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See also:VICTOR See also:COUSIN (1792–1867)
, See also:French philosopher, the son of a watchmaker, was See also:born in See also:Paris, in the Quartier St See also:Antoine, on the 28th of See also:November 1792
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At the See also:age of ten he was sent to the See also:grammar school of the Quartier St Antoine, the Lycee See also:Charlemagne
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Here he studied until he was eighteen
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The lycee had a connexion with the university, and when See also:Cousin See also:left the secondary school he was " crowned " in the See also:ancient See also: There was still another thinker who influenced him at this See also:early See also:period,—See also:Maine de Biran, whom Cousin regarded as the unequalled psychological observer of his time in See also:France . These men strongly influenced both the method and the See also:matter of Cousin's philosophical thought . To Laromiguiere he attributes the See also:lesson of decomposing thought, even though the reduction of it to sensation was inadequate . Royer-Collard taught him that even sensation is subject to certain See also:internal See also:laws and principles which it does not itself explain, which are See also:superior to See also:analysis and the natural patrimony of the mind . De Biran made a See also:special study of the phenomena of the will . He taught him to distinguish in all cognitions, and especially in the simplest facts of consciousness, the fact of voluntary activity, that activity in which our See also:personality is truly revealed . It was through this " triple discipline," as he calls it, that Cousin's philosophical thought was first See also:developed, and that in 1815 he entered on the public teaching of philosophy in the Normal School and in the faculty of letters.' He then took up the study of See also:German, worked at See also:Kant and See also:Jacobi, and sought to master the Philosophy of Nature of See also:Schelling, by which he was at first greatly attracted . The See also:influence of Schelling may be observed very markedly in the earlier See also:form of his philosophy . He sympathized with the principle of faith of Jacobi, but regarded it as arbitrary so See also:long as it was not recognized as grounded in See also:reason . In 1817 he went to See also:Germany, and met See also:Hegel at See also:Heidelberg . In this See also:year appeared Hegel's Encyclopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, of which Cousin had one of the earliest copies . He thought Hegel not particularly amiable, but the two became See also:friends . The following year Cousin went to See also:Munich, where he met Schelling for the first time, and spent a See also:month with him and Jacobi, obtaining a deeper insight into the Philosophy of Nature . The See also:political troubles of France interfered for a time with his career . In the events of 1814–1815 he took the royalist See also:side . He at first adopted the views of the party known as doctrinaire, of which Royer-Collard was the philosophical See also:chief . He seems then to have gone farther than his party, and even to have approached the extreme Left . Then came a reaction against liberalism, and in 1821–1822 Cousin was deprived of his offices alike in the faculty of letters and in the Normal School . The Normal School itself was swept away, and Cousin shared at the hands of a narrow and illiberal See also:government the See also:fate of See also:Guizot, who was ejected from the chair of history . This enforced See also:abandonment of public teaching was not wholly an evil . Ile set out for Germany with a view to further philosophical study . While at See also:Berlin in 1824–1825 he was thrown into See also:prison, either on some See also:ill-defined political See also:charge at the instance of the French See also:police, or on See also:account of certain incautious expressions which he had let fall in conversation . Liberated after six months, he continued under the suspicion of the French government for three years . It was during this period, however, that he thought out and developed what is distinctive in his philosophical See also:doctrine . His See also:eclecticism, his See also:ontology and his philosophy of history were declared in principle and in most of their salient details in the Fragmens philosophiques (Paris, 1826) . The preface to the pm, second edition (1833) and the Avertissement to the mens third (1838) aimed at a vindication of his principles Philosoagainst contemporary See also:criticism . Even the best of his Phiques. later books, the Philosophic ecossaise (4th ed., 1863), the Du vrai, du beau, et du bien (12th ed., 1872; Eng. trans., 3rd ed., See also:Edinburgh, 1854), and the Philosophic de Locke (4th ed., 1861) were simply matured revisions of his lectures during the period from 1815 to 182o . The lectures on Locke were first sketched in 1819, and fully