See also:

• CATEGORY (Gr. Karrlyopia, " accusation ")

CATEGORY (Gr. Karrlyopia, " See also:

• ACCUSATION (Lat. accusatio, accusare, to challenge to a causa, a suit or trial at law)

accusation ")  , a See also:

• TERM

term used both in See also:

• ORDINARY (med. Lat. ordinarius, Fr. ordinaire)

ordinary See also:

• LANGUAGE (adapted from the Fr. langage, from langue, tongue, Lat. lingua)

language and, in See also:

• PHILOSOPHY (Gr. gthos, fond of, and vo4 (a, wisdom)

philosophy with the See also:

• GENERAL
• GENERAL (Lat. generalis, of or relating to a genus, kind or class)

general significance of " class " or " See also:

• GROUP

group." In popular language it is used for any large group of similar things, and still more generally as a See also:

• MERE
• MERE, ADALBERT (1838-1909)

mere synonym for the word " class." The word was introduced into philosophy as a technical term by See also:

• ARISTOTLE
• ARISTOTLE (384-322 B.C.)

Aristotle, who, however, several times used it in its See also:

• ORIGINAL

original sense of " See also:

• ACCUSATION (Lat. accusatio, accusare, to challenge to a causa, a suit or trial at law)

accusation . He also used the verb Karrryopeiv, to accuse, in the specific logical sense, to predicate; ra Karrfyopobuevov becomes the predicate; and KarrlyoptKrj irporacns may be translated as affirmative proposition . But though the word thus received a new signification from Aristotle, it is not on that See also:

• ACCOUNT
• ACCOUNT (through O. Fr. acont, Late Lat. comptum, cornputare, to calculate)

account certain that the thing it was taken to signify was equally a novelty in philosophy . In fact we find in the records of 3 For details of this and other See also:

• HINDU

Hindu systems see H . T . See also:

• COLEBROOKE, HENRY THOMAS (1765-1837)

Colebrooke, See also:

• MISCELLANEOUS

Miscellaneous Essays (1837; new ed., E . B . See also:

• COWELL, JOHN (1554—1611)

Cowell, 1873); H . H . See also:

• WILSON, ALEXANDER (1766-1813)
• WILSON, HENRY (1812–1875)
• WILSON, HORACE HAYMAN (1786–1860)
• WILSON, JAMES (1742—1798)
• WILSON, JAMES (1835— )
• WILSON, JAMES HARRISON (1837– )
• WILSON, JOHN (1627-1696)
• WILSON, JOHN (178 1854)
• WILSON, ROBERT (d. 1600)
• WILSON, SIR DANIEL (1816–1892)
• WILSON, SIR ROBERT THOMAS (1777—1849)
• WILSON, SIR WILLIAM JAMES ERASMUS
• WILSON, THOMAS (1663-1755)
• WILSON, THOMAS (c. 1525-1581)
• WILSON, WOODROW (1856— )

Wilson, Essays and Lectures on the Religions of the See also:

• HINDUS

Hindus (186'-1862); Monier See also:

• WILLIAMS
• WILLIAMS, JOHN (1582-1650)
• WILLIAMS, JOHN (1796-1839)
• WILLIAMS, ROGER (c. 1604–1684)
• WILLIAMS, ROWLAND (1817-1870)
• WILLIAMS, SIR WILLIAM FENWICK

Williams, See also:

• INDIAN

Indian See also:

• WISDOM, BOOK OF, or WISDOM OF SOLOMON (Sept. Io4ia IaXwµwvos; Lat. Vulg. Liber sapientiae)

Wisdom (4th ed., 1893) ; A . E . See also:

• GOUGH, HUGH GOUGH, VISCOUNT (1779-1869)
• GOUGH, JOHN BARTHOLOMEW (1817-1886)
• GOUGH, RICHARD (1735-1809)

Gough's Vaiseshika-Sutras (See also:

• BENARES

Benares, 1873), and Philosophy of the Upanishads (See also:

• LONDON

London, 1882,1891) Max See also:

• MULLER, FERDINAND VON, BARON (1825–1896)
• MULLER, FRIEDRICH (1749-1825)
• MULLER, GEORGE (1805-1898)
• MULLER, JOHANNES PETER (18o1-1858)
• MULLER, JOHANNES VON (1752-1809)
• MULLER, JULIUS (18oi-1878)
• MULLER, KARL OTFRIED (1797-1840)
• MULLER, LUCIAN (1836-1898)
• MULLER, WILHELM (1794-1827)
• MULLER, WILLIAM JAMES (1812-1845)

Muller, See also:

• SANSKRIT

Sanskrit Literature, and particularly his appendix to See also:

• THOMSON, JAMES (1822-1892)
• THOMSON, JAMES (1834-1882)
• THOMSON, JAMES (r700-1748)
• THOMSON, JOHN (1778-184o)
• THOMSON, JOSEPH (1858-1895)
• THOMSON, SIR CHARLES WYVILLE (1830-1882)
• THOMSON, THOMAS (1773-1852)
• THOMSON, WILLIAM (1819-189o)

Thomson's See also:

• LAWS

Laws of Thought .

See also:

• ORIENTAL

Oriental, and See also:

• EARLY
• EARLY, JUBAL ANDERSON (1816-1894)

early See also:

• GREEK
• GREEK, ETRUSCAN AND

Greek thought something corresponding to the Aristotelian See also:

• CLASSIFICATION (Lat. classis, a class, probably from the root cal-, cla-, as in Gr. icaMce, clamor)

classification . Our knowledge of Hindu philosophy, and of the relations in which it may have stood to Greek See also:

• SPECULATION

speculation, scarcely enables us to give decisive answers to various questions that natur- Hlndu ally arise on observation of their many resemblances (see philosoph an See also:

• ARTICLE (from Lat. articulus, a joint)

article by See also:

• RICHARD
• RICHARD (d. 1184)
• RICHARD, FRANCOIS MARIE BENJAMIN (18,9-1908)
• RICHARD, HENRY (1812-1888)
• RICHARD, ST

Richard Garbe in Monist, iv . 176-193) . Yet the similarity between the two is so striking that, if not historically connected, they must at least be regarded as expressions of similar philosophic needs . The Hindu classification to which we specially refer is that of Kaneda, who See also:

• LAYS

lays down six categories., or classes of existence, a seventh being generally added by the commentators . The term employed is Paddrlha, meaning " signification of a word." This is in entire See also:

• HARMONY (Gr. dpµovia, a concord of musical sounds, dpA'ew to join; &plan midi (sc. TeXvil)

harmony with the Aristotelian See also:

• DOCTRINE

doctrine, the categories of which may with truth be described as significations of See also:

• SIMPLE

simple terms, See also:

• EA(nar...), (p.s„,.,.)
• EA(psr...), (p, „...)• (pqr...)

ea SeTa anSE/.Ai aumr~OK7~V XEya/LEVa . The six categories of Kaneda are Substance, Quality, See also:

• ACTION

Action, Genus, Individuality, and See also:

• CONCRETION

Concretion or Co-inherence . To these is added Non-Existence, Privation or Negation . Substance is the permanent substance in which Qualities exist . Action, belonging to or inhering in substances, is that which prod'ices See also:

• CHANGE (derived through the Fr. from the Late Lat. cambium, cambiare, to barter; the ultimate derivation is probably from the root which appears in the Gr. «a urmu', to bend)

change, Genus belongs to substance, qualities and actions; there are higher and See also:

• LOWER

lower genera . Individuality, found only in substance, is that by which a thing is self-existent and marked off from others . Concretion or Co-inherence denotes inseparable or necessary connection, such as that between substance and quality .

