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See also:IMMORTALITY (See also:Lat. in-, not, mortalis, mortal, from mors, See also:death) , the See also:condition or quality of being exempt from See also:death or annihilation . This condition has been predicated of See also:man, both See also:body and soul, in many senses; and the See also:term is used by See also:analogy of those whose deeds or writings have made a lasting impression on the memory of man . The belief in human See also:immortality in some See also:form is almost universal; even in See also:early animistic cults the germ of the See also:idea is See also:present, and in all the higher religions it is an important feature . This See also:article is confined to summarizing the philosophical or scientific arguments for, and objections to, the See also:doctrine of the persistence of the human soul after death . For thg See also:Christian doctrine, see See also:ESCHATOLOGY; and for other religions see the See also:separate articles . In the Orphic mysteries "the soul was See also:regal as a See also:part of the divine, a particula aurae divinae, for which the body in its limited and perishable condition was no See also:fit See also:organ, but a See also:grave or See also:prison(ro viaµa ojia) . The existence of the soul in the body was its See also:punishment for sins in a previous condition; and the See also:doom of its sins in the body was its descent into other bodies, and the postponement of its deliverance " (Salmond's Christian Doctrine of Immortality, p . 109) . This deliverance was what the mysteries promised . A remarkable passage in See also:Pindar (Thren . 2) is thus rendered by J . W . See also:Donaldson (Pindar's Epinician or Triumphal Odes, p . 372) . " By a happy See also:lot, all persons travel to an end See also:free of toil . And the body, indeed, is subject to the powerful See also:influence of death; but a See also:shadow of vitality is still See also:left alive, and this alone is of divine origin; whileour limbs are in activity it sleeps; but, when we See also:sleep, it discloses to the mind in many dreams the future See also:judgment with regard to happiness and misery." The belief of See also:Socrates is uncertain . In the See also:Apology he is represented as sure that " no evil can happen to a See also:good man, either in See also:life or after death, " but as not knowing whether " death be a See also:state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness, or a See also:change or See also:migration of the soul from this See also:world to the next" (i . 40, 41) . In the See also:Phaedo a confident expectation is ascribed to him . He is not the body to be buried; he will not remain with his See also:friends after he has drunk the See also:poison, but he will go away to the happiness of the blessed . The silence of the Memorabilia of See also:Xenophon must be admitted as an See also:argument to the contrary; but the See also:probability seems to be that See also:Plato did not in the Phaedo altogether misrepresent the See also:Master . In Plato's thought the belief held a prominent position . " It is noteworthy," says See also:Professor D . G . See also:Ritchie, " that, in the various dialogues in which Plato speaks of immortality, the arguments seem to be of different kinds, and most of them quite unconnected with one another . In the See also:Phaedrus (245 c) the argument is, that the soul is self-moving, and, therefore, immortal; and this argument is repeated in the See also:Laws (x . 894, 895) . It is an argument that Plato probably inherited from See also:Alcmaeon, the physician of Croton (Arist . De An. i . 2, § 17 405 A 29), whose views were closely connected with those of the Pythagoreans . In the Phaedo the See also:main argument up to which all the others See also:lead is that the soul participates in the idea of life . Recollection (anamnesis) alone would prove pre-existence, but not existence after death . In the tenth See also:book of the See also:Republic we find the curious argument that the soul does not perish like 'the body, because its characteristic evil, See also:sin or wickedness does not kill it as the diseases of the body See also:wear out the bodily life . In the See also:Timaeus (4r A) the immortality even of the gods is made dependent on the will of the Supreme Creator; souls are not in their own nature indestructible, but persist because of His goodness . In the Laws (xii . 