developed in the course of 1829 . During the seven years of enforced abandonment of teaching he produced, besides the Fragmens, the edition of the See also:works of See also:Proclus (6 vols., 1820-1827), and the works of See also:Descartes (II vols., 1826) . He also commenced his See also:Translation of See also:Plato (13 vols.), which occupied his leisure time from 1825 to 1840 . We see in the Fragmens very distinctly the See also:fusion of the different philosophical influences by which his opinions were finally matured . For Cousin was as eclectic in thought and See also:habit of mind as he was in philosophical principle and See also:system . It is 1 Fragmens philosophiques—preface deuxieme . Political troubles . with the publication of the Fragmens of 1826 that the first great widening of his reputation is associated . In 1827 followed the Cours de 1'histoire de la philosophie . In 1828 M. de Vatimesnil, See also:minister of public instruction in See also:Martignac's See also:ministry, recalled Cousin and Guizot to their professorial positions in the university . The three lecturers a years which followed were the period of Cousin's greatest See also:triumph as a lecturer . His return to the chair was the See also:symbol of the triumph of constitutional ideas and was greeted with See also:enthusiasm . The hall of the Sorbonne was crowded as the hall of no philosophical teacher in Paris had been since the days of See also:Abelard . The lecturer had a singular See also:power of identifying himself for the time with the system which he expounded and the See also:historical See also:character he portrayed . Clear and comprehensive in the grasp of the general outlines of his subject, he was methodical and vivid in the See also:representation of details . In exposition he had the rare See also:art of unfolding and aggrandizing . There was a See also:rich, deep-toned, resonant eloquence mingled with the speculative exposition; his See also:style of expression was clear, elegant and forcible, abounding in happy turns and striking antitheses . To this was joined a singular power of rhetorical See also:climax . His philosophy exhibited in a striking manner the generalizing tendency of the French See also:intellect, and its logical need of grouping details See also:round central principles . There was withal a moral See also:elevation in his spiritual philosophy which came See also:home to the See also:hearts of his hearers, and seemed to afford a ground for higher development in See also:national literature and art, and even in politics, than the traditional philosophy of France had appeared capable of yielding . His lectures produced more ardent disciples, imbued at least with his spirit, than those of any other See also:professor of philosophy in France during the 18th See also:century .
Tested by the power and effect of his teaching influence, Cousin occupies a foremost See also:place in the See also:rank of professors of philosophy, who like Jacobi, Schelling and Dugald See also: Jouffroy, however, always kept See also:firm to the early—the French and Scottish—impulses of Cousin's teaching . Cousin continued to lecture regularly for two years and a See also:half after his return to the chair . Sympathizing with the revolution of See also:July, he was at once recognized by the new government as a friend of national See also:liberty . See also:Writing in See also:June 1833 he explains both his philosophical and his political position: " I had the See also:advantage of holding united against me for many years both the sensational and the theological school . In 1830 both See also:schools descended into the See also:arena of politics . The sensational school quite naturally produced the demagogic party, and the theological school became quite as naturally See also:absolutism, safe to See also:borrow from time to time the See also:mask of the See also:demagogue in See also:order the better to reach its ends, as in philosophy it is by See also:scepticism that it under-takes to restore See also:theocracy . On the other See also:hand, he who combated any exclusive principle in See also:science was See also:bound to reject also any exclusive principle in the See also:state, and to defend representative government." The government was not slow to do him See also:honour . He was induced by the ministry of which his friend Guizot was the See also:head to become a member of the See also:council of public instruction and counsellor of state, and in 1832 he was made a peer of France . He ceased to lecture, but retained the See also:title of professor of philosophy . Finally, he accepted the position of minister of public instruction in 1840 under See also:Thiers . He was besides director of the Normal School and virtual head of the university, and from 184o a member of the See also:Institute (See also:Academy of the Moral and Political Sciences) . His character and his See also:official position at this period gave him great power in the university and in the educa-tional arrangements of the See also:country .
