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account of the transaction has been printed by Burton . After a brief sojourn at Ninewells, doubtless occupied in preparing for publication his Philosophical Essays (afterwards entitled An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding), Hume was again associated with General St Clair as secretary in the See also:

EMBASSY

embassy to See also:

Vienna and See also:

TURIN

Turin (1748) . The notes of this See also:

JOURNEY (through O. Fr. jornee or journee, mod. Fr. journee, from med. Lat. diurnata, Lat. diurnus, of or belonging to dies, day)

journey are written in a During his See also:

ABSENCE (Lat. absentia)

absence from See also:

England, See also:

early in the year 1748, the Philosophical Essays were published; but the first reception of the work was little more favourable than that accorded to the See also:

TREATISE

Treatise . To the later See also:

EDITIONS

editions of the work Hume prepared an " See also:

ADVERTISEMENT, or ADVERTISING (Fr. avertissement, warning, or notice)

Advertisement " referring to the Treatise, and desiring that the Essays " may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles." Some See also:

MODERN

modern critics have accepted this See also:

DISCLAIMER

disclaimer as of real value, but in fact it has no significance; and Hume himself in a striking See also:

LETTER (through Fr. lettre from Lat. littera or litera, letter of the alphabet; the origin of the Latin word is obscure; it has probably no connexion with the root of linere, to smear, i.e. with wax, for an inscription with a stilus)

letter to See also:

Gilbert See also:

ELLIOTT, EBENEZER (1781–1849)

Elliott indicated the true relation of the two See also:

WORKS

works .

" I believe the Philosophical Essays contain everything of consequence See also:

RELATING

relating to the understanding which you would meet with in the Treatise, and I give you my See also:

ADVICE (Fr. avis, from Lat. ad, to, and visum, viewed)

advice against See also:

READING

reading the latter . By shortening and simplifying the questions, I really render them much more See also:

COMPLETE

complete . Addo dumminuo . The philosophical principles are the same in both." The Essays are undoubtedly written with more maturity and skill than the Treatise; they contain in more detail application of the principles to See also:

concrete problems, such as miracles, See also:

PROVIDENCE

providence, See also:

IMMORTALITY (Lat. in-, not, mortalis, mortal, from mors, death)

immortality; but the entire omission of the discussion forming See also:

PART

part ii. of the first See also:

BOOK

book of the Treatise, and the great See also:

COMPRESSION

compression of part iv., are real defects which must always render the Treatise the more important work . In 1749 Hume returned to Ninewells, enriched with " near a thousand pounds." In 1751 he removed to Edinburgh, where for the most part he resided during the next twelve years of his life . These years are the richest so far as literary See also:

PRODUCTION (Lat. productionem, from producere, to pro-duce)

production is concerned . In 1751 he published his See also:

POLITICAL

Political Discourses, which had a great and well-deserved success both in England and abroad . It was translated into See also:

French by Mauvillon (1753) and by the See also:

ABBE (Serbo-Croatian Rai))

Abbe le See also:

Blanc (1954) . In the same year appeared the recast of the third book of the Treatise, called Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, of which he says that " of all his writings, philosophical, literary or See also:

HISTORICAL

historical, it is incomparably the best." At this See also:

time also we hear of the Dialogues concerning Natural See also:

Religion, a work which Hume was prevailed on not to publish, but which he revised with great care, and evidently regarded with the greatest favour . The work itself, See also:

LEFT

left by Hume with instructions that it should be published, did not appear till 1779 . In 1751 Hume was again unsuccessful in the attempt to gain a See also:

PROFESSOR (the Latin noun formed from the verb profiteri, to declare publicly, to acknowledge, profess)

professor's chair . In the following year he received, in spite of the usual accusations of heresy, the librarianship of the See also:

ADVOCATES, FACULTY OF

Advocates' Library in Edinburgh, small in emoluments (£40 a year) but See also:

rich in opportunity for literary work .

