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CONSTITUENCY (from " constituent," th...

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Originally appearing in Volume V07, Page 18 of the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica.
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CONSTITUENCY (from " constituent," that which forms a necessary part of a thing; Lat. constituere, to create), a political term for the body of electors who choose a representative for parliament or for any other public assembly, for the place or district possessing the right to elect a representative, and for the residents generally, apart from their voting powers, in such a locality. The term is also applied, in a transferred sense, to the readers of a particular newspaper, the customers of a business and the like. CONSTITUTION' AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. The word constitution (constitutio) in the time of the Roman empire signified a collection of laws or ordinances made by the emperor. We find the word used in the same sense in the early history of English law, e.g. the Constitutions of Clarendon. In its modern use constitution has been restricted to those rules which concern the political structure of society. If we take the accepted definition of a law as a command imposed by a sovereign on the subject, the constitution would consist of the rules which point out where. the sovereign is to be found, the form in which his powers are exercised, and the relations of the different members of the sovereign body to each other where it consists of more persons than one, In every independent political society, it is assumed by these definitions, there will be found somewhere or other a sovereign, whether that sovereign be a single person, or a body of persons, or several bodies of persons. The commands imposed by the sovereign person or body on the rest of the society are positive laws, properly so called. The sovereign body not only makes laws, but has two other leading functions, viz. those of judicature and administration. Legislation is for the most part performed directly by the sovereign body itself; judicature and administration, for the most part, by delegates. The constitution of a society, accordingly, would show how the sovereign body is composed, and what are the relations of its members inter se, and how the sovereign functions of legislation, judicature and administration are exercised. Constitutional law consists of the rules relating to these subjects, and these rules may either be laws properly so called, or they may not-i.e. they may or may not be commands imposed by the sovereign body itself. The English constitutional rule, for example, that the king and parliament are the sovereign, cannot be called a law; for a law presupposes the fact which it asserts. And other rules, which are constantly observed in prac- tice, but have never beenenacted by the sovereign power, are in the same way constitutional laws which are not laws. It is an undoubted rule of the English constitution that the king shall not refuse his assent to a bill which has passed both Houses of Parliament,but it is certainly not a law. Should the king veto such a bill his action would be unconstitutional,but not illegal. On the other hand the rules re- lating to the election of members to the House of Commons are nearly all positive laws strictly so called. Constitutional law, as the phrase is commonly used, would include all the laws dealing with the sovereign body in the exercise of its various functions, and all the rules, not being laws properly so called, relating to the same subject. The above is an attempt to indicate the meaning of the phrases in their stricter or more technical uses. Some wider meanings may be noticed. In the phrase constitutional Pegasus *Perseus *Sagitta Serpens Triangulum *Ursa major *Ursa minor *Vulpecula et Anser *Scorpio *Taurus *Virgo. Pictor (Equuleus pictoris) Piscis australis Puppis Recticulum Sculptor (Apparatus sculptoris) Scutum Sobieskii Sextans Telescopium Toucan Triangulum australe Vela Volans (Piscis volans) (C. E.*) government, a form of government based on certain principles which may roughly be called popular is the leading idea. Great Britain, Switzerland, the United States, are all constitutional governments in this sense of the word. A country where a large portion of the people has some considerable share in the supreme power would be a constitutional country. On the other hand, constitutional, as applied to governments, may mean stable as opposed to unstable and anarchic societies. Again, as a term of party politics, constitutional has come to mean, in England, not obedience to constitutional rules as above described, but adherence to the existing type of the constitution or to some conspicuous portions thereof, in other words, conservative. The ideas associated with constitution and constitutionalism are thus, it will be seen, mainly of modern and European origin. They are wholly inapplicable to the primitive and simple societies of the present or of the former times. The discussion of forms of government occupies a large space in the writings of the Greek philosophers,a fact which is to be explained by the existence among the Greeks of many independent political communities, variously organized, and more or less democratic in character. Between the political problems of the smaller societies and those of the great European nations there is no useful parallel to be drawn, although