959 A) the notion of a future life seems to be treated as a salutary doctrine which is to be believed because the legislator enacts it (Plato, p . 146) . The estimate to be formed of this reasoning has been well stated by Dr A . M . See also:Fairbairn, " Plato's arguments for immortality, isolated, modernized, may be feeble, even valueless, but allowed to stand where and as he himself puts them, they have an altogether different See also:worth . The ratiocinative parts of the Phaedo thrown into syllogisms may be easily demolished by a hostile logician; but in the See also:dialogue as a whole there is a subtle spirit and cumulative force which See also:logic can neither seize nor See also:answer " (Studies in the See also:Philosophy of See also:Religion, p . 226, 1876) . See also:Aristotle held that the vas or active intelligence alone is immortal . The See also:Stoics were not agreed upon the question . See also:Cleanthes is said to have held that all survive to the See also:great conflagration which closes the See also:cycle, See also:Chrysippus that only the See also:wise will . See also:Marcus Aurelius teaches that even if the spirit survive for a See also:time it is at last "absorbed in the generative principle of the universe." Epicureanism thought that " the wise man fears not death, before which most men tremble; for, if we are, it is not; if it is, we are not." Death is extinction . See also:Augustine adopts a Platonic thought when he teaches that the immortality of the soul follows from its participation in the eternal truths . The Apologists themselves welcomed, and commended to others, the Christian See also:revelation as affording a certainty of immortality such as See also:reason could not give .
The Aristotelian school in See also:Islam did not speak with one See also:voice upon the question; See also:Avicenna declared the soul immortal, but See also:Averroes assumes only the eternity of the universal See also:intellect
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Albertus See also:Magnus argued that the soul is immortal, as ex se ipss causa, and as See also:independent of the body; Pietro Pomponazzi maintained that the soul's immortality could be neither proved nor disproved by any natural reasons
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See also:Spinoza, while consistently with his See also:pantheism denying See also:personal immortality, affirms that "the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but there remains of. it something which is eternal " (See also:Ella v. prop. See also:xxiii.)
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The reason he gives is that, as this something " appertains to the
essence of the mind," it is " conceived by a certain eternal See also:necessity through the very essence of See also:God."
See also:Leibnitz, in See also:accord with the distinctive principle of his philosophy, affirmed the See also:absolute See also:independence of mind and body as distinct monads, the See also:parallelism of their functions in life being due to the pre-established See also:harmony
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For the soul, by its nature as a single See also:monad indestructible and, therefore, immortal, death meant only the loss of the znonads constituting the body and its return to the pre-existent state
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The argument of See also:Ernst Platner (Philos
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Aphor. i
.
1174, 1178) is similar
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" If the human soul is a force in the narrower sense, a substance, and not a See also:combination of substances, then, as in the nature of things there is no transition from existence to non-existence, we cannot naturally conceive the end of its existence, any more than we can anticipate a See also:gradual annihilation of its existence." He adds a reason that recalls one of Plato's, " As manifestly as the human soul is by means of the senses linked to the present life, so manifestly it attaches itself by reason, and the conceptions, conclusions, anticipations and efforts to which reason leads it, to God and eternity."
