See also:

• EGOISM (from Gr. and Lat. ego, I, the 1st personal pronoun)

EGOISM (from Gr. and See also:

• LAT

Lat. ego, I, the 1st See also:

• PERSONAL

personal pronoun)  , a See also:

• MODERN

modern philosophical See also:

• TERM

term used generally, in opposition to " See also:

• ALTRUISM (Fr. autrui, from Lat. alter, the other of two)

Altruism," for any ethical See also:

• SYSTEM

system in which the happiness or the See also:

• GOOD, JOHN MASON (1764-1827)

good of the individual is the See also:

• MAIN (from the Aryan root which appears in " may " and " might," and Lat. magnus, great)
• MAIN (Lat. Moenus)

main criterion of moral See also:

• ACTION

action . Another See also:

• FORM (Lat. forma)

form of the word, " Egotism," is really interchangeable, though in See also:

• ORDINARY (med. Lat. ordinarius, Fr. ordinaire)

ordinary See also:

• LANGUAGE (adapted from the Fr. langage, from langue, tongue, Lat. lingua)

language it is often used specially (and similarly " See also:

• EGOISM (from Gr. and Lat. ego, I, the 1st personal pronoun)

egoism," as in See also:

• GEORGE
• GEORGE, 8TH MARQUESS OF TWEEDDALE (1787-1876)
• GEORGE, HENRY (1839—1897)
• GEORGE, LAKE
• GEORGE, SAINT (d. 303)

George See also:

• MEREDITH, GEORGE (1828-1908)

Meredith's Egoist) to describe the See also:

• HABIT (through the French from Lat. habitus, from habere, to have, hold, or, in a reflective sense, to be in a certain condition; in many of the English senses the French use habitude, not habit)

habit of magnifying one's self and one's achievements, or regarding all things from a selfish point of view . Both these ideas derive from the See also:

• ORIGINAL

original meaning of ego, myself, as opposed to everything which is outside myself . This See also:

• ANTITHESIS (the Greek for " setting opposite ")

antithesis of ego and non-ego, self and not-self, may be understood in several senses according to the connexion in which it is used . Thus the self may be held to include one's See also:

• FAMILY

family, See also:

• PROPERTY

property, business, and an indefinitely wider range of persons or See also:

• OBJECTS

objects in which the individual's See also:

• INTEREST

interest is for the moment centred, i.e.. everything which I can See also:

• CALL (from Anglo-Saxon ceallian, a common Teutonic word, cf. Dutch kallen, to talk or chatter)

call " mine." In this, its widest, sense " a See also:

• MAN
• MAN, ISLE OF (anc. Mona)

man's Self is the sum See also:

• TOTAL

total of all that he can call his " (Wm . See also:

• JAMES
• JAMES (Gr. 'IlrKw,l3or, the Heb. Ya`akob or Jacob)
• JAMES (JAMES FRANCIS EDWARD STUART) (1688-1766)
• JAMES, 2ND EARL OF DOUGLAS AND MAR(c. 1358–1388)
• JAMES, DAVID (1839-1893)
• JAMES, EPISTLE OF
• JAMES, GEORGE PAYNE RAINSFOP
• JAMES, HENRY (1843— )
• JAMES, JOHN ANGELL (1785-1859)
• JAMES, THOMAS (c. 1573–1629)
• JAMES, WILLIAM (1842–1910)
• JAMES, WILLIAM (d. 1827)

James, Principles of See also:

• PSYCHOLOGY
• PSYCHOLOGY (>Guxrl, the mind or soul, and X yos, theory)

Psychology, See also:

• CHAP

chap x.) . This self may be divided up in many ways according to the various forms in which it may be expressed . Thus James (ibid.) classifies the various selves " as the material, the spiritual, the social and the " pure." Or again the self may be narrowed down to a man's own See also:

• PERSON, OFFENCES AGAINST THE

person, consisting of an individual mind and See also:

• BODY

body . In the true philosophical sense, however, the conception of the ego is still further narrowed down to the individual consciousness as opposed to all that is outside it, i.e. can be its See also:

• OBJECT

object . This conception of the self belongs mainly to See also:

• METAPHYSICS
• METAPHYSICS, or METAPHYSIC (from Gr. /sera, after, d v med, things of nature, lots, i.e. the natural universe)

metaphysics and involves the whole problem of the relation between subject and object, the nature of reality, and the possibility of knowledge of self and of object . The ordinary See also:

• IDEA (Gr. Ibia, connected with i&eiv, to see; cf. Lat. species from specere, to look at)

idea of the self as a See also:

• PHYSICAL

physical entity, obviously See also:

• SEPARATE

separate from others, takes no See also:

• ACCOUNT
• ACCOUNT (through O. Fr. acont, Late Lat. comptum, cornputare, to calculate)

account of the problem as to how and in what sense the individual is conscious of himself; what is the relation between subject and object in the phenomenon of self-consciousness, in which the mind reflects upon itself both past and See also:

• PRESENT

present ? The mind is in this See also:

• CASE
• CASE, JOHN (d. 1600)

case both subject and object, or, as See also:

• WILLIAM
• WILLIAM (1143-1214)
• WILLIAM (1227-1256)
• WILLIAM (1J33-1584)
• WILLIAM (A.S. Wilhelm, O. Norse Vilhidlmr; O. H. Ger. Willahelm, Willahalm, M. H. Ger. Willehelm, Willehalm, Mod.Ger. Wilhelm; Du. Willem; O. Fr. Villalme, Mod. Fr. Guillaume; from " will," Goth. vilja, and " helm," Goth. hilms, Old Norse hidlmr, meaning
• WILLIAM (c. 1130-C. 1190)
• WILLIAM, 13TH

William James puts it, both " I " and " me." The phenomenon has been described in various ways by different thinkers .

Thus See also:

• KANT, IMMANUEL (1724-1804)

Kant distinguished the two selves as rational and empirical, just as he distinguished the two egos as the noumenal or real and the phenomenal from the metaphysical standpoint . A similar distinction is made by See also:

• HERBART, JOHANN FRIEDRICH (1776-1841)

Herbart . Others have held that the self has a complex content, the subject self being, as it were, a See also:

• FULLER, ANDREW (1954-1815)
• FULLER, GEORGE (1822—1884)
• FULLER, M
• FULLER, MARGARET, MARCHIONESS
• FULLER, MELVILLE WESTON (1833-1910)
• FULLER, THOMAS (16o8-1661)
• FULLER, WILLIAM (1670--c. 1717)

fuller expression of the object-self (so See also:

• BRADLEY, GEORGE GRANVILLE (1821–1903)
• BRADLEY, JAMES (1693–1762)

Bradley); or again the subject self is the active content of the mind, and the object self the passive content which for the moment is exciting the See also:

• ATTENTION (from Lat. ad-tendo, await, expect; the condition of being " stretched " or " tense ")

attention . The most satisfactory and also the most See also:

• GENERAL
• GENERAL (Lat. generalis, of or relating to a genus, kind or class)

general view is that consciousness is complex and unanalysable . The relation of the self to the not-self need not to be treated here (see METAPHYSICS) . It may, however, be pointed out that in so far as an object is cognized by the mind, it becomes in a sense See also:

• PART

part of the complex self-content . In this sense the individual is in himself his own universe, his whole existence being, in other words, the sum total of his psychic relations, and nothing else being for him in existence at all . A similar idea is prominent in many philosophico-religious systems wherein the idea of See also:

• GOD

God or the See also:

• INFINITE (from Lat. in, not, finis, end or limit; cf. findere, to deave)

Infinite is, as it were, the See also:

• UNION
• UNION (known locally as Union Hill and officially as Town of Union)

union of the ego and the non-ego, of subject and object . The self of man is regarded as having limitations, whereas the Godhead is infinite and all-inclusive . In many mystical See also:

• ORIENTAL

Oriental religions the perfection of the human self is absorption in the infinite, as a ripple See also:

• DIES, CHRISTOPH ALBERT (1755-1822)

dies away on the See also:

• SURFACE

surface of See also:

• WATER

water . The problems of the self may be summed up as follows . The psychologist investigates the ideal construction of the self, i.e. the way in which the conception of the self arises, the different aspects or contents of the self and the relation of 9 the subject to the object self .

At this point the epistemologist takes up the question of empirical knowledge and considers the See also:

• KIND (O. E. ge-cynde, from the same root as is seen in " kin," supra)

kind of validity, if any, which it can possess . What existence has the known object for the knowing subject ? The result of this inquiry is generally intellectual See also:

• SCEPTICISM (o-Kesrroµai, I consider, reflect, hesitate, doubt)

scepticism in a greater or less degree, namely, that the object has no existence for the knower except a relative one, i.e. in so far as it is " known " (see RELATIVITY of KNOWLEDGE) . Finally the metaphysician, and in another See also:

• SPHERE (Gr. vclsa?pa, a ball or globe)

sphere the theologian, consider the nature of the pure or transcendental self apart from its relations, i.e. the See also:

• ABSOLUTE (Lat. absolvere, to loose, set free)

absolute self . In See also:

• ETHICS
• ETHICS, SHAFTESBURY, HOBBES

ethics, egoistic doctrines disregard the ultimate problems of selfhood, and assume the self to consist of a man's person and those things in which he is or ought to be directly interested . The general statement that such doctrines refer all moral action to criteria of the individual's happiness, preservation, moral perfection, raises an obvious difficulty . Egoism merely asserts that the self is all-important in the application of moral principles, and does not in any way See also:

• SUPPLY (through Fr. from Lat. supplere, to fill up)

supply the material of these principles . It is a purely formal direction, and as such merely an See also:

• ADJUNCT (from Lat. ad, to, and jungere, to join)

adjunct to a substantive ethical criterion . A See also:

• PRACTICAL

practical theory of ethics seeks to establish a particular moral ideal; if it is an absolute criterion, then the altruist would See also:

• PLACE (through Fr. from Lat. platea, street; Gr. IrAar6s, wide)

place first the attainment of that ideal by others, while the egoist would seek it for himself . The same is true of ethical theories which may be described as material . Of the second type are those, e.g. of See also:

• HOBBES, THOMAS (1588–1679)

Hobbes and See also:

• SPINOZA, BARUCH (1632-1677)

Spinoza, which See also:

• ADVOCATE (Lat. advocatus, from advocare, to summon, especially in law to call in the aid of a counsel or witness, and so generally to summon to one's assistance)

advocate self-preservation as the ideal, as contrasted with modern evolutionist moralists who advocate See also:

• RACE

race-preservation . Again, we may contrast the See also:

• EARLY
• EARLY, JUBAL ANDERSON (1816-1894)

early See also:

• GREEK
• GREEK, ETRUSCAN AND

Greek hedonists, who bade each man seek the greatest happiness (of whatever kind), with modern utilitarian and social hedonists, who prefer the greatest good or the greatest happiness of the greatest number .

It is with hedonistic and other empirical theories that egoism is generally associated . As a See also:

• MATTER

matter of fact, however, egoism has been no less prominent in intuitional ethics . Thus the man who seeks only or primarily his own moral perfection is an egoist See also:

• PAR (Lat. par, equal)

par excellence . Such are ascetics, hermits and the like, whose whole object is the realization of their highest selves . The distinction of egoistical and altruistic action is further complicated by two facts . In the first place, many systems combine the two . Thus See also:

• CHRISTIAN
• CHRISTIAN, WILLIAM (1608-1663)

Christian ethics may be said to insist equally on See also:

• DUTY (from " due," that which is owing, O. Fr. deu, dil, past participle of devoir; Lat. debere, debitum; cf. " debt ")

duty to self and duty to others, while crudely egoistic systems become unworkable if a man renders himself See also:

• OBNOXIOUS (Lat. obnoxiosus, from ob, over, against, and noxa, harm)

obnoxious to his See also:

• FELLOWS, SIR CHARLES (1799-1860)

fellows . On the other See also:

• HAND
• HAND (a word common to Teutonic languages; cf. Ger. Hand, Goth. handus)
• HAND, FERDINAND GOTTHELF (1786-185r)

hand, every deliberate action based on an avowedly altruistic principle necessarily has a reference to the See also:

• AGENT (from Lat. agere, to act)

agent; if it is right that A should do a certain action for the benefit of B, then it tends to the moral self-realization of A that he should do it . Upon whatsoever principle the rightness of an action depends, its performance is right for the agent . The self-reference is inevitable in every action in so far as it is regarded as voluntary and chosen as being of a particular moral quality . It is this latter fact which has led many students of human See also:

• CHARACTER (Gr. xapareri7p, from xap&crew, to scratch)

character to See also:

• STATE
• STATE, GREAT OFFICERS OF

state that men do in fact aim at the gratification of their See also:

• PERSONAL

personal desires and impulses . The See also:

• LAWS

laws of the state and the various rules of conduct laid down by See also:

• RELIGION
• RELIGION, FOLKLORE, CUSTOM

religion or morality are merely devices adopted for general convenience .

The most remarkable statement of this point of view is that of See also:

• FRIEDRICH, JOHANN (1836— )

Friedrich See also:

• NIETZSCHE, FRIEDRICH WILHELM (1844–1900)

Nietzsche, who went so far as to denounce all forms of self-denial as cowardice:—let every one who is strong seek to make himself dominant at the expense of the weak .