In fact, during the seventeen and a half years of the reign of See also: In the first two years of the reign of Louis Philippe more was done for the education of the See also:people than had been either sought or accomplished in all the history of France . In See also:defence of university studies he stood manfully forth in the chamber of peers in 1844, against the clerical party on the one hand and the levelling or See also:Philistine party on the other . His speeches on this occasion were published in a tractate Defense de l'universite et de la philosophie (1844 and 1845) . This period of official life from 1830 to 1848 was spent, so far as philosophical study was concerned, in revising his former lectures and writings, in maturing them for publication or reissue, and in See also:research into certain periods of the See also:Philo sophical history of philosophy . In 1835 appeared De la writings . Metaphysique d'Aristote, suivi d'un essai de traduction des deux premiers livres; in 1836, Cours de philosophie professe d la faculte des lettres See also:pendant l'annee 1818, and Ouvrages inedits d'Abelard . This Cours de philosophie appeared later in 1854 as Du vrai, du beau, et du bien . From 1825 to 184o appeared Cours de l'histoire de la philosophie, in 1829 See also:Manuel de l'histoire de la philosophie de Tennemann, translated from the German . In 1840–1841 we have Cours d'histoire de la philosophie morale au XVIIIe siecle (5 vols.) . In 1841 appeared his edition of the (Euvres philosophiques de Maine-de-Biran; in 1842, Lecons de philosophie sur Kant (Eng. trans . A . G . See also:Henderson, 1854), and in the same year Des Pensees de See also:Pascal . The Nouveaux fragments were gathered together and republished in 1847 . Later, in 1859, appeared Petri Abaelardi See also:Opera . During this period Cousin seems to have turned with fresh interest to those literary studies which he had abandoned for See also:speculation under the influence of Laromiguiere and Royer-Collard . To this renewed interest we owe his studies of men Disciples and followers . and See also:women of note in France in the 17th century . As the results of his work in this See also:line, we have, besides the Des Pensees de Pascal, 1842, Etudes sur See also:les femmes et la societe du studies X VIIe siecle,1853 . He has sketched Jacqueline Pascal (1844), Madame de See also:Longueville (1853), the marquise de See also:Sable (1854), the duchesse de Chevreuse (1856), Madame de Hautefort (1856) . When the reign of Louis Philippe came to a See also:close through the opposition of his ministry, with Guizot at its head, to the demand for electoral reform and through the policy of the See also:Spanish marriages, Cousin, who was opposed to the government on these points, See also:lent his sympathy to See also:Cavaignac and the Provisional government . He published a pamphlet entitled See also:Justice et charite, the purport of which showed the moderation of his political views . It was markedly See also:anti-socialistic . But from this period he passed almost entirely from public life, and ceased to wield the personal influence which he had done during the preceding years . After the coup d'etat of the 2nd of See also:December, he was deprived of his position as permanent member of the superior council of public instruction . From See also:Napoleon and the Empire he stood aloof . A See also:decree of 1852 placed him along with Guizot and See also:Villemain in the rank of honorary professors . His sympathies were apparently with the See also:monarchy, under certain constitutional safeguards . Speaking in 1853 of the political issues of the spiritual philosophy which he had taught during his lifetime, he says,—" It conducts human See also:societies to the true See also:republic, that See also:dream of all generous souls, which in our time can be realized in Europe only by constitutional monarchy." 1 During the last years of his life he occupied a See also:suite of rooms in the Sorbonne, where he lived simply and unostentatiously . The chief feature of the rooms was his See also:noble library, the cherished collection of a lifetime . He died at See also:Cannes on the 13th of See also:January 1867, in his sixty-fifth year . In the front of the Sorbonne, below the lecture rooms of the faculty of letters, a tablet records an See also:extract from his will, in which he bequeaths his noble and cherished library to the halls of his professorial work and triumphs . Philosophy.—There are three distinctive points in Cousin's philosophy . These are his method, the results of his method, and the application of the method and its results to history,—especially to the history of philosophy . It is usual to speak of his philosophy as eclecticism . It is eclectic only in a secondary and subordinate sense . All eclecticism that is not self-condemned and inoperative implies a system of doctrine as its basis,—in fact, a criterion of truth . Otherwise, as Cousin himself remarks, it is simply a See also:blind and useless See also:syncretism . And Cousin saw and proclaimed from an early period in his philosophical teaching the See also:necessity of a system on which to See also:base his eclecticism . This is indeed advanced as an See also:illustration or See also:confirmation of the truth of his system,—as a See also:proof that the facts of history correspond to his analysis of consciousness . These three points—the method, the results, and the philosophy of history—are with him intimately connected; they are developments in a natural order, of sequence . They become in practice See also:Psychology, Ontology and Eclecticism in history . First, as to method . On no point has Cousin more strongly insisted than the importance of method in philosophy . That Method. which he adopts, and the necessity of which he so strongly proclaims, is the See also:ordinary one of observation, analysis and See also:induction . This observational method Cousin regards as that of the a8th century,—the method which Descartes began and abandoned, and which Locke and Condillac applied, though imperfectly, and which See also:Reid and Kant used with more success, yet not completely . He insists that this is the true method of philosophy as applied to consciousness, in which alone the facts of experience appear . But the proper See also:condition of the application of the method is that it shall not through See also:prejudice of system omit a single fact of consciousness .
