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FREDERICK III

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Originally appearing in Volume V26, Page 210 of the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica.
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FREDERICK III., king of Denmark). Suffice it to say that, immediately after his death, the regency appointed to govern Charles X/. Sweden during the minority of his only son and successor, Charles XI., a child four years old, hastened to come to terms with Sweden's numerous enemies, which now included Russia, Poland, Brandenburg and Denmark. The Peace of Oliva (May 3, 166o), made under peace of French mediation, put an end to the long feud with Oliva, 1660. Poland and, at the same time, ended the quarrel between Sweden on the one side, and the emperor and the elector of Brandenburg on the other. By this peace, Sweden's possession of Livonia, and the elector of Brandenburg's sovereignty over east Prussia, were alike confirmed; and the king of Poland renounced all claim to the Swedish crown. As regards Denmark, the Peace of Oliva signified the desertion of her three principal allies, Poland, Brandenburg and the emperor, and thus compelled her to reopen negotiations with Sweden direct. The differences between the two states were finally adjusted by the peace of Copenhagen (May 27, 166o), Denmark ceding the three Scanian provinces to Sweden but receiving back the Norwegian province of Trondhjem and the isle of Bornholm which she had surrendered by the peace of Roskilde two years previously. Denmark was also compelled to recognize, practically, the independence of the dukes of Holstein-Gottorp. The Russian War was terminated by the Peace of Kardis (July 2, 1661), confirmatory of the Peace of Stolbova, whereby the tsar surrendered to Sweden all his Baltic provinces —Ingria, Esthonia and Kexholm. Thus Sweden emerged from the war not only a military power of the first magnitude, but also one of the largest states of Sweden as Europe, possessing about twice as much territory a Great as modern Sweden. Her area embraced 16,800 Power. geographical square miles, a mass of land 7000 sq. m. larger than the modern German Empire. Yet the Swedish Empire was rather a geographical expression than a state with natural and national boundaries. Modern Sweden is bounded by the Baltic; during the 17th century the Baltic was merely the bond between her various widely dispersed dominions. All the islands in the Baltic, except the Danish group, belonged to Sweden. The estuaries of all the great German rivers (for the Niemen and Vistula are properly Polish rivers) debouched in Swedish territory, within which also lay two-thirds of Lake Ladoga and one-half of Lake Peipus. Stock-holm, the capital, lay in the very centre of the empire, whose second greatest city was Riga, on the other side of the sea. Yet this vast empire contained but half the population of modern Sweden—being only 2,500,000, or about 140 souls to the square mile. Further, Sweden's new boundaries were of the most insecure description, inasmuch as they were anti-ethnographical, parting asunder races which naturally went together, and behind which stood powerful neighbours of the same stock ready, at the first opportunity, to reunite them. Moreover, the commanding political influence which Sweden had now won was considerably neutralized by her loss of moral prestige. On Charles X.'s accession in 1655, Sweden's neighbours, though suspicious and uneasy, were at least not adversaries, and might have been converted into allies of the new great power who, if she had mulcted them of territory, had, any-how, compensated them for the loss with the by no means contemptible douceur of religious liberty. At Charles X.'s death, five years later, we find Sweden, herself bled to exhaustion point, surrounded by a broad belt of desolated territory and regarded with ineradicable hatred by every adjacent state. To sink in five years from the position'of the champion of Protestantism to that of the common enemy of every Protestant power was a degradation not to be compensated by any amount of military glory. Charles's subsequent endeavour, in stress of circumstances, to gain a friend by dividing his Polish conquests with the aspiring elector of Brandenburg was a reversal of his original policy and only resulted in the establishment on the southernconfines of Sweden of a new rival almost as dangerous as Denmark, her ancient rival in the west. In 166o, after five years of incessant warfare, Sweden had at length obtained peace and with it the opportunity of organizing and developing her newly won empire. Unfor- Minority of tunately, the regency which was to govern her during Charles x1. the next fifteen years was unequal to the difficulties of a situation which might have taxed the resources of the wisest statesmen. Unity and vigour were scarcely to be expected from a many-headed administration composed of men of mediocre talent whose contrary opinions speedily gave rise to contending factions. There was the high-aristocratic party with a leaning towards martial adventure headed by Magnus de la Gardie (q.v.), and the party of peace and economy whose ablest representative was the liberal and energetic Johan Gyllenstjerna (q.v.). After a severe struggle, de la Gardie'S party prevailed; and its triumph was marked by that general decline of personal and political morality which has given to this regency its unenviable notoriety. Sloth and carelessness speedily invaded every branch of the administration, destroying all discipline and leading to a general neglect of business. Another characteristic of the de la Gardie government was its gross corruption, which made Sweden the obsequious hireling of that foreign power which had the longest purse. This shameful "subsidy policy" dates from the Treaty of Fontainebleau, 1661, by a secret paragraph of which Sweden, in exchange for a considerable sum of money, undertook to support the French candidate on the first vacancy of the Polish throne. The complications ensuing from Louis XIV.'s designs on the Spanish Netherlands led to a bid for the Swedish alliance, both from the French king and his adversaries. After much hesitation on the part of the Swedish government, the anti-French faction prevailed; and in April 1668 Sweden acceded to the Triple Alliance, which finally checkmated the French king by bringing about the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. For the next four years Sweden remained true to the principles of the Triple Alliance; but, in 1672, Louis XIV. succeeded in isolating the Dutch republic and regaining his ancient ally, Sweden. By the Treaty of Stockholm (April 14, 1672), Sweden became, for the next ten years, a "mercenarius Galliae," pledging wAnio. ith France. herself, in return for 400,000 crowns per annum in peace and 600,000 in war-time, to attack, with 16,000 men, any German princes who might be disposed to assist Holland. In 1674 Louis XIV. peremptorily called upon Sweden to fulfil her obligations by invading Brandenburg. In the course of May 1675 a Swedish army advanced into the Mark, but on the 18th of June was defeated at