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Originally appearing in Volume V28, Page 316 of the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica.
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GENERAL PRINCIPLES] the Atlantic; and, throughout the war, the knowledge that at any moment a vast fleet of transports might appear off any one of the ports on their enormous seaboard prevented the Con-federates, notwithstanding that the garrisons were reduced to a most dangerous extent, from massing their full strength for a decisive effort. The power of striking like " a bolt from the blue " is of the very greatest value in war. Surprise was the foundation of almost all the grand strategical combinations of the past, as it will be of those to come. The first thought and the last of the great general is to outwit his adversary, and to strike A"" where he is least expected. And the measures he adopts phlbious power. to accomplish his purpose are not easily divined. What soldier in Europe anticipated Marlborough's march to the Danube and Blenheim field? What other brain besides Napoleon's dreamt of the passage of the Alps before Marengo? Was there a single general of Prussia before Jena who foresaw that the French would march north from the Bavarian frontier, uncovering the roads to the Rhine, and risking utter destruction in case of defeat? Who believed, in the early June of 1815, that an army 130,000 strong would dare to invade a country defended by two armies that mustered together over 200,000 unbeaten soldiers? To what Federal soldier did it occur, on the morning of Chancellorsville, that Lee, confronted by 90,000 Northerners, would detach the half of his own small force of X0,000 to attack his enemy in flank and rear? The very course which appeared to ordinary minds so beset by difficulties and dangers as to be outside the pale of practical strategy has, over and over again, been that which led to decisive victory; and if there is one lesson more valuable than another as regards national defence, it is that preparation cannct be too careful or precautions overdone. Overwhelming numbers, adequately trained, commanded and equipped, are the only means of ensuring absolute security. But a numerical preponderance, either by land or sea, over all possible hostile combinations, is unattainable, and in default the only sound policy is to take timely and ample precautions against all enterprises which are even remotely possible. There is nothing more to be dreaded in war than the combined labours of a thoroughly well-trained general staff, except the intellect and audacity of a great strategist. The ordinary mind, even if it does Impart- not shrink from great danger, sees no way of surmount- tome of strategy. ing great difficulties; and any operation which involves both vast dangers and vast difficulties it scoffs at as chimerical. The heaven-born strategist, on the other hand, " takes no counsel of his fears." Knowing that success is seldom to be won without incurring risks, he is always greatly daring; and by the skill with which be overcomes all obstacles, and even uses them, as Hannibal and Napoleon did the Alps, and as some great captain of the future may use the sea, to further his purpose and surprise his adversary, he shows his superiority to the common herd. It is repeated ad nauseam that in consequence of the vastly improved means of transmitting information, surprise on a large scale is no longer to be feared. It is to be remembered, however, that the means of concentrating troops and ships are far speedier than of old; that false information can he far more readily distributed; and also, that if there is one thing more certain than another, it is that the great strategist, surprise being still the most deadly of all weapons, will devote the whole force of his intellect to the problem of bringing it about. Nor is it to be disguised that amphibious power is a far more terrible weapon than even in the days when it crushed Napoleon. Commerce has increased by leaps and bounds, and it is no longer confined within territorial limits. The arteries vital to the existence of civilized communities stretch over every ocean. States which in 1800 rated their maritime traffic at a few hundred thousand pounds sterling, value it now at many millions. Others, whose flags, fifty years ago, were almost unknown on the high seas, possess to-day great fleets of merchantmen; and those who fifty years ago were self-dependent, rely in great part, for the maintenance of their prosperity, on their intercourse3 I I with distant continents. There is no great power, and few small ones, to whom the loss of its sea-borne trade would be other than a most deadly blow; and there is no great power that is not far more vulnerable than when Great Britain, single-handed, held her own against a European coalition. Colonies, commercial ports, dockyards, coaling-stations are so many hostages to fortune. Year by year they become more numerous. Year by year, as commercial rivalry grows more acute, they become more intimately bound up with the prosperity and prestige of their mother-countries. And to what end? To exist as pledges of peace, auspicia melioris aevi, or to fall an easy prey to the power that is supreme at sea and can strike hard on land? Even the baldest and briefest discussion of the vast subject of war would be incomplete without some reference to the relative merits of professional and unprofessional value of soldiers. Voluntary service still holds its ground in the unprofes-Anglo-Saxon states; and both the United Kingdom atonal and America will have to a great extent to rely, in troops. case of conflicts which tax all their resources, on troops who have neither the practice nor the discipline of their standing armies. What will be the value of these amateurs when pitted against regulars? Putting the question of moral aside, as leading us too far afield, it is clear that the individual amateur must depend upon his training. If, like the majority of the Boers, he is a good shot, a good scout, a good skirmisher and, if mounted, a good horseman and horsemaster, he is undeniably a most useful soldier. But whether amateurs