the predominance of classical learning made it. the fashion for a long time to apply Greek speculations on the nature of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy to public questions in modern Europe. Representation (q.v.), the characteristic principle of European constitutions, has, of course, no place in societies which were not too large to admit of every free citizen participating personally in the business of government. Nor is there much in the politics or the political literature of the Romans to compare with the constitutions of modern states. Their political system, almost from the beginning of empire, was ruled absolutely by a small assembly or by one man. The impetus to constitutional government in modern times has to a large extent come from England, and it is from English politics that the phrase and its associations have been borrowed. England has offered to the world the one conspicuous example of a long, continuous, and orderly development of political institutions. The early date at which the principle of self-government was established in England, the steady growth of the principle, the absence of civil dissension, and the preservation in the midst of change of so much of the old organization, have given its constitution a great influence over the ideas of politicians in other countries. This fact is expressed in the proverbial phrase—" England is the mother of parliaments." It would not be difficult to show that the leading features of the constitutions now established in other nations have been based on, or defended by, considerations arising from the political history of England. In one important respect England differs conspicuously from most other countries. Her constitution is to a large extent unwritten, using the word in much the same sense as when we speak of unwritten law. Its rules can be found in no written document, but depend, as so much of English law does, on precedent modified by a constant process of interpretation. Many rules of the constitution have in fact a purely legal history, that is to say, they have been developed by the law courts, as part of the general body of the common law. Others have in a similar way been developed by the practice of parliament. Both Houses, in fact, have exhibited the same spirit of adherence to precedent, coupled with a power of modifying precedent to suit circumstances, which distinguishes the judicial tribunals. In a constitutional crisis the House of Commons appoints a committee to " search its journals for precedents," just as the court of king's bench would examine the records of its own decisions. And just as the law, while professing to remain the same, is in process of constant change, so, too, the unwritten constitution is, without any acknowledgment of the fact, constantly taking up new ground. In contrast with the mobility of an unwritten constitution is the fixity of a constitution written out, like that of the United States or Switzerland, in one authoritative code. The constitu-tion of the United States, drawn up at Philadelphia in 1787, is contained in a code of articles. It was ratified separately by each state, and thenceforward became the positive and exclusive statement of the constitution. The legislative powers of the legislature are not to extend to certain kinds of bills, e.g. ex post facto bills; the president has a veto which can only be overcome by a majority of two-thirds in both Houses; the constitution itself can only be changed in any particular by the con-sent of the legislatures or conventions of three-fourths of the several states; and finally the judges of the Supreme Court are to decide in all disputed cases whether an act of the legislature is permitted by the constitution or not. The constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land as to the matters which it embraces. The constitution of each state is the supreme law of the state, except so far as it may be controlled by the constitution of the United States. Every statute in conflict with the constitution to which it is subordinate is void so far as this conflict extends. If it concerns only a distinct and separable part of the statute, that part only is' void. Every court before which a statutory right or defence is asserted has the power to inquire whether the statute in question is or is not in conflict with the paramount constitution. This power belongs even to a justice of the peace in trying a cause. He sits to administer the law, and it is for him to deter-mine what is the law. Inferior courts commonly decline to hold a statute unconstitutional, even if there may appear to be substantial grounds for such a decision. The presumption is always in favour of the validity of the law, and they generally prefer to leave the responsibility of declaring it void to the higher courts. The judges of the state courts are bound by their oath of office to support the constitution of the United States. They have an equal right with those of the United States to determine whether or how far it affects any matter brought in question in any action. So, vice versa, the judges of the United States courts, if the point comes up on a trial before them, have the right to determine whether or how far the constitution of a state in-validates a statute of the state. They, however, are ordinarily bound to follow the views of the state courts on such a question. They are not bound by any decision of a state court as to the effect of the constitution of the United States on a state