MENTAL  ASSOCIATION) Mental Association and the Memory-Continuum . 24 . See also:

• GREAT

Great confusion has been occasioned, as we have seen incidentally, by the lax use of the See also:

• TERM

term " association," and this Association confusion has been increased by a further laxity in by similar- the use of the term " association by similarity." ity not In so far as the similarity amounts to identity, as in Funds- assimilation, we have a See also:

• PROCESS

process which is more mental. fundamental than association by contiguity, but then it is not a process of association . And when the reviving presentation is only partially similar to the presentation revived, the nature of the association does not appear to differ from that operative when one " contiguous " presentation revives another . In the one See also:

• CASE
• CASE, JOHN (d. 1600)

case we have, say, a b x recalling a b y , and in the other a b c recalling d e f . Now anybody who will reflect must surely see that the similarity between. a b x and a b y, as distinct from the identity of their partial constituent a b, cannot be the means of recall; for this similarity is nothing but the See also:

• STATE
• STATE, GREAT OFFICERS OF

state of mind—to be studied presently—which results when a b x and a b y, having been recalled are in consciousness together and then compared . But if a b, having concurred with y before and being now See also:

• PRESENT

present in a b x, again revives y, the association, so far as that goes, is manifestly one of contiguity, albeit as soon as the revivalis See also:

• COMPLETE

complete, the state of mindimmediatelyincident may be what See also:

• BAIN, ALEXANDER (1818-1903)
• BAIN, ANDREW GEDDES (1797-1864)

Bain loved to See also:

• STYLE
• STYLE (from Gr. a-6'1ms, a column; a different word from that used in literature, see below)

style " the flash of similarity." So far as the See also:

• MERE
• MERE, ADALBERT (1838-1909)

mere revival itself goes, there is no more similarity in this case than there is when a b c revives d e f . For the very a b c that now operates as the reviving presentation was obviously never in See also:

• TIME (0. Eng. Lima, cf. Icel. timi, Swed. timme, hour, Dan. time; from the root also seen in " tide," properly the time of between the flow and ebb of the sea, cf. O. Eng. getidan, to happen, " even-tide," &c.; it is not directly related to Lat. tempus)
• TIME, MEASUREMENT OF
• TIME, STANDARD

time contiguous with the d e f that is revived; if all traces of previous experiences of a b c were obliterated there would be no revival . In other words, the a b c now present must be " automatically associated," or, as we prefer to say, must be assimilated to those residua of a b c which were " contiguous " with d e f, before the See also:

• REPRESENTATION

representation of this can occur . And this, and nothing more than this, we have seen, is all the " similarity " that could be at See also:

• WORK

work when a b x " brought up "aby . On the whole, then, we may assume that the only principle of association we have to examine is the so-called association by Contiguity contiguity, which, as ordinarily formulated, runs: Inexplicable . Any presentations whatever, which are in conscious- ness together or in See also:

• CLOSE
• CLOSE (from Lat. clausum, shut)
• CLOSE, MAXWELL HENRY (1822-1903)

close See also:

• SUCCESSION (Lat. successio, from succedere, to follow after)

succession, cohere in such a way that when one recurs it tends to revive the See also:

• REST (O. Eng. rest, reste, bed, cognate with other Teutonic forms, e.g. Ger. Rast, Riiste, rest, and probably Gothic Rasta, league, i.e. resting or stopping place)

rest, such tendency increasing with the frequency of the See also:

• CONJUNCTION (from Lat. conjungere, to join together)

conjunction .

It has been often contended that any investigation into the nature of association must be fruitless.' But, if association is thus a first principle, it ought at least to admit of such a statement as shall remove the See also:

• NECESSITY (Lat. necessitas)

necessity for inquiry . So See also:

• LONG, GEORGE (1800-1879)
• LONG, JOHN DAVIS (1838– )

long, however, as we are asked to conceive presentations originally distinct and isolated becoming eventually linked together, we shall naturally feel the need of some explanation of the process, for neither the See also:

• ISOLATION

isolation nor the links are clear—not the isolation, for we can only conceive two presentations separated by other presentations intervening; nor the links, unless these are also presentations, and then the difficulty recurs . But, if for contiguity we substitute continuity and regard the associated presentations as parts of a new continuum, the only important inquiry is how this new whole was first of all integrated . To ascertain this point we must examine each of the two leading divisions of contiguous association—that of simultaneous Formation presentations and that of presentations occurring of Memory- in close succession . The last, being the clearer, may continuum. be taken first . In a See also:

• SERIES (a Latin word from serere, to join)

series of associated presentations A B C D E, such as the movements made in See also:

• WRITING
• WRITING (the verbal noun of " to write," O. Eng. writan, to inscribe)

writing, the words of a poem learned by See also:

• HEART
• HEART, LUNG

heart, or the See also:

• SIMPLE

simple letters of the See also:

• ALPHABET (see also WRITING)

alphabet themselves, we find that each member recalls its successor but not its predecessor . See also:

• FAMILIAR (through the Fr. familier, from Lat. familiaris, of or belonging to the familia, family)

Familiar as this fact is, it is not perhaps easy to explain it satisfactorily . Since C is associated both with B and D, and apparently as intimately with the one as with the other, why does it revive the later only and not the earlier ? B recalls C; why does not C recall B ? We have seen that any ' So See also:

• HUME, ALEXANDER (c. 1557-1609)
• HUME, DAVID (1711-1776)
• HUME, JOSEPH (1777-1855)

Hume, See also:

• TREATISE

Treatise of Human Nature, pt. i . § 4 (See also:

• GREEN, A
• GREEN, ALEXANDER HENRY (1832—1896)
• GREEN, DUFF (1791—1875)
• GREEN, JOHN RICHARD (1837—1883)
• GREEN, MATTHEW (1696-1737)
• GREEN, THOMAS HILL (1836-1882)
• GREEN, VALENTINE (1739–1813)
• GREEN, WILLIAM HENRY (.1825–1900)

Green and See also:

• GROSE, FRANCIS (c. 1730–1791)

Grose's ed., p . 321); also See also:

• LOTZE, RUDOLF HERMANN (1817-1881)

Lotze, Metaphysik, 1st ed., p .

526.573 See also:

• REPRODUCTION

reproduction at all of B, C or D depends primarily upon its having been the See also:

• OBJECT

object of See also:

• SPECIAL

special See also:

• ATTENTION (from Lat. ad-tendo, await, expect; the condition of being " stretched " or " tense ")

attention, so as to occupy at least momentarily the See also:

• FOCUS (Latin for " hearth " or " fireplace ")

focus of consciousness . Now we can in the first instance only surmise that the See also:

• ORDER
• ORDER (through Fr. ordre, for earlier ordene, from Lat. ordo, ordinis, rank, service, arrangement; the ultimate source is generally taken to be the root seen in Lat. oriri, rise, arise, begin; cf. " origin ")
• ORDER, HOLY

order in which they are reproduced is determined by the order in which they were thus attended to when first presented . The next question is whether the association of See also:

• OBJECTS

objects simultaneously presented can be resolved into an association of objects successively attended to . Whenever we try to recall a See also:

• SCENE (Fr. scene, Lat. scaena, Gr. oflvil, a tent or booth, a stage or scene)

scene we saw but for a moment there are always a few traits that recur, the rest being blurred and vague, instead of the whole being revived in equal distinctness or indistinctnpss . On seeing the same scene a second time our attention is See also:

• APT

apt to be caught by something unnoticed before, as this has the See also:

• ADVANTAGE

advantage of novelty; and so on, till we have " lived ourselves into " the whole, which may then admit of simultaneous recall . Bain, who is rightly held to have given the best exposition of the See also:

• LAWS

laws of association, admits something very like this in saying that " coexistence is an artificial growth formed from a certain See also:

• PECULIAR

peculiar class of mental successions." But, while it is easy to think of instances in which the associated objects were attended to successively, and we are all perfectly aware that the surest—not to say the only—way to See also:

• FIX, THEODORE (180o-1846)

fix the association of a number of objects is by thus concentrating attention on each in turn, it seems hardly possible to mention a case in which attention to the associated objects could not have been successive . In fact, an aggregate of objects on which attention could be focused at once would be already associated . The exclusively successional See also:

• CHARACTER (Gr. xapareri7p, from xap&crew, to scratch)

character of contiguous association has recently been denied, and its exclusively simultaneous character maintained instead . It is at once obvious that this opposition of succession and simultaneity cannot be pressed so as to exclude duration altogether and reduce the whole process to an instantaneous event . Nor is there any ground for saying that there is a fixed and even See also:

• DISTRIBUTION (Lat. distribuere, to deal out)

distribution of attention to whatever is simultaneously presented: facts all point the other way . Still, though we cannot exclude the notion of process from consciousness, we may say that presentations attended to together become See also:

• PRO

pro tanto a new whole, are synthesized or complicated . Such See also:

• PRIMARY

primary See also:

• SYNTHESIS (Gr. a6vOeacs, from avvrcBivac, to put together)

synthesis leads not to an association of ideas, but rather to the formation of one percept, which may be-come eventually a See also:

• FREE

free See also:

• IDEA (Gr. Ibia, connected with i&eiv, to see; cf. Lat. species from specere, to look at)

idea .

The disconcerted preperception which sets this free may likewise liberate a similar or contrasting idea, but it will not resolve either complex into the several " ideas of its sensory or motor constituents, with which only the psychologist is familiar . The actual recurrence of some of these constituents may again reinstate the rest, not, however, as memories or as " thoughts," but only as tied ideas in a renewed See also:

• PERCEPTION (from Lat. percipere, to perceive)

perception . Again, it has become usual to distinguish the association of contiguous experiences and the so-called association of similars or opposites as respectively See also:

• EXTERNAL

external and See also:

• INTERNAL

internal forms of association . The new terminology is See also:

• ILLUMINATING

illuminating: the substitution of forms for laws marks the See also:

• ABANDONMENT (Fr. abandonnement, from abandonner, to abandon, relinquish; abandonner was originally equivalent to mettred banddn, to leave to the jurisdiction, i.e. of another, bandon being from Low Latin bandum, bannum, order, decree, " ban ")

abandonment of the old notion that association was by " See also:

• ADHESION (from Lat. adhaerere, to adhere)

adhesion " of the contiguous and " attraction " of the similar . We are thus See also:

• LEFT

left to find the cause of association in interested attention; and that, we may safely say, is an adequate, and apparently the See also:

• SOLE (Solea)

sole adequate, cause for the two commonly recognized forms of external association, the so-called simultaneous and the successive . But these two are certainly not co-See also:

• ORDINATE

ordinate; and if our See also:

• ANALYSIS (Gr. avci and Meta, to break up into parts)

analysis be See also:

• SOUND
• SOUND, THE (Danish Oresund)

sound, the former—for which we would retain the Herbartian term complication—yields us not members of an association but a member for association . So far, then, we should have but one See also:

• FORM (Lat. forma)

form of association, that of the successive contents of focalized attention: and but one result, the representation or memory-continuum,' in contrast to the primary- or presentation-continuum, whence its constituents arise . Turning now to the distinction of external and internal, it at once strikes the unprejudiced mind that " internal association " is something of an See also:

• ANOMALY (from Gr. lwvw)

anomaly, since the very notion of association implies externality . Also, on closer inspection what we find is not an association of similars or opposites as such, but—something quite distinct—a similarity or contrast of associates; of ideas, that is to say, which are contiguous members of the memory (or experience) continuum, or of ideas which have become contiguous through its reduplication . The only case, then, that now remains to be considered is that—to take it in its simplest form—of two primary presentations A and X, parts of different special continua or distinct—i.e. non-adjacent—parts of the same, and occupying the focus of consciousness in immediate succession . This constitutes z Experience-continuum would perhaps be a better name, since it is only a preliminary to a true memory See also:

• RECORD (Lat. recordari, to recall to mind, from cor, heart or mind)

record, as we shall presently see . their integration; for the result of this occupation may be regarded as a new continuum in which A and X become adjacent parts .

For it is characteristic of a continuum that an increase in the intensity of any See also:

• PART

part leads to the intenser presentation of adjacent parts; and in this sense A and X, which were not originally continuous, have come to be so . We have here, then, some See also:

• JUSTIFICATION

justification for the term secondary- or memory-continuum when applied to this continuous series of representations to distinguish it from the primary or presentation-continuum from which its constituents are derived . The most important peculiarity of this continuum, therefore, is that it is a series of representations integrated by means of the movements of attention out of the differentiations of the primary or presentation-continuum, or rather out of so much of these differentiations as pertain to what we know as the primary memory-See also:

• IMAGE (Lat. imago, perhaps from the same root as imitari, copy, imitate)

image . These movements of attention, if the phrase may be allowed, come in the end to depend mainly upon See also:

• INTEREST

interest, but at first appear to be determined entirely by mere intensity.' To them it is proposed to look for that continuity which images lose in so far as they part with the See also:

• LOCAL

local signs they had as percepts and cease to be either localized or projected . Inasmuch as it is assumed that these movements form the connexion between one representation and another in the memory-See also:

• TRAIN (M. Eng. trayn or trayne, derived through Fr. from Late Lat. trahinare, to drag, draw, Lat. trahere, cf. trail, trace, ultimately from the same source)

train, they may be called " temporal signs." 2 The See also:

• EVIDENCE (Lat. evidentia, evideri, to appear clearly)

evidence for their existence can be more conveniently adduced presently; it must suffice to remark here that it consists almost wholly of facts connected with voluntary attention and the voluntary See also:

• CONTROL (Fr. contrdle, older form contre rolle, from Med. Lat. contra-rotulus, a counter roll or copy of a document used to check the original; there is no instance in English of the use of " control " in this, its literal, meaning)

control of the flow of ideas, so that temporal signs, unlike local signs, are fundamentally motor and not sensory . And, unlike impressions, representations can have each but a single sign,' the continuum of which, in contrast to that of local signs, is not rounded and complete, but continuously advancing . But in saying this we are assuming for a moment that the memory-continuum forms a perfectly single and unbroken train . If it ever actually were such, then, in the See also:

• ABSENCE (Lat. absentia)

absence of any repetition of old impressions and apart from voluntary interference with the train, consciousness, till it ceased entirely, would consist of a fixed and See also:

• MECHANICAL

mechanical See also:

• ROUND (O. Fr. rond, Lat. rotundus, the Fr. is the source also of Du. rond; Ger., Swed., Dan. and Nor. rond)

round of images . Some approximation to such a state is often found in uncultured persons who See also:

• LEAD
• LEAD (pronounced iced)

lead uneventful lives, and still more in idiots, who can scarcely think at all . 25 . In actual fact, however, the memory-train is liable to See also:

• CHANGE (derived through the Fr. from the Late Lat. cambium, cambiare, to barter; the ultimate derivation is probably from the root which appears in the Gr. «a urmu', to bend)

change in two respects, which considerably modify its structure, viz . (1) through the evanescence of some parts, and (2) through the partial recurrence of like impressions, which produces reduplications of varying amount and extent in other parts .