In a playful letter to Dr Clephane, he describes his See also:

SATISFACTION (Lat. salisfacerc, to satisfy)

satisfaction at his See also:

APPOINTMENT, POWER OF

appointment, and attributes it in some measure to the support of " the ladies." In 1753 Hume was fairly settled in Edinburgh, preparing for his History of England . He had decided to begin the History, not with See also:

Henry VII., as See also:

Adam See also:

Smith recommended, but with See also:

James I., considering that the political See also:

DIFFERENCES, CALCULUS OF (Theory of Finite Differences)

differences of his time took their origin from that See also:

period . On the whole his attitude in respect to disputed political principles seems not to have been at first consciously unfair . As for the qualities necessary to secure success as a writer on history, he See also:

FELT (cognate with Ger. Filz, Du. vilt, Swed. and Dan. fill; the root is unknown; the word has given Med. Lat. filtrum, " filter ")

felt that he possessed them in a high degree; and, though neither his ideal of an historian nor his equipment for the task of historical See also:

RESEARCH (O. Fr. recerche, from recercher, re- and cercer, mod. chercher, to search; Late Lat. circare, to go round in a circle, to explore)

research would now appear adequate, in both he was much in advance of his time . " But," he writes in the well-known passage of his Life, " miserable was my disappointment . I was assailed by one cry of reproach, disapprobation, and even detestation; ... what was still more mortifying, the book seemed to sink into oblivion . Mr See also:

MILLAR, ANDREW (1707-1768)

Millar told me that in a twelvemonth he sold only See also:

FORTY

forty-five copies of it." This account must be accepted with reservations . It expresses Hume's feelings rather than the real facts . In Edinburgh, as we learn from one of his letters, the book succeeded well, no fewer than 45o copies being disposed of in five See also:

WEEKS, EDWIN LORD (1849-1903)

weeks . Nor is there anything in Hume's correspondence to show that the failure of the book was so complete as he declared . Within a very few years the See also:

sale of the History was sufficient to gain for the author a larger See also:

revenue than had everbefore been known in his See also:

COUNTRY (from the Mid. Eng. contre or contrie, and O. Fr. cuntree; Late Lat. contrata, showing the derivation from contra, opposite, over against, thus the tract of land which fronts the sight, cf. Ger. Gegend, neighbourhood)

country to flow from literature, and to See also:

PLACE (through Fr. from Lat. platea, street; Gr. IrAar6s, wide)

place him in See also:

COMPARATIVE

comparative affluence . He seems to have received £40o for the first edition of the first See also:

VOLUME

volume, £700 for the first edition of the second and 084o for the See also:

At the same time the bitterness of Hume's feelings and their effect are of importance in his life . It is from the publication of the History that we date his virulent hatred of everything See also:

ENGLISH

English, towards society in See also:

LONDON

London, Whig principles, Whig ministers and the public generally (see Burton's Life, ii . 268, 417, 434) . He was convinced that there was a See also:

CONSPIRACY (from Lat. conspirare, literally to breathe together, to agree, combine, and especially to form a secret plot)

conspiracy to suppress and destroy everything Scottish) . The See also:

REMAINDER, REVERSION

remainder of the History became little better than a party pamphlet . The second volume, published in 1756, carrying on the narrative to the Revolution, was better received than the first; but Hume then resolved to work backwards, and to show from a survey of the Tudor period that his Tory notions were grounded upon the history of the constitution . In 1759 this portion of the work appeared, and in 1761 the work was completed by the history of the pre-Tudor periods . The numerous editions of the various portions—for, despite Hume's wrath and grumblings, the book was a great literary success—gave him an opportunity of careful revision, which he employed to remove from it all the `` villainous seditious Whig strokes," and plaguy prejudices of Whiggism " that he could detect . In other words, he See also:

bent all his efforts toward making his History more of a party work than it had been, and in his effort he was entirely successful . The early portion of his History may be regarded as now of little or no value . The See also:

SOURCES

sources at Hume's command were few, and he did not use them all . None the less, the History has a distinct place in the literature of England .

