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OBJECTS
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See also:save in being See also:attention to a See also:special class of objects
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First of all, it is noteworthy that both have the same characteristics
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Thus, what See also: to . We come now to the exposition of the objects of attention or consciousness, i.e. to what we may See also:call the See also:objective or presentational See also:factor of psychical See also:life . The treatment of this will fall naturally into two divisions . In the first we shall have to See also:deal with its See also:general characteristics and with the fundamental processes which all presentation involves . In view of its general and more or less hypothetical See also:character we may call it the theory of presentation . We can then pass on to the special forms of presentations, known as sensations, percepts, images, &c., and to the special processes to which these forms See also:lead up . This exposition will be simplified if we start with a supposition that will enable us to leave aside, at least for the See also:present, the See also:Assumption difficult question of See also:heredity . We know that in of a psycho- the course of each individual's life there is more logical or less of progressive differentiation or development . Individual . Further, it is believed that there has existed a See also:series of sentient individuals beginning with the lowest See also:form of life and advancing continuously up to See also:man . Some traces of the advance already made may be reproduced in the growth of each human being now, but for the most See also:part such traces have been obliterated . What was experience in the past has become See also:instinct in the present . The descendant has no consciousness of his ancestor's failures when performing by " an untaught ability " what they slowly and perhaps painfully acquired . But, if we are to See also:attempt to follow the See also:genesis of mind from its earliest See also:dawn, it is the See also:primary experience rather than the eventual instinct that we have first of all to keep in view . To this end, then, it is proposed to assume that we are dealing with one individual who has continuously advanced from the beginning of psychical life, and not with a series of individuals of whom all save the first inherited certain capacities from their progenitors . The life-See also:history of such an imaginary individual, that is to say, would correspond with all that was new in the experience of a certain typical series of individuals each of whom advanced a certain See also:stage in See also:mental differentiation . On the other See also:hand, from this history would be omitted that inherited See also:reproduction of the See also:net results, so to say, of ancestral experience, that innate tradition by which alone, under the actual conditionsof existence, progress is possible . The See also:process of thus reproducing the old might differ as widely from that of producing the new as See also:electrotyping does from See also:engraving . However, the point is that as psychologists we know nothing directly about it; neither can we distinguish precisely at any See also:link in the See also:chain of life what is old and inherited—See also:original in the sense of See also:Locke and See also:Leibnitz —from what is new or acquired—original in the See also:modern sense . But we are See also:bound as a See also:matter of method to suppose all complexity and differentiation among presentations to have been originated, i.e. experimentally acquired, at some time or other . So See also:long, then, as we are concerned primarily with the progress of this differentiation we may disregard the fact that it has not actually been, as it were, the product of one hand dealing with one tabula rasa to use Locke's—originally See also:Aristotle's—figure, but of many hands, each of which, starting with a reproduction of what had been wrought on the preceding tabulae, put in more or fewer new touches before devising the whole to a successor who would proceed in like manner . rt . What is implied in this process of differentiation and what is it that becomes differentiated ?—these are the questions to which we must now attend . Psychologists have The pre. usually represented mental advance as consisting sentationfundamentally in the See also:combination and recombina- Continuum. tion of various elementary See also:units, the so-called sensations and See also:primitive movements: in other words, as consisting in a See also:species of " mental See also:chemistry . " If we are to resort to See also:physical analogies at all—a matter of very doubtful propriety—we shall find in the growth of a See also:seed or an embryo far better illustrations of the unfolding of the contents of consciousness than in the See also:building up of molecules: the process seems much more a segmentation of what is originally continuous than an See also:aggregation of elements at first See also:independent and distinct . Comparing higher minds or stages of mental development with See also:lower—by what means such comparison is possible we need not now consider—we find in the higher conspicuous See also:differences between presentations which in the lower are indistinguishable or absent altogether . The See also:worm is aware only of the difference between light and dark . The See also:steel-worker See also:sees See also:half a dozen tints where others see only a See also:uniform glow . To the See also:child, it is said, all faces are alike; and throughout life we are See also:apt to See also:note the general, the points of resemblance, before the special, the points of difference . But even when most definite, what we call a presentation is still part of a larger whole . It is not