Against the first See also:kind of argument, as formulated by See also:Moses Mendelssohn, See also:Kant advances the objection that, although we may deny the soul extensive quantity, See also:division into parts, yet we cannot refuse to it intensive quantity, degrees of reality; and consequently its existence may be terminated not by decomposition, but by gradual diminution of its See also:powers (or to use the term he coined for the purpose, by elanguescence)
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This denial of any reasonable ground for belief in immortality in the Critique of Pure Reason (Transcendental See also:Dialectic, bk. ii. ch. i.) is, however, not his last word on the subject
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In the Critique of the See also:Practical Reason (Dialectic, ch. i. sec. iv) the immortality of the soul is shown to be a postulate
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Holiness, " the perfect accordance of the will with the moral See also:law," demands an endless progress; and " this endless progress is only possible on the supposition of an endless duration of the existence and See also:personality of the same rational being (which is called the immortality of the soul)." Not demonstrable as a theoretical proposition, the immortality of the soul " is an inseparable result of an unconditional a priori practical law." The moral See also:interest, which is so decisive on this question in the See also:case of Kant, dominates See also:Bishop See also:
A future life for him is important, because our happiness in it may depend on our present conduct; and therefore our See also:action here should take into See also:account the See also:reward or punishment that it may bring on us hereafter
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As he maintains that probability may and ought to be our See also:guide in life, he is content with proving in the first See also:chapter of the Analogy that " a future life is probable from similar changes (as death) already undergone in ourselves and in others, and from our present powers, which are likely to continue unless death destroy them." While we may fear this, " there is no See also:proof that it will, either from the nature of death," of the effect of which on our powers we are altogether ignorant, " or from the analogy of nature, which shows only that the sensible proof of our powers (not the powers themselves) may be destroyed." The See also:imagination that death will destroy these powers is unfounded, because (1) " this supposes we are compounded, and so discerptible, but the contrary is probable " on metaphysical grounds (the indivisibility of the subject in which consciousness as indivisible inh es, and its distinction from the body) and also experimenta persistence of the living being in spite of changes in the bo y or even losses of parts of the body); (2) this also assumes that " our present living powers of reflection " must be affected in the same way by death " as those of sensation," but this is disproved by their relative independence even in this life; (3) " even the suspension of our present powers of reflection " is not involved in " the idea of death, which is simply See also:dissolution of the body," and which may even " be like See also:birth, a continuation and perfecting of our powers." " Even if suspension were involved, we cannot infer destruction from it " (See also:analysis of chapter i. in See also:Angus's edition)
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He recognizes that " reason did, as it well might, conclude that it should finally, and upon the whole, be well with the righteous and See also:ill with the wicked," but only " revelation teaches us thatthe next state of things after the present is appointed for the See also:execution of this See also:justice " (ch. ii. See also:note ro)
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He does not use this See also:general anticipation of future judgment, as he might have done, as a See also:positive argument for immortality
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See also:Adam See also:Ferguson (Institutes of Moral Philosophy, p
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119, new ed., 1800) argues that " the See also:desire for immortality is an See also:instinct, and can reasonably be regarded as an indication of that which the author of this desire See also:wills to do." From the standpoint of See also:modern See also:science See also: D . See also:Schleiermacher applies the phrase " the immortality of religion " to the religious emotion of•oneness, amid finitude, with the See also:infinite and, amid time, with the eternal; denies any necessary connexion between the belief in the continuance of personal existence and the consciousness of God; and rests his faith on immortality altogether on See also:Christ's promise of living fellowship with His followers, as presupposing their as well as His personal immortality . A . See also:Schopenhauer assigns immortality to the universal will to live; and See also:Feuerbach declares spirit, consciousness eternal, but not any individual subject . R . H . See also:Lotze for the decision of the question See also:lays down the broad principle, " All that has once come to be will eternally continue so soon as for the organic unity of the world it has an unchangeable value, but it will obviously again cease to be, when that is not the case " (Gr. der Psy. p . 74) . Objections to the belief in immortality have been advanced from the standpoints of See also:materialism, See also:naturalism, See also:pessimism and pantheism . Materialism argues that, as life depends on a material organism, thought is a See also:function of the See also:brain, and the soul is but the sum of See also:mental states, to which, according to the theory of psychophysical parallelism, See also:physical changes always correspond; therefore, the dissolution of the body carries with it necessarily the cessation of consciousness . That, as now constituted, mind does depend on brain, life on body, must be conceded, but that this dependence is so absolute that the function must cease with the organ has not been scientifically demonstrated; the connexion of the soul with the body is as yet too obscure to justify any such dogmatism . But against this inference the following considerations may be advanced: (r) Man does distinguish himself from his body; (2) he is conscious of his personal identity ,through all the changes of his body; (3) in the exercise of his will he knows himself not controlled by but controlling his body; (4) his consciousness warrants his denying the absolute See also:identification of himself and his body .