Fehrbellin, and hastily retreated to Demmin. The Fehrbellin affair was a mere skirmish, the actual casualties amounting to less than boo men, but it rudely divested Sweden of her nimbus of invincibility and was the signal for a general attack upon her, known as the Scanian War. In the course of the next three years her empire war The Scanlan . seemed to be crumbling away everywhere. In 1675 Pomerania and the bishopric of Bremen were overrun by the Brandenburgers, Austrians and Danes. In December 1677 the elector of Brandenburg captured Stettin. Stralsund fell on the 15th of October 1678. Greifswald, Sweden's last possession on the Continent, was lost on the 5th of November. A defensive alliance with Sobieski (August 4, 1677) was rendered inoperative by the annihilation of Sweden's sea-power (battle of Oland, June 17, 1676; battle of Fehmarn, June 1677) and the difficulties of the Polish king. Two accidents at this crisis alone saved Sweden from ruin—the splendid courage of the young king who, resolutely and success-fully, kept the Danish invaders at bay (see CHARLES XI., king of Sweden), and the diplomatic activity of Louis XIV. In March 1677 a peace congress began its sessions at Nijmwegen; and in the beginning of April 1678 the French king dictated the terms of a general pacification. One of his chief conditions was the complete restitution of Sweden. A strong Sweden was necessary to the accomplishment of his plans. He suggested, however, that Sweden should rid herself of her enemies by making some " small cession ' . to them. This Charles XI. refused to do, whereupon Louis took it upon himself to conclude peace on Sweden's account without consulting the wishes of Tre&yof the Swedish king. By this Treaty of Nijmwegen NiJmwegen, (Feb. 7) and of St Germain (June 29, 1679) /679. Sweden virtually received full restitution of her German territory. On the 2nd of September by the Peace of Fontainebleau (confirmed by the subsequent Peace of Lund, Oct. 4, 1679), Denmark was also forced to retrocede her conquests. It is certain that Sweden herself could never have extorted such favourable terms, yet " the insufferable tutelage " of France on this occasion inspired Charles XI. with a personal dislike of the mighty ruler of France and contributed to reverse the traditional diplomacy of Sweden by giving it a strong anti-French bias (see CHARLES XI.; OXENSTJERNA, B ENEDICT) . The remainder of the reign of Charles XI. is remarkable for a revolution which converted the government of Sweden into Charles XI. a semi-absolute monarchy. The king emerged from and the the war convinced that if Sweden were to retain her Swedish position as a great power she must radically reform constttu- her whole economical system, and, above all, cir- eton. cumscribe the predominant and mischievous influence of an aristocracy which thought far more of its privileges than of its public duties. He felt that he could now draw upon the confidence and liberality of the lower orders to an unlimited extent, and he proceeded to do so. The Riksdag which assembled in Stockholm in October 168o begins a new era of Swedish history. On the motion of the Estate of Peasants, which had a long memory for aristocratic abuses, the question of the recovery of the alienated crown lands was brought before the Riksdag, and, despite the stubborn opposition of the magnates, a resolution of the Diet directed that all countships, baronies, domains, manors and other estates producing an annual rent of more than £70 per annum should revert to the Crown. The same Riksdag decided that the king was not bound by any particular constitution, but only by law and the statutes. Nay, they added that he was not even obliged to consult the council of state, but was to be regarded as a sovereign lord, responsible to God alone for his actions, and requiring no intermediary between himself and his people. The council thereupon acquiesced in its own humiliation by meekly accepting a royal brief changing its official title from Riksrdd (council of state) to Kungligardd (royal council)—a visible sign that the senators were no longer the king's colleagues but his servants. Thus Sweden, as well as Denmark, had become an absolute monarchy, but. with this important difference, that the right of the Swedish people, in parliament assembled, to be consulted on all important matters was recognized and acted upon. The Riksdag, completely overshadowed by the throne, was during the reign of Charles XI. to do little more than register the royal decrees; but nevertheless it continued to exist as an essential part of the machinery of government. Moreover, this transfer of authority was a voluntary act. The people, knowing the king to be their best friend, trusted him implicity and co-operated with him cheerfully. The Riksdag of 1682 proposed a fresh Reduktion, and declared that the whole question of how far the king was empowered by the law of the land to bestow fiefs, or, in case of urgent national distress, take them back again, was exclusively his majesty's affair. In other words, it made the king the disposer of his subjects' temporal property. Presently this new principle of autocracy was extended to the king's legislative authority also, for, on the 9th of December 1682, all four estates, by virtue of a common declaration, not only confirmed him in the possession of the legislative powers enjoyed by his predecessors, but even conceded to him the right of interpreting and amending the common law. The recovery of the alienated crown lands occupied Charles XI. for the rest of his life. It was conducted by a commission which was ultimately converted into a permanent department of state. It acted on the principle that the titles of all privatelanded estate might be called in question, inasmuch as at some time or other it must have belonged to the Crown; and the burden of proof of ownership was held not to lie with the Crown which made the claim, but with the actual owner of the property. The amount of revenue accruing to the Crown from the whole Reduktion it is impossible to estimate even approximately; but by these means, combined with the most careful management and the most rigid economy, Charles XI. contrived to reduce the national debt from £2,567,000 to £700,000. These operations represent only a part of Charles XI.'s gigantic activity. Here we have only space sufficient to glance at his reorganization of the national armaments. Reorganize. Charles XI. re-established on a broader basis the tion of indelningsverk introduced by Charles IX.