See also:

• IDEALISM (from Gr. i5Ea, archetype or model, through been urged of the truth of its point of view is the persistency Fr. idealisme)

IDEALISM (from Gr. i5Ea, archetype or See also:

• MODEL (0. Fr. modelle, mod. modele; It. modello, pattern, mould; from Lat. modus, measure, standard)

model, through been urged of the truth of its point of view is the persistency Fr. idealisme)  , a See also:

• TERM

term generally used for the attitude of mind with which it has always asserted itself at a certain See also:

• STAGE (Fr. 6/age; from Lat. stare, to stand)

stage in which is prone to represent things in an imaginative See also:

• LIGHT

light and philosophical reflection and as the See also:

• SOLUTION (from Lat. solvere, to loosen, dissolve)

solution of certain recurrent to See also:

• LAY

lay emphasis exclusively or primarily on abstract perfection speculative difficulties . All thought starts from the See also:

• ORDINARY (med. Lat. ordinarius, Fr. ordinaire)

ordinary (i.e. in " ideals ") . With this meaning the philosophical use of See also:

• DUALISM (from rare Lat. dualis, containing two, from duo)

dualism or See also:

• PLURALISM (Lat. plus, plures, many, several)

pluralism which conceives of the See also:

• WORLD

world as consisting the term has little in See also:

• COMMON

common. of the juxtaposition of mutually See also:

• INDEPENDENT

independent things and persons . To understand the philosophical theory that has come to be The first See also:

• MOVEMENT

movement is in the direction of dispelling this appear-known under this See also:

• TITLE (0. Fr. title, mod. titre, from Lat. titulus)

title, we may ask (I) what in See also:

• GENERAL
• GENERAL (Lat. generalis, of or relating to a genus, kind or class)

general it is ance of See also:

• INDEPENDENCE
• INDEPENDENCE, DECLARATION OF
• INDEPENDENCE, WAR OF

independence . They are seen to be See also:

• UNITED

united under the and how it is differentiated from other theories of knowledge relation of cause and effect, determining and determined, which and reality, (2) how it has risen in the See also:

• HISTORY

history of See also:

• PHILOSOPHY (Gr. gthos, fond of, and vo4 (a, wisdom)

philosophy, (3) turns out to mean that they are merely passing manifestations what position it occupies at See also:

• PRESENT

present in the world of See also:

• SPECULATION

speculation. of some single entity or See also:

• ENERGY (from the Gr. ivipyela; iv, in, ipyov, work)

energy which constitutes the real un- 1 . General See also:

• DEFINITION (Lat. definitio, from de-finire, to set limits to, describe)

Definition of See also:

• IDEALISM (from Gr. i5Ea, archetype or model, through been urged of the truth of its point of view is the persistency Fr. idealisme)

Idealism.—Idealism as a philosophical known essence of the things that come before our knowledge. See also:

• DOCTRINE

doctrine conceives of knowledge or experience as a See also:

• PROCESS

process in In the See also:

• PANTHEISM (Gr. 7rav, all, Oeos, god)

pantheism that thus takes the See also:

• PLACE (through Fr. from Lat. platea, street; Gr. IrAar6s, wide)

place of the old dualism which the two factors of subject and See also:

• OBJECT

object stand in a relation there seems no place See also:

• LEFT

left for the individual . Mind and will in of entire interdependence on each other as warp and woof. their individual manifestations fade into the general background Apart from the activity of the self or subject in sensory reaction, of See also:

• APPEARANCE (from Lat. apparere, to appear)

appearance without significance except as a See also:

• LINK

link in a fated memory and association, See also:

• IMAGINATION

imagination, See also:

• JUDGMENT

judgment and inference, See also:

• CHAIN (through the O. Fr. citable, chcene, &c., from Lat. catena)

chain . Deliverance from the pantheistic conception of the there can be no world of See also:

• OBJECTS

objects . A thing-in-itself which is universe comes through the recognition of the central place not a thing to some consciousness is an entirely unrealizable, occupied by thought and purpose in the actual world, and, because self-contradictory, conception . But this is only one as a consequence of this, of the See also:

• ILLEGITIMACY (from " illegitimate," Lat. illegitimus, not in accordance with law, hence born out of lawful wedlock)

illegitimacy of the See also:

• ABSTRACTION (Lat. abs and trahere)

abstraction See also:

• SIDE
• SIDE (mod. Eski Adalia)

side of the truth . It is equally true that a subject apart from whereby material energy is taken for the ultimate reality . an object is unintelligible .

As the object exists through the The first See also:

• ILLUSTRATION

illustration of this movement on a large See also:

• SCALE
• SCALE (1) A

scale was constructive activity of the subject, so the subject lives in the given in the Socratic reaction against the pantheistic conclusions construction of the object . To seek for the true self in any of See also:

• EARLY
• EARLY, JUBAL ANDERSON (1816-1894)

early See also:

• GREEK
• GREEK, ETRUSCAN AND

Greek philosophy (see IONIAN SCHOOL) . The region into which its opposite in the See also:

• FORM (Lat. forma)

form of a not-self does whole movement of which See also:

• SOCRATES

Socrates was a See also:

• PART

part may be idealism: not enter is to grasp a See also:

• SHADOW (0. Eng. Schadewe, sceadu; a form of " shade "; connected with Gr. 6-Ore's, darkness)

shadow . It is in seeking to realize its said to have been in the direction of the assertion of socrates. own ideas in the world of knowledge, feeling and See also:

• ACTION

action that the rights of the subject . Its keynote is to be found the mind comes into See also:

• POSSESSION
• POSSESSION (Lat. possessio, possidere, to possess)

possession of itself; it is in becoming in the Protagorean" See also:

• MAN
• MAN, ISLE OF (anc. Mona)

man is the measure." This seems to have permeated and transformed by the mind's ideas that the world been interpreted by its author and by the See also:

• SOPHISTS (from Gr. codtoris, literally, man of wisdom)

Sophists in general develops the fullness of its reality as object. in a subjective sense, with the result that it became the See also:

• MOTTO (an Italian word, from Late Lat. muttum, a low sound, a mutter or murmur, cf. mutere, to mutter; the Latin word also gives Fr. mot, word)

motto Thus defined, idealism is opposed to ordinary common-sense of a sceptical and individualistic movement in contemporary dualism, which regards knowledge or experience as the result philosophy and See also:

• ETHICS
• ETHICS, SHAFTESBURY, HOBBES

ethics . It was not less against this form of of the more or less accidental relation between two See also:

• SEPARATE

separate idealism than against the See also:

• DETERMINISM (Lat. determinare, to prescribe or limit)

determinism of the early physicists and independent entities—the mind and its ideas on one side, that Socrates protested . Along two lines the thought of Socrates the thing with its attributes on the other—that serve to limit led to idealistic conclusions which may be said to have formed and See also:

• CONDITION (Lat. condicio, from condicere, to agree upon, arrange; not connected with conditio, from condere, conditum, to put together)

condition each other from without . It is equally opposed the basis of all subsequent advance . (I) He perceived the imto the doctrine which represents the subject itself and its See also:

• STATE
• STATE, GREAT OFFICERS OF

state portance of the universal or conceptual See also:

• ELEMENT (Lat. elementum)

element in knowledge, and judgments as the single immediate datum of consciousness, and thus at a single stroke See also:

• BROKE, or BROOKE, ARTHUR (d. 1563)
• BROKE, SIR PHILIP BOWES VERE, BART

broke through the hard See also:

• REALISM (from Low Lat. realis, appertaining to res, things, as opposed to ideas and imaginations)

realism of and all else, whether the objects of an See also:

• EXTERNAL

external world or See also:

• PERSON, OFFENCES AGAINST THE

person ordinary common sense, disproved all forms of See also:

• NATURALISM

naturalism other than the individual subject whose states are known to that were founded on the denial of the reality of thought, and itself, as having a merely problematic existence resting upon cut away the ground from a merely. sensational and subjective See also:

• ANALOGY (Gr. avaXo-yLa, proportion)

analogy or other process of indirect inference . This theory is idealism . This is what See also:

• ARISTOTLE
• ARISTOTLE (384-322 B.C.)

Aristotle means by claiming for Socrates sometimes known as idealism . But it falls See also:

• SHORT, FRANCIS JOB (1857– )

short of idealism that he was the founder of definition .

(2) He taught that See also:

• LIFE

life as above defined in that it recognizes only one side of the See also:

• ANTI, or CAMPA

anti- was explicable only as a See also:

• SYSTEM

system of ends . Goodness consists in thesis of subject and object, and so falls short of the doctrine the knowledge of what these are . It is by his hold upon them that which takes its stand on the See also:

• COMPLETE

complete correlativity of the two the individual is able to give unity and reality to his will . In factors in experience . It is for this See also:

• REASON (Lat. ratio, through French raison)

reason that it is sometimes expounding these ideas Socrates limited himself to the See also:

• SPHERE (Gr. vclsa?pa, a ball or globe)

sphere known as subjective or incomplete idealism . Finally the theory of practice . Moreover, the end or ideal of the See also:

• PRACTICAL

practical life defined is opposed to all forms of realism, whether in the older was conceived of in too vague a way to be of much practical use. form which sought to reduce mind to a See also:

• FUNCTION

function of See also:

• MATTER

matter, His principle, however, was essentially See also:

• SOUND
• SOUND, THE (Danish Oresund)

sound, and led directly to the Platonic Idealism . See also:

• PLATO

Plato extended the Socratic See also:

• DISCOVERY

discovery to the whole of reality and while seeking to see the pre-Socratics with the eyes of Socrates sought " to see Socrates with the Plato. eyes of the pre-Socratics." Not only were the virtues to be explained by their relation to a common or universal See also:

• GOOD, JOHN MASON (1764-1827)

good which only intelligence could apprehend, but there was nothing in all the See also:

• FURNITURE (from " furnish," Fr. fournir)

furniture of See also:

• HEAVEN (0. Eng. hefen, heofon, heofone; this word appears in O.S. hevan; the High. Ger. word appears in Ger. Himmel, Dutch hemel; there does not seem to be any connexion between the two words, and the ultimate derivation of the word is unknown; the sugges

heaven or See also:

• EARTH
• EARTH (a word common to Teutonic languages, cf. Ger. Erde, Dutch aarde, Swed. and Dan. jord; outside Teutonic it appears only in the Gr. 'pq'e, on the ground; it has been connected by some etymologists with the Aryan root ar-, to plough, which is seen in
• EARTH, FIGURE OF
• EARTH, FIGURE OF THE

earth which in like manner did not receive reality from the See also:

• SHARE (O. Eng. scearu, chiefly in compounds, e.g. land-scearu, a share of land, from sceran to cut; cf. " shear" )

share it had in such an intelligible See also:

• IDEA (Gr. Ibia, connected with i&eiv, to see; cf. Lat. species from specere, to look at)

idea or essence . But these ideas are them-selves intelligible only in relation to one another and to the whole . Accordingly Plato conceived of them as forming a system and finding their reality in the degree in which they embody the one all-embracing idea and conceived of not under the form of an efficient but of a final cause, an inner principle of action or tendency in things to realize the fullness of their own nature which in the last resort was identical with the nature of the whole . This Plato expressed in the myth of the See also:

• SUN
• SUN (0. Eng. sonne, Ger. sonne. Fr. soleil, Lat. sol, Gr. ijXior, from which comes helio- in various English compounds)

Sun, but the garment of See also:

• MYTHOLOGY

mythology in which Plato clothed his idealism, beautiful as it is in itself and full of See also:

• SUGGESTION

suggestion, covered an essential weakness . The more Plato dwelt upon his world of ideas, the more they seemed to recede from the world of reality, See also:

• STANDING

standing over against it as principles of condemnation instead of revealing themselves in it .

In this way the Good was made to appear as an end imposed upon things from without by a creative intelligence instead of as an inner principle of See also:

• ADAPTATION (from Lat. adaptare. to fit to)

adaptation . On one side of his thought Aristotle represents a reaction against idealism and a return to the position of common-sense Aristotle. dualism, but on another, and this the deeper side, he represents the See also:

• ATTEMPT (Lat. adtemptare, attentare, to try)

attempt to restore the theory in a more satisfactory form . His See also:

• ACCOUNT
• ACCOUNT (through O. Fr. acont, Late Lat. comptum, cornputare, to calculate)

account of the process of know-ledge in his logical See also:

• TREATISES

treatises exhibits the idealistic See also:

• BENT
• BENT (E1. BENI)
• BENT, JAMES THEODORE (1852–1897)

bent in its clearest form . This is as far removed as possible either from dualism or from See also:

• EMPIRICISM (from Gr. Eµrretpor, skilled in, from sreipa, experiment)

empiricism . The universal is the real; it is that which gives coherence and individuality to the particulars of sense which apart from it are like the routed or disbanded See also:

• UNITS, DIMENSIONS OF
• UNITS, PHYSICAL

units of an See also:

• ARMY
• ARMY (from Fr. armee, Lat. armata)

army . Still more manifestly in his Ethics and Politics Aristotle makes it clear that it is the common or universal will that gives substance and reality to the individual . In spite of these and other anticipations of a See also:

• FULLER, ANDREW (1954-1815)
• FULLER, GEORGE (1822—1884)
• FULLER, M
• FULLER, MARGARET, MARCHIONESS
• FULLER, MELVILLE WESTON (1833-1910)
• FULLER, THOMAS (16o8-1661)
• FULLER, WILLIAM (1670--c. 1717)

fuller idealism, the idea remains as a form imposed from without on a reality otherwise conceived of as independent of it . As we advance from the See also:

• LOGIC (Xoy1K7, sc. rixvrt, the art of reasoning)

logic to the See also:

• METAPHYSICS
• METAPHYSICS, or METAPHYSIC (from Gr. /sera, after, d v med, things of nature, lots, i.e. the natural universe)

metaphysics and from that to his See also:

• ONTOLOGY (adapted from a modern Latin form ontologia used by Jean le Clerc 1692; Gr. 6v, Evros, pres. part. of dam, to be, and klryos, science)

ontology, it becomes clear that the concepts are only " categories " or predicates of a reality lying outside of them, and there is an ultimate See also:

• DIVISION (from Lat. dividere, to break up into parts, separate)

division between the world as the object or matter of thought and the thinking or moving principle which gives its life . It is this that gives the Aristotelian doctrine in its more abstract statements an See also:

• AIR (from an Indo-European root meaning " breathe," " blow ")
• AIR, or ASBEN

air of uncertainty . Yet besides the particular contribution that Aristotle made to idealistic philosophy in his logical and ethical interpretations, he advanced the See also:

• CASE
• CASE, JOHN (d. 1600)

case in two directions . (a) He made it clear that no explanation of the world could be satisfactory that was not based on the notion of continuity in the sense of an See also:

• ORDER
• ORDER (through Fr. ordre, for earlier ordene, from Lat. ordo, ordinis, rank, service, arrangement; the ultimate source is generally taken to be the root seen in Lat. oriri, rise, arise, begin; cf. " origin ")
• ORDER, HOLY

order of existence in which the reality of the See also:

• LOWER

lower was to be sought for in the extent to which it gave expression to the potentialities of its own nature—which were also the potentialities of the whole of which it was a part . (b) From this it followed that difficult as we might find it to explain the relation of terms so remote from each other as sense and thought, the particular and the universal, matter and mind, these oppositions cannot in their nature be See also:

• ABSOLUTE (Lat. absolvere, to loose, set free)

absolute .

These truths, however, were hidden from Aristotle's successors, who for the most part lost the See also:

• THREAD (0. Eng. praed, literally, that which is twisted, prawan, to twist, to throw, cf. " throwster," a silk-winder, Ger. drehen, to twist, turn, Du. draad, Ger. Draht, thread, wire)

thread which Socrates had put into their See also:

• HAND
• HAND (a word common to Teutonic languages; cf. Ger. Hand, Goth. handus)
• HAND, FERDINAND GOTTHELF (1786-185r)

hand . When the authority of Aristotle was again invoked, it was its dualistic and formal, not its idealistic and metaphysical, side that was in See also:

• HARMONY (Gr. dpµovia, a concord of musical sounds, dpA'ew to join; &plan midi (sc. TeXvil)

harmony with the spirit of the See also:

• AGE (Fr. age, through late Lat. aetaticum, from aetas)

age . Apart from one or two of the greatest minds, notably See also:

• DANTE

Dante, what appealed to the thinkers of the See also:

• MIDDLE

middle ages was not the idea of reality as a progressive self-See also:

• REVELATION, BOOK OF

revelation of an inner principle working through nature and human life, but the formal principles of See also:

• CLASSIFICATION (Lat. classis, a class, probably from the root cal-, cla-, as in Gr. icaMce, clamor)

classification which it seemed to offer for a material of thought and action given from another source . See also:

• MODERN

Modern like See also:

• ANCIENT
• ANCIENT (also spelt ANTIENT; derived, through the Fr. ancien, old, from the late Lat. antianum, from ante, before)

ancient idealism came into being as a correctionof the view that threatened to resolve the world of matter and mind alike into the changing manifestations of some Modern single non-spiritual force or substance . While, ~aea/Ism . however, ancient philosophy may be said to have been unilinear, modern philosophy had a twofold origin, and till the See also:

• TIME (0. Eng. Lima, cf. Icel. timi, Swed. timme, hour, Dan. time; from the root also seen in " tide," properly the time of between the flow and ebb of the sea, cf. O. Eng. getidan, to happen, " even-tide," &c.; it is not directly related to Lat. tempus)
• TIME, MEASUREMENT OF
• TIME, STANDARD

time of See also:

• KANT, IMMANUEL (1724-1804)

Kant may be said to have pursued two independent courses . All philosophy is the See also:

• SEARCH, or VISIT AND SEARCH

search for reality and rational certainty as opposed to See also:

• MERE
• MERE, ADALBERT (1838-1909)

mere formalism on the one hand, to authority and dogmatism on the other . In this sense modern philosophy had a common See also:

• ROOT (late O.E. rot, adopted from Scand., cf. Norw. and Swed. rot, Dan. rod; the true O.E. word was wyrt, plant, represented in Ger. Wurz or Wurzel; the ultimate root is the same in both words, and is seen in Lat. radix)
• ROOT, ELIHU (1845– )

root in revolt against medievalism, In See also:

• ENGLAND
• ENGLAND, THE CHURCH OF

England this revolt sought for the certainty and clearness that reason requires in the assurance of an See also:

• OUTER

outer world given to immediate sense experience; on the See also:

• CONTINENT (from Lat. continere, "to hold together "; hence " connected," " continuous ")

continent of See also:

• EUROPE

Europe, in the assurance of an inner world given immediately in thought . Though starting from apparently opposite poles and following widely different courses the two movements led more or less directly to the same results . It is easy to understand how See also:

• ENGLISH

English empiricism issued at once in the trenchant naturalism of See also:

• HOBBES, THOMAS (1588–1679)

Hobbes . It is less comprehensible how the Cartesian philosophy from the starting-point of thought allied itself with a similar point of view . This can be understood only by a study of the details of See also:

• DESCARTES, RENE (1596-1650)

Descartes' philosophy (see CARTESSANISM) .