Under these six classes, yhni Tou ovros, Kaneda then proceeds to range the facts of the universe.' Within Greek philosophy itself there were foreshadowings of the Aristotelian doctrine, but nothing so important as to See also:

• WARRANT (Med. Lat. warantum; O. Fr. garant, warant, derived from O.H.G. root represented in modern German bygewdhren)

warrant the conclusion that Aristotle was directly influenced by it. preek Doubtless the One and Many, Being and Non-Being, of the philosophy . Eleatic See also:

• DIALECTIC, or DIALECTICS

dialectic, with their subordinate oppositions, may be called categories, but they are not so in the Aristotelian sense, and have little or nothing in See also:

• COMMON

common with the later See also:

• SYSTEM

system . Their starting-point and results are wholly diverse . Nor does it appear necessary to do more than ` mention the See also:

• PYTHAGOREAN

Pythagorean table of principles, the number of which is supposed to, have given rise to the decuple arrangement adopted by Aristotle . The two classifications have nothing in common; no term in the one See also:

• LIST (O.E. lisle, a Teutonic word, cf. Dut. lust, Ger. Leiste, adapted in Ital. lista and Fr. lisle)
• LIST, FRIEDRICH (1789-1846)

list appears in. the other; and there is absolutely nothing in the Pythagorean principles which could have led to the theory of the categories.' One naturally turns to See also:

• PLATO

Plato when endeavouring to discover the See also:

• GENESIS
• GENESIS (Gr. 'ybeo-es, becoming; the term being used in English as a synonym for origin or process of coming into being)

genesis of any Aristotelian doctrine, and undoubtedly there are in plat,. the Platonic writings many detached discussions in which the See also:

• MATTER

matter of the categories is touched upon . See also:

• SPECIAL

Special terms also are anticipated at various times, e.g. rou5rts in the Theaetetus, relay and ;raoXEiv in the See also:

• GORGIAS (c. 483–375 B.C.)

Gorgias, and reds TL in the Sophist ? But there does. not seem to be anything in Plato which one could say gave occasion directly and of itself to the Aristotelian doctrine; and even when we take a more comprehensive view of the Platonic system and inquire what in it corresponds to the widest See also:

• DEFINITION (Lat. definitio, from de-finire, to set limits to, describe)

definition of categories, say as ultimate elements of thought and existence, we receive no very definite See also:

• ANSWER (derived from and, against, and the same root as swear)

answer . The Platonic dialectic never worked out into system, and only in two dialogues do we get anything like a list of ultimate or See also:

• ROOT (late O.E. rot, adopted from Scand., cf. Norw. and Swed. rot, Dan. rod; the true O.E. word was wyrt, plant, represented in Ger. Wurz or Wurzel; the ultimate root is the same in both words, and is seen in Lat. radix)
• ROOT, ELIHU (1845– )

root-notions . In the Sophist, Being, See also:

• REST (O. Eng. rest, reste, bed, cognate with other Teutonic forms, e.g. Ger. Rast, Riiste, rest, and probably Gothic Rasta, league, i.e. resting or stopping place)

Rest and See also:

• MOTION (Lat. motio, from movere, to move)
• MOTION, LAWS OF

Motion (rd v abed Kal araacs Kal Ktvne,c are laid down as , iycora rwv yevwp.' To these are presently added the Same and the Other (rabrhv eat Bhrepov), and out of the See also:

• CONSIDERATION (from Lat. considerare, to look at closely, examine, generally taken to be from con-, and the base seen in sidus, sideris, a star, the word being supposed to be originally an astrological or astronomical term)

consideration of all five some See also:

• LIGHT

light is See also:

• CAST (from the verb meaning " to throw "; the word is Scand. in origin, cf. Dan. kaste, and Swed. kasta; " cast " in Middle Eng. took the place of the A.S. weor pan, cf. Ger. werf en)

cast upon the obscure notion of Non-Being (ro in See also:

• LIE, JONAS LAURITZ EDEMIL (1833—1908)
• LIE, MARIUS SOPHUS (1842–1899)

lie) . In the same See also:

• DIALOGUE

dialogue (262 seq.) is found the important distinction of 6vopa and Apia, noun and verb . The Philebus presents us with a totally distinct classification into four elements—the See also:

• INFINITE (from Lat. in, not, finis, end or limit; cf. findere, to deave)

Infinite, the Finite, the Mixture or Unity of both and the Cause of this unity (TO &See also:

• RUPEE (Hindustani rupiya, from Sanskrit rupya)

rupee, r6 wipes, 1) ah qzt cs, 4 atria) . It is at once apparent that, however these classifications are related to one another and to the Platonic system, they lie in a different See also:

• FIELD (a word common to many West German languages, cf. Ger. Feld, Dutch veld, possibly cognate with O.E. f olde, the earth, and ultimately with root of the Gr. irAaror, broad)
• FIELD, CYRUS WEST (1819-1892)
• FIELD, DAVID DUDLEY (18o5-1894)
• FIELD, EUGENE (1850-1895)
• FIELD, FREDERICK (18o1—1885)
• FIELD, HENRY MARTYN (1822-1907)
• FIELD, JOHN (1782—1837)
• FIELD, MARSHALL (183 1906)
• FIELD, NATHAN (1587—1633)
• FIELD, STEPHEN JOHNSON (1816-1899)
• FIELD, WILLIAM VENTRIS FIELD, BARON (1813-1907)

field from that occupied by the Aristotelian categories, and can hardly be said to have anything in common with them .