It was the first attempt at a comprehensive treatment of historic facts, the first to introduce the social and literary aspects of a nation's life as only second in importance to its political fortunes, and the first historical See also:

writing in an animated yet refined and polished See also:

style.2 While the History was in See also:

PROCESS

process of publication, Hume did not entirely neglect his other lines of activity . In 1757 appeared Four See also:

DISSERTATIONS

Dissertations: The Natural History of Religion, Of the Passions, Of Tragedy, Of the See also:

Standard of See also:

TASTE (from Lat. taxare, to touch sharply; tangere, to touch)

Taste . Of these the dissertation on the passions is a very subtle piece of See also:

psychology, containing the essence of the second book of the Treatise . It is remarkable that Hume does not appear to have been acquainted with See also:

SPINOZA, BARUCH (1632-1677)

Spinoza's See also:

ANALYSIS (Gr. avci and Meta, to break up into parts)

analysis of the affections . The last two essays are contributions of no great importance to See also:

AESTHETICS

aesthetics, a See also:

DEPARTMENT (Fr. departement, from departir, to separate into parts)

department of philosophy in which Hume was not strong . The Natural History of Religion is a powerful contribution to the deistic controversy; but, as in the See also:

case of Hume's earlier work, its significance was at the time overlooked . It is an attempt to carry the See also:

war into a See also:

province hitherto allowed to remain at See also:

peace, the theory of the general development of religious ideas . Deists, though raising doubts regarding the historic narratives of the See also:

Christian faith, had never disputed the general fact that belief in one See also:

God was natural and See also:

PRIMITIVE

primitive . Hume endeavours to show that polytheism was the earliest as well as the most natural form of religious belief, and that theism or deism is 1 See Burton, ii . 265, 148 and 238 . Perhaps our knowledge of See also:

Johnson's sentiments regarding the Scots in general, and of his expressions regarding Hume and Smith in particular, may lessen our surprise at this vehemence . 2 See also:

MACAULAY, THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, BARON (1800-1859)

Macaulay describes Hume's characteristic See also:

FAULT (Mid. Eng. faute, through the French, from the popular Latin use of fallere, to fail; the originallof the Latin being replaced in English in the 15th century)

fault as an historian: " Hume is an accomplished See also:

ADVOCATE (Lat. advocatus, from advocare, to summon, especially in law to call in the aid of a counsel or witness, and so generally to summon to one's assistance)

advocate .

Without positively asserting much more than he can prove, he gives prominence to all the circumstances which support his case; he glides lightly over those which—are unfavourable to it; his own witnesses are applauded and encouraged; the statements which seem to throw discredit on them are controverted; the contradictions into which they fall are explained away; a clear and connected abstract of their See also:

EVIDENCE (Lat. evidentia, evideri, to appear clearly)

evidence is given . Everything that is offered on the other See also:

side is scrutinized with the utmost severity; every suspicious circumstance is a ground for See also:

ARGUMENT

argument and invective; what cannot be denied is extenuated, or passed by without See also:

NOTICE

notice; concessions even are sometimes made; but this insidious candour only increases the effect of the vast See also:

mass of sophistry."—Miscell . Writings, " History." With this may be compared the more favourable See also:

VERDICT (O. Fr. verdit, Lat. vere dictum, truly said, used in Late Latin in one word with its present significance)

verdict by J . S . See also:

BREWER, JOHN SHERREN (1810-1879)

Brewer, in the See also:

PREFACE (Med. Lat. prefatia, for classical praefatio, praefari, to speak beforehand)

preface to his edition of the Student's Ilume . the product of reflection upon experience, thus reducing the validity of the historical argument to that of the theoretical proofs . In 1763 he accompanied See also:

Lord See also:

Hertford to See also:

Paris, doing the duties of secretary to the embassy, with the prospect of the appointment to that post . He was everywhere received " with the most extraordinary honours." The society of Paris was peculiarly ready to receive a great philosopher and historian, especially if he were known to be an avowed antagonist of religion, and Hume made valuable friendships, especially with D'See also:

ALEMBERT, JEAN LE ROND

Alembert and See also:

TURGOT, ANNE ROBERT JACQUES, BARON DE

Turgot, the latter of whom profited much by Hume's economical essays . In 1766 he left Paris and returned to Edinburgh . In 1767 he accepted the post of under-secretary to General See also:

Conway and spent two years in London . He settled finally in Edinburgh in 1769, having now through his See also:

PENSION (Lat. pensio, a payment, from pendere, to weigh, to pay)

pension and otherwise an income of £1000 a year . The solitary incident of See also:

note in this period of his life is the ridiculous See also:

QUARREL

quarrel with See also:

Rousseau, which throws much See also:

LIGHT

light upon the See also:

CHARACTER (Gr. xapareri7p, from xap&crew, to scratch)

character of the great sentimentalist .