separated from other presentations, whether simultaneous or successive, by something which is not of the nature of presentation, as one See also:island is separated from another by the intervening See also:sea, or one note in a See also:melody from the next by an interval of silence . In our See also:search for a theory of presentations, then, it is from this " continuity of consciousness " that we must take our start . Working backwards from this as we find it now, we are led alike by particular facts and general considerations to the conception of a totum See also:objectivism or objective continuum which is gradually differentiated, thereby giving rise to what we call distinct presentations, just as some particular presentation, clear as a whole, as Leibnitz would say, becomes with mental growth a complex of distinguishable parts . Of the very beginning of this continuum we can say nothing; See also:absolute beginnings are beyond the See also:pale of See also:science . Experience advances as this continuum is differentiated, every differentiation being a See also:change of presentation . Hence the See also:commonplace of psychologists—We are only conscious as we are conscious of change . But " change of consciousness" is too loose an expression to take the See also:place of the unwieldy phrase differentiation of a presentation-continuum, to which we have been driven . For not only does the See also:term "consciousness" confuse what exactness requires us to keep distinct, an activity and its See also:object, but also the term "change" fails to See also:express the characteristics which distinguish new presentations from other changes . Differentiation implies that the See also:simple becomes complex or the complex more complex; it implies also that this increased complexity is due to the persistence of former changes; we may even say such persistence is GradualDlferentiatlon of PresenfationContinuum . essential to the very See also:idea of development or growth . In trying, not the whole of it, for in this experience of massive sensation alone it is impossible to find other elements which an See also:analysis of spatial See also:intuition unmistakably yields . Extensity and See also:extension, then, are not to be confounded . Now, we find, even at our level of mental See also:evolution, that an increase in the intensity of a sensation is apt to See also:entail an increase in its extensity too . In like manner we observe a greater extent of movement in emotional expression when the intensity of the emotion increases . Even the higher region of See also:imagination is no exception, as is shown by the whirl and confusion of ideas incident to See also:delirium, and, indeed, to all strong excitement . But this " See also:diffusion " or " See also:radiation, " as it has been called, diminishes as we pass from the class of organic sensations to the sensations of the five senses, from movements expressive of feeling to movements definitely purposive, and from the tumult of ideas excited by See also:passion to the steadier sequences determined by efforts to think . Increased differentiation seems, then, to be intimately connected with increased "restriction." Probably there may be found certain initial differentiations which for See also:psychology are ultimate facts that it cannot explain . As already said, the very beginning of experience is beyond us, though it is our business—working from within—to push back our analysis as far as we can .
But some differentiations being given, then it may be safely said that, in accordance with what we have called the principle of subjective selection (see § 6), attention would be voluntarily concentrated upon certain of these and upon the voluntary movements specially connected with them
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To such subjectively initiated modifications of the presentation-continuum, moreover, we may reasonably suppose "restriction" to be in large measure due
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But increased restriction would render further differentiation of the given whole of presentation possible, and so the two processes might supplement each other
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These processes have now proceeded so far that at the level of human consciousness we find it hard to form any tolerably clear conception of a See also: " 12 . In the preceding paragraphs we have had occasion to distinguish between the presentation-continuum or whole field of consciousness, as we may for the present call it, Retentive. and those several differentiations within this field ness . which are ordinarily spoken of as presentations, and to which—now that their true character as parts is clear— then, to conceive our psychological individual in the earliest stages of development we must not picture him as experiencing a See also:succession of absolutely new sensations, which, coming out of nothingness, admit of being strung upon the " See also:thread of consciousness " like beads picked up at See also:random, or cemented into a See also:mass like the bits of stick and See also:sand with which the See also:young caddis covers its nakedness . The notion, which See also:Kant has done much to encourage, that psychical life begins with a confused manifold of sensations—devoid not only of logical but even of psychological unity—is one that becomes more inconceivable the more closely we consider it . An absolutely new presentation, having no sort of connexion with former presentations till the subject has synthesized it with them, is a conception for which it would be hard to find a See also:warrant either by See also:direct observation, by inference from See also:biology, or in considerations of an a priori See also:kind . At any given moment we have a certain whole of presentations, a " field of consciousness, " psychologically one and continuous; at the next we have