It may further be added that materialism can be shown to be an inadequate philosophy in its attempts to account even for the physical universe, for this is inexplicable without the See also:assumption of mind distinct from, and directive of, See also:matter
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The theory
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of psychophysical parallelism has been subjected to a rigorous examination in See also: The body would thus be not the cause of our thinking, but merely a condition restrictive thereof, and, although essential to our sensuous and See also:animal consciousness, it may be regarded as an impeder of our pure spiritual life " (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, end ed., p . Soo) . Further arguments in the same direction are derived from the modern school of psychical See also:research (see especially F . W . H . See also:Myers' Human Personality, 1903) . Another objection is advanced from the standpoint of naturalism, which, whether it issues in materialism or not, seeks to explain man as but a product of the See also:process of nature . The universe is so immeasurably vast in See also:extension and duration, and man is so small, his home but a speck in space, and his history a span in time that it seems an arrogant assumption for him to claim exemption from the universal law of See also:evolution and dissolution . This view ignores that man has ideals of absolute value, truth, beauty, goodness, that he consciously communes with the God who is in all, and through all, and over all, that it is his mind which recognizes the vastness of the universe and thinks its universal law, and that the mind which perceives and conceives cannot be less, but must be greater than the See also:object of its knowledge and thought . Pessimism suggests a third objection . The present life is so little worth living that its continuance is not to be desired . James See also:Thomson (" B.V.") speaks "of the restful rapture of the inviolate grave," and sings the praises of death and of oblivion . We cannot admit that the history of mankind justifies his conclusion; for the great See also:majority of men life is a good, and its continuance an object of See also:hope . For pantheism personal immortality appears a lesser good than reabsorption in the universal life; but against this objection we may confidently maintain that worthier of God and more blessed for man is the hope of a conscious communion in an. eternal life of the See also:Father of all with His whole See also:family . Lastly See also:positivism teaches a corporate instead of an individual immortality; man should desire to live on as a beneficent influence in the See also:race . This conception is expressed in See also:George See also:Eliot's lines: "0, may I join the See also:choir invisible Of those immortal dead who live again In minds made better by their presence: live In pulses stirred to generosity, In deeds of daring rectitude, in scorn For miserable aims that end with self, In thoughts See also:sublime that See also:pierce the See also:night like stars, . And with their mild persistence urge man's See also:search To vaster issues." But these possibilities are not mutually exclusive alternatives . A man may live on in the world by his teaching and example as a power for good, a See also:factor of human progress, and he may also be continuing and completing his course under conditions still more favourable to all most worthy in him . Consciously to participate as a See also:person in the progress of the race is surely a worthier hope than unconsciously to contribute to it as an influence; ultimately to See also:share the See also:triumph as well as the struggle is a more inspiring anticipation . In stating' constructively the doctrine of immortality we must assign altogether secondary importance to the metaphysical arguments from the nature of the soul . It is sufficient to show, as has already been done, that the soul is not so absolutely dependent on the body, that the dissolution of the one must necessarily involve the cessation of the other . Such arguments as the indivisibility of the soul and its persistence can at most indicate the possibility of immortality . The juridical argument has some force; the present life does not show that harmony of condition and character which our sense of justice leads us to expect; the wicked prosper and the righteous suffer; there is ground for the expectation that in the future life the anomalies of this life will be corrected . Although this argument has the support of such great names as Butler and Kant, yet it will repel many minds as an See also:appeal to the See also:motive of self-interest . The ethical argument has greater value . Man's life here is incomplete, and the more lofty his aims, the more worthy his labours, the more incomplete will it appear to be . The man who lives for fame, See also:wealth, power, may be satisfied in this life; but he who lives for the ideals of truth, beauty, goodness, lives not for time but for eternity, for his ideals cannot be realized, and so his life fulfilled on this See also:side of the grave . Unless these ideals are mocking visions, man has a right to expect the continuance of his life for its completion . This is the See also:line of argument See also:developed by Professor See also:Hugo Miinsterberg in his lecture on The Eternal Life (1905), although he states it in the terms See also:peculiar to his See also:psychology, in which personality is conceived as primarily will . " No endless duration is our See also:goal, but See also:complete repose in the perfect See also:satisfaction which the will finds when it has reached the significance, the influence, and the value at which it is aiming " (p . 