statute or any other matter. This judicial power of declaring a statute void because unconstitutional has been not infrequently exercised, from the time when the first state constitutions were adopted. Juries in criminal causes are sometimes made by American statutes or recognized by American practice as judges of the law as well as the fact. The better opinion is that this does not make them judges of whether a law on which the prosecution rests violates the paramount constitution and is therefore void (United States v. Callender, Wharton's State Trials, 688; State v. Main, 69 Connecticut Reports, 123, 128). If a state court decides a point of constitutional law, set up under the constitution of the United States, against the party relying upon it, and this decision is affirmed by the state court of last resort, he may sue out a writ of error, and so bring his case before the Supreme Court of the United States. If the state decision be in his favour, the other side cannot resort to like proceedings. A decree of the Supreme Court of the United States on a point of construction arising under the constitution of the United States settles it for all courts, state and national. The salient characteristic of the United States constitution is, perhaps, its formidable apparatus of provisions against change; and, in fact, only 15 constitutional amendments had been adopted from 1789 up to 1909, the last being in 1870. In the same period the unwritten constitution of England has made a most marked advance, chiefly in the direction of democratizing the monarchy, and diminishing the powers of the House of Lords. The House of Commons has continuously asserted its legislative predominance, and has reduced the other House to the position of a revising chamber, which in the last resort, however, can produce a legislative deadlock, subject to the results of a new general election (see PARLIAMENT). And the cabinet, which depends on the support of the House of Commons, has become more and more the executive council of the realm. One conspicuous feature of the English constitution, by which it is broadly distinguished from written or artificial constitutions, is the presence throughout its entire extent of legal fictions. The influence of the lawyers on the progress of the constitution has already been noticed, and is nowhere more clearly shown than in this peculiarity of its structure. As in the common law, so in the constitution, change has been effected in substance without any corresponding change in terminology. There is hardly one of the phrases used to describe the position of the crown which can be understood in its literal sense, and many of them are currently accepted in more senses than one. The American constitution of 1789 reproduced, however, in essentials, and with necessary modifications, the contemporary British model, and, where it did so, has preserved the old conception of what was then the British system of government. The position and powers of the president were a fair counterpart of the royal prerogative of that day; the two houses of Congress corresponded sufficiently well to the House of Lords and the House of Commons, allowing for the absence of the elements of hereditary rank and territorial influence. While the English constitution has changed much, the American constitution has changed very little in these respects. Allowing for the more democratic character of the constituencies, the organization of the supreme power in the United States is nearer the English type of the 18th century—is, in fact, less elastic than in the United Kingdom. On the other hand, it is not uncommon to misinterpret the rigidity of the United States constitution, from a regard rather to the theory which its text suggests than to the practical working of the machine. For the letter of the constitution has to some extent been modified, if not technically amended, in various respects by judicial interpretation, and by use and wont (e.g. as regards the election of the president). This side of the matter may be studied in C. G. Tiedeman's work cited below. Moreover, even in respect of the 18th-century British character attaching to the constitution, as drawn up in 1787, it has to be remembered that this was not taken direct from England. As several American constitutional historians have elaborately shown (e.g. A. C. McLaughlin, in The Confederation and the Constitution, 19o5), the English idea had already been developed in various directions during the preceding colonial period, and the constitution really represented the English constitutional usage as known in America, into which the Philadelphia convention introduced new features corresponding to the prevailing civil conditions or suggested by English analogy. It is important to emphasize this point, since the resemblance of the American constitution of 1789 to the contemporary English constitution has sometimes been exaggerated; but the fact remains that the written constitution has been less susceptible of development than the unwritten. Between England and some other constitutional countries a difference of much constitutional importance is to be found in the terms on which the component parts of the country were brought together. All great societies have been produced by the aggregation of small societies into larger and larger groups. In England the process of consolidation was completed before the constitution settled down into its present form. In the United States, on the other hand, in Switzerland, and