not an entirely new field but a partial change within this field . Many who would allow this in the case of representations, i.e. where idea succeeds idea by the workings of association, would demur to it in the case of primary presentations or sensations . " For, " they would say, " may not silence be broken by a clap of See also:thunder, and have not the See also:blind been made to see ? " To urge such objections is to See also:miss the See also:drift of our discussion, and to See also:answer them may serve to make it clearer . Where silence can be broken there are representations of preceding sounds and in all See also:probability even subjective presentations of sound as well; silence as experienced by one who has heard is very different from the silence of See also:Condillac's statue before it had ever heard . The question is rather whether such a conception as that of Condillac's is possible; supposing a sound to he, qualitatively, entirely distinct from a See also:smell, could a field of consciousness consisting of smells be followed at once by one in which sounds had part ? And, as regards the blind coming to see, we must remember not only that the blind have eyes but that they are descended from ancestors who could see . What nascent presentations of sight are thus involved it would be hard to say; and the problem of heredity is one that we have for the present See also:left aside . The view here taken is (I) that at its first See also:appearance in psychical life a new sensation or so-called elementary presentation is really a partial modification of some pre-existing presentation which thereby becomes as a whole more complex than it was before; and (2) that this complexity and differentiation of parts never become a See also:plurality of discontinuous presentations, having a distinctness and individuality such as the atoms or elementary particles of the physical See also:world are supposed to have . Beginners in psychology, and some who are not beginners, are apt to be led astray by expositions which set out from the sensations of the special senses, as if these furnished us with the type of an elementary presentation . The fact is we never experience a mere sensation of colour, sound, See also:touch, and the like; and what the young student mistakes for such is really a perception, a sensory presentation combined with various sensory and motor presentations and with representations—and having thus a definiteness and completeness only possible to complex presentations . 1^Ioreover, if we could attend to a pure sensation of sound or colour by itself, there is much to justify the suspicion that even this is complex and not simple, and owes to such complexity its clearly marked specific quality . In certain of our vaguest and most diffused organic sensations there is probably a much nearer approach to the character of the really primitive presentations . In such sensations we can distinguish three See also:variations, viz. variations of quality, of intensity, and of what See also:Bain called Diffusion massiveness, or, as we shall say, extensity . This and last characteristic, which everybody knows who Restriction. knows the difference between the ache of a big bruise and the ache of a little one, between See also:total and partial See also:immersion in a See also:bath, is, as we shall see later on, an essential See also:element in our perception of space . But it is certainly we too may confine the term . But it will be well in the next place, before inquiring more closely into their characteristics, to consider for a moment that persistence of preceding modifications which the principle of progressive differentiation implies . This persistence is best spoken of as retentiveness . It is often confused with memory, though this is something much more complex and special; for in memory there is necessarily some contrast of past and present, whereas here there is simply the persistence of the old . But what is it that persists ? On our theory we must answer, the continuum as differentiated, not the particular differentiation as an isolated unit . If psychologists have erred in regarding the presentations of one moment as merely a plurality of units, they have erred in like manner concerning the so-called residua of such presentations . As we see a certain colour or a certain object again and again, we do not go on accumulating images or representations of it, which are somewhere crowded together like shades on the See also:banks of the See also:Styx; nor is such colour, or whatever it be, the same at the hundredth time of presentation as at the first, as the hundredth impression of a See also:seal on See also:wax would be . There is no such lifeless fixity in mind . .The explanations of perception most in See also:vogue are far too mechanical and, so to say, atomistic; but we must fall back upon the unity and continuity of our presentation-continuum if we are to get a better . Suppose that in the course of a few minutes we take half a dozen glances at a See also:strange and curious See also:flower . We have not as many complex presentations which we might symbolize as Fi, See also:F2, .... F6 . But rather, at first only the general outline is noted, next the disposition of petals, stamens, &c., then the See also:attachment of the anthers, position of the ovary, and so on; that is to say, symbolizing the whole flower as [p'(ab) s' (c d) o' (f g)], we first apprehend say [p'.. s' ..o'], then [p' (a b) s'.. o'.], or [p' (a..) s' (c..) o' (L.)), and so forth . It is because the traits first attended to persist that the later form an addition to them till the complex is at length See also:complete . There is nothing in this instance properly answering to what are known as the reproduction and association of ideas; in the last and complete See also:apprehension as much as in the first vague and inchoate one the flower is there as a primary presentation .