—a system Armaments. of military tenure whereby the national forces were bound to the soil. Thus there was the ruslhdll tenure, under which the tenants, instead of paying rent, were obliged to equip and maintain a cavalry soldier and horse, while the knekthdllarer supplied duly equipped foot soldiers. These indelning soldiers were provided with holdings on which they lived in times of peace. Formerly, ordinary conscription had existed alongside this indelning, or distribution system; but it had proved inadequate as well as highly unpopular; and, in 1682, Charles XI. came to an agreement with the peasantry whereby an extended indelning system was to be susbstituted for general conscription. The navy, of even more importance to Sweden if she were to maintain the dominion of the Baltic, was entirely remodelled; and, the recent war having demonstrated the unsuitability of Stockholm as a naval station, the construction of a new arsenal on a gigantic scale was simultaneously begun at Karlskrona. After a seventeen years' struggle against all manner of financial difficulties, the twofold enter-prise was completed. At the death of Charles XI. Sweden could boast of a fleet of forty-three three-deckers (manned by 11,000 men and armed with 2648 guns) and one of the finest arsenals in the world. Charles XI. had carefully provided against the contingency of his successor's minority; and the five regents appointed by him, if not great statesmen, were at least practical Charles XII., politicans who had not been trained in his austere /697,4718. school in vain. At home the Reduktion was cautiously pursued, while abroad the successful conclusion of the great peace congress at Ryswick was justly regarded as a signal triumph of Sweden's pacific diplomacy (see OXENSTJERNA FAMILY). The young king was full of promise, and had he been permitted gradually to gain experience and develop his naturally great talents beneath the guidance of his guardians, as his father had intended, all might have been well for Sweden. Unfortunately, the sudden, noiseless revolution of the 6th of November 1697, which made Charles XII. absolute master of his country's fate in his fifteenth year (see CHARLES XII.), and the league of Denmark, Saxony and Russia, formed two years later to partition Sweden (see PATKUL, JOHANN REINHOLD; PETER THE GREAT; CHARLES XII.), precipitated Sweden into a sea of troubles in which she was finally submerged. From the very beginning of the Great Northern War Sweden suffered from the inability of Charles XII. to view the situation from anything but a purely personal point of view. Great His determination to avenge himself on enemies Northern overpowered every other consideration. Again and War again during these eighteen years of warfare it was in his power to dictate an advantageous peace. After the dissipation of the first coalition against him by the peace of Travendal (Aug. 18, 1700) and the victory of Narva (Nov. 20, 1700), the Swedish chancellor, Benedict Oxenstjerna, rightly regarded the universal bidding for the favour of Sweden by France and the maritime powers, then on the eve of the War of the Spanish Succession, as a golden opportunity of " ending this present lean war and making his majesty the arbiter of Europe." But Charles, intent on dethroning Augustus of Poland, held haughtily aloof. Subsequently in 1701 he rejected a personal appeal from William III. to conclude peace on his own terms. Five years later (Sept. 24, 1706) he did, indeed, conclude the Polish War by the peace of Altranstadt, but as this treaty brought no advantage to Sweden, not even compensation for the expenses of six years of warfare, it was politically condemnable. Moreover, two of Sweden's Baltic provinces, Esthonia and Ingria, had been seized by the tsar, and a third, Livonia, had been well-nigh ruined. Yet even now Charles, by a stroke of the pen, could have recovered nearly everything he had lost. In 1707 Peter was ready to retrocede everything except St Petersburg and the line of the Neva, and again Charles preferred risking the whole to saving the greater part of his Baltic possessions (for details see CHARLES XII.; PETER THE GREAT). When at last, after the catastrophe of Poltava (June 1709) and the flight into Turkey, he condescended to use diplomatic methods, it was solely to prolong, not to terminate, the war. Even now he could have made honourable terms with his numerous enemies. The resources of Sweden were still very far from being exhausted, and, during 1710 and 1711, the gallant Magnus Stenbock (q.v.) upheld her military supremacy in the north. But all the efforts of the Swedish government were wrecked on the determination of Charles XII. to surrender nothing. Thus he rejected advantageous offers of mediation and alliance made to him, during 1712, by the maritime powers and by Prussia; and, in 1714, he scouted the friendly overtures of Louis XIV. and the emperor, so that when peace was finally concluded between France and the Empire, at the congress of Baden, Swedish affairs were, by common consent, left out of consideration. When, on the 14th of September 1714, he suddenly returned to his dominions, Stralsund and Wismar were all that remained to him of his continental possessions; while by the end of 1715 Sweden, now fast approaching the last stage of exhaustion, was at open war with England, Hanover, Russia, Prussia, Saxony and Denmark, who had formed a coalition to partition her continental territory between them. Nevertheless, at this the eleventh hour of her opportunities, Sweden might still have saved something from the wreck of her empire if Charles had behaved like a reasonable being (see CHARLES XII.; PETER THE GREAT; GORTZ, GEORG HEINRICH VON; OSTERMAN, ANDREI); but he would only consent to play off Russia against England, and his sudden death before Fredrikshald (Dec. II, 1718) left Sweden practically at the end of her resources and at the mercy of her enemies. At the beginning of 1719 pacific overtures were made to England, Hanover, Prussia and Denmark. By the treaties of Stockholm (Feb. 20, 1719, and Feb. 1, 1720) Hanover obtained the bishoprics of Bremen and Verden for herself and Stettin for her confederate Prussia. By the treaty of Frederiksborg or Copenhagen (July 3, 1720) peace was also signed between Den-mark and Sweden, Denmark retroceding Rugen, Further Pomerania as far as the Peene, and Wismar to Sweden, in exchange for an indemnity of 600,000 rix-dollars, while Sweden relinquished her exemption from the Sound tolls and her protectorate over Holstein-Gottorp. The prospect of coercing Russia by means of the British fleet had alone induced Sweden to consent to such sacrifices; but when the last demands of England and her allies had been complied with, Sweden Peace of was left to come to terms as best she could with Nystad, the tsar. Negotiations were reopened with Russia at 1721. Loss Nystad, in May 1720, but peace was not concluded oftheBaltic till the 30th of August 1721, and then only under Provinces. the direst pressure. By the peace of Nystad Sweden ceded to Russia Ingria and Esthonia, Livonia, the Finnish province of Kexholm and the fortress of Viborg. Finland west of Viborg and north of Kexholm was restored to Sweden. She also received an indemnity of two millions of thalers and a solemn undertaking of non-interference in her domestic affairs. It was not the least of Sweden's misfortunes after the Great Northern War that the new constitution, which was to compensate her for all her past sacrifices, should contain within it the elements of many of her future calamities. Early in 1720 Charles XII.'s sister, Ulrica Leonora, who had been elected queen of Sweden immediately after his death, was permitted to abdicate in favour of her hus- Frederick 1, band the prince of Hesse, who was elected king 1720-1751. under the title of Frederick