en masse, that is, when organized into battalions and brigades, are thoroughly trustworthy, depends on the quality of their officers. With good officers, and a certain amount of previous training, there is no reason why bodies of infantry, artillery or mounted infantry, composed entirely of unprofessional soldiers, should not do excellent service in the field. Where they are likely to fail is in discipline; and it would appear that at the beginning of a campaign they are more liable to panic, less resolute in attack, less enduring under heavy losses and great hardships, and much slower in manoeuvre than the professionals. To a certain extent this is inevitable; and it has a most important bearing on the value of the citizen soldier, for the beginning of a campaign is a most critical phase. In short, troops who are only half-trained or have been hastily raised may be a positive danger to the army to which they belong; and the shelter of stout earthworks is the only place for them. Yet the presence of a certain number of experienced fighting men in the ranks may make all the difference; and, in any case, it is probable that battalions composed of unprofessional soldiers, the free citizens of a free and prosperous state, are little if at all inferior, as fighting units, to battalions composed of conscripts. But it is to be understood that the men possess the qualifications referred to above, that the officers are accustomed to command and have a good practical knowledge of their duties in the field. A mob, however patriotic, carrying small-bore rifles is no more likely to hold its own to-day against well-led regulars than did the mob carrying pikes and flint-locks in the past. A small body of resolute civilians, well-armed and skilful marksmen, might easily on their own ground defeat the same number of trained soldiers, especially if the latter were badly led. But in a war of masses, .the power of combination, of rapid and orderly movement, and of tactical manoeuvring is bound to tell. (G.F.R.H.) II. LAWS OF WAR The law of war, in strict usage, does not apply to all armed conflicts, but only to such conflicts as, by the usage of states, Clvnwar constitute war. War exists when the organized armed as distin- forces of one state are opposed to the organized armed gulshed forces of another state. War also exists within the from bounds of a single state when organized armed forces, rebellion. of sufficient power to make the issue doubtful, place themselves in opposition to the armed forces of the existing government. If the disaffected forces are in a state of flagrant inferiority in comparison with those of the existing government there is not a state of war but of rebellion. The combatants in civil war are entitled to treatment in accordance with the law of war. Rebels, as outlaws, have no rights. In the South African campaign (1899-1902) the question arose whether the manifest inferiority of the Boer forces, the possession by the British forces of the seats of government, and their practical occupation of the whole country, did not put an end to the state of war and constitute the Boer fighting forces rebels against a new existing government which had proclaimed annexation of the conquered states. The action of the British commanders is a precedent in favour of the view that the fighting forces of an invaded state are entitled to belligerent rights, though in a state of hopeless inferiority, so long as they remain in the field in organized bands. In this, as in many cases which have formed international usage, the danger of reprisals more than the logic of principles has dictated a different line of conduct from that which the strict principles of law suggested. A somewhat similar, but more complicated situation, arose out of the cession by Spain to the United States of the Philippine Islands. The insurgents being in possession of them at the time, Spain ceded what she did not in fact possess. Thus it has been contended that the position of the insurgents became that of belligerents defending their country against conquest by invading forces. Wars have been classed in different ways—wars of intervention, wars of conquest, wars of defence, wars of independence, just wars, unjust wars, and so on; but the law of war applies to them all without distinction. States do not sit as judges over each other, but treat war, subject to their own interest, as a fact. Interest, however, with the increasing development of international relations is becoming a more important factor in the determination of the attitude of the neutral onlooker (see NEUTRALITY). In the Chino-Japanese War (1894-95) the Japanese had to decide whether the Chinese were entitled to treatment under the European law of war. Japan had acceded to the " Markomannia " on the ground that they were contraband destined for the armed forces of the existing Haytian government. The " Crete-a-Pierrot " had for some years formed part of the Haytian navy, and was commanded by Admiral Killick, who had been an admiral of that navy. There had been no recognition of the belligerency of the insurgents. No state seems to have made any observations on the incident, which may be taken to be in accordance with current international usage. A well-known instance of a neutral government recognizing insurgent forces as belligerent, in spite of the denial of that character to them by the state against which they British re. are carrying on hostilities, occurred in the North cognition American Civil War. The right asserted by Great "the chit' Britain to recognize the belligerency of the Con- federates. federate forces was based on the contention that British commercial interests were very largely affected by the blockade of the Southern_ ports. It is agreed, however, among jurists that, where the interests of neighbouring states are not affected, the recognition of an insurgent's belligerency is needless interference? The recognition of belligerency does not entail recognition of the belligerent as a sovereign state. It goes no farther than its immediate purpose. The belligerent armies effect of are lawful combatants, not bandits. Supplies taken recognifrom invaded territory are