83) . More general in its appeal still is the argument from the affections, which has been beautifully developed in See also:Tennyson's In Memoriam . The See also:heart protests against the severance of death, and claims the continuance of love's communion after death; and as man feels that love is what is most godlike in his nature, love's claim has supreme authority . There is a religious argument for immortality . The See also:saints of the See also:Hebrew nation were sure that as God had entered into See also:fellow-See also:ship with them, death could not sever them from his presence . This is the argument in See also:Psalms xvi. and xvii., if, as is probable, the closing verses do See also:express the hope of a glorious and blessed immortality . This too is the proof Jesus himself offers when he declares God to be the God of the living and not of the dead (Matt. xxii . 32) . God's companions cannot become death's victims . See also:Josiah Royce in his lecture on The Conception of Immortality (1900) combines this argument of the soul's See also:union with God with the argument of the incompleteness of man's life here: " Just because God is One, all our lives have various and unique places in the harmony of the divine life . And just because God attains and wins and finds this uniqueness, all our lives win in our union with Him the individuality which is essential to their true meaning . And just because individuals whose lives have uniqueness of meaning are here only See also:objects of pursuit, the attainment of this very individuality, since it is indeed real, occurs not in our present form of consciousness, but in a life that now we see not, yet in a life whose genuine meaning is continuous with our own human life, however far from our present flickering form of disappointed human consciousness that life of the final individuality may be . Of this our true individual life, our present life is a glimpse, a fragment; ,a hint, and in its best moments a visible beginning . That this individual life of all of us is not something limited in its temporal expression to the life that now we experience, follows from the very fact that here nothing final or individual is found expressed " (PP . 144-146) . R . W . See also:Emerson declares that " the impulse to seek proof of immortality is itself the strongest proof of all." We expect immortality not merely because we desire it; but because the desire itself arises from all that is best and truest and worthiest in ourselves . The desire is reasonable, moral, social, religious; it has the same worth as the loftiest ideals, and worthiest aspirations of the soul of man . The loss of the belief casts a dark shadow over the present See also:fife . " No sooner do we try to get rid of the idea of Immortality—than Pessimism raises its See also:head .. . Human griefs seem little worth assuaging; human happiness too paltry (at the best) to be worth increasing . The whole moral world is reduced to a point . Good and evil, right and wrong, become infinitesimal, ephemeral matters . The affections See also:die away—die of their own conscious feebleness and uselessness . A moral See also:paralysis creeps over us " (Natural Religion, See also:Post-script) . The belief exercises a potent moral influence . " The See also:day," says Ernest See also:Renan, " in which the belief in an after-life shall vanish from the See also:earth will See also:witness a terrific moral and spiritual decadence . Some of us perhaps might do without it, provided only that others held it fast . But there is no See also:lever capable of raising an entire See also:people if once they have lost their faith in the immortality of the soul " (quoted by A .
W
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Momerie, Immortality, p
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9)
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To this belief, many and good as are the arguments which can be advanced for it, a confident certainty is given by Christian faith in the Risen See also:Lord, and the life and immortality which he has brought to See also:light in his See also:Gospel
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In addition to the See also:works referred to above, see R
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K
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Gaye, The Platonic Conception of Immortality and its Connexion with the Theory of Ideas (1904) ; R
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H
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See also:
Fiske, The Destiny of Man, viewed in the Light of his Origin (1884) ; G
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A
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See also:Gordon, Immortality and the New Theodicy (1897); See also: |
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