Suffice it to say that in spite of its spiritualistic starting-point its general result was to give a stimulus to the prevailing scientific tendency as represented by Galileo, See also:

• KEPLER, JOHANN (1571-1630)

Kepler and See also:

• HARVEY
• HARVEY, GABRIEL (c. 1545-1630)
• HARVEY, SIR GEORGE (1806-1876)
• HARVEY, WILLIAM (1578—1657)

Harvey to the principle of See also:

• MECHANICAL

mechanical explanations of the phenomena of the universe . True it was precisely against this that Descartes' immediate successors struggled, But the time-spirit was too strong for them . Determinism had other forms besides that of a crude See also:

• MATERIALISM (from Lat. materia, matter)

materialism, and the direction that See also:

• MALEBRANCHE, NICOLAS (1638-1715)

Malebranche succeeded in giving to speculation led only to the more complete denial of freedom and individuality in the all-devouring pantheism of See also:

• SPINOZA, BARUCH (1632-1677)

Spinoza . The See also:

• FOUNDATIONS

foundations of idealism in the modern sense were laid by the thinkers who sought breathing See also:

• ROOM

room for mind and will in a deeper See also:

• ANALYSIS (Gr. avci and Meta, to break up into parts)

analysis of the relations of the subject to See also:

• BERKELEY
• BERKELEY, GEORGE (1685–1753)
• BERKELEY, MILES JOSEPH (1803-1889)
• BERKELEY, SIR WILLIAM (c. 1608-1677)

Berkeley. the world that it knows . From the outset English philosophy had a leaning to the psychological point of view, and See also:

• LOCKE, GOTTFRIED CHRISTIAN FRIEDRICH (1791–1855)
• LOCKE, JOHN (1632-1704)
• LOCKE, MATTHEW (c. 1630-1677)

Locke was only carrying on the tradition of his predecessors and particularly of Hobbes in definitely accepting it as the basis of his See also:

• ESSAY, ESSAYIST (Fr. essai, Late Lat. exagium, a weighing or balance; exigere, to examine; the term in general meaning any trial or effort)

Essay . It was, however, Berkeley who first sought to utilize the conclusions that were implicit in Locke's starting-point to disprove " the systems of impious and profane persons which exclude all freeedom, intelligence, and See also:

• DESIGN (Fr. desiin, drawing; Lat. designare, to mark out)

design from the formation of things, and instead thereof make a self-existent, stupid, unthinking substance the root and origin of all beings." Berkeley's statement of the view that all knowledge is relative to the subject—that no object, can be known except under the form which our See also:

• POWERS, HIRAM (1805-1873)

powers of sense-See also:

• PERCEPTION (from Lat. percipere, to perceive)

perception, our memory and imagination, our notions and inference, give it—is still the most striking and convincing that we possess . To have established this position was a See also:

• GREAT

great step in speculation . Henceforth ordinary dogmatic dualism was excluded from philosophy; any attempt to revive it, whether with Dr See also:

• JOHNSON, ANDREW
• JOHNSON, ANDREW (1808–1875)
• JOHNSON, BENJAMIN (c. 1665-1742)
• JOHNSON, EASTMAN (1824–1906)
• JOHNSON, REVERDY (1796–1876)
• JOHNSON, RICHARD (1573–1659 ?)
• JOHNSON, RICHARD MENTOR (1781–1850)
• JOHNSON, SAMUEL (1709-1784)
• JOHNSON, SIR THOMAS (1664-1729)
• JOHNSON, SIR WILLIAM (1715–1774)
• JOHNSON, THOMAS

Johnson by an See also:

• APPEAL

appeal to common See also:

• PREJUDICE (Lat. praejudicium)

prejudice, or in the more reflective Johnsonianism of the 18th-See also:

• CENTURY (from Lat. centuria, a division of a hundred men)

century Scottish philosophers, must be an See also:

• ANACHRONISM (from ava, back, and xpovor, time)

anachronism . Equally impossible was it thenceforth to assert the mediate or immediate certainty of material substance as the cause either of events in nature or of sensations in our-selves . But with these advances came the danger of falling into See also:

• ERROR (Lat. error, from errare, to wander, to err)

error from which common-sense dualism and naturalistic See also:

• MONISM (from Gr. µ6vos, alone)

monism were See also:

• FREE

free . From the point of view which Berkeley had inherited from Locke it seemed to follow that not only material substance, but the whole conception of a world of objects, is at most an inference from subjective modifications which are the only immediately certain objects of knowledge . The implications of such a view were first clearly apparent when See also:

• HUME, ALEXANDER (c. 1557-1609)
• HUME, DAVID (1711-1776)
• HUME, JOSEPH (1777-1855)

Hume showed that en the basis of it there seemed to be nothing that we could confidently affirm except the order of our own impressions and ideas .

This being so, not only were physics and See also:

• MATHEMATICS (Gr. /saBnµar1Kil, Sc. vOcvn or E7rlQTt'µn; from p iN.La, "learning" or "science ")

mathematics impossible as sciences of necessary vojective truth, but our apparent consciousness of a permanent self and object alike must be delusive . It was these paradoxes that Kant sought to rebut by a more thoroughgoing See also:

• CRITICISM
• CRITICISM (from the Gr. KpiTrlS, a judge, Kpivew, to decide, to give an authoritative opinion)

criticism of the basis of knowledge the sub-Kant. stance of which is summed up in his celebrated Refuta- tion of Idealism,' wherein he sought to undermine Hume's See also:

• SCEPTICISM (o-Kesrroµai, I consider, reflect, hesitate, doubt)

scepticism by carrying it one step further and demonstrating that not only is all knowledge of self or object excluded, but the consciousness of any See also:

• SERIES (a Latin word from serere, to join)

series of impressions and ideas is itself impossible except in relation to some external permanent and universally accepted world of objects . But Kant's refutation of subjective idealism and his vindication of the place of the object can be fully understood only See also:

• LEIBNITZ (LEIBNIZ), GOTTFRIED WILHELM

Leibnitz. when we take into account the other defect in the teaching of his predecessors that he sought in his Critique to correct . In See also:

• CONTINENTAL

continental philosophy the reaction against mechanical and pantheistic explanations of the universe found even more definite utterance than in English psychological empiricism in the metaphysical system of Leibnitz, whose theory of self-determined monads can be understood only when taken in the light of the assertion of the rights of the subject against the substance of Spinoza and the atoms of the materialist . But Leibnitz also anticipated Kant in seeking to correct the empirical point of view of the English philosophers . True, sense-given material is necessary in order that we may have thought . " But by what means," he asks, " can experience and the senses give ideas ? Has the soul windows ? Is it like a See also:

• WRITING
• WRITING (the verbal noun of " to write," O. Eng. writan, to inscribe)

writing tablet ? Is it like See also:

• WAX

wax ? It is See also:

• PLAIN (O. Fr. plain, from Lat. plenum)

plain that all those who think thus of the soul make it at bottom corporeal . True, nothing is in the See also:

• INTELLECT (Lat. intellectus, from intelligere, to understand)

intellect which has not been in the senses, but we must add except the intellect itself .

The soul contains the notions of being, substance, unity, identity, cause, perception, reasoning and many others which the senses cannot give " (Nouveaux essais, ii. r) . But Leibnitz's conception of the priority of spirit had too little See also:

• FOUNDATION (Lat. fundatio, from fundare, to found)

foundation, and the different elements he sought to combine were too loosely related to one another to stand the See also:

• STRAIN (through O. Fr. straindre, estraindre, mod. i treindre, from Lat. stringere, to draw tight, related to stress, stretch, string, &c.)

strain of the two forces of empiricism and material-ism that were opposed to his idealism . More particularly by the confusion in which he left the relation between the two logical principles of identity and of sufficient reason underlying respectively See also:

• ANALYTIC (the adjective of " analysis," q.v.)

analytic and synthetic, deductive and inductive thought, he may be said to have undermined in another way the idealism he strove to establish . It was in seeking to See also:

• CLOSE
• CLOSE (from Lat. clausum, shut)
• CLOSE, MAXWELL HENRY (1822-1903)

close up the fissure in his system represented by this dualism that his successors succeeded only in adding weakness to weakness by reducing the principle of sufficient reason to that of formal identity (see See also:

• WOLFF (less correctly WOLF), CHRISTIAN (1679-1754)
• WOLFF, CASPAR FRIEDRICH (1733-1794)
• WOLFF, JOSEPH (1795–1862)

WOLFF) and representing all thought as in essence analytic . From this it immediately followed that, so far as the connexion of our experiences of the external world does not show itself irreducible to that of formal identity, it must remain unintelligible . As empiricism had foundered on the difficulty of showing how our thoughts could be an object of sense experience, so Leibnitzian formalism foundered on that of understanding how the material of sense could be an object of thought . On one view as on the other scientific demonstration was impossible . The extremity to which philosophy had been brought by empiricism on the one hand and formalism on the other was Kant . Kant's opportunity . Leibnitz's principle of the " nisi intellectus ipse " was See also:

• EXPANDED

expanded by him into a demonstration the completest yet effected by philosophy of the part played by the subject not merely in the manipulation of the material of experience but in the actual constitution of the object that is known . On the other hand he insisted on the synthetic See also:

• CHARACTER (Gr. xapareri7p, from xap&crew, to scratch)

character of this activity without which it was impossible to get beyond the circle of our own thoughts . The parts of the Critique of Pure Reason, more particularly the " See also:

• DEDUCTION (from Lat. deducere, to take or lead from or out of, derive)

Deduction of the Categories " in which this theory is worked out, may be said to have laid the foundation of modern idealism—" articulum stantis See also:

• AUT

aut cadentis doctrinae." In spite of the defects of Kant's statement—to which it is necessary to return—the place of the concepts and ideals of the mind and the synthetic organizing ' Kritik d. reinen Vernunft, p .