requisitions, not robbery. con of The belligerent ships of war are lawful cruisers, not belligerpirates; and their captures, made in accordance env,. with maritime law, are good prize; and their blockades, if effectual, must be respected by neutrals. But this does not suffice to invest the belligerent with the attributes of independent sovereignty for such objects as negotiation of treaties, and the accrediting of diplomatic and consular agents. This was the attitude of Great Britain and France towards the Confederates in the American Civil War. The position. of a vassal state or a colony carrying on foreign war without the consent of the suzerain or parent state might involve still more complicated issues.' Civilized warfare, the textbooks tell us, is confined, as far as possible, to disablement of the armed forces of the enemy; otherwise war would continue till one of the parties was exterminated. " It is with good reason," observes foeices and Vattel, " that this practice has grown into a custom civilians. with the nations of Europe, at least with those that keep up regular standing armies or bodies of militia. The troops alone carry on war, while the rest of the nation remain in peace " (Law of Nations, iii. 226). Modern notions of patriotism do not, however, view this total and unconditional abstention of the 2 It is also agreed that, as the existence of belligerency imposes burdens and liabilities upon neutral subjects, a state engaged in civil war has no right, in endeavouring to effect its warlike objects, to em-ploy measures against foreign vessels, which, though sanctioned in time of peace, are not recognized in time of war. In other words, it cannot enjoy at one and the same moment the rights of both peace and war. Thus, in 1861, when the government of New Granada, during a civil war, announced that certain ports would be closed, not by blockade, but by order, Lord John Russell said that " it was perfectly competent to the government of a country in a state of tranquillity to say which ports should be open to trade, and which should be closed; but in the event of insurrection, or civil war in that country, it was not competent for its government to close ports which were de facto in the hands of the insurgents; and that such a proceeding would be an invasion of international law relating to blockade " (Hansard, chili., 1846). Subsequently the government of the United States proposed to adopt the same measure against the ports of the Southern States, upon which Lord John Russell wrote to Lord Lyons that " Her Majesty's government entirely concur with the French government in the opinion that a decree closing the Southern ports would be entirely illegal, and would be an evasion of that recognized maxim of the law of nations that the ports of a belligerent can only be closed by an effective blockade " (State Papers, North America, No. I, 1862). In neither case was the order carried out. When in 1885 the President of Colombia, during the existence of civil war, declared several ports to be closed without instituting a blockade, Mr T. F. Bayard, Secretary of State of the United States, in a despatch of 24th April of that year, fully acknowledged the principle of this contention by refusing to acknowledge the closure. In the Servo-Bulgarian War of 1885 the Sultan, though suzerain of Bulgaria, was unmoved by the invasion of his vassal's dominions. Neutral interest. War with Geneva Convention (see below) in 1886, and to the ous peoples. Declaration of Paris (see below) in 1887. China was a people party to neither, and observed the provisions of neither. japan, nevertheless, as related by her learned judicial advisers, Professors Ariga and Takahashi, observed towards the Chinese forces, combatant and non-combatant, all the rules of European International Law without resorting to the reprisals to which Chinese barbarities provoked her. The position of neutral governments towards insurgent forces is always a delicate one. If they are not recognized as Neutral belligerents by the state against which they are position arrayed, the state in question theoretically accepts towards responsibility for the consequences of their acts in insurgents. respect of neutral states. A neutral state may be satisfied with this responsibility, or it may recognize the bel- ligerent character of the insurgents. If, however, it does not, the insurgent forces cannot exercise rights of war against neutral property without exposing themselves to treatment as outlaws and pirates. A case of such treatment occurred in September 19o2 in connexion with a then pending revolution in Hayti. A German cruiser, the " Panther," treated an insurgent gunbcat, the " Crete-a-Pierrot," as a pirate vessel,' and sank her for having stopped and confiscated arms and ammunition found among the cargo of the German steamer The Times (9th September 1902). civilian population as any longer possible. They have found, to some extent, expression in the following Articles of the Hague War-Regulations: " Art. 1. The laws, rights and duties of war apply not only to an army, but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions: (a) To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) to have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; (c) to carry arms openly; and (d) to conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of it, they are included under the denomination ' army.' " Art. 2. The population of a territory not under occupation, who, on the enemy's approach, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time to organize themselves in accordance with Article 1, shall be regarded as belligerent if they carry arms openly, and if they respect the laws and customs of war."' The only alteration made by the revised Convention of Nov. 27th, 1907, as compared with that of 1899 is the insertion in Art. 2 of the words in italics. By these provisions, irregular combatants whom both the government of the United States in the American Civil War and the German government in the Franco-German War refused to regard as legitimate belligerents, are now made legally so .2 I The preamble of the Convention refers specially to Articles 1 and 2 in the