See also:

• CONDITION (Lat. condicio, from condicere, to agree upon, arrange; not connected with conditio, from condere, conditum, to put together)

CONDITION (See also:

• LAT

Lat. condicio, from condicere, to agree upon, arrange; not connected with conditio, from condere, conditum, to put together)  , a stipulation, agreement . The See also:

• TERM

term is applied technically to any circumstance, See also:

• ACTION

action or event which is regarded as the indispensable prerequisite of some other circumstance, action or event . It is also applied generally to the sum of the circumstances in which a See also:

• PERSON, OFFENCES AGAINST THE

person is situated, and more specifically to favourable or prosperous circumstances; thus a person of See also:

• WEALTH

wealth or See also:

• BIRTH (a word common in various forms to Teutonic languages from the root of the verb " to bear ")

birth is described as a person " of See also:

• CONDITION (Lat. condicio, from condicere, to agree upon, arrange; not connected with conditio, from condere, conditum, to put together)

condition," or an See also:

• ATHLETE (Gr. aOX177'7r; Lat. athleta)

athlete as being " in condition," i.e. physically See also:

• FIT

fit, having gone through the necessary course of preliminary training . In all these senses there is implicit the See also:

• IDEA (Gr. Ibia, connected with i&eiv, to see; cf. Lat. species from specere, to look at)

idea of See also:

• LIMITATION, STATUTES OF

limitation or See also:

• RESTRAINT (from " to restrain," Lat. restringere, to hold back, prevent)

restraint imposed with a view to the attainment of a particular end . (I) In See also:

• LOGIC (Xoy1K7, sc. rixvrt, the art of reasoning)

Logic, the term " condition " is closely related to " cause " in so far as it is applied to See also:

• PRIOR (from Lat. prior—former, and hence superior, through O. Fr. priour)
• PRIOR, MATTHEW (1664-1721)

prior events, &c., in the See also:

• ABSENCE (Lat. absentia)

absence of which another event would not take See also:

• PLACE (through Fr. from Lat. platea, street; Gr. IrAar6s, wide)

place . It is, however, different from " cause " inasmuch as it has a pre-dominantly negative or passive significance . Hence the See also:

• ADJECTIVE (from the Lat. adjectives, added)

adjective " conditional " is applied to propositions in which the truth of the See also:

• MAIN (from the Aryan root which appears in " may " and " might," and Lat. magnus, great)
• MAIN (Lat. Moenus)

main statement is made to depend on the truth of another; these propositions are distinguished from categorical propositions, which simply See also:

• STATE
• STATE, GREAT OFFICERS OF

state a fact, as being " composed of two categorical propositions See also:

• UNITED

united by a See also:

• CONJUNCTION (from Lat. conjungere, to join together)

conjunction," e.g. if A is B, C is D . The second statement (the " consequent ") is restricted or qualified by the first (the " antecedent ") . By some logicians these propositions are classified as (I) Hypothetical, and (2) Disjunctive, and their See also:

• FUNCTION

function in syllogistic reasoning gives rise to the following See also:

• CLASSIFICATION (Lat. classis, a class, probably from the root cal-, cla-, as in Gr. icaMce, clamor)

classification of conditional arguments: (a) Constructive hypothetical See also:

• SYLLOGISM (Gr. ovAAoytvµos, from en', and Xb-yor, an argument resulting from combination, i.e. of premises)

syllogism (modus ponens, " affirmative See also:

• MOOD

mood "): If A is B, C is D; but A is B; therefore C is D . (b) Destructive hypothetical syllogism (modus tollens, mood which "removes," i.e. the consequent): if A is B, C is D; but C is not D; therefore A is not B . In (a) the antecedent must be affirmed, .in (b) the consequent must be denied; otherwise'the arguments become fallacious . A second class of conditional arguments are disjunctive syllogisms consisting of (c) the modus ponendo tollens: A is either B or C; but A is B; therefore C is not D; and (d) modus tollendo ponens: A is either B or C; A is not B; therefore A is C .

A more complicated conditional See also:

• ARGUMENT

argument is the See also:

• DILEMMA (Gr. &Xuµua, a double proposition, from bi- and aµ(36.vetv)

dilemma (q.v.).1 The limiting or restrictive significance of " condition " has led to its use in metaphysical theory in contradistinction to the conception of See also:

• ABSOLUTE (Lat. absolvere, to loose, set free)

absolute being, the aseitas of the Schoolmen . ' The terminology used above has not been adopted by all logicians . " Conditional " has been used as See also:

• EQUIVALENT

equivalent to " hypothetical " in the widest sense (including ' disjunctive ") ; or narrowed down to be synonymous with " conjunctive " (the condition being there more explicit), as a subdivision of " hypothetical." Thus all finite things exist in certain relations not only to all other things but also to thought; in other words, all finite existence is " conditioned." Hence See also:

• SIR

Sir Wm . See also:

• HAMILTON
• HAMILTON (GRAND or ASHUANIPI)
• HAMILTON, ALEXANDER (1757-1804)
• HAMILTON, ANTHONY, or ANTOINE (1646-1720)
• HAMILTON, ELIZABETH (1758–1816)
• HAMILTON, EMMA, LADY (c. 1765-1815)
• HAMILTON, JAMES (1769-1831)
• HAMILTON, JAMES HAMILTON, 1ST DUKE OF (1606-1649)
• HAMILTON, JOHN (c. 1511–1571)
• HAMILTON, MARQUESSES AND DUKES OF
• HAMILTON, PATRICK (1504-1528)
• HAMILTON, ROBERT (1743-1829)
• HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM
• HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM (1730-1803)
• HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM ROWAN (1805-1865)
• HAMILTON, THOMAS (1789-1842)
• HAMILTON, WILLIAM (1704-1754)
• HAMILTON, WILLIAM GERARD (1729-1796)

Hamilton speaks of the " See also:

• PHILOSOPHY (Gr. gthos, fond of, and vo4 (a, wisdom)

philosophy of the unconditioned," i.e. of thought in distinction to things which are determined by thought in relation to other things . An analogous distinction is made (cf . H . W . B . See also:

• JOSEPH
• JOSEPH, COMTE DE (1785-1870)
• JOSEPH, FATHER (FRANCOIS LECLERC DU TREMBLAY) (1577-1638)

Joseph, Introduction to Logic, pp . 38o fall.) between the so-called universal lawi of nature and conditional principles, which, though they are regarded as having the force of See also:

• LAW
• LAW (0. Eng. lagu, M. Eng. lawe; from an old Teutonic root lag, " lie," what lies fixed or evenly; cf. Lat. lex, Fr. loi)
• LAW, JOHN (1671—1729)
• LAW, WILLIAM (1686-1761)

law, are yet dependent or derivative, i.e. cannot be treated as universal truths . Such principles hold See also:

• GOOD, JOHN MASON (1764-1827)

good under See also:

• PRESENT

present conditions, but other conditions might be imagined under which they would be invalid; they hold good only as corollaries from the See also:

• LAWS

laws of nature under existing conditions . (2) In Law, condition in its See also:

• GENERAL
• GENERAL (Lat. generalis, of or relating to a genus, kind or class)

general sense is a restraint annexed to a thing, so that by the non-performance the party to it shall receive See also:

• PREJUDICE (Lat. praejudicium)

prejudice and loss, and by the performance commodity or See also:

• ADVANTAGE

advantage .

Conditions may be either: (1) condition in a See also:

• DEED (in O. Eng. dead, from the stem of the verb " to do ")

deed or See also:

• EXPRESS (through the French from the past participle of the Lat. exprimere, to press out, by transference used of representing objects in painting or sculpture, or of thoughts, &c. in words)

express condition, i.e. the condition being expressed in actual words; or (2) condition in law or implied condition, i.e. where, although no condition is actually expressed, the law implies a condition . The word is also used indifferently to mean either the event upon the happening of which some See also:

• ESTATE (through O. Fr. estat, mod. flat, from Lat. status, state, condition, position, stare, to stand)

estate or See also:

• OBLIGATION

obligation is to begin or end, or the See also:

• PROVISION (Lat. provisio)

provision or stipulation that the estate or obligation will depend upon the happening of the event . A condition may be of several kinds: (I) a condition precedent, where, for example, an estate is granted to one for See also:

• LIFE

life upon condition that, if the grantee pay the grantor a certain sum on such a See also:

• DAY (O. Eng. dreg, Ger. Tag; according to the New English Dictionary, " in no way related to the Lat. dies")
• DAY, JOHN (1574-1640?)
• DAY, THOMAS (1748-1789)

day, he shall have the See also:

• FEE

fee See also:

• SIMPLE

simple; (2) a condition subsequent, where, for. example, an estate is granted in fee upon condition that the grantee shall pay a certain sum on a certain day, or that his estate shall cease . Thus a condition precedent gets or gains, while a condition subsequent keeps and continues . A condition may also be affirmative, that is, the doing of an See also:

• ACT (Lat. actus, actum)

act; negative, the not doing of an act; restrictive, compulsory, &c . The word is also used adjectivally in the sense set out above, as in the phrases " conditional See also:

• LEGACY (Lat. legatum)

legacy," " conditional limitation," " conditional promise," &c.; that is, the Iegacy, the limitation, the promise is to take effect only upon the happening of a certain event .