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DELIAN LEAGUE, or CONFEDERACY OF DELOS

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Originally appearing in Volume V07, Page 962 of the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica.
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DELIAN See also:

LEAGUE, or CONFEDERACY OF See also:DELOS  , the name given to a See also:confederation of See also:Greek states under the leadership of See also:Athens, with its headquarters at See also:Delos, founded in 478 B.C. shortly after the final repulse of the expedition of the Persians under See also:Xerxes I . This confederacy, which after many modifications and vicissitudes was finally broken up by the See also:capture of Athens by See also:Sparta in 404, was revived in 378–7 (the " Second Athenian Confederacy ") as a See also:protection against Spartan aggression, and lasted, at least formally, until the victory of See also:Philip II. of Macedon at Chaeronea . These two confederations have an See also:interest quite out of proportion to the significance of the detailed events which See also:form their See also:history . (See See also:GREECE: See also:Ancient History.) They are the first two examples of which we have detailed knowledge of a serious See also:attempt at See also:united See also:action on the See also:part of a large number of self-governing states at a relatively high level of conscious See also:political development . The first See also:league, moreover, in its later See also:period affords the first example in recorded history of self-conscious imperialism in which the subordinate See also:units enjoyed a specified See also:local See also:autonomy with an organized See also:system, See also:financial, military and judicial . The second league is further interesting as the pre-See also:cursor of the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues . History.—Several causes contributed to the formation of the first Confederacy of Delos . During the 6th See also:century B.C . Sparta had come to be regarded as the See also:chief See also:power, not only in the Peloponnese, but also in Greece as a whole, including the islands of the See also:Aegean . The See also:Persian invasions of See also:Darius and Xerxes, with the consequent importance of maritime strength and the capacity for distant enterprise, as compared with that of purely military superiority in the Greek See also:peninsula, caused a considerable loss of See also:prestige which Sparta was unwilling to recognize . Moreover, it chanced that at the See also:time the Spartan leaders were not men of strong See also:character or See also:general ability . See also:Pausanias, the See also:victor of See also:Plataea, soon showed himself destitute of the high qualities which the situation demanded .

See also:

Personal cupidity, discourtesy to the See also:allies, and a tendency to adopt the See also:style and See also:manners of See also:oriental princes, combined to alienate from him the sympathies of the Ionian allies, who realized that, had it not been for the Athenians, the See also:battle of See also:Salamis would never have been even fought, and Greece would probably have become a Persian satrapy . The Athenian contingent which was sent to aid Pausanias in the task of See also:driving the Persians finally out of the Thraceward towns was under the command of the Athenians, See also:Aristides and See also:Cimon, men of tact and probity . It is not, there-fore, surprising that when Pausanias was recalled to Sparta on the See also:charge of treasonable overtures to the Persians, the Ionian allies appealed to the Athenians on the grounds of kinship and urgent See also:necessity, and that when Sparta sent out Dorcis to supersede Pausanias he found Aristides in unquestioned command of the allied See also:fleet . To some extent the Spartans were undoubtedly relieved, in that it no longer See also:fell to them to organize distant expeditions to See also:Asia See also:Minor, and this feeling was strengthened about the same time by the treacherous conduct of their See also:king See also:Leotychides (q.v.) in See also:Thessaly . In any See also:case the inelastic quality of the Spartan system was unable to adapt itself to the spirit of the new See also:age . To Aristides was mainly due the organization of the new league and the See also:adjustment of the contributions of the variousallies in See also:ships or in See also:money . His See also:assessment, of the details of which we know nothing, was so See also:fair that it remained popular See also:long after the league of autonomous allies had become an Athenian See also:empire . The general affairs of the league were managed by a See also:synod which met periodically in the See also:temple of See also:Apollo and See also:Artemis at Delos, the ancient centre sanctified by the See also:common See also:worship of the See also:Ionians . In this synod the allies met on an equality under the See also:presidency of Athens . Among its first subjects of deliberation must have been the ratification of Aristides' assessment . See also:Thucydides See also:lays emphasis on the fact that in these meetings Athens as. See also:head of the league had no more than presidential authority, and the other members were called vivµµaxot (allies), a word, however, of ambiguous meaning and capable of including both See also:free and subject allies . The only other fact preserved by Thucydides is that Athens appointed a See also:board called the Hellenotamiae (raµias, steward) to See also:watch over and administer the See also:treasury of the league, which for some twenty years was kept at Delos, and to receive the contributions (tbopos) of the allies who paid in money .