As regards the first, we may infer that the waning or sinking towards the See also:

• THRESHOLD

threshold of consciousness which we can observe Formation in the primary mental image continues in sub-of ideational consciousness after the threshold is past . For the Continuum. longer the time that elapses before their revival the fainter, the less distinct, and the less complete are the images when revived, and the more slowly they rise . All the elements of a complex are not equally revivable, as we have seen already: tastes, smells and organic sensations, though powerful as impressions to revive other images, have little capacity for ideal ' This connexion of association with continuous movements of attention makes it easier to understand the difficulty above referred to, viz. that in a series A B C D ... B revives C but not A, and so on —a difficulty that the See also:

• ANALOGY (Gr. avaXo-yLa, proportion)

analogy of adhesiveness or links leaves unaccountable . To ignore the part played by attention in association, to represent the memory-continuum as due solely to the concurrence of presentations, is perhaps the See also:

• CHIEF (from Fr. chef, head, Lat. caput)

chief defectof the associationist See also:

• PSYCHOLOGY
• PSYCHOLOGY (>Guxrl, the mind or soul, and X yos, theory)

psychology, both See also:

• ENGLISH

English and See also:

• GERMAN
• GERMAN, DUTCH AND SCANDINAVIAN

German . See also:

• SPENCER
• SPENCER, HERBERT (1820-1903)
• SPENCER, JOHN CHARLES SPENCER, 3RD EARL (1782-1845)
• SPENCER, JOHNPOYNTZ SPENCER
• SPENCER, WILLIAM ROBERT (1769-1834)

Spencer's endeavour to show " that psychical See also:

• LIFE

life is distinguished from See also:

• PHYSICAL

physical life by consisting of successive changes only instead of successive and simultaneous changes " (Principles of Psychology, pt. iv. ch. ii., in particular pp . 403, 406) is really nothing but so much testimony to the work of attention in forming the memory-continuum, especially when, as there is See also:

• GOOD, JOHN MASON (1764-1827)

good See also:

• REASON (Lat. ratio, through French raison)

reason to do, we reject his See also:

• ASSUMPTION, FEAST OF

assumption that this growing seriality is physically determined . 2 A term borrowed from Lotze (Metaphysik, 1st ed., p . 295), but the present writer is alone responsible for the sense here given to it and the See also:

• HYPOTHESIS (from Gr. inrorcOivat, to put under; cf. Lat. suppositio, from sub-ponere)

hypothesis in which it is used . ' Apart, that is to say, of course, from the reduplications of the memory-train spoken of below.reproduction themselves, while See also:

• MUSCULAR

muscular movements, though perhaps of all presentations the most readily revived, do not so readily revive other presentations . Idiosyncrasies are, however, frequent; thus we find one See also:

• PERSON, OFFENCES AGAINST THE

person has an exceptional memory for sounds, another for See also:

• COLOURS, MILITARY

colours, another for forms . Still it is in See also:

• GENERAL
• GENERAL (Lat. generalis, of or relating to a genus, kind or class)

general true that the most intense, the most impressive, and the most interesting presentations persist the longest .

But the evanescence, which is in all cases comparatively rapid at first, deepens sooner or later into real or apparent oblivion . In this manner it comes about that parts of the memory-continuum lose all distinctness of feature and, being without Obiiriscence. recognizable content, shrivel up to a dim and meagre representation of life that has lapsed—a representation that just suffices, for example, to show us that " our earliest recollections " are not of our first experiences, or to See also:

• SAVE, or SAVA (Ger. Sau; Hungarian Szdva; Lat. Savus)

save them from being not only isolated but discontinuous . Such discontinuity can, of course, never be See also:

• ABSOLUTE (Lat. absolvere, to loose, set free)

absolute; we must have something represented even to See also:

• MARK
• MARK, CARL (1858– )
• MARK, GOSPEL OF ST
• MARK, ST

mark the See also:

• GAP

gap . Oblivion and the absence of all representation are thus the same, and the absence of all representation cannot psychologically constitute a break . The terms " See also:

• EVOLUTION

evolution " and " involution " have in this respect been happily applied to the rising and falling of representations . When we recall a particular See also:

• PERIOD
• PERIOD (Gr. irepioSos, a going or way round, circuit, aepi, round, and &Sis, way, road)

period of our past life, or what has long ceased to be a familiar scene, events and features gradually unfold and, as it were, spread out as we keep on attending . A precisely opposite process may then be supposed to take See also:

• PLACE (through Fr. from Lat. platea, street; Gr. IrAar6s, wide)

place when they are left in undisturbed forgetfulness; this process is called obliviscence . More important changes are produced by the repetition of parts of the memory-train . The effect of this is not merely to prevent the evanescence of the particular image Repetition. or series of images, but by partial and more or less frequent reduplications of the memory-train or " See also:

• THREAD (0. Eng. praed, literally, that which is twisted, prawan, to twist, to throw, cf. " throwster," a silk-winder, Ger. drehen, to twist, turn, Du. draad, Ger. Draht, thread, wire)

thread " upon itself to convert it into a partially new continuum, which we might perhaps See also:

• CALL (from Anglo-Saxon ceallian, a common Teutonic word, cf. Dutch kallen, to talk or chatter)

call the ideational continuum or " See also:

• TISSUE (Fr. tissu, tissue, participle of tisser, Lat. texere, to weave)

tissue." The reduplicated portions of the train are strengthened, while at the points of divergence it becomes comparatively weakened, and this apart from the effects of obliviscence . One who had seen the See also:

• KING
• KING (O. Eng. cyning, abbreviated into cyng, cing; cf. O. H. G. chun- kuning, chun- kunig, M.H.G. kiinic, kiinec, kiinc, Mod. Ger. Konig, O. Norse konungr, kongr, Swed. konung, kung)
• KING [OF OCKHAM], PETER KING, 1ST BARON (1669-1734)
• KING, CHARLES WILLIAM (1818-1888)
• KING, CLARENCE (1842–1901)
• KING, EDWARD (1612–1637)
• KING, EDWARD (1829–1910)
• KING, HENRY (1591-1669)
• KING, RUFUS (1755–1827)
• KING, THOMAS (1730–1805)
• KING, WILLIAM (1650-1729)
• KING, WILLIAM (1663–1712)

king but once would scarcely be likely to think of him without finding the attendant circumstances recur as well; this could not happen after seeing him in a See also:

• HUNDRED

hundred different scenes . The central representation of the whole complex would have become more distinct, whereas the several Generic diverging lines would tend to dissipate attention and, Images. by involving opposing representations, to neutralize each other, so that probably no definite background would be re-instated . Even this central representation would be more or less generalized .