197 (ed . Hartenstein).activity which these involve was established with a trenchancy which has been acknowledged by all See also:

• SCHOOLS

schools alike . The " Copernican revolution " which he claimed to have effected may be said to have become the starting-point of all modern philosophy . Yet the divergent uses that have been made of it See also:

• WITNESS
• WITNESS (from O. Eng. witan, to know)

witness to the See also:

• AMBIGUITY (Fr. ambiguite, med. Lat. ambiguitas, from Lat. ambiguus, doubtful; ambi, both ways, agere, to drive)

ambiguity of his statement which is traceable to the fact that Kant was himself too deeply rooted in the thought of his predecessors and carried with him too much, of their spirit to be able entirely to free himself from their assumptions and abstractions . His philosophy was more like Michaelangelo's famous See also:

• SCULPTURE
• SCULPTURE (Lat. sculptura, from sculpere, to carve, cognate with Gr. yXb4ew)

sculpture of the See also:

• DAWN (the 16th-century form of the earlier " Jawing " or " dawning," from an old verb " daw," O. Eng. dagian, to become day; cf. Dutch dagen, and Ger. tagen)

Dawn, a spirit yet encumbered with the stubble of the material from which it was hewn, than a clear cut figure with unmistakable outlines . See also:

• CHIEF (from Fr. chef, head, Lat. caput)

Chief among these encumbering presuppositions was that of a fundamental distinction between perception and conception and consequent upon it between the synthetic and the analytic use of thought . It is upon this in the last resort that the distinction between the phenomenal world of our experience and a noumenal world beyond it is founded . Kant perceives that "perception without conception is See also:

• BLIND, MATHILDE (1841—1896)

blind, conception without, perception is empty," but if he goes so far ought he not to have gone still further and inquired whether there can be any perception at all without a concept, any concept which does not presuppose a See also:

• PRECEPT (Lat. praeceptum, a rule, from praecipere, literally to take beforehand, to give rules, instructions or orders)

precept, and, if this is impossible, whether the distinction between a world of appearance which is known and a world of things-in-themselves which is not, is not illusory ? It was by asking precisely these questions that See also:

• HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1770-1831)

Hegel gave the See also:

• FINISHING

finishing strokes to the Kantian philosophy . The starting-point of all valid philosophy must be the perception Kegei. that the essence of all conscious See also:

• APPREHENSION (Lat. ad, to; prehendere, to seize)

apprehension is the See also:

• UNION
• UNION (known locally as Union Hill and officially as Town of Union)

union of opposites—of which that of subject and object is the most fundamental and all-pervasive . True, before See also:

• DIFFERENCES, CALCULUS OF (Theory of Finite Differences)

differences can be united they must have been separated, but this merely proves that differentiation or analysis is only one See also:

• FACTOR (from Lat. facere, to make or do)

factor in a single process . Equally fundamental is the element of See also:

• SYNTHESIS (Gr. a6vOeacs, from avvrcBivac, to put together)

synthesis .

Nor is it possible at any point in knowledge to prove the existence of a merely given in whose construction the thinking subject has played no part nor a merely thinking subject in whose structure the object is not an organic factor . In coming, as at a certain point in its development it does, to the consciousness of an object, the mind does not find itself in the presence of an opponent, or of anything essentially See also:

• ALIEN (Lat. alienus)

alien to itself but of that which gives content and stability to its own existence . True, the stability it seems to find in it is incomplete . The object cannot See also:

• REST (O. Eng. rest, reste, bed, cognate with other Teutonic forms, e.g. Ger. Rast, Riiste, rest, and probably Gothic Rasta, league, i.e. resting or stopping place)

rest in the form of its immediate appearance without involving us in See also:

• CONTRADICTION, PRINCIPLE OF (principium contradictionis)

contradiction . The sun does not " rise," the See also:

• DEW

dew does not " fall." But this only means that the unity between subject and object to which the See also:

• GIFT (a common Teutonic word, cf. Ger. die Gift, gift, das Gift, poison, formed from the Teut. stem gab-, to give, cf. Dutch geven, Ger. geben; in O. Eng. the word appears with initial y, the guttural of later English is due to Scandinavian influence)

gift of consciousness commits us is incompletely realized in that appearance: the apparent truth has to submit to correction and supplementation before it can be accepted as real truth . It does not mean that there is anywhere a mere fact which is not also an See also:

• INTERPRETATION (from Lat. interpretari, to expound, explain, inter pres, an agent, go-between, interpreter; inter, between, and the root pret-, possibly connected with that seen either in Greek 4 p4'ew, to speak, or irpa-rrecv, to do)

interpretation nor an interpreting mind whose ideas have no hold upon fact . From this it follows that ultimate or absolute reality is to be sought not beyond the region of experience, but in the fullest and most harmonious statement of the facts of our experience . True a completely harmonious world whether of theory or of practice remains an ideal . But the fact that we have already in part realized the ideal and that the degree in which we have realized it is the degree in which we may regard our experience as See also:

• TRUST

trust-worthy, is See also:

• PROOF (in M. Eng. preove, proeve, preve, &°c., from O. Fr . prueve, proeve, &c., mod. preuve, Late. Lat. proba, probate, to prove, to test the goodness of anything, probus, good)

proof that the ideal is no mere idea as Kant tauglh, but the very substance of reality . Intelligible as this development of Kantian idealism seems in the light of subsequent philosophy, the first statement of it in Hegel was not free from obscurity . The unity of opposites translated into its most abstract terms as the " identity of being and not-being," the principle that the " real is the rational," the apparent substitution of " bloodless " categories for the substance of See also:

• CONCRETE
• CONCRETE (Lat. concretes, participle of concrescere, to grow together)

concrete reality gave it an air of See also:

• PARADOX (Gr. treat, beyond, contrary to, Sofia, opinion)

paradox in the eyes of metaphysicians while physicists were scandalized by the premature attempts at a complete philosophy of nature and Stumbling blocks in Hegelian statements . history .

For this Hegel was doubtless partly to blame . But distinguished as (a) that of exploration and tentative exposition in philosophical critics of his own and a later See also:

• DAY (O. Eng. dreg, Ger. Tag; according to the New English Dictionary, " in no way related to the Lat. dies")
• DAY, JOHN (1574-1640?)
• DAY, THOMAS (1748-1789)

day are not hereby absolved from a certain perversity in interpreting these doctrines in a sense precisely opposite to that in which they were intended . The doctrine of the unity of contraries so far from being the denial of the See also:

• LAW
• LAW (0. Eng. lagu, M. Eng. lawe; from an old Teutonic root lag, " lie," what lies fixed or evenly; cf. Lat. lex, Fr. loi)
• LAW, JOHN (1671—1729)
• LAW, WILLIAM (1686-1761)

law of non-contradiction is founded on an absolute reliance upon it . Freed from paradox it means that in every object of thought there are different aspects or elements each of which if brought separately into consciousness may be so emphasized as to appear to contradict another . Unity may be made to contradict diversity, permanence See also:

• CHANGE (derived through the Fr. from the Late Lat. cambium, cambiare, to barter; the ultimate derivation is probably from the root which appears in the Gr. «a urmu', to bend)

change, the particular the universal, individuality relatedness . Ordinary consciousness ignores these " latent fires "; ordinary discussion brings them to light and divides men into factions and parties over them; philosophy not because it denies but because it acknowledges the law of non-contradiction as supreme is pledged to seek a point of view from which they may be seen to be in essential harmony with one another as different sides of the same truth . The " rationality of the real " has in like manner been interpreted as intended to sanctify the existing order . Hegel undoubtedly meant to affirm that the actual was rational in the See also:

• FACE (from Lat. fades, derived either from facere, to make, or from a root fa-, meaning " appear "; cf. Gr. cbatvstv)

face of the philosophy which set up subjective feeling and reason against it . But idealism has insisted from the time of Plato on the distinction between what is actual in time and space and the reality that can only partially be revealed in it . Hegel carried this principle further than had yet been done . His phrase does not therefore sanctify the established fact but, on the contrary, declares that it partakes of reality only so far as it embodies the ideal of a coherent and See also:

• STABLE

stable system which it is not . As little is idealism responsible for any attempt to pass off logical abstractions for concrete reality .

The " Logic " of Hegel is merely the continuation of Kant's " Deduction " of the categories and ideas of the reason which has generally been recognized as the soberest of attempts to set forth the presuppositions which underlie all experience . " What Hegel attempts to show is just that the categories by which thought must determine its object are stages in a process that, beginning with the idea of ` Being,' the simplest of all determinations is driven on by its own See also:

• DIALECTIC, or DIALECTICS

dialectic till it reaches the ideaof self-consciousness . In other words the intelligence when it once begins to define an object for itself, finds itself launched on a movement of self-asserting synthesis in which it cannot stop until it had recognized that the unity of the object with itself involves its unity with all other objects and with the mind that knows it . Hence, whatever we begin by saying, we must ultimately say ` mind ' " (See also:

• CAIRD, EDWARD (1835-1908)
• CAIRD, JOHN (182o–1898)

Caird, Kant, i . 443) . While the form in which these doctrines were stated proved fatal to them in the See also:

• COUNTRY (from the Mid. Eng. contre or contrie, and O. Fr. cuntree; Late Lat. contrata, showing the derivation from contra, opposite, over against, thus the tract of land which fronts the sight, cf. Ger. Gegend, neighbourhood)

country of their See also:

• BIRTH (a word common in various forms to Teutonic languages from the root of the verb " to bear ")

birth, they took deep root in the next See also:

• GENERATION (from Lat. generare, to beget, procreate; genus, stock, race)

generation in English philosophy . Here the See also:

• STONE
• STONE (0. Eng. shin; the word is common to Teutonic languages, cf. Ger. Stein, Du. steen, Dan. and Swed. sten; the root is also seen in Gr. aria, pebble)
• STONE, CHARLES POMEROY (1824-1887)
• STONE, EDWARD JAMES (1831-1897)
• STONE, FRANK (1800-1859)
• STONE, GEORGE (1708—1764)
• STONE, LUCY [BLACKWELL] (1818-1893)
• STONE, MARCUS (184o— )
• STONE, NICHOLAS (1586-1647)

stone that the builders rejected was made the See also:

• HEAD (in 0. Eng. heafad; the word is common to Teutonic languages; cf. Dutch hoofd, Ger. Haupt, generally taken to be in origin connected with Lat. caput, Gr. KerbOvi7)
• HEAD, SIR EDMUND WALKER, BART
• HEAD, SIR FRANCIS BOND, BART

head of the corner . The influences which led to this result were manifold . From the side of literature the way was prepared for it by the See also:

• GENIUS (from Lat. genere, gignere)

genius of See also:

• COLERIDGE, HARTLEY (1796-1849)
• COLERIDGE, JOHN DUKE COLERIDGE, 1ST BARON
• COLERIDGE, SAMUEL TAYLOR (1772-1834)
• COLERIDGE, SARA (1802–1852)
• COLERIDGE, SIR JOHN TAYLOR (1790-1876)

Coleridge, See also:

• WORDSWORTH, CHARLES (1806–1892)
• WORDSWORTH, CHRISTOPHER (1774–1846)
• WORDSWORTH, CHRISTOPHER (1807–1885)
• WORDSWORTH, DOROTHY (1771-1855)
• WORDSWORTH, WILLIAM (1770-185o)

Wordsworth and See also:

• CARLYLE, ALEXANDER (1722-1805)
• CARLYLE, JOSEPH DACRE (1759-18o4)
• CARLYLE, THOMAS (1795-1881)