The league was, therefore, specifically a free confederation of. autonomous Ionian cities founded as a protection against the common danger which threatened the Aegean See also:

basin, and led by Athens in virtue of her predominant See also:naval power as exhibited in the See also:war against Xerxes . Its organization, adopted by the common synod, was the product of the new democratic ideal embodied in the Cleisthenic reforms, as interpreted by a just and moderate exponent . It is one of the few examples of free corporate action on the part of the ancient Greek cities, whose centrifugal yearning for See also:independence so often proved fatal to the Hellenic See also:world . It is, therefore, a profound See also:mistake to regard the history of the league during the first twenty years of its existence as that of an Athenian empire . Thucydides expressly describes the predominance of Athens as i)yeµovia (leadership, headship), not as apxil (empire), and the attempts made by Athenian orators during the second period of the Peloponnesian War to prove that the attitude of Athens had not altered since the time of Aristides are manifestly unsuccessful . Of the first ten years of the league's history we know practically nothing, See also:save that it was a period of steady, successful activity against the few remaining Persian strongholds in See also:Thrace and the Aegean (See also:Herod. i . 106-107, see ATHENS, CIMON) . In these years the Athenian sailors reached a high See also:pitch of training, and by their successes strengthened that corporate See also:pride which had been See also:born at Salamis . On the other See also:hand, it naturally came to pass that certain of the allies became weary of incessant warfare and looked for a period of commercial prosperity . Athens, as the chosen See also:leader, and supported no doubt by the synod, enforced the contributions of ships and money according to the assessment . Gradually the allies began to weary of personal service and persuaded the synod to accept a money See also:commutation . The Ionians were naturally averse from prolonged warfare, and in the prosperity which must have followed the final rout of the Persians and the freeing of the Aegean from the pirates (a very important feature in the league's policy) a money contribution was only a trifling See also:burden .

The result was, however, extremely See also:

bad for the allies, whose status in the league necessarily became See also:lower in relation to that of Athens, while at the same time their military and naval resources correspondingly diminished . Athens became more and more powerful, and could afford to disregard the authority of the synod . Another new feature appeared in the employment of See also:coercion against cities which desired to secede . Athens might fairly insist that the protection of the Aegean would become impossible if some of the chief islands were liable to be used as piratical strongholds, and further that it was only right that all should contribute in some way to the See also:security which all enjoyed . ` The result was that, in the cases of See also:Naxos and See also:Thasos, for instance, the league's resources were employed not against the Persians but against recalcitrant Greek islands, and that the Greek ideal of See also:separate autonomy was outraged . Shortly after the capture of Naxos (c . 467 B.C.) Cimon proceeded with a fleet of 300 ships (only too from the allies) to the See also:south. western and See also:southern coasts of Asia Minor . Ha ving driven the Persians out of Greek towns in See also:Lycia and See also:Caria, he met and routed the Persians on See also:land and See also:sea at the mouth of the See also:Eurymedon in See also:Pamphylia . In 463 after a See also:siege of more than two years the Athenians captured Thasos, with which they had quarrelled over See also:mining rights in the Strymon valley . It is said (Thuc. i . 'or) that Thasos had appealed for aid to Sparta, and that the latter was prevented from responding only by See also:earthquake and the Helot revolt . But this is both unproved and improbable .

Sparta had so far no See also:

quarrel with Athens . Athens thus became See also:mistress of the Aegean, while the synod at Delos had become practically, if not theoretically, powerless . It was at this time that Cimon (q.v.), who had striven to maintain a See also:balance between Sparta, the chief military, and Athens, the chief naval power, was successfully attacked by Ephialtes and See also:Pericles . During the ensuing years, apart from a brief return to the Cimonian policy, the resources of the league, or, as it has now become, the Athenian empire, were directed not so much against See also:Persia as against Sparta, See also:Corinth, See also:Aegina and See also:Boeotia . (See ATHENS; SPARTA, &c.) A few points only need be dealt with here . The first years of the land war brought the Athenian empire to its See also:zenith . Apart from Thessaly, it included all Greece outside the Peloponnese . At the same time, however, the Athenian expedition against the Persians in See also:Egypt ended in a disastrous defeat, and for a time the Athenians returned to a See also:philo-Laconian policy, perhaps under the direction of Cimon (see CIMON and PERICLES) . See also:Peace was made with Sparta, and, if we are to believe 4th-century orators, a treaty, the Peace of See also:Callias or of Cimon, was concluded between the See also:Great King and Athens in 449 after the See also:death of Cimon before the walls of See also:Citium in See also:Cyprus . The meaning of this so-called Peace of Callias is doubtful . Owing to the silence of Thucydides and other reasons, many scholars regard it as merely a cessation of hostilities (see CIMON and CALLIAS, where authorities are quoted) . At all events, it is significant of the success of the See also:main See also:object of the Delian League, the Athenians resigning Cyprus and Egypt, while Persia recognized the freedom of the maritime Greeks of Asia Minor .

During this period the power of Athens over her allies had increased, though we do not know anything of the See also:

process by which this was brought about . See also:Chios, See also:Lesbos and See also:Samos alone furnished ships; all the See also:rest had commuted for a money See also:payment . This meant that the synod was quite powerless . More-over in 454 (probably) the changed relations were crystallized by the transference (proposed by the Samians) of the treasury to Athens (Corp . Inscr . See also:Attic. i . 26o) . Thus in 448 B.C . Athens was not only mistress of a maritime empire, but ruled over See also:Megara,' Boeotia, See also:Phocis, Locris, See also:Achaea and Troezen, i.e. over so-called allies who were strangers to the old See also:pan-Ionian See also:assembly and to the policy of the league, and was practically equal to Sparta on land . An important event must be referred probably to the See also:year 451,—the See also:law of Pericles, by which citizenship (including the right to See also:vote in the See also:Ecclesia and to sit on paid juries) was restricted to those who could prove themselves the See also:children of an Athenian See also:father and See also:mother (Ei; aµ4oiv avroiv) . This measure must have had a detrimental effect on the allies, who thus saw themselves excluded still further from recognition as equal partners in a league (see PERICLES) . The natural result of all these causes was that a feeling of antipathy See also:rose against Athens in the minds of those to whom autonomy was the breath of See also:life, and the fundamental tendency of the Greeks to disruption was soon to prove more powerful than the forces at the disposal of Athens .

The first to secede were the land See also:

powers of Greece proper, whose subordination Athens had endeavoured to See also:guarantee by supporting the democratic parties in the various states . Gradually the exiled oligarchs combined; with the defeat of Tolmides at Coroneia, Boeotia was finally lost to the empire, and the loss of Phocis, Locris and Megara was the immediate sequel . Against these losses the retention of See also:Euboea, Nisaea and Pegae was no See also:compensation; the land empire was irretrievably lost . The next important event is the revolt of Samos, which had quarrelled with See also:Miletus over the See also:city of See also:Priene . The Samians refused the See also:arbitration of Athens . The See also:island was conqueredwith great difficulty by the whole force of the league, and from the fact that the See also:tribute of the Thracian cities and those in Hellespontine See also:district was increased between 439 and 436 we must probably infer that Athens had to. See also:deal with a widespread feeling of discontent about this period . It is, however, equally See also:notice-able on the one hand that the main See also:body of the allies was not affected, and on the other that the Peloponnesian League on the See also:advice of Corinth officially recognized the right of Athens to deal with her rebellious subject allies, and refused to give help to the Samians . The succeeding events which led to the Peloponnesian War and the final disruption of the league are discussed in other articles . (See ATHENS: History, and PELOPONNESIAN WAR.) Two important events alone See also:call for See also:special notice . The first is the raising of the allies' tribute in 425 B.C. by a certain Thudippus, presumably a henchman of See also:Cleon . The fact, though not mentioned by Thucydides, was inferred from See also:Aristophanes (Wasps, 66o), See also:Andocides (de See also:Pace, § 9), See also:Plutarch (Aristides, c . 24), and pseudo-Andocides (Alcibiad .