The Aristotelian doctrine is most distinctly formulated in the See also:

• SHORT, FRANCIS JOB (1857– )

short See also:

• TREATISE

treatise Karnyoplcu, which generally occupies the first See also:

• PLACE (through Fr. from Lat. platea, street; Gr. IrAar6s, wide)

place Aristotle. among the books of the See also:

• ORGANON (Gr. 6pyavov, instrument, from Epyov, work)

Organon . The authenticity of the treatise was doubted in early times by some of the commentators, and the doubts have been revived by such scholars as L . Spengel and Carl Prantl . On the other See also:

• HAND
• HAND (a word common to Teutonic languages; cf. Ger. Hand, Goth. handus)
• HAND, FERDINAND GOTTHELF (1786-185r)

hand, C . A . See also:

• BRANDIS, CHRISTIAN AUGUST (1790–1867)

Brandis, H . See also:

• BONITZ, HERMANN (1814–1888)

Bonitz, and Ed . Zellerare of See also:

• OPINION (Lat. opinio, from opinari, to think)

opinion that the See also:

• TRACT (from Lat. tractare, to treat of a matter, through Provencal tractat and Ital. trattato)

tract is substantially Aristotle's . The matter is hardly' one that can be decided either See also:

• PRO

pro or See also:

• CON

con with anything like certainty; but this is of little moment, for the doctrine of the categories, even of the ten categories, does not stand or fall with only one portion of Aristotle's See also:

• WORKS

works . It is surprising that there should yet be 'so much uncertainty as to the real significance of the categories, and that we should be in nearly See also:

• COMPLETE

complete See also:

• IGNORANCE (Lat. ignorantia, from ignorare, not to know); want of knowledge, a state of mind which in law has important consequences. A well-known legal maxim runs: ignorantia juris non excusat ("ignorance of the law does not excuse")

ignorance as to the See also:

• PROCESS

process of thought by which, Aristotle was led to the doctrine . On both points it is difficult to See also:

• EXTRACT (from Lat. extrahere, to draw out)

extract from the matter before us anything approaching a satisfactory See also:

• SOLUTION (from Lat. solvere, to loosen, dissolve)

solution . The terms employed to denote the categories have been scrutinized with the utmost care, but they give little help .

The most important—K. See also:

• ROD (O.E. rodd, probably related to Norw. rudda, stick, rodda, stake)
• ROD, EDOUARD (1857-1910)

roD Evros or riffs oboists, ytvn ea, 6vTOS or Twv 6erwv, ytv, simply, Td rpwra or rd Kocvh ?I—Ara, aI s-r&o as, or at 6uatptos,S—only indicate that the categories are general classes into which Being as such may be divided, that they are summa genera . The expressions ytvn Twv earnyoptwe and rxivara r%w K., which are used frequently, seem to See also:

• LEAD
• LEAD (pronounced iced)

lead to another and somewhat different view . Karnyopla being taken to mean that which is predicated, ytvn r&v K. would signify the most general classes of predicates, the framework into the divisions of which all predicates must come . To this See also:

• INTERPRETATION (from Lat. interpretari, to expound, explain, inter pres, an agent, go-between, interpreter; inter, between, and the root pret-, possibly connected with that seen either in Greek 4 p4'ew, to speak, or irpa-rrecv, to do)

interpretation there are objections . The categories must be carefully distinguished from See also:

• PREDICABLES (Lat. praedicabilis, that which may be stated or affirmed )

predicables; in' the scholastic phraseology the former refer tofirst intentions, the latter to second intentions, i.e. the one denote real, the other logical connexion . Further, the categories cannot without careful explanation be defined as predicates; they are this and something more . The most important See also:

• CATEGORY (Gr. Karrlyopia, " accusation ")

category, oboist, in one of its aspects cannot be predicate at all . In the Karnyoplau Aristotle prefixes to his enumeration a grammatico-logical disquisition on homonyms and synonyms, and on the elements of the proposition, i.e. subject and predicate . He draws See also:

• ATTENTION (from Lat. ad-tendo, await, expect; the condition of being " stretched " or " tense ")

attention to the fact that things are spoken of either in the connexion known as the proposition, e.g . " a See also:

• MAN
• MAN, ISLE OF (anc. Mona)

man runs," or apart from such connexion, e.g . " man and " runs." He then proceeds, " Of things spoken of apart from their connexion in a proposition' (rwv easel ne6eµtae evurXoten, Xeyoptvwv), each signifies either Substance (obata), or Quantity (roebe), or Quality (oroibv), or Relation (robs et), or Where (i.e . Place, roD), or When (i.e .

See also:

• TIME (0. Eng. Lima, cf. Icel. timi, Swed. timme, hour, Dan. time; from the root also seen in " tide," properly the time of between the flow and ebb of the sea, cf. O. Eng. getidan, to happen, " even-tide," &c.; it is not directly related to Lat. tempus)
• TIME, MEASUREMENT OF
• TIME, STANDARD

Time, See also:

• WORK

work), or Position (KELOBau), or See also:

• POSSESSION
• POSSESSION (Lat. possessio, possidere, to possess)

Possession (Execv), or Action (roeeio), or See also:

• PASSION (post-classical Lat. passio, formed from pati, passus, to suffer, endure)

Passion(rterxecv). oboist, the first category, is subdivided into rpcirn See also:

• ELM

elm-la or See also:

• PRIMARY

primary substance, which is defined to be r6Ee re, the singular thing in which properties inhere, and to which predicates are attached, and 6ebeepar ' The supposed origin of that theory in the treatise wept roD ravrhs, ascribed to See also:

• ARCHYTAS (c. 428—347 B.C.)

Archytas (q.v.), has been proved to be an See also:

• ERROR (Lat. error, from errare, to wander, to err)

error . The treatise itself See also:

• DATES

dates in all See also:

• PROBABILITY (Lat. probabilis, probable or credible)

probability from the Neo-Pythagorean See also:

• SCHOOLS

schools of the 2nd See also:

• CENTURY (from Lat. centuria, a division of a hundred men)

century A.D . 3 Prantl, Ges. der Logik, i . 74-75; F . A . See also:

• TRENDELENBURG, FRIEDRICH ADOLF (1802-1872)

Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, 209. n . $ Seph . 284 D.shelve, genera or See also:

• SPECIES

species which can be predicated of primary substances, and are therefore See also:

• DOLE
• DOLE (from Old Eng. dal, cf. mod. " deal ")

dole only in a secondary sense . Nevertheless, they too, after a certain See also:

• FASHION (adapted from Fr. facon, agon, Lat. factio, making, facere, to do or make)

fashion, signify the singular thing' r6Ee rL (K. p . 3 b 12, 13) . It is this doctrine of arpraTrl o6ota that has raised doubts with regard to the authenticity of the Karnyopta, . But the tenfold classification, which has also been captiously objected to, is given in an acknowledged See also:

• WRITING
• WRITING (the verbal noun of " to write," O. Eng. writan, to inscribe)

writing of Aristotle's (see Topica, i .