Hume certainly did his utmost to secure for Rousseau a comfortable See also:

RETREAT (O. Fr. retrete, mod. retraite, from Lat. retrahere, to draw back)

retreat in England, but his usually See also:

sound See also:

JUDGMENT

judgment seems at first to have been quite at fault with regard to his protege . The quarrel which all the acquaintances of the two philosophers had predicted soon came, and no See also:

LANGUAGE (adapted from the Fr. langage, from langue, tongue, Lat. lingua)

language had expressions strong enough for Rousseau's anger . Hume came well out of the business, and had the sagacity to conclude that his admired friend was little better than a madman . In one of his most charming letters he describes his life in Edinburgh . The new See also:

house to which he alludes was built under his own directions at the corner of what is now called St See also:

David See also:

Street after him; it became the centre of the most cultivated society of Edinburgh . Hume's cheerful See also:

TEMPER (from Lat. temperare, to mingle or compound in due proportion, to qualify, rule, regulate, to be moderate, formed from tempos, time, fit or due season)

temper, his equanimity, his kindness to literary aspirants and to those whose views differed from his own won him universal respect and See also:

AFFECTION (Lat. ad, and facere, to do something to, sc. a person)

affection . He welcomed the work of his friends (e.g . See also:

Robertson and Adam Smith), and warmly recognized the See also:

worth of his opponents (e.g . See also:

George See also:

Campbell and See also:

Reid) . He assisted See also:

BLACKWELL, THOMAS (1701-1757)

Blackwell and See also:

SMOLLETT, TOBIAS GEORGE (1721-1771)

Smollett in their difficulties and became the acknowledged See also:

PATRIARCH (M.E. and O. Fr. patriarche, Lat. patriarcha, Gr. aarpuipxtis, from srarptu., clan, and apxil, rule)

patriarch of literature . In the See also:

SPRING (from " to spring," " to leap or jump up," " burst out," O. Eng., springau, a common Teut. word, cf. Ger. springer, possibly allied to Gr. QnrFpxecOac, to move rapidly)

spring of 1775 Hume was struck with a tedious and harassing though not painful illness . A visit to See also:

Bath seemed at first to have produced good effects, but on the return journey more alarming symptoms See also:

DEVELOPED

developed themselves, his strength rapidly sank, and, little more than a See also:

month later, he died in Edinburgh on the 25th of See also:

AUGUST (originally Sextilis)

August 1776 .

No notice of Hume would be complete without the See also:

SKETCH (directly adapted from Dutch schets, which was taken from Ital. schizzo, a rough draft, Lat. schedium, something hastily made, Gr. oxE&os, sudden, off-hand, axeb6v, near by; Ger. Skizze and Fr. esquisse are from the same source)

sketch of his character See also:

DRAWN

drawn by his own See also:

hand:—" To conclude historically with my own character, I am, or rather was (for that is the style I must now use in speaking of myself, which emboldens me the more to speak my sentimentts),—I was, I say, a See also:

man of mild dispositions, of command of temper, of an open, social and cheerful See also:

HUMOUR (Latin humor)

humour, capable of See also:

ATTACHMENT

attachment, but little susceptible of enmity, and of great moderation in all my passions . Even my love of literary fame, my ruling See also:

PASSION (post-classical Lat. passio, formed from pati, passus, to suffer, endure)

passion, never soured my temper, notwithstanding my frequent disappointments . My See also:

COMPANY

company was not unacceptable to the See also:

young and careless, as well as to the studious and literary; and as I took a particular See also:

PLEASURE (through Fr. plaisir from Lat. placere, to please; Gr. rlbovii)

pleasure in the company of modest See also:

WOMEN

women, I had no See also:

REASON (Lat. ratio, through French raison)

reason to be displeased with the reception I met with from them . In a word, though most men anywise eminent have found reason to complain of calumny, I never was touched, or even attacked, by her baleful tooth; and, though I wantonly exposed myself to the rage of both See also:

CIVIL

civil and religious factions, they seem to be disarmed on my behalf of their wonted fury . My friends never had occasion to vindicate any one circumstance of my character and conduct ; not but that the zealots, we may well suppose, would have been glad to invent and propagate any See also:

story to my disadvantage, but they could never find any which they thought would See also:

WEAR

wear the See also:

FACE (from Lat. fades, derived either from facere, to make, or from a root fa-, meaning " appear "; cf. Gr. cbatvstv)

face of See also:

PROBABILITY (Lat. probabilis, probable or credible)

probability . I cannot say there is no vanity in making this funeral oration of myself, but I hope it is not a misplaced one; and this is a matter of fact which is easily cleansed and ascertained." The more his life has become known, the more confidence we place in this admirable estimate . The results of Hume's speculations may be discussed under two heads:—(1) philosophical, (2) economical . 1 . The philosophical writings, which See also:

mark a distinct See also:

EPOCH (Gr. E7roxij, holding in suspense, a pause, from E1rxav, to hold up, to stop)

epoch in the development of modern thought, can here be considered in two Phi1o~ only of the many aspects in which they See also:

PRESENT

present themselves slaty. as of the highest See also:

INTEREST

interest to the historian of philosophy . In the Treatise of Human Nature, which is in every respect the most complete exposition of Hume's philosophical conception, we have the first thorough-going attempt to apply the fundamental principles of See also:

Locke's empirical psychology to the construction of a theory of knowledge, and, as a natural consequence, the first systematic See also:

criticism of the See also:

CHIEF (from Fr. chef, head, Lat. caput)

chief metaphysical notions from this point of view . Hume, in that work, holds the same relation to Locke and See also:

Berkeley as the See also:

LATE

late J . S .

See also:

Mill held with his See also:

SYSTEM

System of See also:

LOGIC (Xoy1K7, sc. rixvrt, the art of reasoning)

Logic to See also:

Hartley and James Mill . In certain of the later writings, pre-eminently in the Dialogues on Natural Religion, Hume brings the result of his speculative criticism to See also:

bear upon the problems of current theological discussion, and gives in their regard, as previously with respect to general philosophy, the final word of the empirical theory in its earlier form . The interesting parallel between Hume and J . S . Mill in this second feature will not be overlooked . In the first instance, then, Hume's philosophical work is to be regarded as the attempt to See also:

SUPPLY (through Fr. from Lat. supplere, to fill up)

supply for See also:

EMPIRICISM (from Gr. Eµrretpor, skilled in, from sreipa, experiment)

empiricism in psychology a consistent, that is, a logically developed theory of knowledge . In Locke, indeed, such theory is not wanting, but, of all the many in-consistencies in the See also:

ESSAY, ESSAYIST (Fr. essai, Late Lat. exagium, a weighing or balance; exigere, to examine; the term in general meaning any trial or effort)

Essay on the Human Understanding, none is more apparent or more significant than the complete want of See also:

HARMONY (Gr. dpµovia, a concord of musical sounds, dpA'ew to join; &plan midi (sc. TeXvil)

harmony between the view of knowledge developed in the See also:

FOURTH

fourth book and the psychological principles laid down in the earlier part of the work . Though Locke, doubtless, See also:

drew no distinction between the problems of psychology and of theory of knowledge, yet the discussion of the various forms of See also:

COGNITION (Latin cognitio, from cognoscere, to become acquainted with)

cognition given in the fourth book of the Essay seems to be based on grounds quite distinct from and in many respects inconsistent with the fundamental psychological principle of his work . The See also:

PERCEPTION (from Lat. percipere, to perceive)

perception of relations, which, according to him, is the essence of cognition, the See also:

DEMONSTRATIVE

demonstrative character which he thinks attaches to our inference of God's existence, the intuitive knowledge of self, are doctrines incapable of being brought into harmony with the view of mind and its development which is the keynote of his general theory . To some extent Berkeley removed this See also:

RADICAL (Lat. radix, a root)

radical in-consistency, but in his philosophical work it may be said with safety there are two distinct aspects, and while it holds of Locke on the one hand, it stretches forward to Kantianism on the other . Nor in Berkeley are these divergent features ever See also:

UNITED

united into one harmonious whole . It was left for Hume to approach the theory of know-ledge with full consciousness from the psychological point of view, and to work out the final consequences of that view so far as cognition is concerned .