II); it was proved by the See also:

discovery of the assessment See also:list of 425–4 (See also:Hicks and See also:Hill, Inscrip . 64) . The second event belongs to 411, after the failure of the Sicilian expedition . In that year the tribute of the allies was commuted for a 5% tax on all imports and exports by sea . This tax, which must have tended to equalize the Athenian merchants with those of the allied.cities, probably came into force gradually, for beside the new collectors called 1ropcaral we still find Hellenotamiae (C.I.A. iv . [i.] p.34) . The Tribute.—Only a few problems can be discussed of the many which are raised by the insufficient and conflicting See also:evidence at our disposal . In the first See also:place there is the question of the tribute . Thucydides is almost certainly wrong in saying that the amount of the See also:original tribute was 46o talents (about £106,000); this figure cannot have been reached for at least twelve, probably twenty years, when new members had been enrolled (Lycia, Caria, Eion, See also:Lampsacus) . Similarly he is probably wrong, or at all events includes items of which the tribute lists take no See also:account, when he says that it amounted to 600 talents at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, The moderation of the assessment is shown not only by the fact that it was paid so long without objection, but also by the individual items . Even in 425 Naxos and See also:Andros paid only 15 talents, while Athens had just raised an eispkora (income tax) from her own citizens of 200 talents . Moreover it would seem that a tribute which yielded less than the 5% tax of 411 could not have been unreasonable .

The number of tributaries is given by Aristophanes as Imo, but this is greatly in excess of those named in the tribute lists . Some authorities give 200; others put it as high as 290 . The difficulty is increased by the fact that in some cases several towns were grouped together in vne payment (oiwrekels) . These were grouped into five main See also:

geographical divisions (from 443 to 436; afterwards four, Caria being merged in See also:Ionia) . Each See also:division was represented by two elective assessment commissioners (raKrai), who assisted the See also:Boule at Athens in the quadrennial division of the tribute . Each city sent in its own assessment before the raKral., who presented it to the Boule . If there was any difference of See also:opinion the See also:matter was referred to the Ecclesia for See also:settlement . In the Ecclesia a private See also:citizen might propose another assessment, or the case might be referred to the law courts . The records of the tribute are preserved in the so-called See also:quota lists, which give the names of the cities and the proportion, one-sixtieth, of their several tributes, which was paid to Athens . No tribute was paid by members of a See also:cleruchy (q.v.), as we find from the fact that the tribute of a city always decreased when a cleruchy was planted in it . This highly organized financial system must have been gradually evolved, and no doubt reached its perfection only after the treasury was transferred to Athens . See also:Government and See also:Jurisdiction.—There is much difference of opinion among scholars regarding the attitude of imperial Athens towards her allies .

See also:

Grote maintained that on the whole the allies had little ground for complaint; but in so doing he rather seems to leave out of account the Greek's dislike of See also:external discipline . The very fact that the See also:hegemony had become an empire was enough to make the new system highly offensive to the allies . No very strong See also:argument can be based on the paucity of actual revolts . The indolent Ionians had seen the result of See also:secession at Naxos and See also:rebellion at Thasos; the Athenian fleet was perpetually on guard in the Aegean . On the other hand among the mainland cities revolt was frequent; they were ready to See also:rebel Kai 1rapa bbvapw . Therefore, even though Athenian domination may have been highly salutary in its effects, there can be no doubt that the allies did not regard it with See also:affection . To See also:judge only by the negative evidence of the See also:decree of Aristoteles which records the terms of See also:alliance of the second confederacy (below), we gather that in the later period at least of the first league's history the Athenians had interfered with the local autonomy of the allies in various ways—an inference which is confirmed by the terms of " alliance " which Athens imposed on See also:Erythrae, See also:Chalcis and Miletus . Though it appears that Athens made individual agreements with various states, and therefore that we cannot regard as general rules the terms laid down in those which we possess, it is undeniable that the Athenians planted garrisons under permanent Athenian See also:officers (¢pobpapxoi) in some cities . Moreover the practice among Athenian settlers of acquiring land in the allied districts must have been vexatious to the allies, the more so as all important cases between Athenians and citizens of allied cities were brought to Athens . Even on the See also:assumption that the Athenian dicasteries were scrupulously fair in their awards, it must have been peculiarly galling to the self-respect of the allies and inconvenient to individuals to be compelled to carry cases to Athens and Athenian juries . Furthermore we gather from the Aristoteles inscription and from the 4th-century orators that Athens imposed democratic constitutions on her allies; indeed Isocrates (Pang., 106) takes See also:credit for Athens on this ground, and the See also:charter of Erythrae confirms the view (cf . Arist .