following terms: " In the view of the High Contracting Parties, these provisions, the drafting of which has been inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war so far as military necessities permit, are destined to serve as general rules of conduct for belligerents in their relations with each other and with populations; " It has not, however, been possible to agree forthwith on provisions embracing all the circumstances which occur in practice; " On the other hand, it could not be intended by the High Contracting Parties that the cases not provided for should, for want of a written provision, be left to the arbitrary judgment of the military commanders; " Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it expedient to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established among civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience; " They declare that it is in this sense especially that Articles 1 and 2 of the regulations adopted must be understood." x The instructions for the government of armies of the United States in the field, issued in 1863, provided: " Men or squads of men who commit hostilities, whether by fighting or inroads for destruction or plunder, or by raids of any kind, without commission, without being part and portion of the organized hostile army, and without sharing continuously in the war, but who do so with intermitting returns to their homes and avocation, or with the occasional assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the character or appearance of soldiers—such men or squads of men are not public enemies, and therefore, if captured, are not entitled to the privilege of prisoners of war, but shall be treated summarily as highway robbers or pirates." Germany seven years later declined to recognize the regular bands of francs-tireurs unless each individual member of them had been personally called out by legal authority, and wore a uniform or badge, irremovable and sufficient to distinguish him at a distance. The older publicists were, on the whole, strongly opposed to the legalization of irregular troops. Hallock settles the question in a summary way by calling those who engage in partisan warfare, robbers and murderers, and declaring that when captured they are to be treated as criminals (International Law, chap. xviii. s. 8). It is easy to understand the unfavourable opinion of partisan bands usually ex-pressed by the military authorities when the enormous power for damage of modern arms is considered. At the Brussels Conference of 1874 the representatives of the great military Powers of the Continent naturally desired to keep spontaneous movements within the narrowest possible bounds, while the delegates from the secondary states, who have to rely for their defence chiefly upon the patriotism of their people, endeavoured to widen the right of resistance to an invader. Finally the Conference adopted the provisions which were later formally recognized at the Hague Conference (see British State Papers Miscellaneous, No. 1, 1875, pp. 252-257). It is noteworthy that both at the Brussels and the Hague Conferences the British delegate ranged himself on the side of the smaller states in favour of the recognition of guerrilla bands. At the Hague Conference Sir John Ardagh gave notice of his intention to propose an additional Article, to the effect that nothing in the Regulations should " be considered as tending to diminish or suppress the right which belongs to the population of an invaded country patriotically to oppose the most energetic resistance by every legitimate means." The upshot of this notice was to cause the insertion of a proviso in the preamble of the Connected with the position of private persons in time of war is that of their property in invaded territory, a subject which has often been misunderstood. Assertions Enemy as to its immunity from capture in warfare on land property have been made which are historically inaccurate on invaded and are not borne out by contemporary usage. No territory. doubt contemporary usage is an improvement on older usage. An invading army, before the practice of war became more refined, lived by foraging and pillage in the invaded country; pillage, in fact, being one of the inducements held out to the adventurers who formed part of the fighting forces either as officers or as common soldiers, and this continued down to comparatively recent times. Attenuations followed from the rise of standing and regular armies, and the consequent more marked distinction between soldier and civilian. They have now taken the form of systematic requisitions and contributions, the confining of the right of levying these to generals and commanders-in-chief, the institution of quittances or bills drawn by the belligerent invader on the invaded power and handed in payment to the private persons whose movable belongings have been appropriated or used, and of war indemnities. These are methods of lessening the hardships of war as regards the private property on land of the subjects of belligerent states. Their object and effect have by no means been to arrive at immunity, but to develop an organized system by which damage and losses to individuals, whom the fortune of war has brought into immediate contact with the enemy, are spread over the whole community. There is thus no immunity of private property in warfare on land, and the Hague War-Regulations, far from declaring the contrary, have ratified the right of appropriation of private property in the following Article: " Neither requisitions in kind nor services can be demanded from communes or inhabitants except for the necessities of the army of occupation. They must be in proportion to the resources of the country, and of such a nature as not to involve the population in the obligation of taking part in military operations against their country. " These requisitions and services shall only be demanded on the authority of the Commander in the locality occupied. " The contributions in kind shall, as far as possible, be paid for in ready money; if not, their receipt shall be acknowledged and the payment of the amounts due shall be made as soon as possible " (Article 