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PRINCIPLE OF CONTRADICTION (principium contradictionis) , in logic, theSee also: term applied to the second of the three See also: primary " See also: laws of thought." The See also: oldest statement of the See also: law is that contradictory statements cannot both at the same See also: time be true, e.g. the two propositions " A is B " and " A is not B" are mutually exclusive
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A may be B at one time, and not at another; A may be partly B and partly not B at the same time; but it is impossible to predicate of the same thing, at the same time, and in the same sense, the See also: absence and the presence of the same quality
.
This is the statement of the law given by See also: Aristotle
(TO yap afire inraPXEw TE Kai µi) irrrapXEIV abbac roV nil' ai)rcli Kai Kara TO airrb, Metaph
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P 3, 1005 b 19)
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It takes no account of the truth of either proposition; if one is true, the other is not; one of the two must be true
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See also: Modern logicians, following Leibnitz and See also: Kant, have generally adopted a different statement, by which the law assumes an essentially different meaning
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Their See also: formula is " A is not not-A "; in other words it is impossible to predicate of a thing a quality which is its contradictory
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Unlike Aristotle's law this law deals with the necessary relation between subject and predicate in a single See also: judgment
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Whereas Aristotle states that one or other of two contradictory propositions must be false, the Kantian law states that a particular kind of proposition is in itself necessarily false
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On the other See also: hand there is a real connexion between the two laws
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The denial of the statement " A is not-A" presupposes some knowledge of what A is, i.e. the statement A is A
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In other words a judgment about A is implied
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Kant's See also: analytical propositions depend on presupposed concepts which are the same for all See also: people
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His statement, regarded as a logical principle purely and apart from material facts, does not therefore amount to more than that of Aristotle, which deals simply with the significance of negation
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See text-books of Logic, e.g
.
C
.
Sigwart's Logic (trans
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See also: Helen Dendy, See also: London, 1895), vol. i. pp
.
142 See also: fell
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; for the various expressions of the law see See also: Ueberweg's Logik, § 77; also J
.
S
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See also: Mill, Examination of
See also: Hamilton, 471;
See also: Venn, Empirical Logic
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