in Germany the constitution is in form an alliance among a number of separate states, each of which may have a constitution and laws of its own for local purposes. In federal governments it remains a question how far the independence of individual states has been sacrificed by submission to a constitution. In the United States constitutional progress is hampered by the necessity thus created of having every amendment ratified by the separate vote of three-fourths of the states. See also GOVERNMENT; SOVEREIGNTY; CABINET; PREROGATIVE, &c., and the section on Government or Constitution in the articles on the various countries. The standard work on the English constitution is Sir William Anson's Law and Custom of the Constitution (1st ed. 1886; 3rd ed. 109,) see also A. L. Lowell, The Government of England (1908); W. Bagehot, The English Constitution; S. Low, The Governance of England (19o4); A. V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution (7th ed. 1909) ; W. Stubbs, Constitutional History of England (1878) ; R. Gneist, History of the English Constitution (Engl. trans. 1886) ; J. Macy, The English Constitution (New York, 1897) ; E. W. Ridges, Constitutional Law of England (1905) ; F. W. Maitland, Constitutional History of England (1908); G. B. Adams and H. M. Stephens, Select Documents of English Constitutional History (New York, 19o1). For America, see C. E. Stevens, Sources o the Constitution of the United States (London and New York, 1894) G T. Curtis, Constitutional History of the United States (2 vols., New York, 1889–1896) ; T. MeI. Cooley, General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United States (Boston, 188o; 3rd ed. 1898); S. G. Fisher, Evolution of the Constitution of the United States (Philadelphia, 1897) ; J. I. C. Hare, American Constitutional Law (2 vols., Boston, 1889) ; J. F. Jameson (ed.), Essays on the Constitutional History of the United States in the Formative Period, 1775–1789 (Boston, 1889) ; W. M. Meigs, Growth of the Constitution in the Federal Convention of 1787 (Philadelphia, 1900) ; and C. G. Tiedeman, Unwritten Constitution of the United States (New York, 1890). Also A. L. Lowell, Government and Parties in Continental Europe (2 vols., 1896) ; W. F. Dodd, Modern Constitutions (2 vols., Chicago, 1909), a collection of the fundamental laws of twenty-two of the most important countries. " CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS " ('AB17vaiwv aohcreia), a work attributed to the philosopher Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), forming one of a series of Constitutions (aoXireiac), 158 in number, which treated of the institutions of the various states in the Greek world. It was extant until the 7th century of our era, or to an even later date, but was subsequently lost. A copy of this treatise, written in four diff erent hands upon four rolls of papyrus, and dating from the end of the 1st century A.D., was discovered in Egypt, and acquired by the trustees of the British Museum, for whom it was edited by F. G. Kenyon, assistant in the manuscript department, and published in January 1891. Some very imperfect fragments of another copy had been acquired by the Egyptian Museum at Berlin, and were published in 1880. Authorship.—It may be regarded as now established that the treatise discovered in Egypt is identical with the work upon the constitution of Athens that passed in antiquity under the name of Aristotle. The evidence derived from a comparison of the British Museum papyrus with the quotations from the lost work of Aristotle's which are found in scholiasts and grammarians is conclusive. Of fifty-eight quotations from Aristotle's work, fifty-five occur in the papyrus. Of thirty-three quotations from Aristotle, which relate to matters connected with the constitution, or the constitutional history of Athens, although they are not expressly referred to the 'AB17vaiwv ao) treia, twenty-three are found in the papyrus. Of those not found in the papyrus, the majority appear to have come either from the beginning of the treatise, which is wanting in the papyrus, or from the latter portion of it, which is mutilated. The coincidence, therefore, is as nearly as possible complete. It may also be regarded as established by internal evidence that the treatise was composed during the interval between Aristotle's return to Athens in 335 B.C. and his death in 322. There are two passages which give us the latter year as the terminus ad quem, viz. C. 42. I and c. 62. 2. In the former passage the democracy which is about to be described is spoken of as the " present constitution " (i7 vuv rcaraaraoss rns woklreias). The democratic constitution was abolished, and a timocracy established, on the surrender of Athens to Antipater, at the end of the Lamian War, in the autumn of 322. At the same time Samos was lost; it is still reckoned, however, among the Athenian possessions in the latter passage. On the other hand, the foreign possessions of Athens are limited to Lemnos, Imbros, Scyros, Delos and Samos. This could only apply to the period after Chaeronea (338 B.C.). In c. 61. 1, again, mention is made of a special Strategus Eat ras avµpopias; but it can be proved from inscriptions that down to the year 334 the generals were collectively concerned with the symmories. Finally, in c. 54. 