If the authority of consciousness is See also:good in one instance, it is good in all
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If not to be trusted in one, it is not to be trusted in any
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Previous systems have erred in not presenting the facts of consciousness,
1 Du vrai, du beau, et du bien (preface)
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i.e. consciousness itself, in their totality
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The observational method applied to consciousness gives us the science of psycho-logy
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This is the basis and the only proper basis of ontology or See also:metaphysics—the science of being—and of the philosophy of history
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To the observation of consciousness Cousin adds induction as the See also:complement of his method, by which he means inference as to reality necessitated by the data of consciousness, and regulated by certain laws found in consciousness, viz. those of reason
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By his method of observation and induction as thus explained, his philosophy will be found to be marked off very clearly, on the one hand from the deductive construction of notions of an See also:absolute system, as represented either by Schelling or Hegel, which Cousin regards as based simply on See also:hypothesis and See also:abstraction, illegitimately obtained; and on the other, from that of Kant, and in a sense, of See also:Sir W
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See also: These three facts are different in character, but are not found apart in consciousness . Sensations, or the facts of the sensibility, are necessary; we do not impute them to ourselves . The facts of reason are also necessary, and reason is not less See also:independent of the will than the sensibility . Voluntary facts alone are marked in the eyes of consciousness with the characters of imputability and personality . The will alone is the See also:person or Me . The me is the centre of the intellectual See also:sphere without which consciousness is impossible . We find ourselves in a See also:strange See also:world, between two orders of phenomena which do not belong to us, which we apprehend only on the condition of our distinguishing ourselves from them . Further, we apprehend by means of a See also:light which does not come from ourselves . All light comes from the reason, and it is the reason which apprehends both itself and the sensibility which envelops it, and the will which it obliges but does not constrain . Consciousness, then, is composed of these three integrant and inseparable elements . But Reason is the immediate ground of knowledge and of consciousness itself . But there is a peculiarity in Cousin's doctrine of activity or freedom, and in his doctrine of reason, which enters deeply into his system . This is the See also:element of spontaneity in volition and in reason . This is the See also:heart of what is new alike in his doctrine of knowledge and being . Liberty or freedom is a generic See also:term which means a cause or being endowed with self-activity . This is to itself and its own development its own ultimate cause . See also:Free-will is so, although it is preceded by deliberation and determination, i.e. reflection, for we are always conscious that even after determination we are free to will or not to will . But there is a primary See also:kind of volition which has not reflection for its condition, which is yet free and spontaneous . We must have willed thus spontaneously first, otherwise we could not know, before our reflective volition, that we could will and See also:act . Spontaneous volition is free as reflective, but it is the See also:prior act of the two . This view of liberty of will is the only one in accordance with the facts of humanity; it excludes reflective volition, and explains the enthusiasm of the poet and the artist in the act of creation; it explains also the ordinary actions of mankind, which are done as a See also:rule spontaneously and not after reflective deliberation . But it is in his doctrine of the Reason that the distinctive principle of the philosophy of Cousin lies . The reason given to us by psychological observation, the reason of our consciousness, is impersonal in its nature . We do not make it; its character is precisely the opposite of individuality; it is universal and Spontaneity In will . necessary . The recognition of universal and necessary principles in knowledge is the essential point in psychology; it ought to be put first and emphasized to the last that these unperson- exist, and that they are wholly impersonal or absolute. silty o real on . . The number of these principles, their enumeration reas and See also:classification, is an important point, but it is secondary to that of the recognition of their true nature . This was the point which Kant missed in his analysis, and this is the fundamental truth which Cousin thinks he has restored to the integrity of philosophy by the method of the observation of consciousness . And how is this impersonality or absoluteness of the conditions of knowledge to be established ? The See also:answer is in substance that Kant went wrong in putting necessity first as the criterion of those laws . This brought them within the sphere of