I.; and Sweden was, The Limited at the same time, converted into the most limited Monarchy. of monarchies. All power was vested in the people as represented by the Riksdag, consisting, as before, of four distinct estates, nobles, priests, burgesses and peasants, sitting and deliberating apart. The conflicting interests and mutual jealousies of these four independent assemblies made the work of legislation exceptionally difficult. No measure could now become law till it had obtained the assent of three at least of the four estates; but this provision, which seems to have been designed to protect the lower orders against the nobility, produced evils far greater than those which it professed to cure. Thus, measures might be passed by a bare majority in three estates, when a real and substantial majority of all four estates in congress might be actually against it. Or, again, a dominant action in any three of the estates might enact laws highly detrimental to the interests of the remaining estate—a danger the more to be apprehended as in no other country in Europe were class distinctions so sharply defined as in Sweden. Each estate was ruled by its talman, or speaker, who was now elected at the beginning of each Diet, but the archbishop was, ex officio, the talman of the clergy. The landt- constitumarskalk, or speaker of the House of Nobles, presided don of the when the estates met in congress, and also, by Estates. virtue of his office, in the hemliga utskott, or secret committee. This famous body, which consisted of 50 nobles, 25 priests, 25 burgesses, and, very exceptionally, 25 peasants, possessed during the session of the Riksdag not only the supreme executive but also the surpeme judicial and legislative functions. It pre-pared all bills for the Riksdag, created and deposed all ministries, controlled the foreign policy of the nation, and claimed and often exercised the right of superseding the ordinary courts of justice. During the parliamentary recess, however, the executive remained in the hands of the rad, or senate, which was responsible to the Riksdag alone. It will be obvious that there was no room in this republican constitution for a constitutional monarch in the modern sense of the word. The crowned puppet who possessed a casting vote in the rad, of which he was the nominal president, and who was allowed to create peers once in his life (at his coronation), was rather a state decoration than a sovereignty. At first this cumbrous and complicated instrument of government worked tolerably well under the firm but cautious control of the chancellor, Count Arvid Beernhard Horn political (q.v.). In his anxiety to avoid embroiling his country parties, abroad, Horn reversed the traditional policy of Hats and Sweden by keeping France at a distance and draw- caps. ing near to Great Britain, for whose liberal institutions he professed the highest admiration. Thus a twenty years' war was succeeded by a twenty years' peace, during which the nation recovered so rapidly from its wounds that it began to forget them. A new race of politicians was springing up. Since 1719, when the influence of the few great territorial families had been merged in a multitude of needy gentle-men, the first estate had become the nursery and afterwards the stronghold of an opposition at once noble and democratic which found its natural leaders in such men as Count Carl Gyllenborg and Count Carl Gustaf Tessin (q.v.). These men and their followers were never weary of ridiculing the timid caution of the aged statesman who sacrificed everything to perpetuate an inglorious peace and derisively nicknamed his adherents " Night-caps " (a term subsequently softened into " Caps "), themselves adopting the sobriquet " Hats," from the three-cornered hat worn by officers and gentlemen, which was considered happily to hit off the manly self-assertion of the opposition. These epithets instantly caught the public fancy and had already become party badges when the estates met in 1738. This Riksdag, was to mark another turning-point in Swedish Treaties of Stockholm and Frederiksborg 1719 and 1720. history. The Hats carried everything before them; and the aged Horn was finally compelled to retire from a scene where, for three and thirty years, he had played a leading part. The policy of the Hats was a return to the traditional alliance between France and Sweden. When Sweden descended to her natural position as a second-rate power the French- alliance became too costly a luxury. Horn had clearly perceived this; and his cautious neutrality was therefore the soundest statesmanship. But the politicians who had ousted Horn thought differently. To them prosperity without glory was a worthless possession. They aimed at restoring Sweden to her former position as a great power. France, naturally, hailed with satisfaction the rise of a faction which was content to be her armour-bearer in the north; and the golden streams which flowed from Versailles to Stockholm during the next two generations were the political life-blood of the Hat party. The first blunder of the Hats was the hasty and ill-advised war with Russia. The European complications consequent war with upon the almost simultaneous deaths of the emperor Russia, Charles VI. and Anne, empress of Russia, seemed 1741. to favour their adventurous schemes; and, despite the frantic protests of the Caps, a project for the invasion of Russian Finland was rushed through the premature Riksdag of 1740. On the loth of July 1741 war was formally declared against Russia; a month later the Diet was dissolved and the Hat landlmarskalk set off to Finland to take command of the army. The first blow was not struck till six months after the declaration of war; and it was struck by the enemy, who routed the Swedes at Villmanstrand and captured that frontier fortress. Nothing else was done on either side for six months more; and then the Swedish generals made a " tacit truce " with the Russians through the mediation of the French ambassador at St Petersburg. By the time that the " tacit truce " had come to an end the Swedish forces were so demoralized that the mere rumour of a hostile attack made them retire panic-stricken to Helsingfors; and before the end of the year all Finland was in the hands of the Russians. The fleet, disabled by an epidemic, was, throughout the war, little more than a floating hospital. To face the Riksdag with such a war as this upon their consciences was a trial from which the Hats naturally shrank; but, to do them justice, they showed themselves better parliamentary than military strategists. A motion for an inquiry into the conduct of the war was skilfully evaded by obtaining precedence for the succession question (Queen Ulrica Leonora had lately died childless and King Frederick was old); and negotiations were thus opened with the new Russian empress, Elizabeth, who agreed to restore the greater part of Finland if her cousin, Adolphus Frederick of Holstein, were elected successor to the Swedish crown. The Hats eagerly caught at the opportunity of recovering the grand duchy and their own prestige along with it. By the peace of Abo (May Peace of 1 743) terms of the empress were accepted; Abo, 1743. 