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See also:CAVALRY (Fr. cavalerie, Ger. Kavallerie or Reiterei, derived ultimately from See also:late See also:Lat. caballus, See also:horse)
, a word which came into use in military literature about the See also:middle of the 16th See also:century as applied to mounted men of all kinds employed for combatant purposes, whether intended primarily for charging in masses, in small bodies, or for dismounted fighting
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By degrees, as greater refinement of terminology has become desirable, the See also:idea has been narrowed down until it includes only " horsemen trained to achieve the purpose of their See also:commander by the combined See also:action of See also:man and See also:horse," and this See also:definition will be found to See also:cover the whole See also:
The breed is traced into See also:Arabia, where only second-See also:rate horses had been reared hitherto, and thence to different parts of Europe, where eventually centres of cavalry activity See also:developed
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The first detailed See also:evidence of the existence of organized bodies of mounted men is to be found in See also:Xenophon, whose instructions for the breaking, training and command of a See also:squadron remain almost as a See also:model for See also:modern practice
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Their See also:tactical employment, however, seems still to have been relatively insignificant, for the horses were still far too small and too few to deliver a See also:charge with sufficient momentum to break the heavy armed and disciplined hoplites
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The strain of See also:ancient See also:battle was of an entirely different See also:order to that of modern fighting
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In the See also:absence of projectiles of sufficient range and See also:power to sweep a whole See also:area, the fighting was entirely between the front ranks of the opposing forces
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When a front See also:rank fighter See also:fell, his See also:place was immediately taken by his comrade in the See also:rear, who took up the individual combat, excited by his comrade's See also:fate but relatively fresh in mind and muscle
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This See also:process of feeding the fight from the rear could be protracted almost indefinitely
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If then, as a consequence of a charge, a few mounted men did penetrate the ranks, they encountered such a See also:crowd of well-protected and fresh swordsmen that they were soon pulled off their ponies and despatched
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Now and again See also:great leaders, See also: This explains the value attaching in thg old days to the See also:possession of horse-flesh and the rapid spread of the relatively new Dongola or See also:African strain over the then known See also:world . The See also:primitive See also:instinct of aboriginal man is to throw stones or other missiles for purposes of See also:defence (apes will throw anything they can find, but they never use sticks) ; hence, as the See also:Romans penetrated ever farther amongst the See also:barbarian tribes, their , horsemen in first See also:line found ever-increasing need for See also:protection against projectiles . But the greater the See also:weight of See also:armour carried, the greater the demands upon the endurance of the horse . Then, as the weight-carrying breed was expensive and, with the decay of the Roman See also:Empire, corruption and peculation spread, a limit was soon placed on the multiplication of charging cavalry, and it became necessary to fall back on the indigenous See also:pony, which could only carry a rider from place to place, not charge . Thus there was a See also:gradual levelling down of the mounted arms, the heavy cavalry becoming too heavy to gallop and the See also:light not See also:good enough for See also:united action . Against such opponents, the lighter and better mounted tribesmen of Asia found their task easy . They cut off the supplies of the marching infantry, filled up or destroyed the See also:wells, &c., and thus demonstrated the strategic See also:necessity of See also:superior mobility . With the decay of See also:civilization discipline also disappeared, and, as discipline consists essentially in the spirit of self-See also:sacrifice for the good of the community, its opposite, self-preservation, became the guiding principle . This in turn led to the increase of armour carried, and thence to the demand for heavier horses, and this demand working through several centuries led ultimately to the breeding of the great weight-carrying animals on whose existence that of See also:medieval See also:chivalry depended . These horses, however, being very costly and practically useless for See also:general purposes, could only become the See also:property of the wealthy, who were too See also:independent to feel the need of See also:combination, and preferred to live on the spoliation and See also:taxation of the weak . This spoliation eventually impelled the weaker men to combine, and