It has been often remarked that one's most familiar See also:

• FRIENDS, SOCIETY
• FRIENDS, SOCIETY OF

friends are apt to be mentally pictured less concretely and vividly than persons seen more seldom and then in similar attitudes and moods; in the former case a " generic image " has grown out of such more specific representations as the latter affords . Still further removed from memory-images are the images that result from such familiar percepts as those of horses, houses, trees, &c . Thus as the See also:

• JOINT (through Fr. from Lat. junctum, jungere, to join)

joint effect of obliviscence and reduplication we are provided with trains of ideas distinct from the memory-thread and thereby with the material, already more Trains of or less organized, for intellectual and volitional Ideas . manipulation . We do not experience the flow of ideas—save very momentarily and occasionally—altogether undisturbed; even in dreams and See also:

• REVERIE

reverie it is continually interrupted and diverted . Nevertheless it is not difficult to ascertain that, so far as it is left to itself, it takes a very different course from that which we should have to retrace if See also:

• BENT
• BENT (E1. BENI)
• BENT, JAMES THEODORE (1852–1897)

bent on See also:

• REMINISCENCE (from Lat. reminisci, to remember)

reminiscence and able to recollect perfectly . The readiness and steadiness of this flow are shown by the extremely small effort necessary in order to follow it . Nevertheless from its very nature it is liable, though not to See also:

• POSITIVE (or PORTABLE) ORGAN

positive breaches This contrast of thread and tissue is suggested, of course, by See also:

• HERBART, JOHANN FRIEDRICH (1776-1841)

Herbart's terms Reihe and Gewebe . It is justified by the fact that memory proper follows the single See also:

• LINE

line of temporal continuity, while ideation furnishes the basis for manifold logical connexions . of continuity from its own working, yet to occasional blocks or impediments to the smooth succession of images at points where reduplications diverge, and either permanently or at the particular time neutralize each other.' The flow of ideas is, however, exposed to positive interruptions from -two distinct sides—by the intrusion of new presentations and Cont7icto! of voluntary interference . The only result of such interruptions which we need here consider is the conflict Presents- of presentations that may ensue . Herbart and his dons. followers have gone so far as to elaborate a complete See also:

• SYSTEM

system of psychical See also:

• STATICS (from Gr. root am-, stand, or cause to stand)

statics and See also:

• DYNAMICS
• DYNAMICS (from Gr. bbvayts, strength)

dynamics, based on the conception of presentations as, forces and on certain more or, less improbable assumptions as to the modes in which such forces interact .

Since our See also:

• POWER [WILLIAM GRATTAN] TYRONE (1797-1841)

power of attention is limited, it continually .happens that attention is See also:

• DRAWN

drawn off by new presentations at the expense of old ones . But, even if we regard this non-voluntary redistribution of attention as implying a struggle between presentations, still such conflict to secure a place in consciousness is very different from a conflict between presentations that are already there . Either may be experienced to any degree possible without the other appearing at all; thus, absorbed in watching a starry See also:

• SKY (M. Eng. skie, cloud; O. Eng. skua, shade; connected with an Indo-European root sku, cover, whence " scum," Lat. obscurus, dark, &c.)

sky, one might be unaware of the chilliness of the See also:

• AIR (from an Indo-European root meaning " breathe," " blow ")
• AIR, or ASBEN

air, though recognizing at once, as soon as the See also:

• COLD (in O. Eng. cald and ceald, a word coming ultimately from a root cognate with the Lat. gelu, gelidus, and common in the Teutonic languages, which usually have two distinct forms for the substantive and the adjective, cf. Ger. Kolte, kalt, Dutch koude

cold is See also:

• FELT (cognate with Ger. Filz, Du. vilt, Swed. and Dan. fill; the root is unknown; the word has given Med. Lat. filtrum, " filter ")

felt, that, so far from being incompatible, the clearness and the coldness are causally connected . This difference between a conflict of presentations to enter the See also:

• FIELD (a word common to many West German languages, cf. Ger. Feld, Dutch veld, possibly cognate with O.E. f olde, the earth, and ultimately with root of the Gr. irAaror, broad)
• FIELD, CYRUS WEST (1819-1892)
• FIELD, DAVID DUDLEY (18o5-1894)
• FIELD, EUGENE (1850-1895)
• FIELD, FREDERICK (18o1—1885)
• FIELD, HENRY MARTYN (1822-1907)
• FIELD, JOHN (1782—1837)
• FIELD, MARSHALL (183 1906)
• FIELD, NATHAN (1587—1633)
• FIELD, STEPHEN JOHNSON (1816-1899)
• FIELD, WILLIAM VENTRIS FIELD, BARON (1813-1907)

field of consciousness—if we allow for a moment the propriety of the expression—and that opposition or incompatibility between presentations which is only possible when they are in consciousness has been strangely confused by the Herbartians . In the former the intensity of the presentation is primarily alone of See also:

• ACCOUNT
• ACCOUNT (through O. Fr. acont, Late Lat. comptum, cornputare, to calculate)

account; in the latter, on the contrary, quality and content are mainly concerned . Only the last requires any See also:

• NOTICE

notice here, since such opposition arises when the ideational continuum is interrupted in the ways just mentioned, and apparently arises in no other way . Certainly there is no such opposition between primary presentations: there we have the See also:

• LAW
• LAW (0. Eng. lagu, M. Eng. lawe; from an old Teutonic root lag, " lie," what lies fixed or evenly; cf. Lat. lex, Fr. loi)
• LAW, JOHN (1671—1729)
• LAW, WILLIAM (1686-1761)

law of incopresentability preventing the presentation of opposites with the same local sign; and their presentation with different local signs involves, on this level at all events, no conflict . But what has never been presented could hardly be represented, if the ideational process were undisturbed: even in our dreams See also:

• WHITE
• WHITE, ANDREW DICKSON (1832– )
• WHITE, GILBERT (1720–1793)
• WHITE, HENRY KIRKE (1785-1806)
• WHITE, HUGH LAWSON (1773-1840)
• WHITE, JOSEPH BLANCO (1775-1841)
• WHITE, RICHARD GRANT (1822-1885)
• WHITE, ROBERT (1645-1704)
• WHITE, SIR GEORGE STUART (1835– )
• WHITE, SIR THOMAS (1492-1567)
• WHITE, SIR WILLIAM ARTHUR (1824--1891)
• WHITE, SIR WILLIAM HENRY (1845– )
• WHITE, THOMAS (1628-1698)
• WHITE, THOMAS (c. 1550-1624)

white negroes or round squares, for instance, never appear . In fact, absurd and bizarre as See also:

• DREAM (from a root dreug, connected with Germ. trugen, to deceive)

dream-imagery is, it never at any moment entails overt contradictions, though See also:

• CONTRADICTION, PRINCIPLE OF (principium contradictionis)

contradiction may be implicit . But between ideas and percepts actual incompatibility is frequent . In the perplexity of See also:

• ISAAC (Hebrew for " he laughs," on explanatory references to the name, see ABRAHAM)

Isaac, e.g . —" The See also:

• VOICE (Fr. voix, from Lat. vox)

voice is See also:

• JACOB
• JACOB, JOHN (1812-1858)

Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of See also:

• ESAU

Esau "—we have such a case in a familiar form .