Phoenix-squares

Polit., vi . 9 1307 b 20; Thuc. viii . 21, 48, 64, 65) . Even though we admit that Chios, Lesbos and Samos (up to 440) retained their oligarchic governments and that Selymbria, at a time (409 B.c.) when the empire was in extremis, was permitted to choose its own constitution, there can be no doubt that, from whatever See also:

motive and with what-ever result, Athens did exercise over many of her allies an authority which extended to the most intimate concerns of local See also:administration . Thus the great attempt on the part of Athens to See also:lead a harmonious league of free Greek states for the See also:good of Hellas degenerated into an empire which proved intolerable to the autonomous states of Greece . Her failure was due partly to the commercial See also:jealousy of Corinth working on the dull antipathy of Sparta, partly to the hatred of See also:compromise and discipline which was fatally characteristic of Greece and especially of Ionian Greece, and partly also to the lack of tact and See also:restraint shown by Athens and her representatives in her relations with the allies . The Second League.—The conditions which led to the second Athenian or Delian Confederacy were fundamentally different, not only in virtue of the fact that the allies had learned from experience the dangers to which such a league was liable, but because the enemy was no longer an oriental power of whose future action there could be no certain anticipation, but Sparta, whose ambitious projects since the fall of Athens had, shown that there could be no safety for the smaller states save in See also:combination . There can be no reasonable doubt that as soon as the Athenians began to recover from the paralysing effect of the victory of See also:Lysander and the See also:internal troubles in which they were involved by the government of the See also:Thirty, their thoughts turned to the possibility of recovering their lost empire . The first step in the direction was the recovery of their sea-power, which was effected by the victory of See also:Conon at See also:Cnidus (See also:August 394 B.C.) . Gradually individual cities which had formed part of the Athenian empire returned to their alliance with Athens, until the Spartans had lost See also:Rhodes, See also:Cos, Nisyrus, Teos, Chios, Mytilene, See also:Ephesus, Erythrae, See also:Lemnos, See also:Imbros, See also:Scyros, See also:Eretria, Melos, See also:Cythera, See also:Carpathus and Delos . Sparta had only Sestos and See also:Abydos of all that she had won by the battle of See also:Aegospotami . At the same time no systematic constructive attempt at a renewal of empire can as yet be detected .

Athenian relations were with individual states only, and the terms of alliance were various . Moreover, whereas Persia had been for several years aiding Athens against Sparta, the revolt of the Athenian ally See also:

Evagoras (q.v.) of Cyprus set them at enmity, and with the secession of Ephesus, Cnidus and Samos in 391 and the See also:civil war in Rhodes, the See also:star of Sparta seemed again to be in the ascendant . But the whole position was changed by the successes of See also:Thrasybulus, who brought over the Odrysian king Medocus and Seuthes of the Propontis to the Athenian alliance, set up a See also:democracy in See also:Byzantium and reimposed the old To % See also:duty on goods from the See also:Black Sea . Many of the island towns subsequently came over, and from See also:inscriptions at See also:Clazomenae (C.I.A. ii . 14b) and Thasos (C.I.A. iv . 11b) we learn that Thrasybulus evidently was deliberately aiming at a renewal of the empire, though the circumstances leading to his death at See also:Aspendus when seeking to raise money suggest that he had no general backing in Athens . The peace of See also:Antalcidas or the King's Peace (see ANTALe1DAS; SPARTA) in 386 was a See also:blow to Athens in the interests of Persia and Sparta . Antalcidas compelled the Athenians to give their assent to it only by making himself See also:master of the See also:Hellespont by stratagem with the aid of See also:Dionysius the See also:Elder of See also:Syracuse . By this peace all the Greek cities on the mainland of Asia with the islands of Cyprus and Clazomenae were recognized as Persian, all other cities except Imbros, Lemnos and Scyros as autonomous . Directly, this arrangement prevented an Athenian empire; indirectly, it caused the sacrificed cities and their kinsmen on the islands to look upon Athens as their See also:protector . The See also:gross selfishness of the Spartans, herein exemplified, was emphasized by their capture of the Theban citadel, and, after their See also:expulsion, by the See also:raid upon See also:Attica in time of peace by the Spartan Sphodrias, and his See also:immunity from See also:punishment at Sparta (summer of 378 B.C.) . The Athenians at once invited their allies to a See also:conference, and the Second Athenian Confederacy was formed in the archonship of Nausinicus on the basis of the famous decree of Aristoteles .