7 an event is dated by the archonship of Cephisophon (329). We thus get the years 329 and 322 as fixing the limits of the period to which the composition of the work must be assigned. It follows that, whether it is by Aristotle or not, its date is later than that of the Politics, in which there is no reference to any event subsequent to the death of Philip in 336 The only question as to authorship that can fairly be raised is the question whether it is by Aristotle or by a pupil; i.e. as to the sense in which it is " Aristotelian." The argument on the two sides may be summarized as follows: Against.—(i.) The occurrence of non-Aristotelian words and phrases and the absence of turns of expression characteristic of the undisputed writings of Aristotle. (ii.) The occurrence of statements contradictory of views found in the Politics; e.g. C. 4 (Constitution of Draco) compared with Pol. 1274 b 15 (OpaKovror v0µ01 AEV dot, 7roX retg 6' iorapxoirp robs ;Awns gOoKEV); c. 8. I (the archons appointed by lot out of selected candidates) compared with Pol. 1274 a 17, and 1281 b 31 (the archons elected by the demos); c. 17. I (total length of Peisistratus' reign, 19 years) compared with Pol. 1315 b 32 (total length, 17 years); c. 21. 6 (Cleisthenes left the clan and phratries unaltered) compared with Pol. 1319 b 20 (Cleisthenes increased the number of the phratries); c. 21. 2 and 4 compared with Pol. 1275 b 37 (different views as to the class admitted to citizenship by Cleisthenes). It will be observed that the instances quoted relate to the most famous names in the early history of Athens," viz. Draco, Solon, Peisistratus and Cleisthenes. (iii.) Arguments drawn from the style, composition and general character of the work, which are alleged to be unworthy of the author of the undoubtedly genuine writings. There is no sense of proportion (contrast the space devoted to Peisistratus and his sons, or to the Four Hundred and the Thirty, with the inadequate treatment of the period between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars); there is a lack of historical insight and an uncritical acceptance of erroneous views; and the anecdotic element is unduly prominent. These considerations led several of the earlier critics to deny the Aristotelian authorship, e.g. the editors of the Dutch edition of the text, van Herwerden and van Leeuwen; Rtihl, Caner and Schvarcz in Germany; H. Richards and others in England. For.—(i.) The consensus of antiquity. Every ancient writer who mentions the Constitution attributes it to Aristotle, while no writer is known to have questioned its genuineness. (ii.) The coincidence of the date assigned to its composition on internal grounds with the date of Aristotle's second residence in Athens. (iii.) Parallelisms of thought or expression with passages in the Politics; e.g. c. 16. 2 and 3 compared with Pol. 1318 b 14 and 1319 a 30; the general view of Solon's legislation compared with Pol. 1296 b 1; c. 27. 3 compared with Pol. 1274 a 9. To argument (i.) against the authorship, it is replied that the Constitution is an historical work, intended for popular use; differences in style and terminology from those of a philosophical treatise, such as the Politics, are to be expected. To argument (ii.) it is replied that, as the Constitution is a later work than the Politics, a change of view upon particular points is not surprising. These considerations have led the great majority of writers upon the subject to attribute the work to Aristotle himself. On this side are found Kenyon and Sandys among English scholars, and in Germany, Wilamowitz, Blass, Gilbert, Bauer, Bruno Keil, Busolt, E. Meyer, and many others. On the whole, it can hardly be doubted that the view which is supported by so great a weight of authority is the correct one. The arguments advanced on the other side are not to be lightly set aside, but they can scarcely outweigh the combination of external and internal evidence in favour of the attribution to Aristotle. An attentive study of the parallel passages in the Politics will go a long way towards carrying conviction. It is true that a series such as the Constitutions might well be entrusted to pupils working under the direction of their master. It is also true, however, that the Constitution of Athens must have been incomparably the most important of the series and the one that would be most naturally reserved for the master's hand. There are no traces in the treatise either of variety of authorship or of incompleteness, though there are evidences of interpolation. " Contents.—The treatise consists of two parts, one historical, and the other descriptive. The first forty-one chapters compose the former part, the remainder of the work the latter. The first part comprised an account of the original constitution of Athens,and of the eleven changes through which it successively passed (see c. 41). The papyrus, however, is imperfect at the beginning (the manuscript from which it was copied appears to have been similarly defective), the text commencing in the middle of a sentence which relates to the trial and banishment of the Alcmeonidae for their part in the affair of Cylon. The missing chapters must have contained a sketch of the original constitu- tion, and of the changes introduced in the time of Ion and Theseus. The following is an abstract of Part I. in its present form. Chapters 2, 3, description of the constitution before the time of Draco. 4, Draco's constitution. 5-12, reforms of Solon. 13, party feuds after the legislation of Solon. 14-19, the rule of Peisistratus and his sons. 20, 21, the reforms of Cleisthenes. 22, changes introduced between Cleisthenes and the invasion of Xerxes. 