Carlyle; from the side of morals and politics by the profound discontent of the constructive spirit of the century with the disintegrating conceptions inherited from See also:

• UTILITARIANISM (Lat. utilis, useful)

utilitarianism . In taking root in England idealism had to contend against the traditional empiricism represented by See also:

• MILL
• MILL (O. Eng. mylen, later myln, or miln, adapted from the late Lat. molina, cf. Fr. moulin, from Lat. mola, a mill, molere, to grind; from the same root, mol, is derived " meal;" the word appears in other Teutonic languages, cf. Du. molen, Ger. muhle)
• MILL, JAMES (1773-1836)
• MILL, JOHN (c. 1645–1707)
• MILL, JOHN STUART (1806-1873)

Mill on the one hand and the pseudo-Kantianism which was rendered current by See also:

• MANSEL, HENRY LONGUEVILLE (1820-1871)

Mansel and See also:

• HAMILTON
• HAMILTON (GRAND or ASHUANIPI)
• HAMILTON, ALEXANDER (1757-1804)
• HAMILTON, ANTHONY, or ANTOINE (1646-1720)
• HAMILTON, ELIZABETH (1758–1816)
• HAMILTON, EMMA, LADY (c. 1765-1815)
• HAMILTON, JAMES (1769-1831)
• HAMILTON, JAMES HAMILTON, 1ST DUKE OF (1606-1649)
• HAMILTON, JOHN (c. 1511–1571)
• HAMILTON, MARQUESSES AND DUKES OF
• HAMILTON, PATRICK (1504-1528)
• HAMILTON, ROBERT (1743-1829)
• HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM
• HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM (1730-1803)
• HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM ROWAN (1805-1865)
• HAMILTON, THOMAS (1789-1842)
• HAMILTON, WILLIAM (1704-1754)
• HAMILTON, WILLIAM GERARD (1729-1796)

Hamilton on the other . As contrasted with the first it stood for the See also:

• NECESSITY (Lat. necessitas)

necessity of recognizing a universal or ideal element as a constitutive factor in all experience whether cognitive or volitional; as contrasted with the latter for the ultimate unity of subject and object, knowledge and reality, and therefore for the denial of the existence of any thing-in-itself for ever outside the range of experience . Its polemic against the philosophy of experience has exposed it to general misunderstanding, as though it claimed some a priori path to truth .

In reality it stands for a more thoroughgoing and consistent application of the test of experience . The defect of English empiricism from the outset had been the uncritical See also:

• ACCEPTANCE (Lat. acceptare, frequentative form of accipere, to receive)

acceptance of the metaphysical See also:

• DOGMA (Gr. Sbypa, from b6aeiv, to seem; literally " that which seems, sc. good or true or useful " to any one)

dogma of a pure unadulterated sense-experience as the criterion of truth . This See also:

• ASSUMPTION, FEAST OF

assumption idealism examines and rejects in the name of experience itself . Similarly it only carried the doctrine of relativity to its logical conclusion in denying that there could be any absolute relativity . Object stands in essential relation to subject, subject to object . This being so, it is wholly illogical to seek for any test of the truth and reality of either except in the form which that relation itself takes . In its subsequent development idealism in England hee passed through several clear'- marked stages which may be the writings of J . F . See also:

• FERRIER, ARNAUD DU (c. 1508-1585)
• FERRIER, JAMES FREDERICK (1808-1864)
• FERRIER, PAUL (1843– )
• FERRIER, SUSAN EDMONSTONE (1782–1854)

Ferrier,' J . Hutchison See also:

• STIRLING
• STIRLING, JAMES (1692-1770)
• STIRLING, JAMES HUTCHISON (182o-1909)
• STIRLING, MARY ANNE [FANNY] (1815-1895)
• STIRLING, WILLIAM ALEXANDER, (titular) EARL OF (1726—1783)
• STIRLING, WILLIAM ALEXANDER, EARL OF (c. 1567-1640)

Stirling ? See also:

• BENJAMIN
• BENJAMIN, JUDAHPHILIP (1811-1884)

Benjamin See also:

• JEWETT, SARAH ORNE (1849–1909)

Jewett,' W . T .

See also:

• HARRIS, GEORGE, 1ST BARON (1746–1829)
• HARRIS, JAMES (1709-1780)
• HARRIS, JOEL CHANDLER (1848-1908)
• HARRIS, JOHN (c. 1666-1719)
• HARRIS, SIR WILLIAM SNOW
• HARRIS, THOMAS LAKE (1823-1906)
• HARRIS, WILLIAM TORREY (1835-1909)

Harris; 4 (b) of confident application to the central problems of logic, ethics and politics, See also:

• FINE

fine See also:

• ART

art and See also:

• RELIGION
• RELIGION, FOLKLORE, CUSTOM

religion, and as a principle of constructive criticism and interpretation chiefly in T . H . See also:

• GREEN, A
• GREEN, ALEXANDER HENRY (1832—1896)
• GREEN, DUFF (1791—1875)
• GREEN, JOHN RICHARD (1837—1883)
• GREEN, MATTHEW (1696-1737)
• GREEN, THOMAS HILL (1836-1882)
• GREEN, VALENTINE (1739–1813)
• GREEN, WILLIAM HENRY (.1825–1900)

Green,' E . Caird,° B . Bosanquet;' (c) of vigorous effort to develop on fresh lines its underlying metaphysics in F . H . See also:

• BRADLEY, GEORGE GRANVILLE (1821–1903)
• BRADLEY, JAMES (1693–1762)

Bradley 8 J . M . E . McTaggart,' A . E . See also:

• TAYLOR
• TAYLOR, ANN (1782-1866)
• TAYLOR, BAYARD (1825–1878)
• TAYLOR, BROOK (1685–1731)
• TAYLOR, ISAAC (1787-1865)
• TAYLOR, ISAAC (1829-1901)
• TAYLOR, JEREMY (1613-1667)
• TAYLOR, JOHN (158o-1653)
• TAYLOR, JOHN (1704-1766)
• TAYLOR, JOSEPH (c. 1586-c. 1653)
• TAYLOR, MICHAEL ANGELO (1757–1834)
• TAYLOR, NATHANIEL WILLIAM (1786-1858)
• TAYLOR, PHILIP MEADOWS (1808–1876)
• TAYLOR, ROWLAND (d. 1555)
• TAYLOR, SIR HENRY (1800-1886)
• TAYLOR, THOMAS (1758-1835)
• TAYLOR, TOM (1817-1880)
• TAYLOR, WILLIAM (1765-1836)
• TAYLOR, ZACHARY (1784-1850)

Taylor,10 See also:

• JOSIAH (Heb. yo' shiyydhu, perhaps " Yah [weh] supports ")

Josiah Royce" and others .

Under the See also:

• INFLUENCE (Late Lat. influentia, from influere, to flow in)

influence of these writers idealism, as above expounded though with difference of interpretation in individual writers, may be said towards the end of the 19th century to have been on its way to becoming the leading philosophy in the See also:

• BRITISH

British Isles and See also:

• AMERICA

America . 3 . Reaction against Traditional Idealism.—But it was not to be expected that the position idealism had thus won for itself would remain See also:

• LONG, GEORGE (1800-1879)
• LONG, JOHN DAVIS (1838– )

long unchallenged . It had its roots in New a literature and in forms of thought remote from the Dualism common track; it had been formulated before the and Praggreat advances in See also:

• PSYCHOLOGY
• PSYCHOLOGY (>Guxrl, the mind or soul, and X yos, theory)

psychology which marked the course mattsm. of the century; its latest word seemed to involve consequences that brought it into conflict with the vital See also:

• INTEREST

interest the human mind has in freedom and the possibility of real See also:

• INITIATION (Lat. inilium, beginning, entrance, from mire, to go in)

initiation . It is not, therefore, surprising that there should have been a vigorous reaction . This has taken mainly two opposite forms . On the one hand the attack has come from the old ground of the danger that is threatened to the reality of the external world and may be said to be in the interest of the object . On the other hand the theory has been attacked in the interest of the subject on the ground that in the statuesque world of ideas into which it introduces us it leaves no room for the element of movement and process which See also:

• RECENT

recent psychology and metaphysic alike have taught us underlies all life . The conflict of idealism with these two lines of criticism—the See also:

• ACCUSATION (Lat. accusatio, accusare, to challenge to a causa, a suit or trial at law)

accusation of See also:

• SUBJECTIVISM

subjectivism on the one side of intellectualism and rigid See also:

• OBJECTIVISM

objectivism on the other—may be said to have constituted the history of Anglo-Saxon philosophy during the first See also:

• DECADE (from Gr. Oka, ten)

decade of the loth century . I . Whatever is to be said of ancient Idealism, the modern doctrine may be said notably in Kant to have been in the See also:

• MAIN (from the Aryan root which appears in " may " and " might," and Lat. magnus, great)
• MAIN (Lat. Moenus)

main a vindication of the subjective factor in knowledge . But that space and time, matter and cause should owe their origin to the action of the mind has always seemed paradoxical to common sense .