at first their combination took the See also:form of the construction of fortified places, against which mounted men were powerless . On the other See also:hand, expense put a limit to the area which fortifications could enclose, and this again limited the supplies for the See also:garrison . Horsemen sweeping the See also:country for See also:miles around had no difficulty in feeding themselves, and the surrender of all beleaguered places through See also:starvation was ultimately inevitable, unless See also:food could be introduced from allied towns in the vicinity . It was of no use to introduce fighting men only into a place which primarily required food (cf . See also:Lucknow, 1857) to protract its resistance . Hence some means had to be found to surround the See also:supply-convoys with a physically impenetrable See also:shield, and eighteen-See also:foot pikes in the hands of powerful disciplined soldiers met the requirements . Against eight to ten ranks of such men the best cavalry in the world, relying only on their swords, were helpless, and for the time (towards the See also:close of the 15th century) infantry remained masters of the field on the See also:continent of Europe . See also:England meanwhile had developed on lines of her own . Thanks to her longbowmen and the military See also:genius of her leaders, she might have retained indefinitely the command of the continent had it not been for the invention of See also:gunpowder, which, though readily accepted by the See also:English for sieges in See also:France, proved the ultimate cause of their undoing . It was the See also:French who developed the use of See also:siege See also:artillery most rapidly, and their cavalry were not slow to take the hint; unlike the longbow and the crossbow, the See also:pistol could be used effectively from horseback, and presently the knights and their retainers, having the deepest purses, provided themselves with See also:long pistols in addition to their lances and swords . These weapons sent a See also:bullet through any armour which a foot-soldier could conveniently carry, or his commander afford, and if anything went wrong with their mechanism (which was complicated and uncertain) the See also:speed of his horse soon carried the rider out of danger . A new form of attack against infantry, introduced by the French at Cerisoles, 1544, thus developed itself . A See also:troop or squadron, formed in from twelve to sixteen ranks, trotted up to within pistol shot of the See also:angle of the square to be attacked and halted; then each rank in See also:succession cantered off man by man to the See also:left, discharging his pistol at the square as he passed, and riding back to his place behind the See also:column to reload . This could be prolonged indefinitely, and against such tactics the infantry were powerless . The stakes carried by English archers to check the See also:direct charge of horse-men became useless, as did also chevaux de frise, though the latter (which originated in the 14th century) continued to be employed by the Austrians against the swiftly-charging See also:Turks till the close of the 17th century . Thus it became necessary to devise some new impediment which, whilst remaining See also:mobile, would also give cover and an See also:advantage in the final hand-to-hand See also:shock . The problem was solved in Bohemia, See also:Poland and See also:Moravia (Hussite See also:wars, about 1420), where, distances being great and the country open, greater mobility and capacity in the convoys became essential . Great trains of wagons were placed in charge of an infantry escort, of which a See also:part had become possessed of firearms, and these moved across country in as many as twelve parallel lines drilled to form laagers, as nowadays in See also:South See also:Africa . Again the cavalry proved helpless, and for nearly a century in central Europe the word " Wagenburg " (See also:wagon-fortress) became synonymous with " army." Then an unfortunate See also:inspiration came to the wagon-men . A large See also:gun was relatively cheaper to manufacture, and more effective than a small one . To keep their assailants at a distance, they mounted See also:wall-pieces of about one-See also:inch See also:bore on their wagons . For a moment the See also:balance inclined in their favour, but the cavalry were See also:quick to see their advantage in this new idea, and they immediately followed suit . They, too, mounted guns on wheels, and, as their mobility gave them choice of position, they were able to concentrate their See also:fire against any See also:side of the See also:laager, and again ultimate surrender was the only way out of the defenders' See also:dilemma . The interesting problem thus raised was never finally solved, for the See also:scene of action now shifted to western Europe, to the valley of the Po, and more particularly to the See also:Netherlands, where fortresses were closer together and the clayey nature of the See also:Rhine See also:delta had already made paved roads necessary . Then, the Wagenburg being no longer needed for the See also:short transits between one fortified See also:town and another, the infantry reasserted themselves . Firearms having been much improved in the See also:interval the spearmen (pikemen) had already (about 1515) learnt to protect