reflection, and gave as their See also:guarantee the impossibility of thinking them reversed; and led to their being regarded as wholly relative to human intelligence, restricted to the sphere of the phenomenal, incapable of revealing to us substantial reality—necessary, yet subjective . But this test of necessity is a wholly secondary one; these laws are not thus guaranteed to us; they are each and all given to us, given to our consciousness, in an act of spontaneous See also:apperception or' See also:apprehension, immediately, instantaneously, in a sphere above the reflective consciousness, yet within the reach of knowledge . And " all subjectivity with all reflection expires in the spontaneity of apperception . The reason becomes subjective by relation to the voluntary and free self; but in itself it is impersonal; it belongs not to this or to that self in humanity; it belongs not even to humanity . We may say with truth that nature and humanity belong to it, for without its laws both would perish." But what is the number of those laws ? Kant reviewing the enterprise of See also:Aristotle in modern times has given a See also:complete See also:list taws of of the laws of thought, but it is arbitrary in classificareason, tion and may be legitimately reduced . According to Cousin, there are but two primary laws of thought, that of causality and that of substance . From these flow naturally all the others . In the order of nature, that of substance is the first and causality second . In the order of acquisition of our knowledge, causality precedes substance, or rather both are given us in each other, and are contemporaneous in consciousness . These principles of reason, cause and substance, given thus psychologically, enable us to pass beyond the limits of the relative and subjective to See also:objective and absolute reality,—enable us, in a word, to pass from psychology, or the science of know-ledge, to ontology or the science of being . These laws are inextricably mixed in consciousness with the data of volition and sensation, with free activity and fatal See also:action or impression, and they See also:guide us in rising to a personal being, a self or free cause, and to an impersonal reality, a not-me—nature, the world of force—lying out of us, and modifying us . As I refer to myself the act of See also:attention and volition, so I cannot but refer the sensation to some cause, necessarily other than myself, that is, to an See also:external cause, whose existence is as certain for me as my own existence, since the phenomenon which suggests it to me is as certain as the phenomenon which had suggested my reality, and both are given in each other . I thus reach an objective impersonal world of forces which corresponds to the variety of my sensations . The'relation of these forces or causes to each other is the order of the universe . But these two forces, the me and the not-me, are reciprocally limitative . As. reason has apprehended these two simultaneous phenomena, attention and sensation, and led us The immediately to conceive the two sorts of distinct See also:Infinite or absolute. causes, correlative and reciprocally finite, to which they are related, so, from the notion of this See also:limitation, we find it impossible under the same guide not to conceive a supreme cause, absolute and infinite, itself the first and last cause of all . This is relatively to self and not-self what these are to their proper effects . This cause is self-sufficient, and is sufficient for the reason . This is See also:God; he must be conceived under the notion of cause, related to humanity and the world . He is absolute substance only in so far as he is absolute cause,and his essence lies precisely in his creative power . He thus creates, and he creates necessarily . This theodicy of Cousin laid him open obviously enough to the charge of See also:pantheism . This he repels, and his answer may be summed up as follows . Pantheism is properly the deification of the law of phenomena, the universe God. charge of But I distinguish the two finite causes self and not-self , &fl from each other and from the infinite cause . They are not See also:mere modifications of this cause or properties, as with See also:Spinoza,—they are free forces having'their power or See also:spring of action in themselves, and this is sufficient for our See also:idea of independent finite reality . I hold this, and I hold the relation of these as effects to the one supreme cause . The God I plead for is neither the deity of Pantheism, nor the absolute unity of the Eleatics, a being divorced from all possibility of creation or See also:plurality, a mere metaphysical abstraction . The deity I maintain is creative, and necessarily creative . The deity of Spinoza and the Eleatics is a mere substance, not a cause in any sense . As to the necessity under which Deity exists of acting or creating, this is the highest form of liberty, it is the freedom of spontaneity, activity without deliberation . His action is not the result of a struggle between See also:passion and virtue . He is free in an unlimited manner the purest spontaneity in See also:man is but the See also:shadow of the freedom of God . He acts freely but not arbitrarily, and with the consciousness of being able to choose the opposite See also:part . He cannot deliberate or will as we do . His spontaneous action excludes at once the efforts and the miseries of will and the |