The terms which he employs in describing the aim and See also:

SCOPE (through Ital. scopo, aim, purpose, intent, from Gr. o'KOaos, mark to shoot at, aim, o ic07reiv, to see, whence the termination in telescope, microscope, &c.)

scope of his work are not those which we should now employ, but the See also:

DECLARATION (from Lat. declarare, to make fully clear, clams)

declaration, in the introduction to the Treatise, that the See also:

SCIENCE (Lat. scientia, from scire; to learn, know)

science of human nature must be treated according to the experimental method, is in fact See also:

EQUIVALENT

equivalent to the statement of the principle implied in Locke's Essay, that the problems of psychology and of theory of knowledge are identical . This view is the characteristic of what we may See also:

CALL (from Anglo-Saxon ceallian, a common Teutonic word, cf. Dutch kallen, to talk or chatter)

call the English school of philosophy . In See also:

order to make perfectly clear the full significance of the principle which Hume applied to the See also:

SOLUTION (from Lat. solvere, to loosen, dissolve)

solution of the chief philosophical questions, it is necessary to render somewhat more precise Theory and complete the statement of the psychological view which lies at the See also:

FOUNDATION (Lat. fundatio, from fundare, to found)

foundation of the empirical theory, and ofknowto distinguish from it the problem of the theory of know- ledge. ledge upon which it was brought to bear . Without entering into details, which it is the less necessary to do because the subject has been recently discussed with great fulness in works readily accessible, it may be said that for Locke as for Hume the problem of psychology was the exact description of the contents of the individual mind, and the determination of the conditions of the origin and development of conscious experience in the individual'mind . And the See also:

ANSWER (derived from and, against, and the same root as swear)

answer to the problem which was furnished by Locke is in effect that with which Hume started . The conscious experience of the individual is the result of interaction between the individual mind and the universe of things . This solution presupposes a See also:

PECULIAR

peculiar conception of the general relation between the mind and things which in itself requires See also:

JUSTIFICATION

justification, and which, so far at least as the empirical theory was developed by Locke and his successors, could not be obtained from psychological analysis . Either we have a right to the See also:

ASSUMPTION, FEAST OF

assumption contained in the conception of the individual mind as See also:

STANDING

standing in relation to things, in which case the grounds of the assumption must be sought elsewhere than in the results of this reciprocal relation, or we have no right to the assumption, in which case reference to the reciprocal relation can hardly be accepted as yielding any solution of the psychological problem . But in any case,—and, as we shall see, Hume endeavours so to See also:

state his psychological premises as to conceal the assumption made openly by Locke,—it is apparent that this psychological solution does not contain the answer to the wider and radically distinct problem of the theory of knowledge . For here we have to consider how the individual intelligence comes to know any fact whatsoever, and what is meant by the cognition of a fact . With Locke, Hume professes to regard this problem as virtually covered or answered by the fundamental psychological theorem; but the See also:

SUPERIOR

superior clearness of his reply enables us to mark with perfect precision the nature of the difficulty inherent in the attempt to regard the two as identical . For purposes of psychological analysis the conscious experience of the individual mind is taken as given fact, to be known, i.e. observed, discriminated, classified and explained in the same way in which any one See also:

SPECIAL

special portion of experience is treated .

Now if this mode of treatment be accepted as the only possible method, and its results assumed to be conclusive as regards the problem of knowledge, the fundamental peculiarity of cognition is overlooked . In all cognition, strictly so-called, there is involved a certain See also:

SYNTHESIS (Gr. a6vOeacs, from avvrcBivac, to put together)

synthesis or relation of parts of a characteristic nature, and if we attempt to discuss this synthesis as though it were in itself but one of the facts forming the matter of knowledge, we are driven to regard this relation as being of the quite See also:

EXTERNAL

external See also:

KIND (O. E. ge-cynde, from the same root as is seen in " kin," supra)

kind discovered by observation among matters of knowledge . 'The difficulty of reconciling the two views is that which gives rise to much of the obscurity in Locke's treatment of the theory of knowledge; in Hume the effort to identify them, and to explain the synthesis which is essential to cognition as merely the accidental result of external relations among the elements of conscious experience, appears with the utmost clearness, and gives the keynote of all his philosophical work . The final perplexity, concealed by various forms of expression, comes forward at the See also:

close of the Treatise as absolutely unsolved, and leads Hume, as will be pointed out, to a truly remarkable See also:

CONFESSION (Lat. confessio, from confiteor, acknowledge, confess)

confession of the weakness of his own system . While, then, the general See also:

IDEA (Gr. Ibia, connected with i&eiv, to see; cf. Lat. species from specere, to look at)

idea of a theory of knowledge as based upon psychological analysis is the groundwork of the Treatise, it is a particular consequence of this idea that furnishes to Hume the characteristic criterion applied by him to all philosophical questions . If the relations involved in the fact of cognition are only those discoverable by observation of any particular portion of known experience, then such relations are quite external and contingent . The only necessary relation which can be discovered in a given fact of experience is that of non-See also:

CONTRADICTION, PRINCIPLE OF (principium contradictionis)

contradiction (i.e. purely formal) ; the thing must be what it is, and cannot be conceived as having qualities contradictory of its nature . The universal test, therefore, of any supposed philosophical principle is the possibility or impossibility of imagining its contradictory . All our knowledge is but the sum of our conscious experience, and is consequently material for See also:

IMAGINATION

imagination . " Let us See also:

FIX, THEODORE (180o-1846)

fix our See also:

ATTENTION (from Lat. ad-tendo, await, expect; the condition of being " stretched " or " tense ")

attention out of ourselves as much as possible ; let us See also:

chase our imagination to the heavens or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions which have appeared in that narrow See also:

COMPASS (Fr. corn pas, ultimately from Lat. cum, with, and passus, step)

compass . This is the universe of the imagination, nor have we any idea but what is there produced." (Works, ed. of 1854, i . 93, cf. i .

107.) The course of Hume's work follows immediately from his fundamental principle, and the several divisions of the treatise, so far as the theoretical portions are concerned, are but its logical See also:

con-sequences . The first part of the first book contains a brief statement of the contents of mind, a description of all that observation can discover in conscious experience . The second part deals with those judgments which See also:

REST (O. Eng. rest, reste, bed, cognate with other Teutonic forms, e.g. Ger. Rast, Riiste, rest, and probably Gothic Rasta, league, i.e. resting or stopping place)

rest upon the formal elements of experience, space and time . The third part discusses the principle of real connexion among the elements of experience, the relation of cause and effect . The fourth part is virtually a See also:

CONSIDERATION (from Lat. considerare, to look at closely, examine, generally taken to be from con-, and the base seen in sidus, sideris, a star, the word being supposed to be originally an astrological or astronomical term)

consideration of the ultimate significance of this conscious experience, of the place it is supposed to occupy in the universe of existence, in other words, of the relations between the conscious experience of an individual mind as disclosed to observation and the supposed realities of self and external things . In the first part Hume gives his own statement of the psycho-logical See also:

FOUNDATIONS

foundations of his theory . Viewing the contents of mind as /See also:

DENS, PETER (1690-1775)

dens matter of experience, he can discover among them only and n:- one distinction, a distinction expressed by the terms pressions . Impressions and ideas . Ideas are secondary in nature, copies of data supplied we know not whence . All that appears in conscious experience as See also:

PRIMARY

primary, as arising from some unknown cause, and therefore relatively as See also:

ORIGINAL

original, Hume designates by the See also:

TERM

term impression, and claims to imply by such term no theory whatsoever as to the origin of this portion of experience . There is simply the fact of conscious experience, ultimate and inexplicable . Moreover, if we remain faithful to the fundamental conception that the contents of the mind are merely matters of experience, it is evident in the first place that as impressions are strictly individual, ideas also must be strictly particular, and in the second place that the faculties of combining, discriminating, abstracting and judging, which Locke had admitted, are merely expressions for particular modes of having See also:

MENTAL

mental experience, i.e. are modifications of conceiving (cf. i .