themselves by musketeers trained to take advantage of cover and ground somewhat in the same See also:fashion as the modern skirmisher . These musketeers kept light guns at a distance from their pikemen, but dared not venture far out, as their fire was altogether inadequate to stop a See also:rush of horsemen; when the latter threatened to intervene, they had to run for safety to the squares of pikemen, whom they assisted in turn by keeping the cavalry beyond pistol range . Hence the horsemen had to fall back upon more powerful guns, and these, being slow and requiring more See also:train, could be most economically protected by infantry (see also ARTILLERY) . Thus about the close of the 16th century western armies differentiated themselves out into the still existing three types cavalry, artillery and infantry . Moreover, each type 17th- was subdivided, the cavalry becoming heavy, See also:medium century OroSress, and dragoons . At this period there was nothing to disturb the See also:equilibrium of two contending forces except the characters of their respective leaders . The See also:mercenary See also:element had triumphed everywhere over the feudal levies . The moral qualities of all were on the same indifferent level, and battles in the open followed one recognized course . Neither army being able to outmarch the other, both See also:drew up masses of pikes in parallel lines . The musketeers covered the deployment of the heavy guns on either side, the cavalry drew up on the wings and a strictly parallel fight ensued, for in the absence of a See also:common cause for which men were willing to See also:die, See also:plunder was the ruling See also:motive, and all See also:control and discipline melted in the excitement of the contest . It is to the growth of Protestantism that cavalry owes its next great forward leap . To sweep the battlefield, it was absolutely essential that men should be ready tc subordinate selfish considerations to the See also:triumph of their cause . The Roman Catholicism of the See also:day gave many loopholes for the evasion of clear See also:duty, but from these the reformed faith was See also:free, and it is to the reawakened sense of duty that Gustavus See also:Adolphus appealed .
This alone rendered combination amongst his subordinate leaders possible, and on this power of combination all his victories depended
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Other cavalry soldiers, once let loose in the charge, could never be trusted to return to the field, the prospective plunder of the enemy's baggage being too strong a temptation; but the See also:
In disgust the king then wrote, " Die Cavallerie is nicht einmal See also:werth dasz sie der Teufel See also:week holet," and he immediately set about their re-form with his usual See also:energy and thoroughness
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Three years after Mollwitz, the result of his exertions was apparent in the greatly increased importance the arm acquired on the battlefield, and the charge of the See also:Bayreuth dragoons at See also:Hohenfriedberg (See also:June 4, 1745), who with 1500 horses rode over and dispersed 20 See also:Austrian battalions, bringing in 2500 prisoners and 67 See also:colours, will always rank as one of the most brilliant feats in military history.' The following years of See also:peace (1745–1756) were devoted to the methodical preparation of the cavalry to meet the requirements that Frederick's methods of war would make upon them, and it is to this period that the student should devote See also:special See also:attention
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From the very outbreak of the Seven Years' War (1956) this training asserted its influence, and See also:Rossbach (1957) and Zorndorf (1958) are the See also:principal examples of what cavalry handled in masses can effect
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At Rossbach General v
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Seydlitz, at the See also:head of 38 squadrons, practically began and ended the destruction of the French army, and at Zorndorf he saved the day for the Prussians by a See also:series of the most brilliant charges, which successively destroyed the See also:Russian right wing and centre
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These battles so conclusively demonstrated the superiority of the Prussian cavalry that their enemies completely altered their tactical See also:procedure
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They now utilized their enormous numerical superiority by working in two See also:separate armies, each almost as strong as the whole Prussian force