23, 24, the supremacy of the Areopagus, 479–461 B.C. 25, its overthrow by Ephialtes. 26, 27, changes introduced in the time of Pericles. 28, the rise of the demagogues: 29-33, the revolution of the Four Hundred. 34-40, the government of the Thirty. 41, list of the successive changes in the constitution. It may be noted that the reforms of Solon, the tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons, and the revolutions of the Four Hundred and the Thirty, together occupy considerably more than two-thirds of Part I. Part II. describes the constitution as it existed at the period of the composition of the treatise (329–322 B.C.). It begins with an account of the conditions of citizenship and of the training of the ephebi (citizens between the ages of 18 and 20). In chapters 43-49 the functions of the Council (t3ouX,) and of the officials who act in concert with it are described. 50-6o deal with the officials who are appointed by lot, of whom the most important are the nine Archons, to whose functions five chapters (55-59) are devoted. The military officers, who come under the head of elective officials, form the subject of c. 61. With c. 63 begins the section on the Law-courts, which occupied the remainder of the Constitution. This portion, with the"exception of c. 63, is fragmentary in character, owing to the mutilated condition of the fourth roll of the papyrus on which it was written.' It will thus be seen that the subjects which receive fullest treatment in Part II. are the Council, the Archons and the Law-courts. The Ecclesia, on the other hand, is dealt with very briefly, in connexion with the prytaneis and proedri (cc. 43, 44). Sources.—The labours of several workers in this field, notably Bruno Keil and Wilamowitz, have rendered it comparatively easy to form a general estimate of Aristotle's indebtedness to previous writers, although problems of great difficulty are encountered as soon as it is attempted to determine the precise sources from which the historical part of the work is derived. Among these sources are unquestionably Herodotus (for the tyranny of Peisistratus, and for the struggle between Cleisthenes and Isagoras), Thucydides (for the episode of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and for the Four Hundred), Xenophon (for the Thirty), and the poems of Solon. There is now among critics a general consensus in favour of the view that the most important of his sources was the Atthis of Androtion, a work published in all probability only a few years earlier than the Constitution; in any case, after the year 346. From it are derived not only the passages which are annalistic in character and read like excerpts from a chronicle (e.g. c. 13. I, 2; C. 22; C. 26. 2, 3), but also most of the matter common to the Constitution and to Plutarch's Solon. The coincidences with Plutarch, which are often verbal, and extend to about 50 lines out of 170 in cc. 5-11 of the Constitution, can best be explained on the hypothesis that Hermippus, the writer followed by Plutarch, used the same source as Aristotle, viz. the Atthis of Androtion. Androtion is probably closely followed in the account of the pre-Draconian constitution, and to him appear to be due the explanation of local names (e.g. xoopiov are s), or proverbial expressions (e.g. Tb µ7) 4 nXoKptveZv), as well as the account of " Strategems " such as that of Themistocles against the Areopagus (c. 25) or that employed by Peisistratus in order to disarm the people (c. 15. 4). Whether the anecdotes, which are a conspicuous feature in the Constitution, should be referred to the same source is more open to doubt. It is also generally agreed that among the sources was a work, written towards the end of the 5th century B.C., by an author of oligarchical sympathies, with the object of defaming the character and policy of the heroes of the democracy. This source can be traced in passages such as c. 6. 2 (Solon turning the Seisachtheia to the profit of himself and his friends), 9. 2 (obscurity of Solon's laws intentional, cf. c. 35. 2), 27. 4 (Pericles' motive for the introduction of the dicasts' pay). But while the object (el (3ovXbµevoc (3Xaa th', c. 6) and the date of this oligarchical pamphlet (for the date cf. Plutarch's Solon, c. 15 of 7repi Kbveoa Kai KXeiviav rcai 'Iivbvucov, which points to a time when Conon, Alcibiades and Callias were prominent in public life) are fairly certain, the authorship is quite uncertain, as is also its relationship to another source of importance, viz. that from which are derived the accounts of the Four Hundred and the Thirty. The view taken of the character and course of these revolutions betrays a strong bias in favour of Theramenes, whose ideal is alleged to have been the erarpws aoXteela. It has been maintained, on the one hand, that this last source (the authority followed in the accounts of the Four Hundred and the Thirty) is identical with the oligarchical pamphlet, and, on the other, that it is none other than the Atthis of Androtion. The former hypothesis is improbable. In favour of the latter two arguments may be adduced. In the first place, Androtion's father, Andron, was one of the Four Hundred, and took Theramenes' side. Secondly, the precise marks of time, which are characteristic of the Atthis, are conspicuous in these chapters. In view, however, of the fact that Androtion in his political career showed himself not only a democrat, but a democrat of the extreme school, the hypothesis must be pronounced untenable. Value.