7, 743) , and only that small part of Finland which lay beyond the Kymmene was retained by Russia. In March 1751 old King Frederick died. His slender prerogatives had gradually dwindled down to vanishing point. Adolphus Adolphus Frederick (q.v.) would have given even less Frederick trouble than his predecessor but for the ambitious !l., 1751- promptings of his masterful consort Louisa Ulrica, 1771. Frederick the Great's sister, and the tyranny of the estates, who seemed bent upon driving the meekest of princes into rebellion. An attempted monarchical revolution, planned by the queen and a few devoted young nobles in 1756, was easily and remorselessly crushed; and, though the unhappy king did not, as he anticipated, share the fate of Charles Stuart, he was humiliated as never monarch was humiliated before. The same years which beheld this great domestic triumph of the Hats saw also the utter collapse of their foreign "system." At the instigation of France they plunged recklessly into the Seven Years' War; and the result was ruinous. The French subsidies, which might have sufficed for a six weeks' demonstration(it was generally assumed that the king of Prussia would give little trouble to a European coalition), proved quite in-adequate; and, after five unsuccessful campaigns, the The Seven unhappy Hats were glad to make peace and ignomini- yearn war. ously withdraw from a little war which had cost the country 40,000 men and £2,500,000. When the Riksdag met in 176o, the indignation against the Hat leaders was so violent that an impeachment seemed inevitable; but once more the superiority of their parliamentary tactics prevailed, and when, after a session of twenty months, the Riksdag was brought to a close by the mutual consent of both the exhausted factions, the Hat government was bolstered up for another four years. But the day of reckoning could not be postponed for ever; and when the estates met in 1765 it brought the Caps into power at last. Their leader, Ture Rudbeck, was elected marshal of the Diet over Frederick Axel von Fersen (q.v.), the Hat candidate, by a large majority; and, out of the hundred seats in the secret committee, the Hats succeeded in getting only ten. The Caps struck at once at the weak point of their opponents by ordering a budget report to be made; and it was speedily found that the whole financial system of the Hats had been based upon reckless improvidence and Rale of the Caps. wilful misrepresentation, and that the only fruit of their long rule was an enormous addition to the national debt and a depreciation of the note circulation to one-third of its face value. This revelation led to an all-round retrenchment, carried into effect with a drastic thoroughness which has earned for this parliament the name of the " Reduktion Riksdag." The Caps succeeded in transferring £250,000 from the pockets of the rich to the empty exchequer, reducing the national debt by £575,179, and establishing some sort of equilibrium between revenue and expenditure. They also introduced a few useful reforms, the most remarkable of which was the liberty of the press. But their most important political act was to throw their lot definitely in with Russia, so as to counterpoise the influence of France. Sweden was Alliance. R . not then as now quite outside the European Concert. Alghough no longer a great power, she still had many of the responsibilities of a great power; and if the Swedish alliance had considerably depreciated in value, it was still a marketable commodity. Sweden's peculiar geographical position made her virtually invulnerable for six months out of the twelve, her Pomeranian possessions afforded her an easy ingress into the very heart of the moribund empire, while her Finnish frontier was not many leagues from the Russian capital. A watchful neutrality, not venturing much beyond defensive alliances and commercial treaties with the maritime powers, was therefore Sweden's safest policy, and this the older Caps had always followed out. But when the Hats became the armour-bearers of France in the north, a protector strong enough to counteract French influence became the cardinal exigency of their opponents, the younger Caps, who now flung themselves into the arms of Russia, overlooking the fact that even a pacific union with Russia was more to be feared than a martial alliance with France. For France was too distant to be dangerous. She sought an ally in Sweden and it was her endeavour to make that ally as strong as possible. But it was as a future prey, not as a possible ally, that Russia regarded her ancient rival in the north. In the treaty which partitioned Poland there was a secret clause which engaged the contracting powers to uphold the existing Swedish constitution as the swiftest means of subverting Swedish independence; and an alliance with the credulous Caps, " the Patriots " as they were called at St Petersburg, guaranteeing their constitution, was the corollary to this secret understanding. Thus, while the French alliance of the warlike Hats had destroyed the prestige of Sweden, the Russian alliance of the peaceful Caps threatened to destroy her very existence. Fortunately, the domination of the Caps was not for long. The general distress occasioned by their drastic reforms had found expression in swarms of pamphlets which bit and stung the Cap government, under the protection of the new press laws. The senate retaliated by an order in council (which the. French Alliance. king refused to sign) declaring that all complaints against the measures of the last Riksdag should be punished with fine and imprisonment. The king, at the suggestion of the crown prince (see GUSTAVUS III.), thereupon urged the senate to summon an extraordinary Riksdag as the speediest method of relieving the national distress, and, on their refusing to comply with his wishes, abdicated. From the 15th of December to the 21st of December 1768 Sweden was without a regular government. Then the Cap senate gave way and the estates were convoked for the 19th of April 1769. On the eve of the contest there was a general assembly of the Hats at the French embassy, where the Comte de Modene furnished them with 6,000,000 livres, but not till they had signed in his presence an undertaking to reform the constitution in a monarchical sense. Still more energetic on the other side, the Russian minister, Ivan Osterman, became the treasurer as well as the counsellor of the Caps, and scattered the largesse of the Russian empress with a lavish hand; and so lost to all' feeling of patriotism were the Caps that they openly threatened all who ventured to vote against them with the Muscovite vengeance, and fixed Norrkoping, instead of Stockholm, as the place of meeting for the Riksdag as being more accessible to the Russian fleet. But it soon became evident that the Caps were playing a losing game; and, when the Riksdag met theca[ of the caps. at NorrkSPing on the r9th of April, they found them- selves in a minority in all four estates. In the contest for the marshalate of the Diet the leaders of the two parties were again pitted against each other, when the verdict of the last Riksdag was exactly