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When the latter moved against either, the one threatened immediately threw up heavy entrenchments, against which cavalry were, of course, ineffective, whilst the other pursued its See also: The long muskets and bayonets were laid aside, but the See also:cuirass was retained for the melee, and by the close of the great struggle the various branches of the arm had differentiated themselves out into the types still adhered to, heavy cavalry, dragoons, hussars, whose equipment as regards essentials thenceforward hardly varied up to the latter- years of the loth century . The only striking difference lies in the entire rejection of the lance in the armament of the charging squadrons, and the See also:reason is characteristic of the principles of the day . The Prussian cavalry had realized that success was decided, not primarily by actual collision, but by the moral effect of the appearance of an absolutely closed wall of horse-men approaching the adversary at full speed . If the necessary degree of cohesion was attained, the other side was morally beaten before collision took place, and either turned to See also:flight, or met the shock with so little See also:resolution that it was ridden over without difficulty . In the former See also:case any weapon was good enough to kill a flying enemy; in the latter, in the melee which then ensued, the crush in the ranks of the victors was still so great that the lance was a hindrance rather than a help . In the years succeeding the war the efficiency of the Prussian cavalry sank very rapidly, the initial cause being the See also:death of Seydlitz at the early See also:age of fifty-two . His personality had alone dominated the discontent, lethargy and hopelessness created'by ruthless See also:financial economies . When he was gone, as always in the absence of a great leader, men adapted their lives to the line of least resistance . In See also:thirty years the See also:wreck was See also:complete, and within the splendid squadrons which had been accustomed to manceuvre with perfect precision at the highest speed, there were (as F . A. von der Marwitz in his Nan/class clearly shows) not more than seven thoroughly trained men and horses to each, the See also:remainder being trained for little longer and receiving less attention than is the case with modern and line or See also:auxiliary cavalry . For the See also:generation preceding the outbreak of the French Revolution, Frederick the Great's army, and especially his Cavalry cavalry, had become the model for all Europe, but in the the mainspring of the excellence of his squadrons revolu- was everywhere overlooked . Seydlitz had manceuvred tnottary great masses of horsemen, therefore every one 'else wam must have great masses also; but no nation grasped the See also:secret, viz. the unconditional obedience of the horse to its rider, on which his success had depended . Neither was it possible under the prevailing social conditions to secure the old See also:stamp of horse, or the former attention to detail on the part of men and See also:officers . In France, owing to the agricultural decay of the country, suitable remounts for charging cavalry were almost unobtainable, and as this particular See also:branch of the arm was almost exclusively commanded by the See also:aristocracy it suffered most in the early days of the Revolution: The hussars, being chiefly recruited and officered by Alsatians and Germans from the Rhine provinces, retained their individuality and traditions much longer than the dragoons and cuirassiers, and, to the very close of the great wars, we find them always ready to charge at a gallop; but the unsteadiness and poor See also:horsemanship of the other branches was so great that up to 1812, the See also:year of their destruction, they always charged at a trot only, considering that the advantage of superior cohesion thus gained more than balanced the loss of momentum due to the slower See also:pace . Generally, the growth of the French cavalry service followed the universal See also:law . The best big horses went to the heavy charging cavalry, viz. the cuirassiers, the best light horses to the hussars, and the dragoons received the remainder, for in principle they were only infantry placed on horseback for convenience of loco-See also:motion, and were not primarily intended for combined mounted action . Fortunately for them, their principal adversaries, the Austrians, had' altogether failed to grasp the See also:lesson of the Seven Years' War . See also:Writing in 178o See also:Colonel Mack, a very capable officer, said, " Even in1769, the cavalry could not ride, could not See also:manage to control their horses . Not a single squadron could keep its dressing at a gallop, and before they had gone fifty yards at least ten out of See also:forty horses in the first rank would break out to the front," and though the See also:veteran field See also:marshal See also:Lacy issued new regulations, their spirit seems always to have escaped the executive officers . The See also:British cavalry was almost worse off, for See also:economy had reduced its squadrons to See also:mere skeletons, and the traditional British See also:style of horsemanship, radically different from that in See also:vogue in France, made their training for combined action even more difficult than elsewhere . Hence the history of cavalry during the earlier campaigns of the Revolution is marked by no decisive triumphs, the results are always in-adequate when judged by the magnitude of the forces employed, and only the brilliant exploit of the 15th Light Dragoons (now Hussars) at Villers en Couche (See also:April 24, 1794) deserves to be cited as an instance of the extraordinary influence which even a few horsemen can exercise over a demoralized or untrained See also:mob of infantry . Up to the See also:campaign of Poland (see NAPoLEo c CAMPAIGNS) French victories were won chiefly by the brilliant infantry fighting, cavalry