the 3rd brigade immediately, and holding the 4th brigade in reserve . The 1st division, warned by their own scouts that French troops were in Ste See also:Marie, deployed to attack this village, and were assisted in their endeavour by a brigade of See also:Saxons detached by the crown prince of Saxony, who from his position could see behind the See also:poplar screen that limited the view of the commander-in-chief . Hence he was already aware that the French position extended to Ron-See also:court at least, and had despatched a whole division down the valley of the Orne to outflank them . No See also:news of this movement, however, appears to have reached Prince Frederick Charles . The French troops in Ste Marie were only an outpost of the 6th corps, and seeing themselves outnumbered; they withdrew about 2.30, the Prussians rushing. the village immediately after-wards . Considerable confusion arose from the convergence of these three brigades upon one village, and more than an hour passed before the troops could be disentangled and massed for further operations . The leaders of the two Guard brigades, still ignorant of the extent of the French position. rallied theirmen on the main bodies of their commands (which had not been engaged) and then lay down facing exactly as they.had done when brought forward to the attack . Thus the 1st brigade lay, facing about east-south-east, south of the chaussee and some five See also:hundred yards west of the village . The znd brigade lay south-west of the village about three hundred yards away from it and facing nearly north-east . The Saxons were on the left rear of the 1st brigade, but took longer to recover themselves than the See also:Guards . With the Hessians and the IX . Corps the action still dragged; the 3rd brigade of the Guards had become involved in the fight, and notwithstanding the arrival of the corps artillery of the III . Corps in the centre the situation was still critical . From the south also came the See also:thunder of guns and no encouraging news from that See also:quarter had as yet reached the prince's headquarters . About 4.30 p.m. the prince therefore had to consider how long it would take to obtain a decision . To postpone it till the morrow seemed undesirable: to achieve it before nightfall was only possible at the cost of immediate effort . He therefore decided to assault St Privat with all the Guards available, and called up the III., X. and Saxons to assist them . The 4th brigade of the Guards now received their orders to attack See also:Jerusalem (a See also:hamlet a little south of St Privat), and the 1st division was ordered to assault St Privat itself . Von Pape, commanding the latter division, pointed out that no artillery force adequate to prepare the way for him was as yet on the ground, and that the Saxons were still a long way to the rear . But his orders were imperative, and the 4th brigade was already moving off and had to be supported at any cost . Actually all available batteries had already been sent for and were trotting forward from every quarter towards the objective . He accordingly transmitted his orders, and the znd brigade was the first to attempt their execution . It had to wheel half-right in mass to bring it in the required direction, and then to advance till its rear was clear of the obstruction formed by the gardens of St Marie . By the time (5.30) it had sufficiently cleared this village it became apparent that the 4th brigade in its See also:extension for attack would overlap the front assigned to the znd, hence a further (half-left) wheel, still in mass, had to be undertaken before room for deployment could be obtained . Almost as the commands were given, the French suddenly opened an overwhelming long-range fire and their bullets swept like hail through the crowded mass of the German troops . Nevertheless the wheel was effected, the fresh direction taken, the troops extended for attack, and then the whole brigade dashed towards the houses assigned them as their objective . Meanwhile the 1st brigade had moved round the north of the village and carried out its extension without serious hindrance . But emerging from the hollow running north from St Marie, they came under a heavy fire not only from St Privat but also from Roncourt, which latter village they now saw for the first time . Instinctively a portion of their line worked to the left to face this new menace, and the front thus became dangerously extended . They were, however, now abreast of the znd brigade, and the whole line raced forward to reach the effective range of their very inferior weapons, which were about equal at zoo yds. to the French See also:rifle at 600 . But the losses of the znd brigade, particularly in See also:officers, had been too heavy, and the See also:rush died out whilst still 500 yds. from the two villages . It was now about 6 p.m. and a long pause ensued, while the 220 guns, which by 'degrees had unlimbered behind them, brought St Privat and Roncourt under fire . About 7 p.m. the Saxon turning-movement took effect; their infantry from the Orne valley attacked Roncourt from the north, and about 7.15 the village was carried . Neither Prince Frederick Charles nor the troops in the fighting-line could see what had taken See also:place; but the former seeing other Saxons moving towards Montois and the masses of the III. and X . Corps approaching, whilst the See also:rain of shells into St Privat exceeded anything hitherto seen on any battlefield, decided to call on the whole of his force to attack . He was in the See also:act of issuing his orders when a psychological See also:wave swept through the fighting-line, and the men See also:rose and rushed the village at the point of the See also:bayonet . It was now about eight o'See also:clock, and the See also:light was rapidly failing . The French artillery had already evaded the coming blow, and had changed position, " right back," to cover the flank of the rest of the army, and the Prussian and Saxon artillery trotting forward conformed to this new front, their shells sweeping the ground for 2000 yds. to the south of Amanvillers . The confusion in and around St Privat, where troops from four several corps were all intermingled, became so extreme that no further infantry-advance could be attempted; so under cover of the fierce artillery duel the remnants of the unfortunate 6th corps drifted away towards Metz down the many ravines leading into the See also:river valley . The " annihilation " of the Guard at St Privat has become historic . Yet, heavy as were the losses of the 1st Guard division they were not excessive compared to those previously endured . In round numbers one-third of their effectives had fallen—most of them in the first great rush forward at 5.30 p.m.; but actually they had been more or less under fire since about 2 p.m., and many were hit by French shells plunging into the turmoil about St Privat from 8 to to p.m . But the'See also:legend cannot be justified when the facts are compared with the slaughter of the Seven Years' War, of See also:Napoleon's battles, the See also:Crimea, and the See also:American See also:Civil War, or with the horrible See also:punishment of von Wedell's brigade (38th) only two days before . It is now time to return to the southern See also:theatre of the battle-field, where an entirely independent engagement had been raging all the afternoon . Von See also:Goeben with the VIII . Corps was standing massed about Rezonville when von Manstein's guns opposite Amanvillers suddenly made themselves heard . See also:Wheeling his corps to face the French to the eastward he immediately sent forward his artillery and prepared to support his comrade . Von Zastrow with the VII . Corps followed his example.' Both corps took as their See also:primary objective the farms of St See also:Hubert and Point du Jour, standing just above the defile made by the Verdun-Metz road where it climbs out of the Mance ravine towards the French position . About 3.30 p.m . St Hubert was carried by a confused mass of some 49 companies, and von Steinmetz, believing the main French position to have been pierced, ordered the 4th cavalry division to See also:cross the ravine by the chaussee and pursue . Simultaneously von Zastrow, under the same impression, had ordered his corps artillery to advance by the same road, and von Goeben, thinking his troops in front required support, had sent forward an infantry brigade by the same line of road . Presently all these columns converged upon the defile and a hopeless entanglement ensued . Three batteries succeeded in struggling through the mass, and, in coming into action, their left resting on St Hubert . But the See also:remainder of the troops had to be wi |