9, p . 103 b 20).4 At the same time it is at least remarkable that in two places where the enumeration seems intended to be complete (Met. p.1017 a 25; An . Pos. i . 22, p . 83 a 21), only eight are mentioned, fxeuv and eelrBa, being omitted . In other passages' six, five, four, and three are given, frequently with some addition, such as Kal at WXXau K . It is also to be observed that, despite of this wavering, distinct intimations are given by Aristotle that he regarded his list as complete, and he uses phrases which would seem to indicate that the See also:

• DIVISION (from Lat. dividere, to break up into parts, separate)

division had been exhaustively carried out . He admits certainly that some predicates which come under one category might be referred to another, but he declines to deduce all from one highest class, or to recognize any relation of subordination among the several classes . The full import of the categories will never be adequately reached from the point of view taken up in the KarnyoplaL, which bears all the marks of an early and preliminary study . For true understanding we must turn to the See also:

• METAPHYSICS
• METAPHYSICS, or METAPHYSIC (from Gr. /sera, after, d v med, things of nature, lots, i.e. the natural universe)

Metaphysics, where the doctrine is handled at large . The discussion of Being in that work starts with a distinction that at once gives us a See also:

• CLUE

clue. re Ev is spoken of in many ways; of these four are classified—rh 6v KaTa OTI.OE,fK6S, Td 61, thy AXn9ts, rd Se hvi' sL Kal tveryelq., and rh 6v Kara ih exihuaTQ TCUY See also:

• EAR (common Teut.; O.E. are, Ger. Ohr, Du. oor, akin to Lat. auris, Gr. ovs)

ear optws . It is evident from this that the categories can be regarded neither as purely logical nor as purely metaphysical elements.' They indicate the general forms or ways in which Being can be predicated; they are determinations of Being regarded as an See also:

• OBJECT

object of thought, and consequently as matter of speech .

It becomes apparent also why the See also:

• ANALYSIS (Gr. avci and Meta, to break up into parts)

analysis of the categories starts from the singular thing, for it is the primary See also:

• FORM (Lat. forma)

form under which all that is becomes object of knowledge, and the other categories modify or qualify this real individual . Ilavra 6t Th, ytyvoµeva See also:

• ORB

orb rt See also:

• RIVES, WILLIAM CABELL (1793-1868)

rives ytyvETO.L Kai EK eons Kal TI . Td Et ri Xtyw Kab' lKhaTnv Karnyoplav 4 yap T6Ee fl ovate, 4 'nude 4 roD (Met. p . I032 a 13-18) . . The categories, therefore, are not logical forms, but real predicates; they are the general modes in which Being may be expressed . The definite thing, that which comes forward in the process from potentiality to full actuality, can only appear and be spoken of under forms of individuality, quality, quantity and so on . The nine later categories all denote entity in a certain imperfect fashion . The categories then are not to be regarded as heads of predicates, the framework into which predicates can be thrown . They are real determinations of Being—allgemeine Bestimmtheiten, as See also:

• HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1770-1831)

Hegel calls them . They are not summa genera of existences, still less are they to be explained as a classification of namable things in general . The objections See also:

• MILL
• MILL (O. Eng. mylen, later myln, or miln, adapted from the late Lat. molina, cf. Fr. moulin, from Lat. mola, a mill, molere, to grind; from the same root, mol, is derived " meal;" the word appears in other Teutonic languages, cf. Du. molen, Ger. muhle)
• MILL, JAMES (1773-1836)
• MILL, JOHN (c. 1645–1707)
• MILL, JOHN STUART (1806-1873)

Mill has taken to the list are entirely irrelevant, and would only have significance if the categories were really—what they are not—an exhaustive division of See also:

• CONCRETE
• CONCRETE (Lat. concretes, participle of concrescere, to grow together)

concrete existences . See also:

• GROTE, GEORGE (1794–1871)

Grote's view (Aristotle, i .

Io8) that Aristotle See also:

• DREW
• DREW, SAMUEL (1765-1833)

drew up his list by examining various popular propositions, and throwing the different predicates into genera, " according as they stood in different logical relation to the subject," has no See also:

• FOUNDATION (Lat. fundatio, from fundare, to found)

foundation . The relation of the predicate category to the subject is not entirely a logical one; it is a relation of real existence, and wants the essential marks of the propositional form . The logical relations of Tb Ev are provided for otherwise than by the categories . Aristotle has given no intimation of the course of thought by which he was led to his tenfold arrangement, and it seems hopeless to discover it . Trendelenburg in various essays has worked out the See also:

• IDEA (Gr. Ibia, connected with i&eiv, to see; cf. Lat. species from specere, to look at)

idea that the root of the matter is to be found in grammatical considerations, that the categories originated from investigations into grammatical functions, and that a See also:

• CORRESPONDENCE
• CORRESPONDENCE (from med. scholastic Lat. correspondentia, corrcspondere, compounded of Lat. cum, with, and respond ere, to answer; cf. Fr. correspondance)

correspondence will be found to obtain between categories and parts of speech . Thus, Substance corresponds to noun substantive, Quantity and Quality to the See also:

• ADJECTIVE (from the Lat. adjectives, added)

adjective, Relation partly to the See also:

• COMPARATIVE

comparative degree and perhaps to the pre-position, When and Where to the adverbs of time and place, Action to the active, Passion to the passive of the verb, Position (Keio8cu) to the intransitive verb, Ixsiv to the See also:

• PECULIAR

peculiar Greek perfect . That there should be a very See also:

• CLOSE
• CLOSE (from Lat. clausum, shut)
• CLOSE, MAXWELL HENRY (1822-1903)

close correspondence between the categories and grammatical elements is by no means surprising; that the one were deduced from the other is both philosophically and historically improbable . Reference to the detailed criticisms of Trendelenburg by See also:

• RITTER, HEINRICH (1791-1869)
• RITTER, KARL (1779–1859)

Ritter, Bonitz, and See also:

• ZELLER, EDUARD (1814-1908)

Zeller will be sufficient . Aristotle has also See also:

• LEFT

left us in doubt on another point . Why should there be only ten categories? and why should' these be the ten ? See also:

• KANT, IMMANUEL (1724-1804)

Kant and Hegel, it is well known, signalize as the See also:

• GREAT

great defect in the Aristotelian categories the want of a principle, and yet some of Aristotle's expressions would warrant the inference that he had a principle, and that he thought his arrangement exhaustive . The leading idea of all later attempts at reduction to unity of principle, Against this passage even Prantl can raise no objection of any moment ; see See also:

• GEE, THOMAS (1815—1898)

Gee. der Logik, i, 206. n .

' See Bonitz, See also:

• INDEX

Index Aristotelicus, s.v., anff Prantl, Ges. der Logik, i . 207 . the division into substance and See also:

• ACCIDENT
• ACCIDENT (from Lat. accidere, to happen)

accident, was undoubtedly not overlooked by Aristotle, and Fr . See also:

• BRENTANO, KLEMENS (1778-1842)
• BRENTANO, LUDWIG JOSEPH [called Lujo]

Brentano' has collected with great See also:

• DILIGENCE

diligence passages which indicate how the complete list might have been deduced from this primary distinction . His See also:

• TABULAR

tabular arrangements (pp . 175, 177) are particularly deserving of attention . The results, however, are hardly beyond the reach of doubt . There was no fundamental change in the doctrine of the categories from the time of Aristotle to that of Kant, and only two proposed Later reclassifications are of such importance as to require Greek See also:

• NOTICE

notice . The See also:

• STOICS

Stoics adopted a fivefold arrangement of highest classes, yevLKL'orara . TO OP or Ti, Being, or some-what in general, was subdivided into 67rossipsva or subjects, See also:

• TROIA

Troia or qualities in general, which give definiteness to the See also:

• BLANK (from the Fr. blanc, white)

blank subject,7rc,s EXovra, modes which further determine the subject, and robs TL 7rurs Exovra, definite relative modes . These categories are so related that each involves the existence of one higher than itself, thus there cannot be a wpbs rL 'See also:

• RIOT (0. Fr. riote, of uncertain etymology)

riot EXov which does not rest upon or imply a ran EXov, but 7rws EXov is impossible without rotas, which only exists in inaoKEtpevov, a form or phase of rb 6v.2 See also:

• PLOTINUS (A.D. 204-270)

Plotinus, after a lengthy critique of Aristotle's categories, sets out a twofold list . TO EV, K[V7)0sc, oriuts, TabTbT77S, 1TEp6T77S are the See also:

• PRIMITIVE

primitive categories (7rpwra yEVn) of the intelligible See also:

• SPHERE (Gr. vclsa?pa, a ball or globe)

sphere. stria, wpbs TL, 7roLa, 7rorbs, Kb /7t "LS are the categories of the sensible See also:

• WORLD

world .

The return to the Platonic classification will not See also:

• ESCAPE (in mid. Eng. eschape or escape, from the O. Fr. eschapper, modern echapper, and escaper, low Lat. escapium, from ex, out of, and cappa, cape, cloak; cf. for the sense development the Gr. iichueoOat, literally to put off one's clothes, hence to sli

escape notice . See also:

• MODERN

Modern philosophy, neglecting altogether the dry and tasteless treatment of the Aristotelian doctrine by scholastic writers, gave a Modern new, a wider and deeper meaning to the categories. philosophy . They now appear as ultimate or root notions, the See also:

• META

meta- See also:

• PHYSICAL

physical or thought elements, which give coherence and consistency to the material of knowledge, the necessary and universal relations which obtain among the particulars of experience . There was thus to some extent a return to See also:

• PLATONISM

Platonism, but in reality, as might easily be shown, the new interpretation was, with due See also:

• ALLOWANCE (from "allow,' derived through 0. Fr. alouer from the two Lat. origins adlaudare, to praise, and allocare, to assign a place; so that the English word combined the general idea of "assigning with approval")

allowance for difference in point of view, in strict harmony with the true doctrine of Aristotle . The modern theory dates in particular from the time of Kant, who may be said to have reintroduced the term into philosophy . Naturally there are some anticipations in earlier thinkers . The Substance, Attribute and Mode of See also:

• CARTESIANISM

Cartesianism can hardly be classed among the categories; nor does See also:

• LEIBNITZ (LEIBNIZ), GOTTFRIED WILHELM

Leibnitz's See also:

• CHANCE (through the O. Fr. cheance, from the Late Lat. cadentia, things happening, from cadere, to fall out, happen; cf. " case ")

chance See also:

• SUGGESTION

suggestion of a fivefold arrangement into Substance, Quantity, Quality, Action and Passion, and Relations, demand any particular notice . See also:

• LOCKE, GOTTFRIED CHRISTIAN FRIEDRICH (1791–1855)
• LOCKE, JOHN (1632-1704)
• LOCKE, MATTHEW (c. 1630-1677)

Locke, too, has a classification into Substances, Modes and Relations, but in it he has manifestly no intention of See also:

• DRAWING

drawing up a table of categories . What in his system corresponds most nearly to the modern view of these elements is the division of kinds of real See also:

• PREDICATION (from Lat. praedicare, to state, assert)

predication . In all judgments of knowledge we predicate either (I) Identity or Diversity, (2) Relation, (3) Co-existence, or necessary connexion, or (4) Real existence . From this the transition was easy to See also:

• HUME, ALEXANDER (c. 1557-1609)
• HUME, DAVID (1711-1776)
• HUME, JOSEPH (1777-1855)

Hume's important classification of philosophical relations into those of Resemblance, Identity, Time and Place, Quantity or Number, Quality, Contrariety, Cause and Effect . These attempts at an exhaustive See also:

• DISTRIBUTION (Lat. distribuere, to deal out)

distribution of the necessary relations of all See also:

• OBJECTS

objects of knowledge indicate the direction taken by modern thought, before it received its complete expression from Kant .

The doctrine of the categories is the very See also:

• KERNEL (O.E. cyrnel, a diminutive of " corn," seed, grain)

kernel of the Kantian system, and, through it, of later See also:

• GERMAN
• GERMAN, DUTCH AND SCANDINAVIAN

German philosophy . To explain Kant. it fully would be to write the See also:

• HISTORY

history of that philosophy . The categories are called by Kant Root-notions of the Understanding (Stammbegriffe See also:

• DES

des Verstandes), and are briefly the specific forms of the a priori or formal See also:

• ELEMENT (Lat. elementum)

element in rational See also:

• COGNITION (Latin cognitio, from cognoscere, to become acquainted with)

cognition . It is this distinction of matter and form in knowledge that marks off the Kantian from the Aristotelian doctrine . To Kant knowledge was only possible as the See also:

• SYNTHESIS (Gr. a6vOeacs, from avvrcBivac, to put together)

synthesis of the material or a posteriori with the formal or a priori . The material to which a priori forms of the understanding were applied was the sensuous content of the pure intuitions, Time and Space . This content could not be known by sense, but only by intellectual See also:

• FUNCTION

function . But the understanding in the process of knowledge makes use of the universal form of synthesis, the See also:

• JUDGMENT

judgment; intellectual function is essentially of the nature of judgment or the reduction of a manifold to unity through a conception . The specific or type forms of such function will, therefore, be expressed in judgments; and a complete classification of the forms of judgments is the See also:

• KEY
• KEY (in O. Eng. tang; the ultimate origin of the word is unknown; it appears only in Old Frisian kei of other Teutonic languages; until the end of the 17th century the pronunciation was kay, as in other words in O. Eng. ending in aeg; cf. daeg, day; clang
• KEY (the phraseograms being indicated by hyphens)
• KEY, SIR ASTLEY COOPER (1821-1888)
• KEY, THOMAS HEWITT (1799-1875)

key by which one may See also:

• HOPE, ANTHONY
• HOPE, THOMAS (c. 1770-1831)

hope to discover the system of categories . Such a list of judgments Kant thought he found in ordinary See also:

• LOGIC (Xoy1K7, sc. rixvrt, the art of reasoning)

logic, and from it he drew up his well-known See also:

• SCHEME (Lat. schema, Gr. oxfjya, figure, form, from the root axe, seen in exeiv, to have, hold, to be of such shape, form, &c.)

scheme of the twelve categories . These forms are the determinations of all objects of experience, for it is only through them that the manifold of sense can be reduced to the unity of consciousness, and thereby constituted experience . They are a priori conditions, subjective in one sense, but See also:

• OBJECTIVE, or OBJECT GLASS

objective as being universal, necessary and constitutive of experience .