only intervening (as at See also:Jena) to charge a beaten enemy and complete his destruction by pursuit . But after the terrible See also:waste of See also:life in the See also:winter of 1806-7i and the appalling losses in battle, See also:Napoleon introduced a new form of attack . The case-shot preparation of his artillery (see ARTILLERY) sowed confusion and terror in the enemy's ranks, and the opportunity was used by masses of cavalry . Henceforward this method dominated the See also:Napoleonic tactics and strategy . The essential difference between this See also:system and the Frederician lies in this, that with the artillery available in the former period it was not possible to say in advance at what point the intervention of cavalry would be necessary, hence the need for speed and precision of manceuvre to ensure their arrival at the right time and place . Napoleon now selected beforehand the point he meant to overwhelm and could bring his cavalry masses within striking distance at leisure . Once placed, it was only necessary to induce them to run away in the required direction to overwhelm everything by sheer weight of men and horses, • This method failed at See also:Waterloo because the ground was too heavy; the slope of it against the charge, and the whole condition of the horses too See also:low for the exertion demanded of them . The British cavalry from- t to 1815 suffered from the same causes which at the beginning of the aoth century brought about its breakdown in the South African War . Over-See also:sea transport brought the horses to See also:land in poor condition, and it was rarely possible to afford them sufficient time to recover and become accustomed to the change in See also:forage, the conditions of the particular theatre of operations, &c., before they had to be led against the enemy—hence a • heavy casualty See also:roll and the introduction into the ranks , of raw unbroken horses which interfered with the precision of manceuvre of the remainder . Their losses (about 13% per annum) were small as compared with those of South Africa, but this is mainly accounted for by the fact that, operations being generally in the See also:northern hemisphere, the change of See also:climate was never so severe . Tactically, they suffered, like the Austrians and Prussians, from the absence of any conception of the Napoleonic strategy amongst their principal leaders . As it was not known where the great See also:blow was to fall, they were distributed along the whole line, and thus became habituated to the idea of operating in relatively small bodies . This is the worst school for the cavalry soldier, because it is only when -working in masses of forty to sixty squadrons that the cumulative consequences of small errors of detail become so apparent as to convince all ranks of the necessity of conforming accurately to established prescriptions . Nevertheless, they still retained the practice of charging at a gallop, and as a whole were by far the most efficient See also:body of horsemen who survived at the close of the great wars . In the reaction that then ensued all over Europe, cavalry practically ceased to exist . The financial and agricultural exhaustion of all countries, and of Prussia in particular, was so complete that See also:money was nowhere to be found for the great concentrations and manoeuvre practices which are Darer more essential to the efficiency of the cavalry than to 19th century. that of the other arms . Hence a whole generation of officers See also:grew up in See also:ignorance of the fundamental principles which govern the employment of their arm . It was not till 1848 that the Prussians began again to unite whole cavalry divisions for See also:drill and manoeuvre, and the soldiers of the older generation had not yet passed away when the campaigns of 1866 and 1870 brought up again the realities of the battle-field . Meanwhile the introduction of long-range artillery and small arms had entirely destroyed the tactical relation of the three arms on which the Napoleonic tactics and strategy had been based, and the idea gained ground that the battle-field would no longer afford the same opportunities to cavalry as before . The experiences gained by the Americans in the See also:Civil War helped to confirm this preconception . If in battles waged between infantries armed only with muzzle-loading rifles, cavalry could find no opportunity to repeat past exploits, it was argued that its chances could not fail to be still further reduced by the See also:breech-loader . But this reasoning ignored the principal factors of former successes . The mounted men in See also:America failed not as a See also:con-sequence of the armament they encountered, but because the war brought out no Napoleon to create by his skill the opportunity for decisive cavalry action, and to See also:mass his men beforehand in confident anticipation . The same reasoning applies to the See also:European campaigns of 1866 and 187o, and the results obtained by the arm were so small, in proportion to the See also:numbers of squadrons available and to their cost of See also:maintenance as compared with the other arms, that a strong reaction set in everywhere against the existing institutions, and the re-creation of the See also:dragoon, under the new name of mounted rifleman, was advocated in the See also: |