There is here not merely mental See also:

• ARREST (Fr. arrester, arreeter, to stop or stay)

arrest but actual conflict: the voice perceived identifies Jacob, at the same time the hands identify Esau . The images of Esau and Jacob by themselves are different, but do not conflict; neither is there any See also:

• STRAIN (through O. Fr. straindre, estraindre, mod. i treindre, from Lat. stringere, to draw tight, related to stress, stretch, string, &c.)

strain, quite the contrary, in recognizing a person partly like Jacob and partly like Esau . For there is no See also:

• DIRECT

direct incompatibility between smooth and rough, so long as one pertains only to voice and the other only to hands, but the same hands and voice cannot be both smooth and rough . Similar incompatibilities may arise without the intrusion of percepts, as when, in trying to guess a riddle or to solve a problem, or generally to eliminate intellectual See also:

• DIFFERENCES, CALCULUS OF (Theory of Finite Differences)

differences, we have images which in themselves are only logically opposite, psychologically opposed, or in conflict, because each strives to enter the same complex . In all such conflicts alike we find, in fact, a relation of presentations the exact converse] of that which constitutes similarity . In the latter we have two complete presentations, a b x and a b y, as similar, each including the See also:

• COMMON

common part a b; in the former we have two partial presentations, x and y, as contraries, each excluding the other from the incomplete a b— . And this a b, it is to be noted, is not more essential to the similarity than to the conflict . But in the one case it is a generic image (and can logically be predicated of two subjects) ; in the other it is a partially determined individual (and cannot be subject to opposing predicates) . Except as thus supplementing a b, x and y do not conflict; See also:

• BLACK
• BLACK, ADAM (1784-1874)
• BLACK, JEREMIAH SULLIVAN (1810–1883)
• BLACK, WILLIAM (1841-1898)

black and white are not incompatible save as-attributes of the same thing . The possibility of most of these conflicts—of all, indeed, that have any logical interest—lies in that reduplication of the memory-continuum which gives rise to these new complexes, generic images or general ideas . Reminiscence and Expectation: Temporal Perception . 26 .

Having thus attempted to ascertain the formation of the ideational continuum out of the memory-train, the question arises: How now are we to distinguish between imagining and remembering, and again, between imagining and expecting ? ' It is a mark of the looseness of much of our psychological terminology that facts of this See also:

• KIND (O. E. ge-cynde, from the same root as is seen in " kin," supra)

kind are commonly described as cases of association . Dr Bain calls them " obstructive association," which is about on a See also:

• PAR (Lat. par, equal)

par with " progress backwards " ; Mr See also:

• SULLY, JAMES (1842– )
• SULLY, MAXIMILIEN DE BETHUNE
• SULLY, THOMAS (1783—1872)

Sully's " divergent association " is better . But it is See also:

• PLAIN (O. Fr. plain, from Lat. plenum)

plain that what we really have is an arrest or See also:

• INHIBITION (from Lat. inhibere, to restrain, prevent)

inhibition consequent on association, and nothing that is either itself association or that leads to association . It is plainly absurd to make the difference depend on the presence of belief in memory and expectation and on its absence in mere See also:

• IMAGINATION

imagination; for the belief itself depends on this difference instead of constituting it . One real and obvious distinction, however, which Hume pointed out as regards memory, is the fixed order and position of the ideas of what is remembered or expected as contrasted with " the See also:

• LIBERTY (Lat. libertas, from liber, free)

liberty " of the imagination to transpose and change its ideas . This order and Imagination and Memory position in the case of memory are, of course, norm- ally those of the See also:

• ORIGINAL

original impressions, but it seems rather naive of Hume to tell us that memory " is tied down to these without any power of variation," while imagination has liberty to trans-pose as it pleases, as if the originals sat to memory for their portraits, while to imagination they were but studies . Such See also:

• CORRESPONDENCE
• CORRESPONDENCE (from med. scholastic Lat. correspondentia, corrcspondere, compounded of Lat. cum, with, and respond ere, to answer; cf. Fr. correspondance)

correspondence being out of the question—as Hume takes care to state as soon as it suits him—all we have, so far, is this fixity and definiteness as contrasted with the kaleidoscopic instability of ideation . In this respect what is remembered or expected resembles what is perceived: the grouping not only does not change capriciously and spontaneously, but resists any mental efforts to change it . But, provided these characteristics are there, we should be apt to believe that we are remembering, just as, mutatis mutandis, with like characteristics we might believe that we were perceiving: See also:

• HALLUCINATION (from Lat. alucinari or allucinari, to wander in mind, Gr. a.)^i resty or hXvecv, from an, wandering)

hallucination is possible in either case . This fixity of order and position is, however, not sufficient to constitute a typical reminiscence where the term is exactly used . But remembering is often regarded as See also:

• EQUIVALENT

equivalent to knowing and recognizing, as when on revisiting some once familiar place one remarks, " How well I remember it!" What is meant is that the place is recognized, and that its recognition awakens memories .

Memory includes recognition; recognition as such does not include memory . In human consciousness, as we directly observe it, there is, perhaps, no pure recognition: here the new presentation in not only assimilated to the old, but the former framing of circumstance is reinstated, and so perforce distinguished from the present . It may be there is no See also:

• WARRANT (Med. Lat. warantum; O. Fr. garant, warant, derived from O.H.G. root represented in modern German bygewdhren)

warrant for supposing that such redintegration of a preceding field is ever absolutely nil, still we are justified in regarding it as extremely vague and meagre, both where mental evolution is but slightly advanced and where frequent repetition in varying and irrelevant circumstances has produced a blurred and neutral See also:

• ZONE (Gr. 'WV77, a girdle, from 'wvvLvay to gird)

zone . The last is the case with a great part of our knowledge; the writer happens to know that See also:

• BOS, LAMBERT (1670—1717)

bos is the Latin for " ox " and bufo the Latin for " See also:

• TOAD

toad," and may be said to remember both items of knowledge, if " remember " is only to be synonymous with " retain." But if he came across bos in See also:

• READING

reading he would think of an ox and nothing more; bufo would immediately call up not only " toad " but See also:

• VIRGIL (PUBLIUS VERGILIUS MARC)
• VIRGIL, POLYDORE (c. 1470-1555)

Virgil's Georgics, the only place in which he has seen the word, and which he never read but once . In the former there is so far nothing but recognition (which, however, of course rests upon retentiveness); in the latter there is also remembrance of the time and circumstances in which that piece of knowledge was acquired . Of course in so far as we are aware that we recognize we also think that remembrance is at any See also:

• RATE

rate possible, since what we know we must previously have learned—recognition excluding novelty . But the point here urged is that there is an actual reminiscence only when the recognition is accompanied by a reinstatement of portions of the memory-train continuous with the previous presentation of what is now recognized . Summarily stated, we may say that between knowing and remembering on the one See also:

• HAND
• HAND (a word common to Teutonic languages; cf. Ger. Hand, Goth. handus)
• HAND, FERDINAND GOTTHELF (1786-185r)

hand and imagining on the other the difference primarily turns on the fixity and completeness of the grouping in the former; in the latter there is a shifting See also:

• PLAY

play of images more or less " generic," reminding one of " dissolving views." Hence the first two approximate in character to perception, and are rightly called recognitions . Between them, again, the difference turns primarily on the presence or absence of temporal signs . In what is remembered these are still intact enough to ensure a localization in the past of what is recognized; in what is known merely such localization is prevented, either because of the obliviscence of temporal connexions or because the reduplications of the memory-train that have consolidated the central See also:

• GROUP

group have entailed their suppression . There is further the difference first mentioned, which is often only a difference of degree, viz. that reminiscences have more circumstantiality, so to say, than mere recognitions have: more of the See also:

• COLLATERAL (from Med. Lat. collateralis,—cum, with, and latus, lateris, side,—side by side, hence parallel or additional)

collateral constituents of the original See also:

• CONCRETE
• CONCRETE (Lat. concretes, participle of concrescere, to grow together)

concrete field of consciousness are reinstated . But of the two characteristics of memory proper—(a) concreteness or circumstantiality, and (b) localization in the past—the latter is the more essential .