reversed, Fersen defeating Rudbeck by 234, though Russia spent no less a sum than £i1,5oo to secure the election of the latter. The Caps had short shrift, and the joint note which the Russian, Prussian and Danish ministers presented to the estates protesting, in menacing terms, against any " reprisals " on the part of the triumphant faction, only hastened the fall of the government. The Cap senate resigned en masse to escape impeachment, and an exclusively Hat ministry took its place. The On the 1st of June the Reaction Riksdag, as it Reaction was generally called, removed to the capital; and Riksdag. it was now that the French ambassador and the crown prince Gustavus called upon the new senators to redeem their promise as to a reform of the constitution which they had made before the elections. But when, at the fag-end of the session, they half-heartedly brought the matter forward, - the Riksdag suddenly seemed to be stricken with paralysis. Impediments multiplied at every step; the cry was raised: " The constitution is in danger "; and on the 3oth of January 1770 the Reaction Riksdag, after a barren ten months' session, rose amidst chaotic confusion without accomplishing anything. Adolphus Frederick died on the 12th .of February 1771. The elections held on the demise of the Crown resulted in a Gustavus partial victory for the Caps, especially among the III., 1771- lower orders; but in the estate of the peasants 1792. their majority was merely nominal, while the mass of the nobility was dead against them. Nothing could be done, however, till the arrival of the new king (then at Paris), and every one felt that with Gustavus III. an entirely incalculable factor had entered into Swedish politics. Unknown to the party leaders, he had already renewed the Swedish alliance with France and had received solemn assurances of assistance from Louis XV. in case he succeeded in re-establishing monarchical rule in Sweden. France undertook, moreover, to pay the outstanding subsidies to Sweden, amounting to one and a half millions of livres annually, beginning from January 1772; and Vergennes, one of the great names of French diplomacy, was to be sent to circumvent the designs of Russia at Stockholm as he had previously circumvented them at Constantinople. Immediately after his return to Stockholm, Gustavus endeavoured to reconcile the jarring factions by inducing the leaders to form a composition committee to adjust their differences. In thus mediating he was sincere enough, but all his pacific efforts were frustrated by their jealousy ofhim and of each other. Still worse, the factions now intrenched still further on the prerogative. The new coronation oath contained three revolutionary clauses. The first aimed at making abdications in the future impossible by binding the king to reign uninterruptedly. The second obliged him to abide, not by the decision of all the estates together, as heretofore, but by that of the majority only, with the view of enabling the actually dominant lower estates (in which was a large Cap majority) to rule without, and even in spite of, the nobility. The third clause required him, in all cases of preferment, to be guided not " principally," as heretofore, but " solely " by merit, thus striking at the very root of aristocratic privilege: It was clear that the ancient strife of Hats and Caps had become merged in a conflict of classes; the situation was still further complicated by the ominous fact that the non-noble majority was also the Russian faction. All through 1771 the estates were wrangling over the clauses of the coronation oath. A second attempt of the king to mediate between them foundered on the suspicions of the estate of burgesses; and, on the 24th of February 1772, the nobility yielded from sheer weariness. The non-noble Cap majority now proceeded to attack the senate, the last stronghold of the Hats, and, on the 25th of April, succeeded in ousting their opponents. It was now, for the first time, that Gustavus, reduced to the condition of a roi faineant, began seriously to consider the possibility of a revolution; of its necessity there could be no doubt. Under the sway of the now dominant faction, Sweden, already the vassal, could not fail speedily to become the victim of Russia. She was on the point of being absorbed in that Northern System, the invention of the Russian minister of foreign affairs, Nikita Panin (q.v.), which that patient statesman had made it the ambition of his life to realize. Only a swift and sudden coup d'etat could save the inde- Monarchial pendence of a country isolated from the rest of Coup d'etat Europe by a hostile league. The details of the '4 1774 famous revolution of the 19th of August 1772 are elsewhere set forth (see GUSTAVUS III.; TOLL, JOHAN KRISTOFFER; SPRENGTPORTEN, JAKOB MAGNUS). Here we can only dwell upon its political importance and consequences. The new constitution of the loth of August 1772, which Gustavus imposed upon the terrified estates at the bayonet's point, converted a weak and disunited republic into a strong but limited monarchy, in which the balance of power inclined, on the whole, to the side of the monarch. The estates could only assemble when summoned by him; he could dismiss them whenever he thought fit; and their deliberations were to be confined exclusively to the propositions which he might think fit to lay before them. But these very extensive powers were subjected to many important checks. Thus, without the previous consent of the estates, no new law could be imposed, no old law abolished, no offensive war undertaken, no extraordinary war subsidy levied. The estates alone could tax. them-selves; they had the absolute control of the Bank of Sweden, and the inalienable right of controlling the national expenditure. Thus the parliament held the purse; and this seemed a sufficient guarantee both of its independence and its frequent convention. The senate, not the Riksdag, was the chief loser by the change; and, inasmuch as henceforth the senators were appointed by the king, and were to be responsible to him alone; a senate in opposition to the Crown was barely conceivable. Abroad the Swedish revolution made a great sensation. Catherine II. of Russia saw in it the triumph of her arch-enemy France, with the prolongation of the costly Turkish War as its immediate result. But the absence of troops on the Finnish border, and the bad condition of the frontier fortresses, con-strained the empress to listen to Gustavus's pacific assurances, and stay her hand. She took the precaution, however, of concluding a fresh secret alliance with Denmark, in which the Swedish revolution was significantly described as " an act of violence " constituting a casus foederis, and justifying both powers in seizing the first favourable opportunity for intervention to restore the Swedish constitution of 1720. In Sweden itself the change was, at first, most popular. But Gustavus's first Riksdag, that of 1778, opened the eyes of the deputies to the fact that their political supremacy had departed. The king was now their sovereign lord; and, for all his courtesy and gentleness, the jealousy with which he guarded and the vigour with which he