Those who attended the conference were probably Athens, Chios, Mytilene, Methymna, Rhodes, Byzantium, See also:

Thebes, the latter of which joined Athens soon after the Sphodrias raid . In the See also:spring of 377 invitations were sent out to the maritime cities . Some time in that year Tenedos, Chios, Chalcis in Euboea, and probably the Euboean cities Eretria, Carystus and See also:Arethusa gave in their adherence, followed by See also:Perinthus, Peparethus, Sciathus and other maritime cities . At this point Sparta was roused to a sense of the significance of the new confederacy, and the Athenian See also:corn See also:supply was threatened by a Spartan fleet of sixty triremes . The Athenians immediately fitted out a fleet under See also:Chabrias, who gained a decisive victory over the Spartans between Naxos and See also:Paros (battle of Naxos 376 B.C.), both of which were added to the league . Proceeding northwards in 375.Chabrias brought over a large number of the Thraceward towns, including See also:Abdera, Thasos and See also:Samothrace . It is interesting to notice that a See also:garrison was placed in Abdera in See also:direct contravention of the terms of the new confederacy (See also:Meyer, Gesch. d . Alt., v . 394) . About the same time the successes of See also:Timotheus in the See also:west resulted in the addition to the league of Corcyra and the cities of Cephallenia, and his moderation induced the Acarnanians and Alcetas, the Molossian king, to follow their example . Once again Sparta sent out a fleet, but Timotheus in spite of financial embarrassment held his ground . By this time, however, the alliance between Thebes and Athens was growing weaker, and Athens, being See also:short of money, concluded a peace with Sparta (probably in See also:July 374), by which the peace of Antalcidas was confirmed and the two states recognized each other as mistress of sea and land respectively .

Trouble, however, soon arose over Zacynthus, and the Spartans not only sent help to the Zacynthian oligarchs but even besieged Corcyra (373) . Timotheus was sent to relieve the island, but shortness of money compelled him to See also:

search for new allies, and he spent the summer of 373 in persuading See also:Jason of Pherae (if he had not already joined), and certain towns in Thrace, the See also:Chersonese, the Propontis and the Aegean to enrol themselves . This delay in sending help to Corcyra was rightly or wrongly condemned by the Athenians, who dismissed Timotheus in favour of See also:Iphicrates . The expedition which followed produced negative successes, but the See also:absence of any See also:positive success and the pressure of financial difficulty, coupled with the defection of Jason (probably before 371), and the high-handed action of Thebes in destroying Plataea (373), induced Athens to renew the peace with Sparta which Timotheus had broken . With the support of Persia an agreement was made by a See also:congress at Sparta on the .basis of the autonomy of the cities, See also:Amphipolis and the Chersonese being granted to Athens . The Thebans at first accepted the terms, but on the See also:day after, realizing that they were thus balked of their pan-Boeotian ambition, withdrew and finally severed themselves from the league . The peace of 371 may be regarded as the conclusion of the first distinct period in the league's existence . The original purpose of the league—the protection of the allies from the ambitions of Sparta—was achieved . Athens was recognized as mistress of the sea; Sparta as the chief land power . The inherent weakness of the See also:coalition had, however, become apparent . The See also:enthusiasm of the allies (numbering about seventy) waned rapidly before the financial exigencies of successive See also:campaigns, and it is abundantly clear that Thebes had no interest save the See also:extension 9f her power in Boeotia . Though her secession, therefore, meant very little loss of strength, there were not wanting signs that the league was not destined to remain a power in the land .