—It is by no means easy to convey a just impression of the value of Aristotle's work as an authority for the constitutional history of Athens. In all that relates to the practice of his own day Aristotle's authority is final. There can be no question, therefore, as to the importance, or the trustworthy character, of the Second Part. But even here a caution is necessary. It must be remembered that its authority is final for the 4th century only, and that we are not justified in arguing from the practice of the 4th century to that of the 5th, unless corroborative evidence is available. In the First Part, however, where he is treating of the institutions and practice of a past age, Aristotle's authority is very far from being final. An analysis of this part of the work discloses his dependence, in a remarkable degree, upon his sources. Occasionally he compares, criticizes or combines; as a rule he adheres closely to the writer whom he is using. There is no evidence, either of independent inquiry, or of the utilization of other sources than literary ones. Where "original documents" are quoted, or referred to, as e.g. in the history of the Four Hundred, or of the Thirty, it is probable that he derived them from a previous writer. For the authority of Aristotle we must substitute, therefore, the authority of his sources; i.e. the value of any particular statement will vary with the character of the source from which it comes. For the history of the 5th century the passages which come from Androtion's Atthis carry with them a high degree of authority. It by no means follows, however, that a statement relating to earlier times is to be accepted simply because it is derived from the same source. And in passages which are derived from other sources than the Atthis much lower degree of authority can be claimed, even for statements relating to the 5th century. The supremacy of the Areopagus after the Persian Wars, the policy attributed to Aristides (c. 24), and the association of Themistocles with Ephialtes, are cases in point. Nor must the reader expect to find in the Constitution a great work, in any sense of the term. The style, it is true, is simple and clear, and the writer's criticisms are sensible. But the reader will look in vain for evidence of the philosophic insight which makes the Politics, even at the present day, the best text-book of political philosophy. It is perhaps hardly too much to say that there is not a single great idea in the whole work. He will look in vain, too, for any consistent view of the history of the constitution as a whole, or for any adequate account of its development. He will find occasional misunderstandings of measures, and confusions of thought. There are appreciations which it is difficult to accept,. and inaccuracies which it is difficult to pardon. There are contradictions which the author has overlooked, and there are omissions which are unaccountable. Yet, in spite of such defects,the importance of the Constitution can hardly be exaggerated. Its recovery has rendered obsolete any history of the Athenian constitution that was written before the year 1891. Before this date our knowledge was largely derived from the statements of scholiasts and lexicographers which had not seldom been misunderstood. The recovery of the Constitution puts us for the first time in possession of the evidence. To appreciate the difference that has been made by its recovery, it is only necessary to Compare what we now know of the reforms of Cleisthenes with what we formerly knew. It is much of it evidence that needs a careful process of weighing and sifting before it can be safely used; but it is, as a rule, the best, or the only evidence. The First Part may be less trustworthy than the Second; it is not less indispensable to the student of constitutional history. Editions of the text: Editio princeps, ed. by F. G. Kenyon, 3oth January 1891, with commentary. Autotype facsimile of the papyrus (1891). Aristotelis 1roXtrela 'ABnva wv, ed. G. Kaibel et U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (Berlin, Weidmann, 1891). Aristotelis qui fertur 'ABrtvatwv 7roAOreia recensuerunt H. van Herwerden et J. van Leeuwen (Leiden, 1891). Teubner text, ed. by F. Blass (Leipzig, 1892). Edition of the text without commentary by Kenyon. Most of these have passed through several editions. The fullest commentary is that contained in the edition of the text by J. E. Sandys (London, 1893). The best translations are those of Kenyon, in English, and of Kaibel and Kiessling, in German. Works dealing with the subject: Bruno Kell, Die Solonische Verfassung nach Aristoteles (Berlin, 1892) ; G. Gilbert, Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens (Eng. trans., 1895) ; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Aristoteles and Athen (2 vols., Berlin, 1893), a work of great importance, in spite of many unsound conclusions; E. Meyer, Forschungen, vol. ii. pp. 406 if. (the section dealing with the Four Hundred is especially valuable). Articles: R. W. Macan, Journal of Hellenic Studies (April 1891); R. Nissen, Rheinisches Museum (1892), p. 161; G. Busolt, Hermes (1898), pp. 71 ff.; O. Seeck, " Quellenstudien zu des Aristoteles' Verfassungsgeschichte Athens," in Lehmann's Beitrage zur•alien Geschichte, vol. iv. pp. 164 and 270. (E. M. W.)
End of Article: CONSTITUENCY (from " constituent," that which forms a necessary part of a thing; Lat. constituere, to create)
CONSTIPATION (from Lat. constipare, to press closel...

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