Nor is the impression which its enunciation in Kant made, likely to have been lightened in this country by the connexion that was sure to be traced between Berkeleyanism and the new teaching or by the form which the doctrine received at the hands of T . H . Green, its leading English representative between 187o and 1880 . If what is real in things is ultimately nothing but their relations, and if relations are inconceivable apart from the See also:

• RELATING

relating mind, what is this but the See also:

• DISSOLUTION (from Lat. dissolvere, to break up into parts)

dissolution of the solid ground of external reality which my consciousness seems to assure me underlies and eludes all the conceptual network by which I try to bring one part of my experience into connexion with another ? It is quite true that modern idealists like Berkeley himself have sought to See also:

• SAVE, or SAVA (Ger. Sau; Hungarian Szdva; Lat. Savus)

save themselves from the gulf of subjectivism by calling in the aid of a universal or See also:

• INFINITE (from Lat. in, not, finis, end or limit; cf. findere, to deave)

infinite mind or by an appeal to a See also:

• TOTAL

total or absolute experience to which our own is relative . But the former See also:

• DEVICE

device is too obviously a See also:

• DEUS
• DEUS, JOAO DE (1830-1896)

deus ex machina, the purpose of which would be equally well served by supposing with See also:

• FICHTE, IMMANUEL HERMANN (originally HARTMANN) VON (1797-1879)
• FICHTE, JOHANN GOTTLIEB (1762-1814)

Fichte the individual self to be endowed with the See also:

• POWER [WILLIAM GRATTAN] TYRONE (1797-1841)

power of subconsciously extraditing a world which returns to it in consciousness under the form of a See also:

• FOREIGN

foreign creation . The appeal to an Absolute on the other hand is only to substitute one difficulty for another . For granting that it places the centre of reality outside the individual self it does so only at the See also:

• PRICE
• PRICE, BARTHOLOMEW (1818–1898)
• PRICE, BONAMY (1807-1888)
• PRICE, RICHARD (1723-1791)

price of reducing the reality of the latter to an appearance; ' Institutes of Metaphysics (1854) ; See also:

• WORKS

Works (1866) . s See also:

• SECRET (Lat. secretum, hidden, concealed)

Secret of Hegel (1865) . Dialogues of Plato (1871) . See also:

• JOURNAL
• JOURNAL (through Fr. from late Lat. diurnalis, daily)

Journal of Spec . Phil .

(1867) . i Hume's Phil . Works (1875) . ° See also:

• CRITICAL (in alphabetical order of authors)

Critical account of the Phil. of Kant (1899) . Knowledge and Reality (1885) ; Logic (1888) . s Appearance and Reality (1893) . Studies in Hegelian Cosmology (1901) . 10 Elements of Metaphysics (1903) . n The World and the Individual (1901) . and if only one thing is real what becomes of the many different things which again my consciousness assures me are the one world with which I can have any practical concern ? To meet these difficulties and give back to us the assurance of the substantiality of the world without us it has therefore been thought necessary to maintain two propositions which are taken to be the refutation of idealism . (1) There is given to us immediately in knowledge a world entirely independent of and different from our own impressions on the one hand and the conceptions by which we seek to establish relations between them upon the other .

The relation of these impressions (and for the matter of that of their inter-relations among themselves) to our minds is only one out of many . As a leading writer puts it: " There is such a thing as greenness having various relations, among others that of being perceived."' (2) Things may be, and may be known to be simply different . They may exclude one another, exist so to speak in a condition of armed See also:

• NEUTRALITY

neutrality to one another, without being positively thereby related to one another or altered by any change taking place in any of them . As the same writer puts it: " There is such a thing as numerical difference, different from conceptual difference,"2 or expressing the same thing in other words " there are relations not grounded in the nature of the related terms." In this See also:

• DOUBLE
• DOUBLE (from the Mid. Eng. duble, the form which gives the present pronunciation, through the Old Er. duble, from Lat. duplus, twice as much)

double-barrelled criticism it is important to distinguish what is really relevant . Whatever the shortcomings of individual writers may be, modern idealism differs, as we have seen, from the arrested idealism of Berkeley precisely in the point on which dualism insists . In all knowledge we are in See also:

• TOUCH (derived through Fr. toucher from a common Teutonic and Indo-Germanic root, cf. " tug," " tuck," O. H. Ger. zucchen, to twitch or draw)

touch not merely with the self and its passing states, but with a real object which is different from them . On this head there is no difference, and idealism need have no difficulty in accepting all that its opponents here contend . The difference between the two theories does not consist in any difference of emphasis on the See also:

• OBJECTIVE, or OBJECT GLASS

objective side of knowledge, but in the See also:

• STANDARD
• STANDARD, BATTLE OF THE

standard by which the nature of the object is to be tested—the difference is logical not metaphysical—it concerns the definition of truth or falsity in the knowledge of the reality which both admit . To idealism there can be no ultimate test, but the possibility of giving any fact which claims to be true its place in a coherent system of mutually related truths . To this dualism opposes the doctrine that truth and falsehood are a matter of mere immediate See also:

• INTUITION (from Lat. intueri, to look at)

intuition: " There is no problem at all in truth and falsehood, some propositions are true and some false just as some See also:

• ROSES, WARS OF THE

roses are red and some See also:

• WHITE
• WHITE, ANDREW DICKSON (1832– )
• WHITE, GILBERT (1720–1793)
• WHITE, HENRY KIRKE (1785-1806)
• WHITE, HUGH LAWSON (1773-1840)
• WHITE, JOSEPH BLANCO (1775-1841)
• WHITE, RICHARD GRANT (1822-1885)
• WHITE, ROBERT (1645-1704)
• WHITE, SIR GEORGE STUART (1835– )
• WHITE, SIR THOMAS (1492-1567)
• WHITE, SIR WILLIAM ARTHUR (1824--1891)
• WHITE, SIR WILLIAM HENRY (1845– )
• WHITE, THOMAS (1628-1698)
• WHITE, THOMAS (c. 1550-1624)

white."a The issue between the two theories under this head may here be left with the remark that it is a curious comment on the logic of dualism that setting out to vindicate the reality of an objective standard of truth it should end in the most subjective of all the way a thing appears to the individual . The criticism that applies to the first of the above contentions applies mutatis mutandis to the second . As idealism differs from Berkeleyanism in asserting the reality of an " external " world so it differs from Spinozism in asserting the reality of difference within it .

Determination is not merely negation . On this head there need be no See also:

• QUARREL

quarrel between it and dualism . Ours is a many-sided, a many-coloured world . The point of conflict again lies in the nature and ground of the assigned differences . Dualism meets the assertion of absolute unity by the See also:

• COUNTER

counter assertion of mere difference . But if it is an error to treat the unity of the world as its only real aspect, it is equally an error to treat its differences as something ultimately irreducible . No philosophy founded on this assumption is likely to maintain itself against the twofold See also:

• EVIDENCE (Lat. evidentia, evideri, to appear clearly)

evidence of modern psychology and modern logic . According to the first the world, whether looked at from the side of our perception or from the side of the object perceived, can be made intelligible only when we accept it for what it is as a real continuity . Differences, of course, there are; and, if we like to say so, every difference is unique, but this does not mean- that they are given in absolute independence of everything else, " fired at us out of 1 See Mind, New Series, xii. p . 433 sqq• 2 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1900-1901), p . 110. s Mind, New Series, xiii. p . 523; cf .

204, 35e- a See also:

• CANNON (a word common to Romance languages, from the Lat. canna, a reed, tube, with the addition of the augmentative termination -on, -one)

cannon." They See also:

• BEAR
• BEAR, BLACK
• BEAR, BROWN
• BEAR, GRIZZLY
• BEAR, ISABELLINE
• BEAR, WHITE

bear a definite relation to the structure of our See also:

• PHYSICAL

physical and psychical nature, and correspond to definite needs of the subject that manifests itself therein . Similarly from the side of logic . It is not the teaching of idealism alone but of the facts which logical analysis has brought See also:

• HOME
• HOME, DANIEL DUNGLAS (1833-1886)
• HOME, EARLS OF

home to us that all difference in the last resort finds its ground in the quality or content of the things differentiated, and that this difference of content shows in turn a double strand, the strand of sameness and the strand of otherness—that in which and that by which they differ from one another . Idealism has, of course, no quarrel with numerical difference . All difference has its numerical aspect: two different things are always two both in knowledge and in reality . What it cannot accept is the doctrine that there are two things which are two in themselves apart from that which makes them two—which are not two of something . So far from establishing the truth for which dualism is itself concerned—the reality of all differences—such a theory can end only in a scepticism as to the reality of any difference . It is difficult to see what real difference there can be between things which are differences of nothing . II . More widespread and of more serious import is the attack from the other side to which since the publication of A . See also:

• SETH
• SETH (Egyptian Set, Sth~~~{{{or Sts)
• SETH (I* according to Dillmann, " setting " or " slip "; Septuagint, Philo and New Testament, fie, but r Chron. i. 1 Ells in A ; Josephus, EfjOor, Vulg. Seth)

Seth's Hegelianism and See also:

• PERSONALITY (from Lat. persona, originally an actor's mask, from personare,1 to sound through)

Personality (1887) and W . See also:

• JAMES
• JAMES (Gr. 'IlrKw,l3or, the Heb. Ya`akob or Jacob)
• JAMES (JAMES FRANCIS EDWARD STUART) (1688-1766)
• JAMES, 2ND EARL OF DOUGLAS AND MAR(c. 1358–1388)
• JAMES, DAVID (1839-1893)
• JAMES, EPISTLE OF
• JAMES, GEORGE PAYNE RAINSFOP
• JAMES, HENRY (1843— )
• JAMES, JOHN ANGELL (1785-1859)
• JAMES, THOMAS (c. 1573–1629)
• JAMES, WILLIAM (1842–1910)
• JAMES, WILLIAM (d. 1827)

James's Will to Believe (1903) idealism has been subjected .

Here also it is important to distinguish what is relevant from what is irrelevant in the See also:

• LINE

line of criticism represented by these writers . There need be no contradiction between idealism and a reasonable See also:

• PRAGMATISM

pragmatism . In so far as the older doctrine is open to the See also:

• CHARGE
• CHARGE (through the Fr. from the Late Lat. carricare, to load in a carrus or wagon; cf. " cargo ")

charge of neglecting the conative and teleological side of experience it can afford to be grateful to its critics for recalling it to its own See also:

• EPONYMOUS

eponymous principle of the priority of the ",ideal " to the "idea," of needs to the conception of their object . The real issue comes into view in the attempt, under-taken in the interest of freedom, to substitute for the notion of the world as a cosmos pervaded by no discernible principle and in its essence indifferent to the form impressed upon it by its active parts . To the older idealism as to the new the essence of mind or spirit is freedom . But the See also:

• GUARANTEE (sometimes spelt " guarantie " or " guaranty "; an O. Fr. form of " warrant," from the Teutonic word which appears in German as wahren, to defend or make safe and binding)

guarantee of freedom is to be sought for not in the denial of law, but in the whole nature of mind and its relation to the structure of experience . Without mind no orderly world: only through the action of the subject and its " ideas " are the eon-fused and incoherent data of sense-perception (themselves shot through with both strands) built up into that system of things we See also:

• CALL (from Anglo-Saxon ceallian, a common Teutonic word, cf. Dutch kallen, to talk or chatter)

call Nature, and which stands out against the subject as the See also:

• BODY

body stands out against the soul whose functioning may be said to have created it . On the other hand, without the world no mind: only through the action of the environment upon the subject is the idealizing activity in which it finds its being called into existence . Herein lies the paradox which is also the deepest truth of our spiritual life . In interpreting its environment first as a world of things that seem to stand in a relation of exclusion to one another and to itselt, then as a natural system governed by rigid mechanical necessity, the mind can yet feel that in its very opposition the world is akin to it, See also:

• BONE (a word common in various forms to Teutonic languages, in many of which it is confined to the shank of the leg, as in the German Bein)
• BONE, HENRY (1755-1834)

bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh . What is true of mind is true of will . Idealism starts from the relativity of the world to purposive consciousness .