The remaining history may be broken up into two periods, the first from 371 to 357, the second from 357 to 338 . Throughout these two periods, which saw the decline and final See also:

dissolution of the alliance, there is very little specific evidence for its existence . The events seem to belong to the histories of the several cities, and examples of corporate action are few and uncertain . None the less the known facts justify a large number of inferences as to the significance of events which are on the See also:surface merely a part of the individual See also:foreign policy of Athens . Period 377–357.—The first event in this period was the battle of See also:Leuctra (July 371), in which, no doubt to the surprise'of Athens, Thebes temporarily asserted itself as the chief land power in Greece . To counterbalance the new power Athens very rashly plunged into Peloponnesian politics with the ulterior object of inducing the states which had formerly recognized the hegemony of Sparta to See also:transfer their See also:allegiance to the Delian League . It seems that all the states adopted this policy with the exception of Sparta (probably) and See also:Elis . The policy of Athens was mistaken for two reasons: (I) Sparta was not entirely humiliated, and (2) alliance with the land powers of Peloponnese was incalculably dangerous, inasmuch as it involved Athens in enterprises which could not awake the enthusiasm of her maritime allies . This new coalition naturally alarmed Sparta, which at once made overtures to Athens on the ground of their common danger from Thebes . The alliance was concluded in 369 . About the same time Iphicrates was sent to take See also:possession of Amphipolis according to the treaty of 371 . Some success in See also:Macedonia roused the hostility of Thebes, and the subsequent attempts on Amphipolis caused the Chalcidians to declare against the league .

It would appear that the old suspicion of the allies was now thoroughly awakened, and we find Athens making great efforts to conciliate Mytilene by honorific decrees (Hicks and Hill, 109) . This suspicion, which was due primarily, no doubt, to the agreement with Sparta, would find See also:

confirmation in the subsequent See also:exchange of compliments with Dionysius I. of Syracuse, Sparta's ally, who with his sons received the Athenian citizenship . It is not clear that the allies officially approved this new friendship; it is certain that it was actually distasteful to them . The same dislike would be roused by the Athenian alliance with See also:Alexander of Pherae (368-367) . The maritime allies naturally had no See also:desire to be involved in the quarrels of See also:Sicily, Thessaly and the Peloponnese . In 367 Athens and Thebes sent See also:rival ambassadors to Persia, with the result that Athens. was actually ordered to abandon her claim to Amphipolis, and to remove her See also:navy rrom the high seas The claim to Amphipolis was subsequently affirmed, but the Greek states declined to obeythe See also:order of Persia . In 366 Athens lost See also:Oropus, a blow which she endeavoured to repair by forming an alliance with See also:Arcadia and by an attack on Corinth . At the same time certain of the Peloponnesian states made peace with Thebes, and some hold that Athens joined this peace (Meyer, Gesch. d . Alt. v . 449) . Timotheus was sent in 366–365 to make a demonstration against Persia . Finding Samos in the hands of Cyprothemis, a servant of the See also:satrap See also:Tigranes, he laid siege to it, captured it after a ten months' siege and established a cleruchy .

Though Samos was not apparently one of the allies, this latter action could not but remind the allies of the very dangers which the second confederacy had set out to avoid . The next important event was the serious attempt on the part of See also:

Epaminondas to See also:challenge the Athenian naval supremacy . Though Timotheus held his ground the confederacy was undoubtedly weakened . In 362 Athens joined in the opposition to the Theban expedition which ended in the battle of See also:Mantineia (July) . In the next year the Athenian generals failed in the See also:north in their attempt to See also:control the Hellespont . In Thessaly Alexander of Pherae became hostile and after several successes even attacked the See also:Peiraeus . See also:Chares was ordered to make See also:reprisals, but instead sailed to Corcyra, where he made the mistake of siding with the oligarchs . The last event of the period was a success, the recovery of Euboea (357), which was once more added to the league . During these fourteen years the policy of Athens towards her maritime allies was, as we have seen, shortsighted and inconsistent . Alliances with various land powers, and an inability to understand the true relations which alone could unite the league, combined to alienate the allies, who could discover no See also:reason for the See also:expenditure of their contributions on protecting Sparta or Corinth against Thebes . The Evi 3piov of the league is found taking action in several instances, but there is evidence (cf. the expedition of Epaminondas in 363) that there was ground for suspecting disloyalty in many quarters . On the other hand, though the Athenian fleet became stronger and several cities were captured, the league itself did not gain any important voluntary adherents .

