CONATION (from

See also:

• LAT

Lat. conari, to

See also:

• ATTEMPT (Lat. adtemptare, attentare, to try)

attempt, strive)  , a psycho-logical term, originally chosen by 'Sir William Hamilton (Lectures on Metaphysics, pp . 127 foil.), used generally of an attitude of mind involving a tendency to take action, e.g. when one decides to remove an object which is causing a painful sensation, or to try to interrupt' an unpleasant train of thought . This use of the word tends to lay emphasis on the mind as self-determined in relation to external objects . Another less common use of the word is to describe the pleasant or painful sensations which accompany muscular activity; the conative phenomena, thus regarded, are psychic changes brought about by external causes . The chief difficulty in connexion with Conation is that of distinguishing it from Feeling, a term of very vague significance both in technical and in common usage . Thus the German psychologist F . Brentano holds that no real distinction can be made . He argues that the mental process from sorrow or dissatisfaction, through hope for a change and courage to act, up to the voluntary determination which issues in action, is a single homogeneous whole (Psycltologie, pp . 308-309) . The mere fact, however, that the series is continuous is no ground for not distinguishing its parts; if it were so, it would be impossible to distinguish by separate names the various colours in the solar spectrum, or indeed perception from conception . A more material objection, moreover, is that, in point of fact, the feeling of pleasure or pain roused by a given stimulus is specifically different from, and indeed may not be followed by, the determination to modify or remove it . Pleasure and pain, i.e. hedonic sensation per se, are essentially distinct from appetition and aversion; the pleasures of hearing music or enjoying sun-shine are not in general accompanied by any volitional activity .

It is true that painful sensations are generally accompanied by definite aversion or a tendency to take action, but the cases of

positive pleasure are amply sufficient to support a distinction . Therefore, though in ordinary language such phrases as " feeling aversion " are quite legitimate, accurate psychology compels us to confine " feeling " to states of consciousness in which no conative activity is present, i.e. to the psychic phenomena of pleasure or pain considered in and by themselves . The study of such phenomena is specifically described as Hedonics (Gr. ikovn, pleasure) or Algedonics (Gr . 6.X•ynbeev, pain); the latter term was coined by H . R . Marshall (in Pain, Pleasure and Aesthetics, 1894), but has not been generally used . The problem of conation is closely related to that of Attention (q.v.), which indeed, regarded as active consciousness, implies conation (G . T . Ladd, Psychology, 1894, p . 213) . Thus, whenever the mind deliberately focusses itself upon a particular object, there is implied a psychic effort (for the relation between Attention and Conation, see G . F .

Stout,

Analytic Psychology, bock i. chap. vi.) . All conscious action, and in a less degree even unconscious or reflex action, implies attention; when the mind" attends " to any given external object, the organ through the medium of which information regarding that object is conveyed to the mind is set in motion .