The table of logical judgments with corresponding categories is as follows ' Brentano, Bedeutung des Seienden Hach A., pp . 148-178 . 2 For detailed examination of the Stoic categories, see Prantl, Ges. d . Logik, i . 428 sqq.; Zeller, Ph. d . Griech. iii. i, 82, sqq.; Trendelenburg, Kateg. p . 217 . Judgments . Categories . Universal . Unity . Particular Of Quantity See also:

• PLURALITY (0. Fr. pluralitd, Late Lat. pluralitas, plural number)

Plurality .

Singular . . Totality . Affirmative Reality . IL Negative Of Quality Negation . Infinite . See also:

• LIMITATION, STATUTES OF

Limitation . Categorical . Inherence and Subsistence III . (Substance and Accident) . Hypothetical Of Relation Causality and Dependence (Cause and Effect) . Disjunctive . Community (See also:

• RECIPROCITY (Lat. reciprocus, returning back the same way, alternating, probably from re back and pro forward)

Reciprocity) .

Problematical Possibility and Impossibility . Iv . Assertoric Existence and Non-Existence . . f Of Modality See also:

• APODICTIC (Gr. aroSeucTLK6r, capable of demonstration)

Apodictic . See also:

• NECESSITY (Lat. necessitas)

Necessity and Contingency . Kant, it is well known, criticizes Aristotle severely for having See also:

• DRAWN

drawn up his categories without a principle, and claims to have disclosed the only possible method by which an exhaustive classification might be obtained . What he criticized in Aristotle is brought against his own See also:

• PROCEDURE (Fr. procedure, from Lat. procedere, to go for-ward)

procedure by the later German thinkers, particularly See also:

• FICHTE, IMMANUEL HERMANN (originally HARTMANN) VON (1797-1879)
• FICHTE, JOHANN GOTTLIEB (1762-1814)

Fichte and Hegel . And in point of fact it cannot be denied that Kant has allowed too much completeness to the ordinary logical distribution of propositions; he has given no See also:

• PROOF (in M. Eng. preove, proeve, preve, &°c., from O. Fr . prueve, proeve, &c., mod. preuve, Late. Lat. proba, probate, to prove, to test the goodness of anything, probus, good)

proof that in these forms are contained all species of synthesis, and in consequence he has failed to show that in the categories, or pure conceptions, are contained all the modes of a priori synthesis . Further, his principle has so far the unity he claimed for it, the unity of a single function, but the specific forms in which such unity manifests itself are not themselves accounted for by this principle . Kant himself hints more than once at the possibility of a completely rational system of the categories, at an See also:

• EVOLUTION

evolution from one single See also:

• MOVEMENT

movement of thought, and in his Remarks on the Table of the Categories gave a pregnant hint as to the method to be employed . From any complete realization of this suggestion Kant, however, was precluded by one portion of his theory . The categories, although the necessary conditions under which alone an object of experience can be thrown, are merely forms of the mind's own activity; they apply only to sensuous and consequently subjective material .

Outside of and beyond them lies the thing-in-itself, which to Kant represented the ultimately real . This See also:

• SUBJECTIVISM

subjectivism was a distinct See also:

• HIATUS (Lat. for gaping, or gap)

hiatus in the Kantian system, and against it principally Fichte and Hegel directed See also:

• CRITICISM
• CRITICISM (from the Gr. KpiTrlS, a judge, Kpivew, to decide, to give an authoritative opinion)

criticism . It was See also:

• MANIFEST (Lat. manifestus, clear, open to view)

manifest that at the root of the whole system of categories there See also:

• LAY

lay the synthetizing unity of self- Fichte. consciousness, and it was upon this unity that Fichte fixed as giving the possibility of a more complete and rigorous See also:

• DEDUCTION (from Lat. deducere, to take or lead from or out of, derive)

deduction of the pure notions of the understanding . Without the See also:

• ACT (Lat. actus, actum)

act of the Ego, whereby it is self-conscious, there could be no knowledge, and this primitive act or function must be, he saw, the position or See also:

• AFFIRMATION (from Lat. affirmare, to assert)

affirmation of itself by the Ego . The first principle then must be that the Ego posits itself as the Ego, that Ego =Ego, a principle which is unconditioned both in form and matter, and therefore capable of See also:

• STANDING

standing absolutely first, of being the See also:

• ARIUS ("Apews)

Arius in a system . Meta-physically regarded this act of self-position yields the categories of Reality . But, so far as matter is concerned, there cannot be affirmation without negation, omnis determinatio est negatio . The determination of the Ego presupposes or involves the Non-Ego . The form of the proposition in which this second act takes to itself expression, the Ego is not = Not-Ego, is unconditioned, not derivable from the first . It is the See also:

• ABSOLUTE (Lat. absolvere, to loose, set free)

absolute See also:

• ANTITHESIS (the Greek for " setting opposite ")

antithesis to the primitive thesis . The category of Negation is the result of this second act . From these two propositions, involving absolutely opposed and mutually destructive elements, there results a third which reconciles both in a higher synthesis .

The notion in this third is determination or limitation; the Ego and Non-Ego limit, and are opposed to one another . From these three positions Fichte proceeds to evolve the categories by a See also:

• SERIES (a Latin word from serere, to join)

series of thesis, antithesis and synthesis . In thus seizing upon the unity of self-consciousness as the origin for systematic development, Fichte has clearly taken a step in advance of, and yet in strict harmony with, the Kantian doctrine . For, after all that can be said as to the demonstrated See also:

• CHARACTER (Gr. xapareri7p, from xap&crew, to scratch)

character of formal logic, Kant's procedure was empirical, and only after the list of categories had been drawn out, did he bring forward into prominence what gave them coherence and reality . The peculiar method of Fichte, also, was nothing but a consistent application of Kant's own Remark on the Table of the Categories . Fichte's doctrine, however, is open to some of the objections advanced against Kant . His method is too abstract and See also:

• EXTERNAL

external, and wants the unity of a single principle . The first two of his fundamental propositions stand isolated from one another, not to be resolved into a primitive unity . With him, too, the whole stands yet on the See also:

• PLANE

plane of subjectivity . He speaks, indeed, of the universal Ego as distinct from the empirical self-consciousness; but the universal does not rise with him to concrete spirit . Nevertheless the Wissenschaftslehre contains the only real advance in the treatment of the categories from the time of Kant to that of Hegel.' This, of 2 It does not seem necessary to do more than refer to the slight alterations made on Kant's Table of Categories by J . G. von See also:

• HERDER, JOHANN GOTTFRIED VON (1744-1803)

Herder (in the Metakritik), by See also:

• SOLOMON, ODES OF
• SOLOMON, PSALMS OF

Solomon Malmon (in the Propadeutik zu einer course, does not imply that there were not certain elements in See also:

• SCHELLING, FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH VON (1775-1854)
• SCHELLING, KAROLINE (1763-1809)

Schelling, particularly in the Transcendental See also:

• IDEALISM (from Gr. i5Ea, archetype or model, through been urged of the truth of its point of view is the persistency Fr. idealisme)

Idealism, that are of value in the transition to the later system; but on the whole it is only in Hegel that the whole matter of the Kantian categories has been assimilated and carried to a higher See also:

• STAGE (Fr. 6/age; from Lat. stare, to stand)

stage .