52). In another Article provision, moreover, is made for the utilization of property in kind belonging to private persons:-- " An army of occupation can only take possession of the cash, funds and property liable to requisition belonging strictly to the state, depots of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies, and, generally, all movable property of the state which may be used for military operations. " All appliances, whether on land, at sea, or in the air adapted for the transmission of news, or for the transport of persons or things, exclusive of cases governed by naval law, depots of arms, and generally, all kinds of ammunition of war, may be seized, even if they belong to private individuals, but must be restored and compensation fixed when peace is made." Utilizable neutral rolling-stock is not excepted, Article ig of the Convention on the rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in war on land only providing that " The plant of railways coming from neutral states, whether the property of those states, or of companies, or of private persons, and recognizable as such, shall be sent back as soon as possible to the country of origin." Enemy property at sea is subject to different rules from those which govern it on land. It is liable to capture and confiscation wherever found on the high seas or in enemy waters. The United States has made strenuous Enemy efforts to get this rule of maritime warfare altered, at sea. and immunity from capture accepted as the law of the sea. It has even made this a condition of its accession to the Declaration of Paris (see NEUTRALITY). But thus far other powers have shown no disposition to agree to any alteration. At the Hague Conferences the United States raised the question again, but thus far all that has been done has been to ratify Convention-denying the right of military commanders to act accord- ing to their own arbitrary judgment (Parliamentary Papers, No. 1, 1899, c. 9534)• existing exemptions. The considerations which have led man-kind to systematize the practice of war in regard to private property on land do not arise in the same form in connexion with private property at sea. Here there is no question of seizing the live stock, or the bedding, or the food, or the utensils of the private citizen. If ship and cargo are captured, it may be hard upon the merchant, but such captures do not directly deprive him of the necessaries of life. Yet, as in the case of war on land, its hardships have been attenuated, and progress has been made by developing a more systematic procedure of capture of private property at sea. Thus exemption from capture is now allowed by belligerents to enemy merchant ships which, at the outbreak of war, are on the way to one of their ports, and they also allow enemy merchantmen in their ports at its outbreak a certain time to leave them. This is confirmed by the Hague Convention of 1907 on the status of enemy ships on the outbreak of hostilities. A somewhat similar practice exists as regards pursuit of merchant ships which happen to be in a neutral port at the same time with an enemy cruiser. Under the Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the rights and duties of neutral powers in naval war (Art. 16), this, too, is confirmed. Lastly, there has grown up, on grounds similar to those which have led to the indulgence shown to private property on land, a now generally recognized immunity from capture of small vessels engaged in the coast fisheries, provided they are in no wise made to serve the purposes of war, which also has been duly confirmed in the Hague Conventions of 1907 by Art. 3 of the convention relative to certain restrictions on the exercise of the right of capture in maritime war. This has all been done with the object of making the operations of war systematic, and enabling the private citizen to estimate his risks and take the necessary precautions to avoid capture, and of restricting acts of war to the purpose of bringing it to a speedy conclusion. We have seen that the only immunity of private property yet known to the laws of war is a limited one at sea. War, by its very nature, seems to prevent the growth of any such immunity. The tendency in war on land has been to spread its effects over the whole community, to keep a faithful record on both sides of all confiscations, appropriations and services enforced against private citizens; beyond this, protection has not yet been extended. There is good reason for this. The object of each belligerent being to break the enemy's power and force him to sue for peace, it may not be enough to defeat him in the open field; it may be necessary to prevent him from repairing his loss both in men and in the munitions of war. This may imply crippling his material resources, trade and manufactures. It has been contended that " to capture at sea raw materials used in the manufacturing industry of a belligerent state, or products on the saie of which its prosperity, and therefore its taxable sources depend, is necessarily one of the objects, and one of the least cruel, which the belligerents pursue. To capture the merchant vessels which carry these goods, and even to keep the seamen navigating them prisoners, is to prevent the employment of the ships by the enemy as transports or cruisers, and the repairing from among the seamen of the mercantile marine of losses of men in the official navy." 1 The question of reform of the existing practice would naturally be viewed in different countries according to their respective interests. The United States has obviously an interest in the exemption of its merchant vessels and cargoes from capture, a small official navy being sufficient for the assertion of its ascendancy on the American continent. It may also be presumed to be in the interest of Italy, who, in a treaty with the United States in 1871, provided for mutual recognition of the exemption. In the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 the principle of inviolability was adhered to by both parties. Germany proclaimed the same principle in 1870, but afterwards abandoned it. There is a strong movement in Great Britain in favour of the general adoption