enforced the prerogative plainly showed that he meant to remain so. But it was not till after eight years more had elapsed that actual trouble began. The Riksdag of 1778 had been obsequious; the Riksdag of 1786 was mutinous. It rejected nearly all the royal measures outright, or so modified them that Gustavus himself withdrew them. When he dismissed the estates, the speech from the throne held out no prospect of their speedy revocation. Nevertheless, within three years, the king was obliged to summon another Riksdag, which met at Stockholm on the 26th of January 1789. His attempt in the interval to rule without a parliament had been disastrous. It was only by a breach of his own constitution that he had been able to declare war against Russia (April 1788); the conspiracy of Anjala (July) had paralysed all military operations at the very opening of the campaign; and the sudden invasion of his western provinces by the Danes, almost simultaneously (September), seerned to bring him to the verge of ruin. But the contrast, at this crisis, between his self-sacrificing patriotism and the treachery of the Russophil aristocracy was so striking that, when the Riksdag assembled, Gustavus found that the three lower estates were ultra-royalist, and with their aid he succeeded, not without running great risks (see GUSTAVUS III.; . NoRDIN, GUSTAF; WALLQVIST, OLAF), in crushing the opposition of the nobility by a second coup d'etat (Feb. 16, 1789), and passing the The Act of famous Act of Union and Security which gave the Unlpn and king an absolutely free hand as regards foreign security. affairs and the command of the army, and made 1789. further treason impossible. For this the nobility never forgave him. It was impossible, indeed, to resist openly so highly gifted and so popular a sovereign; it was only by the despicable expedient of assassination that the last great monarch of Sweden was finally removed, to the infinite detriment of his country. The ensuing period was a melancholy one. The aristocratic classes loudly complained that the young king, Gustavus IV., Gustavus still a minor, was being brought up among crypto- Iv., 1792- Jacobins; while the middle classes, deprived of 1809. the stimulating leadership of the anti-aristocratic " Prince Charming," and becoming more and more inoculated with French political ideas, drifted into an antagonism not merely to hereditary nobility, but to hereditary monarchy likewise. Everything was vacillating and uncertain; and the general instability was reflected even in foreign affairs, now that the master-hand of Gustavus III. was withdrawn. Sweden and The renewed efforts of Catherine II. to interfere Revolu- in Sweden's domestic affairs were, indeed, vigorously ilonary repulsed, but without tact or discretion, so that the France. good understanding between the two countries was seriously impaired, especially when the proclivities of Gustaf Reuterholm (q.v.), who then virtually ruled Sweden, induced him to adopt what was generally considered an indecently friendly attitude towards the government at Paris. Despite the execution of Louis XVI. (Jan. 21, 1793), Sweden, in the hope of obtaining considerable subsidies, recognized the new French republic; and secret negotiations for contracting an alliance were actually begun in May' of the same year, till the menacing protests of Catherine, supported as they were by all the other European powers, finally induced Sweden to suspend them. The negotiations with the French Jacobins exacerbated the hatred which the Gustavians already felt for the Jacobin councillors of the duke-regent (see CHARLES XIII., king of Sweden). Smarting beneath their grievances and seriously believing that not only the young king's crown but his very life was in danger, they formed a conspiracy, the soul of which was Gustaf Mauritz Armfelt (q.v.), to overthrow the government,with the aid of a Russian fleet, supported by a rising of the Dalecarlians. The conspiracy was discovered and vigorously suppressed. The one bright side of this gloomy and sordid period was the rapprochement between the Scandinavian kingdoms during the revolutionary wars. Thus, on the 27th of March Alliance 1794, a neutrality compact was formed between with Denmark and Sweden; and their united squadrons Denmark. patrolled the North Sea to protect their merchantmen from the British cruisers. This approximation between the two governments was happily followed by friendly feelings between the two nations, under the pressure of a common danger. Presently Reuterholm renewed his coquetry with the French republic, which was officially recognized by the Swedish government on the 23rd of April 1795. In return, Sweden received a subsidy of 56,000; and a treaty between the two powers was signed on the 14th of September 1795. On the other hand, an attempt to regain the friendship of Russia, which had broken off diplomatic relations with Sweden, was frustrated by the refusal of the king to accept the bride, the grand duchess Alexandra, Catherine II.'s granddaughter, whom Reuterholm had provided for him. This was Reuterholm's last official act. On the 1st of November 1796, in accordance with the will of his father, Gustavus IV., now in his eighteenth year, took the government into his own hands. The government of Gustavus IV. (q.v.) was almost a pure autocracy. At his very first Riksdag, held at Norrkoping in March 1800, the nobility were compelled, at last, to ratify Gustavus III.'s detested Act of Union and Security, which hitherto they had steadily refused to do. Shortly after this Riksdag rose, a notable change took place in Sweden's foreign policy. In December 1800 Denmark Sweden and Russia acceded to a second Armed Neutrality of the North, directed against Great Britain; and the arsenal of Karlskrona, in all probability, was only saved from the fate of Copenhagen by the assassination of the emperor Paul, which was followed by another change of system in the north. Hitherto Sweden had kept aloof from continental complications; but the arrest Qustavus N and execution of the duc d'Enghien in 1804 inspired joins the Gustavus IV. with such a hatred of Napoleon that European when a general coalition was formed against the coalition, French emperor he was one of the first to join it 1804, (Dec. 3, 1804), pledging himself to send an army corps to co-operate with the English and Russians in driving the enemy out of Holland and Hanover. But his senseless quarrel with Frederick William III. of Prussia detained him in Pomerania; and when at last (December 1$05) he led his 6000 men towards the Elbe district the third coalition had already been dissipated by the victories of Ulm and Austerlitz. In 1806 a rupture between Sweden and Prussia was only prevented by Napoleon's assault upon the latter power. After Jena Napoleon attempted to win over Sweden, but Gustavus rejected every overture. The result was the total loss of Pomerania, and the Swedish army itself was only saved from destruction by the ingenuity of J. K. Toll (q.v.). At Tilsit the emperor Alexander I. had undertaken to compel " Russia's geographical enemy," as Napoleon designated Sweden, to accede to the newly established Continental Russian