128 n., 137, 192) . By this theory, Hume is freed from all the problems of See also:

ABSTRACTION (Lat. abs and trahere)

abstraction and judgment . A comparative judgment is simplified into an isolated perception of a peculiar form, and a See also:

SERIES (a Latin word from serere, to join)

series of similar facts are grouped under a single See also:

SYMBOL (Gr. o-uµ(3oXov, a sign)

symbol, representing a particular perception, and only by the See also:

accident of See also:

CUSTOM (from O. Fr. costume, costume or coustume; Low Lat. costuma, a shortened form of consuetudo)

custom treated as universal (see i . 37, 38, 100) . Such, in substance, is Hume's restatement of Locke's empirical view . Conscious experience consists of isolated states, each of which is to be regarded as a fact and is related to others in a quite external See also:

FASHION (adapted from Fr. facon, agon, Lat. factio, making, facere, to do or make)

fashion . It remains to be seen how knowledge can be explained on such a basis; but, before proceeding to sketch Hume's answer to this question, it is necessary to draw attention, first, to the peculiar See also:

DEVICE

device invariably resorted to by him when any exception to his general principle that ideas are secondary copies of impressions presents itself, and, secondly, to the nature of the substitute offered by him for that perception of relations or synthesis which even in Locke's con-fused statements had appeared as the essence of cognition . When-ever Hume finds it impossible to recognize in See also:

art idea the See also:

mere copy of a particular impression, he introduces the phrase " manner of conceiving." Thus general or abstract ideas are merely copies of a DAVID particular impression conceived in a particular manner . The ideas of space and time, as will presently be pointed out, are copies of impressions conceived in a particular manner . The idea of necessary connexion is merely the See also:

REPRODUCTION

reproduction of an impression which the mind feels itself compelled to conceive in a particular manner . Such a fashion of disguising difficulties points, not only to an in-consistency in Hume's theory as stated by himself, but to the initial See also:

ERROR (Lat. error, from errare, to wander, to err)

error upon which it proceeds; for these perplexities are but the consequences of the See also:

DOCTRINE

doctrine that cognition is to be explained on the basis of particular perceptions . These external relations are, in fact, what Hume describes as the natural bonds of connexion among ideas, and, regarded subjectively as principles of association among the facts of mental experience, they form the substitute he offers for the synthesis implied in knowledge .

These principles of association determine the imagination to combine ideas in various modes, and by this See also:

MECHANICAL

mechanical See also:

COMBINATION (Lat. combinare, to combine)

combination Hume, for a time, endeavoured to explain what are otherwise called judgments of relation . It was impossible, however, for him to carry out this view consistently . The only combination which, even in See also:

APPEARANCE (from Lat. apparere, to appear)

appearance, could be explained satisfactorily by its means was the formation of a complex idea out of simpler parts, but the idea of a relation among facts is not accurately described as a complex idea; and, as such relations have no basis in impressions, Hume is finally driven to a confession of the See also:

ABSOLUTE (Lat. absolvere, to loose, set free)

absolute impossibility of explaining them . Such confession, however, is only reached after a vigorous effort had been made to render some account of knowledge by the experimental method . The psychological conception, then, on the basis of which Hume proceeds to discuss the theory of knowledge, is that of conscious experience as containing merely the See also:

SUCCESSION (Lat. successio, from succedere, to follow after)

succession of isolated Assoc/aimpressions and their fainter copies, ideas, and as See also:

BOUND, or BOUNDARY (from O. Fr. bonde, Med. Lat. bodena or butina, a frontier line)

bound t/oa together by merely natural or external links of connexion, the principles of association among ideas . The foundations of cognition must be discovered by observation or analysis of experience so conceived . Hume wavers somewhat in his See also:

DIVISION (from Lat. dividere, to break up into parts, separate)

division of the various kinds of cognition, laying stress now upon one now upon another of the points in which mainly they differ from one another . Nor is it of the first importance, See also:

SAVE, or SAVA (Ger. Sau; Hungarian Szdva; Lat. Savus)

save with the view of criticizing his own consistency, that we should adopt any of the divisions implied in his exposition . For See also:

PRACTICAL

practical purposes we may regard the most important discussions in the Treatise as falling under two heads . In the first place there are certain principles of cognition which appear to rest upon and to See also:

EXPRESS (through the French from the past participle of the Lat. exprimere, to press out, by transference used of representing objects in painting or sculpture, or of thoughts, &c. in words)

express relations of the universal elements in conscious experience, viz. space and time . The propositions of See also:

MATHEMATICS (Gr. /saBnµar1Kil, Sc. vOcvn or E7rlQ