of immunity. Whether it may now be expedient for her to agree to such immunity is an open question. It is 1 Barclay, " Proposed Immunity of Private Property at Sea from Capture by Enemy," Law Quarterly Review (January 1900).quite conceivable, however, that different considerations would weigh with her in a war with the United States from those which would arise in a war with France or Germany. In the case of the United States it might be in the interest of both parties to localize the operations of war, and to interfere as little as possible, perhaps for the joint exclusion of neutral vessels, with the traffic across the Atlantic. In the case of a war with France or Germany, Great Britain might consider that the closing of the high sea to all traffic by the merchantmen of the enemy would be very much in her own interest. The converse subject of the treatment of subjects of the one belligerent who remain in the country of the other belligerent also was not dealt with at the Hague. British practice in this matter has always been indulgent, the protection to the persons and property of non-combatant enemies on British soil dating back to Magna Carta (s. 48), and this is still the law of England. The practice on the continent of Europe varies according to circumstances, to which no doubt, in the event of the invasion of Great Britain, British practice would also have to adapt itself. The Hague War-Regulations deal fully with the treatment of prisoners, and though they add nothing to existing practice, such treatment is no longer in the discretion of,v:r rs of war of the signatory Powers, but is binding on them. They provide as follows: Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile government, but not in that of the individuals or corps who captured them. They must be humanely treated. All their personal belongings, except arms, horses and military papers, remain their property (Article 4). Prisoners of war may be interned in a town, fortress, camp or any other locality, and bound not to go beyond certain fixed limits; but they can only be confined as an indispensable measure of safety, and only so long as circumstances necessitating this measure shall endure (Article 5). The state may utilize the labour of prisoners of war according to their rank and aptitude, with the exception of officers. Their tasks shall not be excessive, and shall have nothing to do with the military operations. Prisoners may be authorized to work for the public service, for private persons, or on their own account. Work done for the state shall be paid for ac-cording to the tariffs in force for soldiers of the national army employed on similar tasks, or if there are none in force, then according to a tariff suitable to the work executed. When the work is for other branches of the public service or for private persons, the conditions shall be settled in agreement with the military authorities. The wages of the prisoners shall go towards improving their position, and the balance shall be paid them at the time of their release, after de-ducting the cost of their maintenance (Article 6). The government into whose hands prisoners of war have fallen is bound to maintain them. Failing a special agreement between the belligerents, prisoners of war shall be treated, as regards food, quarters and clothing, on the same footing as the troops of the government which has captured them (Article 7). Prisoners of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations and orders in force in the army of the state into whose hands they have fallen. Any act of insubordination warrants the adoption, as regards them, of such measures of severity as may be necessary. Escaped prisoners, recaptured before they have succeeded in re-joining their army, or before quitting the territory occupied by the army that captured them, are liable to disciplinary punishment. Prisoners who, of ter succeeding in escaping, are again taken prisoners, are not liable to any punishment for the previous flight (Article 8). Every prisoner of war, if questioned, is bound to declare his true name and rank, and if he disregards this rule, he is liable to a curtailment of the advantages accorded to the prisoners of war of his class (Article 9). Prisoners of war may be set at liberty on parole if the laws of their country authorize it, and, in such a case, they are bound, on their personal honour, scrupulously to fulfil, both as regards their own government and the government by whom they were made prisoners, the engagements they have contracted. In such cases, their own government shall not require of nor accept from them any service incompatible with the parole given (Article to). A prisoner of war cannot be forced to accept his liberty on parole; similarly the hostile government is not obliged to assent to the prisoner's request to be set at liberty on parole (Article II). Any prisoner of war who is liberated on parole and recaptured, bearing arms against the government to whom he had pledged his honour or against the allies of that government, forfeits his right to be treated as a prisoner of war, and can be brought before the courts (Article 12). An interesting provision in the Regulations assimilates individuals who, following an army without directly belonging to it, such as newspaper correspondents /ouraalfists. and reporters, sutlers, contractors, fall into the enemy's hands, to prisoners of war, provided they can produce a Enemy subjectstneir property on hostile territory. certificate from the military authorities of the army they were accompanying. A new departure is made by clauses providing for the institution of a bureau for information relative to prisoners of tnforma- war. This is to be created at the commencement of lion office hostilities, in each of the belligerent states and, when as to necessary, in the neutral countries on whose territory prisoners, belligerents have been received. It is intended to answer all inquiries about prisoners of war, and is to be furnished by the various services concerned with all the necessary information to enable it to keep an individual return for each prisoner of war. It is to be kept informed of internments and