System. Gustavus IV. naturally rejected all the conquest of proposals of Alexander to close the Baltic against Finland, the English; but took no measures to defend Finland 1808i against Russia, though, during the autumn of 1807, it was notorious that the tsar was preparing to attack the grand duchy. On the 21st of February 1808 a Russian army crossed the Finnish border without any previous declaration of war. On the 2nd of April the king ordered a general levy of 30,000 men; but while two army corps, under Armfelt and Toll, together with a British contingent of ro,000 men under Moore, were stationed in Scania and on the Norwegian border in anticipation of an attack from Denmark, which, at the instigation of Napoleon, had simultaneously declared war against Sweden, the little Finnish army was left altogether unsupported. The conquest of Finland, after an heroic struggle against overwhelming odds, is elsewhere recorded (see FINLAND: History). Its immediate consequence Deposition in Sweden proper was the deposition of Gustavus of Gustavus IV. (March 13, 1809), who was clearly incapable of Iv., 1809. governing. The nobility took advantage of this opportunity to pay off old scores against Gustavus III. by excluding not only his unhappy son but also that son's whole family from the succession—an act of injustice which has never been adequately defended. But indeed the whole of this inter-mediate period is full of dark subterranean plots and counter-plots, still inexplicable, as, for instance, the hideous Fersen murder (June 20, 181o) (see FERSEN, HANS AXEL VON) evidently intended to terrorize the Gustavians, whose loyalty to the ancient dynasty was notorious. As early as the 5th of Charles June 1809 the duke regent was proclaimed king, xIII., 1809- under the title of Charles XIII. (q.v.), after accepting '819. the new liberal constitution, which was ratified by the Riksdag the same day. The new king was, at best, a useful stopgap, in no way likely to interfere with the liberal revolution which had placed him on the throne. Peace was what the exhausted nation now required; and negotiations had already been opened at Fredrikshamn. But the Russian demands were too humiliating, and the war was resumed. But the defeats of Savarsbruk and Ratan (Aug. 19, 1809) broke the spirit of the Swedish army; and peace was obtained by the sacrifice of Finland, the Aland islands, " the fore-posts of Stockholm," as Napoleon rightly described them, and Vesterbotten as far as the rivers Tornea and Muonio (treaty of Fredrikshamn, Sept. 17, 1809). The succession to the throne, for Charles XIII. was both infirm and childless, was settled, after the mysterious death Bernadotte (May 28, 181o) of the first elected candidate, chosen as Prince Charles Augustus of Augustenburg, by the Crown selection of the French marshal, Bernadotte (see Prince. CHARLES XIV., king of Sweden), who was adopted by Charles XIII. and received the homage of the estates on the 5th of November 181o. The new crown prince was very soon the most popular and the most powerful man in Sweden. The infirmity of the old Influence king, and the dissensions in the council of state, and Poltcyof placed the government and especially the control of Bernadotte. foreign affairs almost entirely in his hands; and he boldly adopted a policy which was antagonistic indeed to the wishes and hopes of the old school of Swedish statesmen, but, perhaps, the best adapted to the circumstances. Finland he at once gave up for lost. He knew that Russia would never voluntarily relinquish the grand duchy, while Sweden could not hope to retain it permanently, even if she reconquered it. But the acquisition of Norway might make up for the loss of Finland; and Bernadotte, now known as the crown prince Charles John, argued that it might be an easy matter to persuade the anti-Napoleonic powers to punish Denmark for her loyalty to France by wresting Norway from her. Napoleon he rightly distrusted, though at first he was obliged to submit to the emperor's dictation. Thus on the 13th of November 181o, the Swedish government was forced to declare war against Great Britain, though the British government was privately informed at the same time that Sweden was not a free agent and that the war would be a mere demonstration. But the pressure of Napoleon became more and more intolerable, culminating in the occupation of Pomerania by French troops in 1812. The Swedish government thereupon concluded a secret convention with Russia (treaty of Petersburg, April 5, 1812), undertaking to send 30,000 men to operate against Napoleon in Germany in return for a promise from Alexander guaranteeing to Sweden the possession of Norway. Too late Napoleon endeavoured to outbid Alexander by offering to Sweden Finland, all Pomerania and Mecklenburg, in return for Sweden's active co-operation against Russia. The Orebro Riksdag (April-August 1812), remarkable besides for its partial repudiation of Sweden's national debt and its reactionary press laws, introduced general conscription into Sweden, and thereby enabled the crown prince to carry out hisambitious policy. In May 1812 he mediated a peace between Russia and Turkey, so as to enable Russia to use all her forces against France (peace of Bucharest); and on the 18th of July, at Orebro, peace was also concluded between Great Britain on one side and Russia and Sweden on the other. These two treaties were, in effect, the corner-stones of a fresh coalition against Napoleon, and were confirmed on the outbreak of the Franco-Russian War by a conference between Alexander and Charles John at Abo on the 30th of August 1812, when the tsar undertook to place an army corps of 35,000 men at the disposal of the Swedish crown prince for the conquest of Norway. The treaty of Abo, and indeed the whole of Charles John's foreign policy in 1812, provoked violent and justifiable criticism among the better class of politicians in Sweden. The immorality of indemnifying Sweden at the expense of a weaker friendly power was obvious; and, while Finland was now definitively sacrificed, Norway had still to be won. Moreover, Great Britain and Russia very properly insisted that Charles John's first duty was to the anti-Napoleonic coalition, the former power vigorously objecting to the expenditure of her subsidies on the nefarious Norwegian adventure before the common enemy had been crushed. Only on his very ungracious compliance did Great Britian also promise to countenance the union of Norway and Sweden (treaty of Stockholm, March 3, 1813); and, on the 23rd of April, Russia gave her guarantee to the same effect. The Swedish crown prince rendered several important services to the allies during the campaign of 1813 (see CHARLES XIV., king of Sweden); but, after Leipzig, he went his own way, determined at all hazards to cripple Denmark and secure Norway. How this " job " was managed contrary to the dearest wishes of the Norwegians themselves, and how, finally (Nov. 14, 1814), Norway as a free and independent kingdom Union wkh was united to Sweden under a common king, is !Norway. elsewhere described (see DENMARK; NORWAY;
End of Article: FREDERICK III
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