It sometimes happens that we have the one with little or nothing of the other . For example, we may have but a faint and meagre representation of a scene, yet if it falls into and retains a fixed place in the memory train we have no doubt that some such experience was once actually ours . On the other hand, as in certain so-called illusions of memory, we may suddenly find ourselves reminded by what is happening at the moment of a preceding experience exactly like it—some even feel that they know from what is thus recalled what will happen next; and yet, because we are wholly unable to assign such representation a place in the past, instead of a belief that it happened, there arises a most distressing sense of bewilderment, as if one were haunted and had lost one's See also:

• PERSONAL

personal See also:

• BEARINGS

bearings.' It has been held by some psychologists 2 that memory proper includes the representation of one's past self as See also:

• AGENT (from Lat. agere, to act)

agent or patient in the event or situation recalled . And this is true as regards all but the earliest human experience, at any rate; still, whereas it is easy to see that memory is essential to any development of self consciousness, the converse is not at all clear, and would involve us in a needless circle . 27 . Intimately connected with memory is expectation . We may as the result of reasoning conclude that a certain event Expectation. will happen; we may also, in like manner, conclude that a certain other event has happened . But as we should not call the latter memory, so it is desirable to distinguish such indirect anticipation as the former from that expectation which is directly due to the interaction of ideas . Any See also:

• MAN
• MAN, ISLE OF (anc. Mona)

man knows that he will See also:

• DIE
• DIE (Fr. de, from Lat. datum, given)

die, and may make a variety of arrangements in anticipation of See also:

• DEATH

death, but he cannot with propriety be said to be expecting it unless he has actually present to his mind a series of ideas ending in that of death, such series being due to previous associations, and unless, further, this series owes its representation at this moment to the actual recurrence of some experience to which that series succeeded before . And as familiarity with an object or event in very various settings may be a See also:

• BAR
• BAR (0. Fr. barre, Late Lat. barra, origin unknown)
• BAR, CONFEDERATION OF
• BAR, FRANCOIS DE (1538-1606)
• BAR, THE

bar to recollection, so it may be to expectation: the See also:

• AVERAGE

average Englishman, e.g. is continually surprised without his See also:

• UMBRELLA

umbrella, though only too familiar with See also:

• RAIN (O.E. regn; the word is common to Teutonic languages, cf. Ger. Regen, Swed. and Dan. regn; it has been connected with Lat. rigare, to wet, Gr. 13pixeav)

rain, since in our See also:

• CLIMATE

climate one not specially attentive to the See also:

• WEATHER (O. Eng. weder; the word is common to Teutonic languages; cf. Du. weder, Dan. veir, Icel. ve8r, and Ger. Wetter and Gewitter, storm; the root is wa- to blow, from which is derived " wind ")

weather obtains no clear representation of its successive phases . But after a series of events A B C D E . . . has been once experienced we instinctively expect the recurrence of B C .

. . on the recurrence of A, i.e. provided the memory-train continues so far intact . Such expectation, at first perhaps slight—a mere tendency easily overborne—becomes strengthened by every repetition of the series in the old order, till eventually, if often fulfilled and never falsified, it becomes certain and, as we commonly say, irresistible . To have a clear case of expectation, then, it is not necessary that we should distinctly remember any previous experience like it, but only that we should have actually present some earlier member of a series which has been firmly associated by such previous experiences, the remaining members, or at least the next, if they continue serial, being revived through that which is once again realized . This expectation may be instantly checked by reflection, just as it may, of course, be disappointed in fact;'but these are matters which do not concern the inquiry as to the nature of expectation while expectation lasts . We shall continue this inquiry to most advantage by widening it into an examination of the distinction of present, past and future . To a being whose presentations never passed through ' Any full discussion of paramnesia, as these very interesting states of mind are called, belongs to mental See also:

• PATHOLOGY (from Gr. raBos, suffering)

pathology . 2 As, e.g . See also:

• JAMES
• JAMES (Gr. 'IlrKw,l3or, the Heb. Ya`akob or Jacob)
• JAMES (JAMES FRANCIS EDWARD STUART) (1688-1766)
• JAMES, 2ND EARL OF DOUGLAS AND MAR(c. 1358–1388)
• JAMES, DAVID (1839-1893)
• JAMES, EPISTLE OF
• JAMES, GEORGE PAYNE RAINSFOP
• JAMES, HENRY (1843— )
• JAMES, JOHN ANGELL (1785-1859)
• JAMES, THOMAS (c. 1573–1629)
• JAMES, WILLIAM (1842–1910)
• JAMES, WILLIAM (d. 1827)

James See also:

• MILL
• MILL (O. Eng. mylen, later myln, or miln, adapted from the late Lat. molina, cf. Fr. moulin, from Lat. mola, a mill, molere, to grind; from the same root, mol, is derived " meal;" the word appears in other Teutonic languages, cf. Du. molen, Ger. muhle)
• MILL, JAMES (1773-1836)
• MILL, JOHN (c. 1645–1707)
• MILL, JOHN STUART (1806-1873)

Mill (Analysis of the Human Mind, ch. x.), who treats this difficult subject with great acuteness and thoroughness.the transitions which ours undergo—first divested of the strength and vividness of impressions, again reinvested with them and brought back from the faint See also:

• WORLD

world of ideas present, —the See also:

• SHARP, GRANVILLE (1735-1813)
• SHARP, JAMES (1618-1679)
• SHARP, JOHN (1645-1714)
• SHARP, RICHARD (1759-1835)
• SHARP, WILLIAM (1749-1824)
• SHARP, WILLIAM (1856-1905)

sharp contrasts of " now " and " then," and past, and all the manifold emotions they occasion, would be Future. quite unknown . Even we, so far as we confine our activity and attention to ideas are almost without them . Time-order, succession, antecedence, and consequence, of course, there might be still, but in that sense of events as " past and gone for ever," which is one of the See also:

• MELANCHOLY (Gr. µe)tayXotia, from µEtas, black, and Xotii, bile)

melancholy factors in our life; and in the See also:

• OBLIGATION

obligation to wait and work in See also:

• HOPE, ANTHONY
• HOPE, THOMAS (c. 1770-1831)

hope or dread to what is " still to come " there is much more than time-order . It is to presentations in their primary See also:

• STAGE (Fr. 6/age; from Lat. stare, to stand)

stage, to impressions, that we owe what real difference we find between now and then, whether prospective or retrospective, as it is to them also that we directly owe our sense of the real, of what is and exists as opposed to the non-existent that is not . But the present alone and life in a succession of presents, or, in other words, continuous occupation with impressions, give us no knowledge of the present as present .