changes, liberations on parole, evasions, admissions into hospital, deaths, &c. It is also the duty of the bureau to receive and collect all objects of personal use, valuables, letters, &c., found on the battlefields or left by prisoners who have died in hospital or ambulance, and to transmit them to those interested. Letters, money orders and valuables, as well as postal parcels destined for the prisoners of war or despatched by them, are to be free of all postal duties both in the countries of origin and destination, as well as in those they pass through. Gifts and relief in kind for prisoners of war are to be admitted free of all duties of entry, as well as of payments for carriage by the government railways. Furthermore, relief societies for prisoners of war, regularly con- stituted with the object of charity, are to receive every facility, within the bounds of military requirements and administrative regulations, for the effective accomplishment of their task. Delegates of these societies are to be admitted to the places of internment for the distribution of relief, as also to the halting-places of repatriated prisoners, " if furnished with a personal permit by the military authorities, and on giving an engagement in writing to comply with all their regulations for order and police." The obligations of belligerents with regard to sick and wounded in war on land are now governed by the Geneva Convention of sicxand July 6th, look. By this Convention ambulances and wounded, military hospitals, their medical and administrative staff and chaplains are " respected and protected under all circumstances," and the use of a uniform flag and arm-badge bearing a red cross are required as a distinguishing mark of their character. A Convention, accepted at the Peace Conferences, has now adapted the principles of the Geneva Convention to maritime warfare. This new Convention provides that Military hospital-ships, that is to say, ships constructed or assigned by states specially and solely for the purpose of assisting the wounded, sick or shipwrecked, and the names of which have been communicated to the belligerent powers at the commencement or during the course of hostilities, and in any case before they are employed, are to be respected and cannot be captured while hostilities last. As regards hospital-ships equipped wholly or in part at the cost of private individuals or officially recognized relief societies, they likewise are to be respected and exempt from capture, provided the belligerent or neutral power to which they belong shall have given them an official commission and notified their names to the hostile power at the commencement of or during hostilities, and in any case before they are employed. The belligerents have the right to control and visit them ; they can refuse to help them, order them off, make them take a certain course, and put a commissioner on board; they can even detain them, if important circumstances require it. The religious, medical or hospital staff of any captured ship is inviolable, and its members cannot be made prisoners of war. Lastly, neutral merchantmen, yachts or vessels, having, or taking on board, sick, wounded or shipwrecked of the belligerents, cannot be captured for so doing. The following prohibitions are also placed by the Hague Regulations on the means of injuring the enemy: To employ poison or poisoned arms. 16Jurlug To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to enemy, the hostile nation or army. siege, bom- To kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down arms bardments. or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion. To declare that no quarter will be given. To employ arms, projectiles or material of a nature to cause superfluous injury. To make improper use of a flag of truce, the national flag or military ensigns and the enemy's uniform, as well as the distinctive badges of the Geneva Convention. To destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war; to attack or bombard towns, villages, habitations or Ruses of buildings which are not defended. To pillage a town or place, even when taken by assault. war. Ruses of war and the employment of methods necessary to obtain information about the enemy and the country, on the contrary, are considered allowable. A spy is one who, acting clandestinely, or on false pretences, obtains, or seeks to obtain, information in the zone of operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party (the Hague War-Regulations, Art. 29). Spies. Thus, soldiers not in disguise who have penetrated into the zone of operations of a hostile army to obtain information are not considered spies. Similarly, the following are not considered spies: soldiers or civilians, carrying out their mission openly, charged with the delivery of despatches destined either for their own army or for that of the enemy. To this class belong likewise individuals sent in balloons to deliver despatches, and generally to maintain communication between the various parts of an army or a territory (ib.). A spy taken in the act cannot be punished without previous trial, and a spy who, after rejoining the army to which he belongs, is subsequently captured by the enemy, is a prisoner of war, and not punishable for his previous acts of espionage.' In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps are to be taken to spare as far as possible buildings devoted to religion, art, science and charity, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not used at the same time for military purposes; but the besieged are to indicate these buildings or places by some particular and visible signs and notify them to the assailants. A new Convention respecting bombardments by naval forces was adopted by the Hague Conference of 1907, forbidding the bombardment of undefended " ports, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings," unless after a formal summons the local authorities decline to comply with requisitions for provisions or supplies necessary for the immediate use of the naval force before the place in question. But they may not be bombarded on account of failure to pay money contributions. On the other hand, the prohibition