But this again may be so stated as to represent only one side of the truth . It is equally true that the will is relative to the world of objects and interests to which it is attached through instincts and feelings, habits and sentiments . Li See also:

• ISOLATION

isolation from its object the will is as much an abstraction as thought apart from the world of percepts, memories and associations which give it content and stability . And just as mind does not lose but gain in individuality in proportion as it parts with any claim to the capricious determination of what its world shall be, and becomes dominated by the conception of an order which is immutable so the will becomes See also:

• TREE (0. Eng. treo, treow, cf. Dan. tree, Swed. Odd, tree, trd, timber; allied forms are found in Russ. drevo, Gr. opus, oak, and 36pv, spear, Welsh derw, Irish darog, oak, and Skr. dare, wood)
• TREE, SIR HERBERT BEERBOHM (1853- )

tree and " See also:

• PERSONAL

personal " in proportion as it identifies itself with objects and interests, and subordinates itself to See also:

• LAWS

laws and requirements which involve the suppression of all that is merely arbitrary and subjective . Here, too, subject and object grow together . The power and vitality of the one is the power and vitality of the other, and this is so because they are not two things with separate roots but are both rooted in a common reality which, while it includes, is more than either . Passing by these contentions as unmeaning or irrelevant and seeing nothing but irreconcilable contradiction between the conceptions of the word as immutable law and a self-determining subject pragmatism (q.v.) seeks other means of vindicating the reality of freedom . It agrees with older forms of See also:

• LIBERTARIANISM (from Lat. libertas, freedom)

libertarianism in taking its stand on the fact of spontaneity as See also:

• PRIMARY

primary and self-evidencing, but it is not content to assert its existence side by side with rigidly determined sequence . It carries the See also:

• WAR
• WAR (O. Eng. werre, Fr. guerre, of Teutonic origin; cf. O.H.G. werran, to confound)

war into the See also:

• CAMP (from Lat. campus, field)

camp of the enemy by seeking to demonstrate that the completely determined action which is set over against freedom as the basis of explanation in the material world is merely a See also:

• HYPOTHESIS (from Gr. inrorcOivat, to put under; cf. Lat. suppositio, from sub-ponere)

hypothesis which, while it serves sufficiently well the limited; purpose for which it is devised, is incapable of verification in the ultimate constituents of physical nature . There seems in fact nothing to prevent us from holding that while natural laws See also:

• EXPRESS (through the French from the past participle of the Lat. exprimere, to press out, by transference used of representing objects in painting or sculpture, or of thoughts, &c. in words)

express the See also:

• AVERAGE

average tendencies of multitudes they give no See also:

• CLUE

clue to the movement of individuals . Some have gone farther and argued that from the nature of the case no causal explanation of any real change in the world of things is possible . A cause is that which contains the effect (" causa aequat effectum "), but this is precisely what can never be proved with respect to anything that is claimed as a real cause in the concrete world .

Everywhere the effect reveals an element which is indiscoverable in the cause with the result that the identity we seek for ever eludes us . Even the resultant of mechanical forces refuses to resolve itself into its constituents . In the " resultant " there is a new direction, and with it a new quality the component forces of which no analysis can discover., It is not here possible to do more than indicate what appear to be the valid elements in these two conflicting interpretations of the requirements of a true idealism . On behalf of the older it may be confidently affirmed that no solution is likely to find general acceptance which involves the rejection of the conception of unity and intelligible order as the primary principle of our world . The assertion of this principle by Kant was, we have seen, the corner-stone of idealistic philosophy in general, under-lying as it does the conception of a permanent subject not less than that of a permanent object . As little from the side of knowledge is it likely that any theory will find acceptance which reduces all thought to a process of analysis and the discovery of abstract identity . There is no logical principle which requires that we should derive qualitative change by logical analysis from quantitative difference . Everywhere experience is synthetic: it gives us multiplicity in unity . Explanation of it does not require the annihilation of all differences but the apprehension of them in organic relation to one another and to the whole to which they belong . It was, as we have seen, this conception of thought as essentially synthetic for which Kant paved the way in his polemic against the formalism of his continental predecessors . The revival as in the above See also:

• ARGUMENT

argument of the idea that the function of thought is the elimination of difference, and that rational connexion must fail where absolute identity is indiscoverable merely shows how imperfectly Kant's See also:

• LESSON (through Fr. lecon from Lat. lectio, reading; legere, to read)

lesson has been learned by some of those who prophesy in his name . Finally, apart from these more See also:

• ACADEMIC

academic arguments there is an undoubted paradox in a theory which, at a moment when in whatever direction we look the best See also:

• INSPIRATION (Lat. inspirare, breathe upon or into)

inspiration in See also:

• POETRY

poetry, See also:

• SOCIOLOGY

sociology and physical See also:

• SCIENCE (Lat. scientia, from scire; to learn, know)

science comes from the idea of the unity of the world, gives in its See also:

• ADHESION (from Lat. adhaerere, to adhere)

adhesion to pluralism on the ground of its preponderating practical value .

On the other hand, idealism would be false to itself if it interpreted the unity which it thus seeks to establish in any sense that is incompatible with the validity of moral distinctions and human responsibility in the fullest sense of the term . It would on its side be, indeed, a paradox if at a time when the validity of human ideals and the responsibility of nations and individuals to realize them is more universally recognized than ever before on our See also:

• PLANET (Gr. ssXavirrns, a wanderer)

planet, the philosophical theory which hitherto has been chiefly identified with their vindication should be turned against them . Yet the See also:

• DEPTH

depth and extent of the dissatisfaction are sufficient evidence that the most recent developments are not free from ambiguity on this vital issue . What is thus suggested is not a rash departure from the general point of view of idealism (by its achievements in every See also:

• FIELD (a word common to many West German languages, cf. Ger. Feld, Dutch veld, possibly cognate with O.E. f olde, the earth, and ultimately with root of the Gr. irAaror, broad)
• FIELD, CYRUS WEST (1819-1892)
• FIELD, DAVID DUDLEY (18o5-1894)
• FIELD, EUGENE (1850-1895)
• FIELD, FREDERICK (18o1—1885)
• FIELD, HENRY MARTYN (1822-1907)
• FIELD, JOHN (1782—1837)
• FIELD, MARSHALL (183 1906)
• FIELD, NATHAN (1587—1633)
• FIELD, STEPHEN JOHNSON (1816-1899)
• FIELD, WILLIAM VENTRIS FIELD, BARON (1813-1907)

field to which it has been applied, " stat See also:

• MOLE
• MOLE, LOUIS MATHIEU, COMTE (1781—1855)
• MOLE, MATHIEU (1584—1656)

mole sua ") but a cautious inquiry into the possibility of reaching a conception of the world , The most striking statement of this argument is to be found in Boutroux's See also:

• TREATISE

treatise De la contingence See also:

• DES

des lois de la nature, first published in 1874 and reprinted without alteration in 1905 . The same general line of thought underlies James See also:

• WARD
• WARD, ADOLPHUS WILLIAM (1837- )
• WARD, ARTEMUS
• WARD, EDWARD MATTHEW (1816-1879)
• WARD, ELIZABETH STUART PHELPS (1844-1911)
• WARD, JAMES (1769--1859)
• WARD, JAMES (1843– )
• WARD, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS (1830-1910)
• WARD, LESTER FRANK (1841– )
• WARD, MARY AUGUSTA [MRS HUMPHRY WARD]
• WARD, WILLIAM (1766-1826)
• WARD, WILLIAM GEORGE (1812-1882)

Ward's Naturalism and See also:

• AGNOSTICISM

Agnosticism (2nd ed., 1903), and A . J . See also:

• BALFOUR, FRANCIS MAITLAND (1851-1882)
• BALFOUR, ROBERT (known also as BALFOREUS) (1550?-1625?)
• BALFOUR, SIR JAMES (of Pittendreich) (d. 1583 Or 1584)
• BALFOUR, SIR JAMES, BART

Balfour's Foundations of Belief (8th ed., 1901) . H . Bergson's works on the other hand contain the elements of a reconstruction similar in spirit to the suggestions of the present See also:

• ARTICLE (from Lat. articulus, a joint)

article.in which a place can be found at once for the idea of unity and determination and of movement and freedom . Any attempt here to anticipate what the course of an idealism inspired by such a spirit of caution and comprehension is likely to be cannot but appear dogmatic . Yet it may be permitted to make a suggestion . Taking for granted the unity of the world idealism is committed to interpret it as spiritual as a unity of See also:

• SPIRITS

spirits .