This we first obtain when our present consciousness consists partly of memories or partly of expectations as well . An event expected differs from a like event remembered chiefly in two ways—in its relation to present impressions and images and in the active attitude to which it leads . The diverse feelings that accompany our intuitions of time and contribute so largely to their colouring are mainly consequences of these differences . Let us take a series of simple and familiar events A B C D E, representing ideas by small letters, and perceptions by capitals whenever it is necessary to distinguish them . Such series may be present in consciousness in such See also:

• WISE, HENRY ALEXANDER (1806-1876)
• WISE, ISAAC MAYER (1819-1900)

wise that a b e d are imaged while E is perceived anew, i.e. the whole symbolized as proposed would be a b e d E; such would be, e.g. the state of a See also:

• DOG

dog that had just finished his daily See also:

• MEAL

meal . Again, there may be a fresh impression of A which revivesb c d e; we should have then (I) Abed e—the state of our dog when he next See also:

• DAY (O. Eng. dreg, Ger. Tag; according to the New English Dictionary, " in no way related to the Lat. dies")
• DAY, JOHN (1574-1640?)
• DAY, THOMAS (1748-1789)

day gets sight of the dish in which his See also:

• FOOD
• FOOD (like the verb " to feed," from a Teutonic root, whence O. Eng. foda; cf. " fodder "; connected with Gr. lrareicOae, to feed)

food is brought to him . A little later we may have (2) a b C d e . Here a b are either after-sensations or primary memory-images, or have at any rate the increased intensity due to See also:

• RECENT

recent impression; but this increased intensity will be rapidly on the wane even while C lasts, and a b will See also:

• PALE (through Fr. pal, from Lat. palms, a stake, for paglus, from the stem pag- of pangere, to fix; " pole " is from the same original source)

pale still further when C gives place to D, and we have (3) a b c D e . But, returning to (2), we should find d e to be increasing in intensity and definiteness, as compared with their state in (I), now that C, instead of A, is the present impression . For, when A occupied this position, not only was e raised less prominently above the threshold of consciousness by reason of its greater distance from A in the memory-continuum, but, owing to the reduplications of this continuum, more lines of possible revival were opened up, to be successively negatived as B succeeded to A and C to E; even See also:

• DOGS, ISLE OF

dogs know that " there is many a slip 'twixt the See also:

• CUP (in O.E. cuppe; generally taken to be from Late Lat. cuppa, a variant of Lat. cupa, a cask, cf. Gr. KuaeXXov)

cup and the See also:

• LIP (a word common in various forms, to Teutonic languages, cf Ger. Lippe, Dan. laebe; Lat. labium is cognate)

lip." But, where A B C D E is a series of percepts such as we have here supposed—and a series of simpler states would hardly afford much ground for the distinctions of past, present and future—there would be a varying amount of active See also:

• ADJUSTMENT (from late Lat. ad juxtare, derived from juxta, near, but early confounded with a supposed derivation from justus, right)

adjustment of sense-See also:

• ORGANS

organs and other movements supplementary to full sensation . In (2), the point at which we have a b C d e, for instance, such adjustments and movements as were appropriate to b would cease as B lapsed and be replaced by those appropriate to C . Again, as C succeeded to B, and d in consequence increased in intensity and definiteness, the movements adapted to the reception of D would become nascent, and so on .

Thus, psycho-logically regarded, the distinction of past and future and what we might call the oneness of direction of time depend, as just described, (I) upon the continuous sinking of the primary memory-images on the one See also:

• SIDE
• SIDE (mod. Eski Adalia)

side, and the continuous rising of the See also:

• ORDINARY (med. Lat. ordinarius, Fr. ordinaire)

ordinary images on the other side, of that member of a series of percepts then repeating which is actual at the moment; and (2) 011 the prevenient adjustments of attention, to which such words as " expect," " await," " anticipate," all testify by their See also:

• ETYMOLOGY (Gr. grvµos, true, and X6yos, "account)

etymology . These conditions in turn will be found to depend upon all that is implied in the formation of the memory-train and upon that recurrence of like series of impressions which we attribute to the " uniformity of nature . " If we never had the continuum preserves the order of events intact, we have still no same series of impressions twice, knowledge of time would be impossible, as indeed would knowledge of any sort . 28 . Time is often figuratively represented as a line, and we may perhaps utilize this figure to make clear the relation of our perception of time to what we call time itself . The Succession . present, though conceived as a point or instant of time, is still such that we actually can and do in that moment attend to a See also:

• PLURALITY (0. Fr. pluralitd, Late Lat. pluralitas, plural number)

plurality of presentations to which we might other-wise have attended to severally in successive moments . Granting this implication of simultaneity and succession, we may, if we represent succession as a line, represent simultaneity as a second line at right angles to the first; pure time—or time-length without time-breadth, we may say— is a mere See also:

• ABSTRACTION (Lat. abs and trahere)

abstraction . Now it is with the former line that we have to do in treating of time as it is (or as we conceive it), and with the latter in treating of our perception of time, where, just as in a See also:

• PERSPECTIVE (Lat. peespicere, to see through)

perspective representation of distance, we are confined to lines in a See also:

• PLANE

plane at right angles to the actual line of See also:

• DEPTH

depth . In a succession of events A B C D E ... the presence of B means the absence of A and of C, but the presentation of this succession involves the simultaneous presence, in some mode or other, of two or more of the presentations A B C D . In our temporal perception, then, all that corresponds to the differences of past, present and future is presented simultaneously . To this fact the name of " specious present or " psychical present " has been given .

What we have is not a moving point or moment of See also:

• OBJECTIVE, or OBJECT GLASS

objective time, but rather a moving line, the contents of which, continuously changing, simultaneously represent a portion of the line of objective succession, viz. the immediate past as still present in primary memory-images, and the immediate future as anticipated in prepercepts and nascent acts.' This truism—or See also:

• PARADOX (Gr. treat, beyond, contrary to, Sofia, opinion)

paradox—that all we know of succession is but an See also:

• INTERPRETATION (from Lat. interpretari, to expound, explain, inter pres, an agent, go-between, interpreter; inter, between, and the root pret-, possibly connected with that seen either in Greek 4 p4'ew, to speak, or irpa-rrecv, to do)

interpretation of what is really simultaneous or coexistent, we may then concisely See also:

• EXPRESS (through the French from the past participle of the Lat. exprimere, to press out, by transference used of representing objects in painting or sculpture, or of thoughts, &c. in words)

express by saying that we are aware of time only through time-perspective, and experience shows that it is a long step from a succession of presentations to such presentation of succession . The first See also:

• CONDITION (Lat. condicio, from condicere, to agree upon, arrange; not connected with conditio, from condere, conditum, to put together)

condition of such presentation is that we should have represented together presentations that were in the first instance attended to successively, and this we have both in the persistence of primary memory-images and in the simultaneous reproduction of longer or shorter portions of the memory-train . In a series thus secured there may be time-marks, though no time, and by these marks the series will be distinguished from other simultaneous series . To ask which is first among a number of simultaneous presentations is unmeaning; one might be logically See also:

• PRIOR (from Lat. prior—former, and hence superior, through O. Fr. priour)
• PRIOR, MATTHEW (1664-1721)

prior to another, but in time they are together and priority. is excluded . Nevertheless after each distinct representation a, b, c, d there probably follows, as we have supposed, some trace of that See also:

• MOVEMENT

movement of attention of which we are aware in passing from one presentation to another . In our present reminiscences we have, it must be allowed, little direct See also:

• PROOF (in M. Eng. preove, proeve, preve, &°c., from O. Fr . prueve, proeve, &c., mod. preuve, Late. Lat. proba, probate, to prove, to test the goodness of anything, probus, good)

proof of this inter-position, though there is strong indirect evidence of it in the tendency of the flow to follow the order in which the presentations were first attended to . With the movements themselves we are familiar enough, though the residua of such movements are not ordinarily conspicuous . These residua, then, are our temporal signs, and, together with the representations connected by them, constitute the memory-continuum . But temporal signs alone will not furnish all the pictorial exactness of the time-perspective . They give us only a fixed series; but the working of obliviscence, by insuring a progressive variation in intensity and distinctness as we pass from one member of the series to the other, yields the effect which we call time-distance . By themselves such See also:

• VARIATIONS
• VARIATIONS, CALCULUS
• VARIATIONS, CALCULUS OF

variations would leave us liable to confound more vivid representations in the distance with fainter ones nearer the present, but from this See also:

• MISTAKE (i.e. take amiss)

mistake the temporal signs save us; and, as a See also:

• MATTER

matter of fact, where the memory-train is imperfect such mistakes continually occur . On the other hand, where these variations are slight and imperceptible, though the memory- ' Cf .