The generals were compelled to support their forces by See also:

plunder or out of their private resources, and, frequently failing, diverted their efforts from the pressing needs of the allies to purely Athenian See also:objects . Period 357—3.38.—The latent discontent of the allies was soon fanned into hostility by the intrigues of See also:Mausolus, See also:prince of Cardia, who was anxious to extend his See also:kingdom . Chios, Rhodes, Cos, Byzantium, Erythrae and probably other cities were in revolt by the spring of 356, and their attacks on loyal members of the confederacy compelled Athens to take the offensive . Chabrias had already been killed in an attack on Chios in the previous autumn, and the fleet was under the command of Timotheus, Iphicrates and Chares, who sailed against Byzantium . The enemy sailed north from Samos and in a battle off Embata (between Erythrae and Chios) defeated Chares, who, without the consent of his colleagues, had ventured to engage them in a See also:storm . The more cautious generals were accused of corruption in not supporting Chares . Iphicrates was acquitted and Timotheus condemned . Chares sought to replenish his resources by aiding the Phrygian satrap Artabazus against See also:Artaxerxes Ochus, but a See also:threat from the Persian See also:court caused the Athenians to recall him, and peace was made by which Athens recognized the independence of the revolted towns . The league was further weakened by the secession of Corcyra, and by 355 was reduced to Athens, Euboea and a few islands . By this time, moreover, Philip II. of Macedon had begun his career of See also:conquest, and had shattered an embryonic alliance between the league and certain princes of Thrace (Cetriporis), See also:Paeonia (Lyppeius) and See also:Illyria (Grabus) . In 355 his advance temporarily ceased, but, as we learn from Isocrates and See also:Xenophon, the financial exhaustion of the league was such that its destruction was only a matter of time . Resuming operations in 354, Philip, in spite of temporary checks at the hands of Chares, and the spasmodic opposition of a 12 LEAGUE few See also:barbarian chiefs, took from the league all its Thracian and Macedonian cities (Abdera, Maronea, Neapolis, Methone.) In 352–351 Philip actually received help from former members of the confederacy .

In 351 See also:

Charidemus, Chares and See also:Phocion were sent to oppose him, and we find that the contributions of the Lesbian cities were assigned to them for supplies, but no successes were gained . In 349 Euboea and Olynthuswere lost to the league, of which indeed nothing remained but an empty form, in spite of the facts that the expelled Olynthians appealed to it in 348 and that Mytilene rejoined in 347 . In 346 the peace of Philocrates was made between the league and Philip on terms which were accepted by the Athenian Houle . It is very remarkable that, in spite of the powerlessness of the confederacy, the last re-corded event in its history is the steady See also:loyalty of Tenedos, which gave money to Athens about 340 (Hicks and Hill, 146) . The victory of Philip at Chaeronea in 338 finally destroyed the league . In spite of the precautions taken by the allies to prevent the domination of Athens at their expense, the policy of the league was almost throughout directed rather in the interests of Athens . Founded with the specific object of thwarting the ambitious designs of Sparta, it was plunged by Athens into enterprises of an entirely different character which exhausted the resources of the allies without benefiting them in any respect . There is no doubt that, with very few exceptions, the cities were held to their allegiance solely by the See also:superior force of the Athenian navy . The few instances of its action show that the EuvEi5r ov was practically only a See also:tool in the hands of Athens . The Second League.—The chief See also:modern See also:works are G . Busolt, " Der zweite athenische See also:Band " in Neue Jahrbiicher See also:fur classische Philologie (supp. vol . Vii., 1873-1875, pp .

641-866), and F . H . See also:

Marshall, The Second Athenian Confederacy (1905), one of the See also:Cambridge See also:Historical Essays (No. xiii.) . The latter is based on Busolt's monograph and includes subsequent epigraphic evidence, with a full list of authorities . For inscriptions see Hicks and Hill, op. cit., and the Inscriptiones Atticae, vol. ii. pt . 5 . The meagre data given by ancient writers are collected by Busolt and Marshall . (J . M .

End of Article: DELIAN LEAGUE, or CONFEDERACY OF DELOS
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