The Hegelian philosophy, in brief, is a system of the categories; and, as it is not intended here to expound that philosophy, it is impossible to give more than a few general and quite external observations as to the Hegelian mode of viewing these elements of thought . With Kant, as has been seen, the categories were still subjective, not as being forms of the individual subject, but as having over against them the world of noumena to which they were inapplicable . Self-consciousness, which was, even with Kant, the nodus or kernel whence the categories sprang, was nothing but a logical centre,—the reality was concealed . There was thus a See also:

• DUALISM (from rare Lat. dualis, containing two, from duo)

dualism, to overcome which is the first step in the Hegelian system . The principle, if there is to be one, must be universally applicable, all-comprehensive . Self-consciousness is precisely the principle wanted ; it is a unity, an identity, containing in itself a multiplicity . The universal in absolute self-consciousness is just pure thinking, which in systematic evolution is the categories; the particular is the natural or multiform, the external as such; the concrete of both is spirit, or self-consciousness come to itself . The same See also:

• LAW
• LAW (0. Eng. lagu, M. Eng. lawe; from an old Teutonic root lag, " lie," what lies fixed or evenly; cf. Lat. lex, Fr. loi)
• LAW, JOHN (1671—1729)
• LAW, WILLIAM (1686-1761)

law that obtains among the categories is found adequate to an explanation of the external thing which had so sadly troubled Kant . The categories themselves are moments of the universal of thought, type forms, or definite aspects which thought assumes; determinations, Bestimmungen, as Hegel most frequently calls them . They evolve by the same law that was found to be the essence of ultimate reality—i.e. of self-consciousness . The complete system is pure thought, the Universal See also:

• PAR (Lat. par, equal)

par excellence . After the Hegelian there can hardly be said to have been a philosophical treatment of the categories in See also:

• GERMANY
• GERMANY (Ger. Deutschland)

Germany which is not more or less a criticism of that system .

It does not seem necessary to mention the unimportant modifications introduced by Kuno See also:

• FISCHER
• FISCHER, EMIL (1852– )
• FISCHER, ERNST KUNO BERTHOLD (1824–1907)

Fischer, J . E . See also:

• ERDMANN
• ERDMANN, JOHANN EDUARD (1805-1892)

Erdmann, or others belonging to the school . In the strongly-opposed philosophy of J . F . See also:

• HERBART, JOHANN FRIEDRICH (1776-1841)

Herbart the categories can hardly be said to hold a prominent place . They are, with him, the most general notions which are psychologically formed, and he classifies them as follows:—(1) Thing, either as product of thought or as given in experience; (2) See also:

• PROPERTY

Property, either qualitative or quantitative; (3) Relation; (4) The Negated . Along with these he posits as categories of inner process—(1) Sensation, (2) Cognition, (3) Will, (4) Action . Joh . Fr . L . See also:

• GEORGE
• GEORGE, 8TH MARQUESS OF TWEEDDALE (1787-1876)
• GEORGE, HENRY (1839—1897)
• GEORGE, LAKE
• GEORGE, SAINT (d. 303)

George (1811-1873),' who in the See also:

• MAIN (from the Aryan root which appears in " may " and " might," and Lat. magnus, great)
• MAIN (Lat. Moenus)

main follows See also:

• SCHLEIERMACHER, FRIEDRICH DANIEL ERNST (1768-1834)

Schleiermacher, draws out a table of categories which shows, in some points, traces of Herbartian See also:

• INFLUENCE (Late Lat. influentia, from influere, to flow in)

influence .

His arrangement by enneads, or series of nine, is fanciful, and wanting in inner principle . The most imposing of more See also:

• RECENT

recent attempts at a reconstruction of the categories is that of F . A . Trendelenburg . To him the first Trendelen- principle, or primitive reality, is Motion, which is both See also:

• BURG

burg. real as external movement, and ideal as inner construction . The necessary conditions of Motion are Time and Space, which are both subjective and objective . From this point onwards are See also:

• DEVELOPED

developed the mathematical (point, See also:

• LINE

line, &c.) and real (causality, substance, quantity, quality, &c.) categories which appear as involved in the notion of motion . Matter cannot be regarded as a product of motion; it is the See also:

• CONDITION (Lat. condicio, from condicere, to agree upon, arrange; not connected with conditio, from condere, conditum, to put together)

condition of motion, we must think something moved . All these categories, " under the presupposition of motion as the first See also:

• ENERGY (from the Gr. ivipyela; iv, in, ipyov, work)

energy of thought, are ideal and subjective relations; as also, under the presupposition of motion as the first energy of Being, real and objective relations."' A serious difficulty presents itself in the next category, that of End (Zweck), which can easily be thought for inner activity, but can hardly be reconciled with real motion . Trendelenburg solves the difficulty only empiric-ally, by pointing to the insufficiency of the merely See also:

• MECHANICAL

mechanical to account for the organic . The consideration of Modality effects the transition to the forms of logical thought . On the whole, Trendelenburg's unique fact of motion seems rather a blunder .

There is much more involved than he is willing to allow, and motion per se is by no means adequate to self-consciousness . His theory has found little favour . See also:

• HERMANN, JOHANN GOTTFRIED JAKOB (1772–1848)
• HERMANN, KARL FRIEDRICH (1804–1855)

Hermann See also:

• ULRICI, HERMANN (1806-1884)

Ulrici works out a system of the categories from a psychological or logical point of view . To him the fundamental UlricL fact of philosophy is the distinguishing activity (unter- scheidende Tatigkeit) of thought . Thought is only possible by distinction, difference . The fixed points in the relations of objects upon which this activity turns are the categories, which may be called the forms or laws of thought . They are the aspects of things, notions under which things must be brought, in See also:

• ORDER
• ORDER (through Fr. ordre, for earlier ordene, from Lat. ordo, ordinis, rank, service, arrangement; the ultimate source is generally taken to be the root seen in Lat. oriri, rise, arise, begin; cf. " origin ")
• ORDER, HOLY

order to become neuen Theorie des Denkens), by J . F . See also:

• FRIES
• FRIES, ELIAS MAGNUS (1794–1878)
• FRIES, JOHN (c. 1764-1825)

Fries (in the Neue Kritik der Vernunft), or by See also:

• SCHOPENHAUER, ARTHUR (1788-186o)

Schopenhauer, who desired to reduce all the categories to one—that of Causality . We should require a new philosophical vocabulary even to translate the extraordinary compounds in which K . C . F .