does not apply to military works, depots of arms, &c., or ships of war in a harbour. Another new Convention adopted at the Hague in 19oq dealt with the laying of automatic submarine contact mines. Its main provisions are as follows: It is forbidden: t. To lay unanchored automatic contact mines, except when they are so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after the person who laid them ceases to control them; 2. To lay anchored automatic contact mines which do not become harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings; 3. To use torpedoes which do not become harmless when they have missed their mark (Art. I). It is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off the coast and ports of the enemy, with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping (Art. 2). When anchored automatic contact mines are employed, every possible precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful shipping. The belligerents undertake to do their utmost to render these mines harmless within a limited time, and, should they cease to be under surveillance, to notify the danger zones as soon as military exigencies permit, by a notice addressed to shipowners, which must also be communicated to the Governments through the diplomatic channel. (Art. 3.) Neutral Powers which lay automatic contact mines off their coasts must observe the same rules and take the same precautions as are imposed on belligerents. The neutral Power must inform shipowners, by a notice issued in advance, where automatic contact mines have been laid. This notice must be communicated at once to the Governments through the diplomatic channel. (Art. 4.) At the close of the war the Contracting Powers undertake to do their utmost to remove the mines which they have laid, each Power removing its own mines. As regards anchored automatic contact mines laid by one of the belligerents off the coast of the other, their position must be notified to the other party by the Power which laid them, and each Power must proceed with the least possible delay to remove the mines in its own waters. (Art. 5.) h. me_ See, as to Flags of Truce, Art. 32 of the Hague Regulations. Relief societies. The Contracting Powers which do not at present own perfected mines of the pattern contemplated in the present Convention, and which, consequently, could not at present carry out the rules laid down in Articles i and 3, undertake to convert the materiel of their mines as soon as possible so as to bring it into conformity with the foregoing requirements. (Art. 6.) Territory is considered as occupied when it is actually under the authority of the hostile army. The authority having passed ocaupa- into the hands of the occupant, the latter takes all Don of possible steps to re-establish public order and safety. hostile Compulsion of the population of occupied territory to territory. take part in military operations against their own country, or even give information respecting the army of the other belligerent and pressure to take the oath to the hostile power are prohibited. Private property must be respected, save in case of military necessity (Arts. 46 and 52). The property of religious, charitable and educational institutions, and of art and science, even when state property, are assimilated to private property, and all seizure of, and destruction or intentional damage done to such institutions, to historical monuments, works of art or science is prohibited (Art. 56). Practice as regards declarations of war has hitherto varied. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 was preceded by a deliberate declaration. In the war between Japan and China there was no declaration. (See Ariga, La Guerre sino japonaise, Paris, 1896). The delivery of an ultimatum specifying those terms, the compliance with which is demanded within a specified time, is practically a conditional declaration of war which becomes absolute in case of non-compliance. Thus the note communicated by the United States to Spain on 20th April 1898 demanded Modern the " immediate withdrawal of all the land and sea practice. forces from Cuba," and gave Spain three days to accept these terms. On the evening of 22nd April the United States seized several Spanish vessels, and hostilities were thus opened. In the case of the Transvaal War, the declaration also took the form of an ultimatum. A special Hague convention adopted at the Conference of 1907 now provides that hostilities " must not commence without previous and explicit warning in the form of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war." It also provides that the existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral powers and shall not take effect in regard to them until after the receipt of the notification which may be given by telegraph. Most of the good effect of the provision, however, is negatived by the qualification that neutral powers cannot rely on the absence of notification if it is clearly established that they were in fact aware of the existence of a state of war. Too much confidence must not be placed in regulations con- cerning the conduct of war. Military necessity, the heat of action, the violence of the feelings which come into Future of lawof war. play will always at times defeat the most skilfully- combined rules diplomacy can devise. Still, such rules are a sign of conditions of public opinion which serve as a restraint upon the commission of barbarities among civilized peoples. The European operations in China consequent on the " Boxer " rising showed how distance from European criticism tends to loosen that restraint. On the other hand, it was significant that both the United States and Spain, who were not parties to the Declaration of Paris, found themselves, in a war confined to them, under the necessity of observing provisions which the majority of civilized states have agreed to respect. (T. BA.)
End of Article: GENERAL
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GIOVANNI BUONAVENTURA GENELLI (1798 -- 1868)
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GENERAL (Lat. generalis, of or relating to a genus,...

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