This is implied in the phrase by which it has sought to signalize its break with Spinozism: " from substance to subject." The universal or infinite is one that realizes itself in finite particular minds and See also:

• WILLS, WILLIAM GORMAN (1828-1891)

wills, not as accidents or imperfections of it, but as its essential form . These on their side, to be subject in the true sense must be conceived of as possessing a life which is truly their own„ the expression of their own nature as self-See also:

• DETERMINANT

determinant . In saying subject we say self, in saying self we say free creator . No conception of the infinite can therefore be true which does not leave room for movement, process, free creation . Oldness, sameness, permanence of principle and direction, these must be, otherwise there is nothing; but newness of embodiment, existence, realization also, otherwise nothing is . Now it is just to these implications in the idea of spirit that some of the prominent recent expositions of Idealism seem to have failed to do See also:

• JUSTICE (Lat. justitia)

justice . They have failed particularly when they have left the idea of " determination " unpurged of the suggestion of time See also:

• SUCCESSION (Lat. successio, from succedere, to follow after)

succession . The very word lends itself to this See also:

• MISTAKE (i.e. take amiss)

mistake . Idealists have gone beyond others in asserting that the subject in the sense of a being which merely repeats what has gone before is timeless . This involves that its activity cannot be truly conceived of as included in an antecedent, as an effect in a cause or one term of an See also:

• EQUATION (from Lat. aequatio, aequare, to equalize)

equation in the other . As the activity of a subject or spirit it is essentially a new birth . It is this failure that has led to the present revolt against a " See also:

• BLOCK
• BLOCK (from the Fr. bloc, and possibly connected with an Old Ger. Block, obstruction, cf. " baulk ")
• BLOCK, MAURICE (1816–19or)

block universe:" But the difficulty is not to be met by See also:

• RUNNING

running to the• opposite extreme in the assertion of a loose and ramshackle one .

This is merely another way of. perpetuating the mistake of allowing the notion of determination by an other or a preceding to continue to dominate us in a region where we have in reality passed from it to the notion of determination by self or by self-acknowledged ideals . As the correction from the one side consists in a more whole-hearted acceptance of the conception of determination by an ideal as the essence of mind, so from the other side it must consist in the recognition of the valuelessness of a freedom which does not mean submission to a self-chosen, though not self-created, law . The solution here suggested is probably more likely to meet with opposition from the side of Idealism than of Pragmatism . It involves, it will be said, the reality of time, the dependence of the Infinite in the finite, and therewith a departure from the whole line of Hegelian thought . (i) It does surely involve the reality of time in the sense that it involves the reality of existence, which it is agreed is process . Without process the eternal is not complete or, if eternity means completeness, is not truly eternal . Our mistake lies in abstraction of the one from the other, which, as always, ends in. confusion of the one with the other . Truth lies in giving each its place . Not only does eternity assert the conception of the See also:

• HOUR

hour but the hour asserts the conception of eternity—with what adequacy is another question . (2) The second of the above objections takes its point from the contradiction to religious consciousness which seems to be involved . This is certainly a mistake . Religious consciousness asserts, no doubt, that See also:

• GOD

God is necessary to the soul : from Him as its inspiration, to Him as its ideal are all things .

But it asserts with equal emphasis that the soul is necessary to God . To declare itself an unnecessary creation is surely on the part of the individual soul the height of impiety . God lives in the soul as it in Him . He also might say, from it as His offspring, to it as the object of His outgoing love are all things . (3) It is a mistake to attribute to Hegel the doctrine that time is an illusion . If in a well-known passage (Logic § 212) he seems to countenance the Spinoxistic view he immediately corrects it by assigning an " actualizing force " to this illusion and making it a " necessary dynamic element of truth." Consistently with this we have the conclusion stated in the succeeding See also:

• SECTION
• SECTION (Lat. sectio, cutting, secare, to cut)

section on the Will . " Good, the final end of the world, has being only while it constantly produces itself . And the world of the spirit and the world of nature continue to have this distinction, that the latter moves only in a recurring See also:

• CYCLE
• CYCLE (Gr. KUK)^os, a circle)

cycle while the former certainly also makes progress." The mistake is not Hegel's but ours . It, is to be remedied not by giving up the idea of the Infinite but by" ceasing to think of the Infinite as of a being endowed with a static perfection which the finite will merely reproduces, and definitely recognizing the forward effort of the finite as an essential element in Its self-expression . If there be any truth in this suggestion it seems likely that the last word of idealism, like the first, will prove to be that the type of the highest reality is to be sought for not in any fixed Parmenidean circle of achieved being but in an ideal of good which while never fully expressed under the form of time can never become actual and so fulfil itself under any other . See also:

• HALDANE, JAMES ALEXANDER (1768–1851)
• HALDANE, RICHARD BURDON (1856– )
• HALDANE, ROBERT (1764–1842)

Haldane, Essays in Phil . Criticism (1883); See also:

• JOHN
• JOHN (1167–1216)
• JOHN (1290-c. 1320)
• JOHN (1296-1346)
• JOHN (1371–1419)
• JOHN (1468-1532)
• JOHN (1801-1873)
• JOHN (Heb. llni')
• JOHN (ZAPOLYA) (1487-1540)
• JOHN, 4TH MARQUESS OF TWEEDDALE (c. 1695-1762)
• JOHN, DON (1545-1578)
• JOHN, DON (1629–1679)
• JOHN, GOSPEL OF ST
• JOHN, or HAYS (1513–1571)
• JOHN, THE APOSTLE
• JOHN, THE EPISTLES OF

John See also:

• WATSON, RICHARD (1737-1816)
• WATSON, THOMAS (c. 1557–1592)
• WATSON, WILLIAM (1858- )
• WATSON, WILLIAM (c. 1559-1603)

Watson, Kant and i his English Critics (1880.; J .

B . See also:

• BAILLIE, JOANNA (1762-1851)
• BAILLIE, LADY GRIZEL (1665-1746)
• BAILLIE, ROBERT (1602-1662)
• BAILLIE, ROBERT (d. 1684)

Baillie, Idealistic Construction of Experience (1906) ; J . S . See also:

• MACKENZIE
• MACKENZIE, ALEXANDER (1822-1892)
• MACKENZIE, HENRY (1745-1831)
• MACKENZIE, SIR ALEXANDER (c. 1755-1820)
• MACKENZIE, SIR ALEXANDER CAMPBELL (1847— )
• MACKENZIE, SIR GEORGE (1636-1691)
• MACKENZIE, SIR MORELL (1837-1892)
• MACKENZIE, WILLIAM LYON (1795-1861)

Mackenzie, Outlines of Metaphysics (1902) ; A . E . Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics (1903) ; R . L . See also:

• NETTLESHIP, HENRY (1839-1893)
• NETTLESHIP, RICHARD LEWIS (1846-1892)

Nettleship, Lectures and Remains (1897) ; D . G . See also:

• RITCHIE, CHARLES THOMSON RITCHIE, 1ST BARON (1838-1906)
• RITCHIE, DAVID GEORGE (1853-1903)

Ritchie, Philosophical Studies (1905) . (B) Works on particular branches of philosophy: (a) Logic—F . H .

Bradley, Principles of Logic (1883); B . Bosanquet, Logic (1888) and Essentials of Logic (1895) . (b) Psychology—J . See also:

• DEWEY, DAVIS RICH (1858- )
• DEWEY, GEORGE (1837- )
• DEWEY, MELVIL (1851- )

Dewey, Psychology (1886); G . F . Stout, Analytic Psychology (1896); B . Bosanquet, Psychology of the Moral Self (1897) . (c) Ethics—F . H . Bradley, Ethical Studies (1876); J . Dewey, Ethics (1891); W . R .

Sorley, Ethics of Naturalism (2nd ed., 1904) ; J . S . Mackenzie, See also:

• MANUAL

Manual of Ethics (4th ed., 1900) ; J . H . Muirhead, Elements of Ethics (3rd ed., 1910) . (d) Politics and See also:

• ECONOMICS

Economics—B . Bosanquet, Philosophical Theory of the State (1899), and Aspects of the Social Problem (1895); B . See also:

• BONAR, HORATIUS (1808-1889)

Bonar, Philosophy and See also:

• POLITICAL

Political See also:

• ECONOMY

Economy in their See also:

• HISTORICAL

historical Relations (1873) ; D . G . Ritchie, Natural Rights (1895) ; J . S . Mackenzie, An Introd. to Social Phil .

(1890); J . See also:

• MACCUNN, HAMISH (1868— )

MacCunn, Six See also:

• RADICAL (Lat. radix, a root)

Radical Thinkers (1907) . (e) Aesthetic—B . Bosanquet, History of Aesthetic (1892), and Introd. to Hegel's Phil. of the Fine Arts (1886) ; W . Hastie, Phil. of Art by Hegel and Michele' (1886) . (f) Religion—J . Royce, Religious Aspect of Philosophy (1885), and The Conception of God (1897) ; R . B . Haldane, The Pathway to Reality (1903) ; E . Caird, See also:

• EVOLUTION

Evolution of Religion (1893) ; J . Caird, Introd. to the Phil. of Religion (1880) H . See also:

• JONES
• JONES, ALFRED GILPIN (1824-1906)
• JONES, EBENEZER (182o-186o)
• JONES, ERNEST CHARLES (1819-1869)
• JONES, HENRY (1831-1899)
• JONES, HENRY ARTHUR (1851- )
• JONES, INIGO (1573-1651)
• JONES, JOHN (c. 1800-1882)
• JONES, MICHAEL (d. 1649)
• JONES, OWEN (1741-1814)
• JONES, OWEN (1809-1874)
• JONES, RICHARD (179o-1855)
• JONES, SIR ALFRED LEWIS (1845-1909)
• JONES, SIR WILLIAM (1746-1794)
• JONES, THOMAS RUPERT (1819– )
• JONES, WILLIAM (1726-1800)

Jones, Idealism as a Practical Creed (1909) .

(C) Recent Criticism . Besides works mentioned in the See also:

• TEXT (Lat. textum, woven fabric, from texere, to weave)

text: W . James, Pragmatism (1907), A Pluralistic Universe (1909), The Meaning of Truth (1909); H . See also:

• STURT, CHARLES (d. 186g)

Sturt, Personal Idealism (1902); F . C . S . See also:

• SCHILLER, JOHANN CHRISTOPH FRIEDRICH VON (1759-18o5)

Schiller, See also:

• HUMANISM (from Lat. humanus, human, connected with holm)

Humanism (1903) ; G . E . See also:

• MOORE, A
• MOORE, ALBERT JOSEPH (1841–1893)
• MOORE, EDWARD (1712–1757)
• MOORE, GEORGE (1853– )
• MOORE, GEORGE FOOT (1851– )
• MOORE, HENRY (1831–1895)
• MOORE, JOHN (1729-1802)
• MOORE, SIR JOHN (1761-1809)
• MOORE, THOMAS (1779-1852)

Moore, Principia Ethica; H . Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil (1907) . See also ETHICS and METAPHYSICS . (J .

H .