See also:CONATION (from See also:Lat. conari, to See also:attempt, strive)
, a psycho-logical See also:term, originally chosen by 'See also:Sir See also:- WILLIAM
- WILLIAM (1143-1214)
- WILLIAM (1227-1256)
- WILLIAM (1J33-1584)
- WILLIAM (A.S. Wilhelm, O. Norse Vilhidlmr; O. H. Ger. Willahelm, Willahalm, M. H. Ger. Willehelm, Willehalm, Mod.Ger. Wilhelm; Du. Willem; O. Fr. Villalme, Mod. Fr. Guillaume; from " will," Goth. vilja, and " helm," Goth. hilms, Old Norse hidlmr, meaning
- WILLIAM (c. 1130-C. 1190)
- WILLIAM, 13TH
William See also:- HAMILTON
- HAMILTON (GRAND or ASHUANIPI)
- HAMILTON, ALEXANDER (1757-1804)
- HAMILTON, ANTHONY, or ANTOINE (1646-1720)
- HAMILTON, ELIZABETH (1758–1816)
- HAMILTON, EMMA, LADY (c. 1765-1815)
- HAMILTON, JAMES (1769-1831)
- HAMILTON, JAMES HAMILTON, 1ST DUKE OF (1606-1649)
- HAMILTON, JOHN (c. 1511–1571)
- HAMILTON, MARQUESSES AND DUKES OF
- HAMILTON, PATRICK (1504-1528)
- HAMILTON, ROBERT (1743-1829)
- HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM
- HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM (1730-1803)
- HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM ROWAN (1805-1865)
- HAMILTON, THOMAS (1789-1842)
- HAMILTON, WILLIAM (1704-1754)
- HAMILTON, WILLIAM GERARD (1729-1796)
Hamilton (Lectures on See also:Metaphysics, pp
.
127 See also:foil.), used generally of an attitude of mind involving a tendency to take See also:action, e.g. when one decides to remove an See also:object which is causing a painful sensation, or to try to interrupt' an unpleasant See also:train of thought
.
This use of the word tends to See also:lay emphasis on the mind as self-determined in relation to See also:external See also:objects
.
Another less See also:common use of the word is to describe the pleasant or painful sensations which accompany See also:muscular activity; the conative phenomena, thus regarded, are psychic changes brought about by external causes
.
The See also:chief difficulty in connexion with See also:Conation is that of distinguishing it from Feeling, a term of very vague significance both in technical and in common usage
.
Thus the See also:German psychologist F
.
See also:Brentano holds that no real distinction can be made
.
He argues that the See also:mental See also:process from sorrow or dissatisfaction, through See also:hope for a See also:change and courage to See also:act, up to the voluntary determination which issues in action, is a single homogeneous whole (Psycltologie, pp
.
308-309)
.
The See also:mere fact, however, that the See also:series is continuous is no ground for not distinguishing its parts; if it were so, it would be impossible to distinguish by See also:separate names the various See also:colours in the See also:solar spectrum, or indeed See also:perception from conception
.
A more material objection, moreover, is that, in point of fact, the feeling of See also:pleasure or See also:pain roused by a given stimulus is specifically different from, and indeed may not be followed by, the determination to modify or remove it
.
Pleasure and pain, i.e. hedonic sensation per se, are essentially distinct from appetition and aversion; the pleasures of See also:hearing See also:music or enjoying See also:sun-shine are not in See also:general accompanied by any volitional activity
.
It is true that painful sensations are generally accompanied by definite aversion or a tendency to take action, but the cases of See also:positive pleasure are amply sufficient to support a distinction
.
Therefore, though in See also:ordinary See also:language such phrases as " feeling aversion " are quite legitimate, accurate See also:psychology compels us to confine " feeling " to states of consciousness in which no conative activity is See also:present, i.e. to the psychic phenomena of pleasure or pain considered in and by themselves
.
The study of such phenomena is specifically described as Hedonics (Gr. ikovn, pleasure) or Algedonics (Gr
.
6.X•ynbeev, pain); the latter term was coined by H
.
R
.
See also:Marshall (in Pain, Pleasure and See also:Aesthetics, 1894), but has not been generally used
.
The problem of conation is closely related to that of See also:Attention (q.v.), which indeed, regarded as active consciousness, implies conation (G
.
T
.
See also:Ladd, Psychology, 1894, p
.
213)
.
Thus, whenever the mind deliberately focusses itself upon a particular object, there is implied a psychic effort (for the relation between Attention and Conation, see G
.
F
.
Stout, See also:Analytic Psychology, bock i. See also:chap. vi.)
.
All conscious action, and in a less degree even unconscious or reflex action, implies attention; when the mind" attends " to any given external object, the See also:organ through the See also:medium of which See also:information regarding that object is conveyed to the mind is set in See also:motion
.
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