See also:

• KRAUSE, KARL CHRISTIAN FRIEDRICH (1781—1832)

Krause expounds his theory of the categories . Notices of the changes introduced by See also:

• ANTONIO
• ANTONIO (1429—1498)
• ANTONIO, NICOLAS (1617-1684)

Antonio Rosmini-Serbati, and of Vincenzo See also:

• GIOBERTI, VINCENZO (18oI-1852)

Gioberti's remarkable theory, will be found in Ragnisco's work referred to below . 1 System der Metaphysik (1844) . 2 Logische Untersuchungen, i . 376-377.objects of thought . They are thus the most general predicates or heads of predicates . The categories cannot be completely gathered from experience, nor can they be evolved a priori; but, by attending to the general relations of thought and its purely indefinite matter, and examining what we must predicate in order to know Being, we may attain to a satisfactory list . Such a list is given in great detail in the System der Logik (1852), and in briefer, preciser form in the Compendium der Logik (2nd ed., 1872); it is in many points well deserving of attention . The definition of the categories by the able See also:

• FRENCH
• FRENCH, DANIEL CHESTER (1850– )
• FRENCH, NICHOLAS (1604-1678)

French logician See also:

• CHARLES
• CHARLES (1270-1325)
• CHARLES (1421-1461)
• CHARLES (1525-1574)
• CHARLES (c. 1319-1364)
• CHARLES (Fr. Charles; Span. Carlos; Ital. Carlo; Ger. Karl; derived from O.H.G. Charal,latinized as Carolus, meaning originally " man ": cf. Mod.Ger., Kerl," fellow," A.S. ceorl, Mod. Eng. " churl ")
• CHARLES (KARL EITEL ZEPHYRIN LUDWIG; in Rum. CAROL)
• CHARLES [KARL ALEXANDER] (1712-1780)
• CHARLES, ELIZABETH (1828-1896)
• CHARLES, JACQUES ALEXANDRE CESAR (1746-1823)
• CHARLES, THOMAS (1755-1814)

Charles See also:

• BERNARD, CHARLES DE
• BERNARD, CLAUDE (1813-1878)
• BERNARD, JACQUES (1658--1718)
• BERNARD, MOUNTAGUE (1S2o—1882)
• BERNARD, SAINT
• BERNARD, SAINT (Iogo-1153)
• BERNARD, SIMON (1779—1839)
• BERNARD, SIR THOMAS, BART

Bernard See also:

• RENOUVIER, CHARLES BERNARD (1815-1903)

Renouvier in some respects resembles that of Ulrici . To him the primitive fact is Relation, of which all the cate- Renouvler, gories are but forms . " The categories," he says, " are the See also:

• RENO

Reno primary and irreducible laws of knowledge, the funda- See also:

• MENTAL

mental HamJJton, relations which determine its form and regulate its MIJJ movements." His table and his criticism of the Kantian theory are both of See also:

• INTEREST

interest.' The criticism of Kant's categories by See also:

• COUSIN (Fr. cousin, Ital. cugino, Late Lat. cosinus, perhaps a popular and familiar abbreviation of consobrinus, which has the same sense in classical Latin)
• COUSIN, JEAN (1500-1590)
• COUSIN, VICTOR (1792–1867)

Cousin and his own attempted classification are of no importance . Of little more value is the elaborate table drawn out by See also:

• SIR

Sir W .

See also:

• HAMILTON
• HAMILTON (GRAND or ASHUANIPI)
• HAMILTON, ALEXANDER (1757-1804)
• HAMILTON, ANTHONY, or ANTOINE (1646-1720)
• HAMILTON, ELIZABETH (1758–1816)
• HAMILTON, EMMA, LADY (c. 1765-1815)
• HAMILTON, JAMES (1769-1831)
• HAMILTON, JAMES HAMILTON, 1ST DUKE OF (1606-1649)
• HAMILTON, JOHN (c. 1511–1571)
• HAMILTON, MARQUESSES AND DUKES OF
• HAMILTON, PATRICK (1504-1528)
• HAMILTON, ROBERT (1743-1829)
• HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM
• HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM (1730-1803)
• HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM ROWAN (1805-1865)
• HAMILTON, THOMAS (1789-1842)
• HAMILTON, WILLIAM (1704-1754)
• HAMILTON, WILLIAM GERARD (1729-1796)

Hamilton.' The generalized category of the Conditioned has but little meaning, and the subordinate categories evolve themselves by no principle, but are arranged after a formal and quite arbitrary manner . They are never brought into connexion with thought itself, nor could they be shown to See also:

• SPRING (from " to spring," " to leap or jump up," " burst out," O. Eng., springau, a common Teut. word, cf. Ger. springer, possibly allied to Gr. QnrFpxecOac, to move rapidly)

spring from its nature and relations . J . S Mill presented, " as a substitute for the abortive classification of Existences, termed the categories of Aristotle," the following as an enumeration of all nameable things: (1) Feelings, or states of consciousness; (2) The minds which experience these feelings; (3) Bodies, or external objects which excite certain of those feelings; (4) Successions and co-existences, likenesses and unlikenesses, between feelings or states of consciousness.' This classification proceeds on a quite peculiar view of the categories, and is here presented only for the See also:

• SAKE

sake of completeness . By modern psychologists the subject has been closely investigated . See also:

• PROFESSOR (the Latin noun formed from the verb profiteri, to declare publicly, to acknowledge, profess)

Professor G . F . Stout (See also:

• MANUAL

Manual of See also:

• PSYCHOLOGY
• PSYCHOLOGY (>Guxrl, the mind or soul, and X yos, theory)

Psychology, vol. ii. pp . 312 See also:

• FOIL

foil.) defines categories as " forms of cognitive consciousness, modern universal principles or relations presupposed either in all psycholocognition or in all cognition of a certain See also:

• KIND (O. E. ge-cynde, from the same root as is seen in " kin," supra)

kind." He then gists. treats External (or Physical) Reality, Space, Time, Causality and " Thinghood " from the standpoint of the perceptual consciousness; showing in what sense the categories of causality, substance and the rest exist in the sphere of See also:

• PERCEPTION (from Lat. percipere, to perceive)

perception . As contrasted with the ideational, the perceptual consciousness is concerned with practice . Perception tells the See also:

• CHILD
• CHILD, FRANCIS JAMES (1825-1896)
• CHILD, L
• CHILD, LYDIA MARIA (1802-1880)
• CHILD, SIR FRANCIS (1642-1713)
• CHILD, SIR JOHN (d. 1690)
• CHILD, SIR JOSIAH (163o - 1699)

child of things as See also:

• SEPARATE

separate entities, not in their ultimate relations as parts of a coherent whole . G .

T . See also:

• LADD, GEORGE TRUMBULL (1842– )

Ladd (Psychology Descriptive and Explanatory, ch. xxi., on " Space, Time and Causality ") defines the categories from the psychological standpoint as " those highly abstract conceptions which the mind frames by reflection upon its own most general modes of behaviour . They are our own notions resulting from co-operation of See also:

• IMAGINATION

imagination and judgment, concerning the ultimate and unanalyzable forms of our own existence and development." In other words, the categories are highly abstract, have no content, and are realized as a kind of thinking which has for its object all the other mental processes .