W . James, Principles of Psychology, i . 629 sqq . ; L . W . Stern, "Psychische Prasenzzeit," Z. f . Psych., (1897), xiii . 325 sqq . such distinct appreciation of See also:

• COMPARATIVE

comparative distance in time as we have nearer the present where these perspective effects are considerable . 29 . When in retrospect we See also:

• NOTE
• NOTE (Lat. nota, mark, sign, from noscere, to know)

note that a particular presentation X has had a place in the field of consciousness, while certain other presentations, A B C D ..., have succeeded each other, then we may be said in observing this Duration. relation of the two to perceive the duration of X . And it is in this way that we do subjectively estimate longer periods of time .

But first, it is evident that we cannot apply this method to indefinitely See also:

• SHORT, FRANCIS JOB (1857– )

short periods without passing beyond the region of distinct presentation; and, since the knowledge of duration implies a relation between distinguishable presentations See also:

• ABC

ABC D and X, the case is one in which the hypothesis of subconsciousness can hardly help any but those who confound the fact of time with the knowledge of it . Secondly, if we are to compare different durations at all, it is not enough that one of them should last out a series A B C D, and another a series L M N 0; we also want some sort of common measure of those series . See also:

• LOCKE, GOTTFRIED CHRISTIAN FRIEDRICH (1791–1855)
• LOCKE, JOHN (1632-1704)
• LOCKE, MATTHEW (c. 1630-1677)

Locke was awake to this point, though he expresses himself vaguely (See also:

• ESSAY, ESSAYIST (Fr. essai, Late Lat. exagium, a weighing or balance; exigere, to examine; the term in general meaning any trial or effort)

Essay, ii. r4, §§ 9-12) . He speaks of our ideas succeeding each other " at certain distances not much unlike the images in the inside of a See also:

• LANTERN (an adaptation of the Fr. lanterne from Lat. lanterna or laterna, supposed to be from Gr. Aa urritp, a torch or lamp, Aaµaew, to shine, cf. " lamp "; the 16th- and 17th-century form " lanthorn " is due to a mistaken derivation from " horn," as a m

lantern turned round by the See also:

• HEAT (0. E. haktu, which like " hot," Old Eng. hat, is from the Teutonic type haita, hit, to be hot; cf. Ger. hitze, heiss; Dutch, hitte, heet, &c.)

heat of a See also:

• CANDLE (Lat. candela, from candere, to glow)

candle, " and " guesses " that " this See also:

• APPEARANCE (from Lat. apparere, to appear)

appearance of theirs in train varies not very much in a waking man." Now what is this " distance " that separates A from B, B from C, and so on, and what means have we of knowing that it is tolerably See also:

• CONSTANT, BENJAMIN (1845-1902)

constant in waking life ? It is probably that the residuum of which we have called a temporal sign; or, in other words, it is the movement of attention from A to B . But we must endeavour here to get a more exact notion of this movement . Everybody knows what it is to be distracted by a rapid succession of varied impressions, and equally what it is to be wearied by the slow and monotonous recurrence of the same impressions . Now these " feelings " of See also:

• DISTRACTION (from Lat. distrakere, to pull asunder)

distraction and tedium owe their characteristic qualities to movements of attention . In the first, attention is kept incessantly on the move; before it is accommodated to A, it is disturbed by the suddenness, intensity, or novelty of B; in the second, it is kept all but stationary by the repeated presentation of the same impression . Such excess and defect of surprises make one realize a fact which in ordinary life is so obscure as to See also:

• ESCAPE (in mid. Eng. eschape or escape, from the O. Fr. eschapper, modern echapper, and escaper, low Lat. escapium, from ex, out of, and cappa, cape, cloak; cf. for the sense development the Gr. iichueoOat, literally to put off one's clothes, hence to sli

escape notice . But recent experiments have set this fact in a more striking See also:

• LIGHT

light, and made clear what Locke had dimly before his mind in talking of a certain distance between the presentations of a waking man . In estimating very short periods of time, of a second or less—indicated say by the beats of a See also:

• METRONOME (Gr. Orpov, measure, and voµos, law)

metronome—it is found that there is a certain period for which the mean of a number of estimates is correct, while shorter periods are on the whole over-estimated, and longer periods under-estimated .

This we may perhaps take to be evidence of the time occupied in accommodating or fixing attention . Whether the " point of indifference " is determined by the rate of usual bodily movement, as Spencer asserts and See also:

• WUNDT, WILHELM MAX (1832— )

Wundt conjectures, or conversely, is a question we need not discuss just now . But, though the fixation of attention does of course really occupy time, it is probably not in the first instance perceived as time, i.e. as continuous " protensity, " to use a term of See also:

• HAMILTON
• HAMILTON (GRAND or ASHUANIPI)
• HAMILTON, ALEXANDER (1757-1804)
• HAMILTON, ANTHONY, or ANTOINE (1646-1720)
• HAMILTON, ELIZABETH (1758–1816)
• HAMILTON, EMMA, LADY (c. 1765-1815)
• HAMILTON, JAMES (1769-1831)
• HAMILTON, JAMES HAMILTON, 1ST DUKE OF (1606-1649)
• HAMILTON, JOHN (c. 1511–1571)
• HAMILTON, MARQUESSES AND DUKES OF
• HAMILTON, PATRICK (1504-1528)
• HAMILTON, ROBERT (1743-1829)
• HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM
• HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM (1730-1803)
• HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM ROWAN (1805-1865)
• HAMILTON, THOMAS (1789-1842)
• HAMILTON, WILLIAM (1704-1754)
• HAMILTON, WILLIAM GERARD (1729-1796)

Hamilton's, but as intensity . Thu,s, if this supposition be true, there is an See also:

• ELEMENT (Lat. elementum)

element in our concrete time-perception which has no place in our abstract conception of time . In time conceived as physical there is no trace of intensity; in time psychically experienced duration is primarily an intensive magnitude, See also:

• WITNESS
• WITNESS (from O. Eng. witan, to know)

witness the comparison of times when we are " bored " with others when we are amused . It must have struck every one as See also:

• STRANGE, SIR ROBERT (1721-1792)

strange who has reflected upon it that a period of time which seems long in retrospect—such as an eventful excursion—should have appeared short in passing; while a period, on the contrary, which in memory has dwindled to a wretched span seemed See also:

• EVERLASTING, or IMMORTELLE

everlasting till it was gone . But, if we consider that in retrospect length of time is represented primarily and chiefly by impressions that have survived, we have an explanation of one-See also:

• HALF

half; and in the intensity of the movements of attention we shall perhaps find an explanation II of the other . What tells in retrospect is the series a b e d e, &c.; what tells in the wearisome present is the intervening t,t213, &c., or rather the original See also:

• ACCOMMODATION (Lat. accommodare, to make fit, from ad, to, cum, with, and modus, measure)

accommodation of which these temporal signs are the r