There is a limit, of course, to such a See also:procedure, but the instance taken, we may safely say, is not such as to exceed the See also:bounds of a simultaneous field of consciousness
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Assuming then that such increase of differentiation through the persistence of preceding differentiations holds of the presentation-continuum as a whole, we conclude that, in those circumstances in which we now have a specific sensation of, say, red or sweet, there would be for some more primitive experience nothing but a vague, almost organic, sensation, which, however, would persist, so that on a repetition of the circumstances it could be again further differentiated
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The earlier differentiations, in See also:short, do not disappear like the waves of yesterday in the See also:calm of to-See also:day, nor yet last on like old scars beside new ones; but rather the two are blended and combined, so that the whole field of consciousness, like a continually growing picture, increases indefinitely in complexity of See also:pattern
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13
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Assimilation.—This process, in which later differentiations blend with and thereby further restrict and specialize what is retained of earlier and less definite presentations, is thus a further implication of the principle of the progressive development of the presentational continuum
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When not ignored altogether this further process has been commonly regarded as merely a simple form of " association," its peculiarity being, as it was supposed, that the presentations associated—though numerically distinct—were in quality perfectly identical
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In point of fact, both these assumptions seem to be erroneous and due to the so-called psychologist's See also:fallacy.' For the experiencing subject there is apparently at this stage—as we have already urged—neither the numerical distinctness nor the qualitative identity which the words " past impression (A1) " and " present impression (See also:A2) " suggest
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Still the connexion between this process of mere blending or See also:fusion, which we shall call assimilation, and the process of association proper is so close, and the detailed analysis called for so complex, that we must needs defer further discussion till we come to treat of association as a whole (cf. below, § 24)
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It may then be possible to show that we have here to do with a process
As, e.g. in interpreting the conduct of See also:children as if they were already " grown-up " persons; cf
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J
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See also:
(1882), pp
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369 fn
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374; See also:
When it is said that " a See also:constant impression is the same as a blank," what is meant turns out to be something not psychological at all, as, e.g., our insensibility to the See also:motion of the See also:earth or to the pressure of the See also:air—cases in which there is obviously no presentation, nor even any See also:evidence of See also:nervous change
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Or else this See also:paradox proves to be but an awkward way of expressing what we may call See also:accommodation, whether physiological or psychological
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Thus the skin soon adapts itself to certain seasonal alterations of temperature, so that See also:heat or cold ceases to be See also:felt: the sensation ceases because the nervous change, its proximate physical counterpart, has ceased
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Again, there is what James See also: . We are more conscious of heat when passing to a higher temperature, and of cold when passing to a lower . The See also:state we have passed to is our explicit consciousness, the state we have passed from is our implicit consciousness." But the transition need not be from heat to cold, or vice versa: it can equally well take place from a neutral state, which is indeed the normal state, of neither heat nor cold; a new-See also:born mammal, e.g. must experience cold, having never experienced heat . Again, suppose a sailor becalmed gazing for a whole See also:morning upon a stretch of sea and See also:sky, what sensations are implicit here ? Shall we say yellow as the greatest contrast to blue, or darkness as the contrary of light, or both ? What, again, is the implicit consciousness when the explicit is sweet; is it See also:bitter or sour, and from what is the transition in such a case ? For one thing it seems clear that the transition of attention from one presentation to another and the differences between the presentations themselves are distinct facts . It is strange that the psychologist who has laid such stress on neutral states of surprise 2 The See also:Works of Thos . See also:Reid, supplementary note, p . 932 . as being akin to feeling and so distinct from special presentations, should in any way confound the two . The See also:mistake is perhaps accounted for by the fact that Bain, in See also:common with the rest of his school, nowhere distinguishes between attention and the presentations that are attended to . If " change of impression " and being conscious or mentally alive are the same thing, it is then manifestly tautologous to say that one is the indispensable See also:condition of the other . If they are not the same thing, then the succession of shocks or surprises cannot wholly determine the impressions which successively determine them . But we have still to consider whether the impressions them-selves are nothing but differences or contrasts . " We do not know any one thing of itself but only the difference between it and another thing," said Bain . But it is See also:plain we cannot speak of contrast or difference between two states or things as a contrast or difference, if the states or things are not themselves presented; the so-called contrast or difference would then be itself a single presentation, and its supposed " relativity " but an inference . Difference is not more necessary to the presentation of two objects than two objects to the presentation of difference . And, what is more, a difference between presentation is not at all the same thing as the presentation of that difference . The former must precede the latter; the latter, which requires active comparison, need not follow . There is an See also:ambiguity in the words " know," " knowledge," which Bain seems not to have considered: " to know " may mean either to perceive or apprehend, or it may mean to understand or comprehend.' Knowledge in the first sense is only what we shall have presently to discuss as the recognition or assimilation of an impression (see below, § 18); knowledge in the latter sense is the result of intellectual comparison and is embodied in a proposition . Thus a blind man who cannot know light in the first sense can know about light in the second if he studies a See also:treatise on See also:optics . Now in simple perception or recognition we cannot with any exactness say that two things are perceived: straight is a thing, i.e. a definite object presented; not so not-straight, which answers to no definite object at all . Only when we rise to intellectual know-ledge is it true to say: " No one could understand the meaning of a straight See also:line without being shown a line not straight, a See also:bent or crooked line." 2 Two distinct presentations are necessary to the comparison that is here implied; but we must first re-cognize our objects before we can compare them, and this further step we may never take . We need, then, to distinguish between the comparativity of intellectual knowledge, which we must admit—for it rests at bottom on a purely See also:analytical proposition—and the " See also:differential theory of presentations," which, however plausible at first sight, must be wrong somewhere, since it commits us to absurdities . Thus, if we cannot have a presentation X but only the presentation of the difference between Y and Z, it would seem that in like manner we cannot have the presentation of Y or Z, nor therefore of their difference X, till we have had the presentation of A and B say, which differ by Y, and of C and D, which we may suppose differ by Z . The lurking See also:error in this See also:doctrine, that all presentations are but differences, may perhaps emerge if we examine more closely what may be meant by difference . We may speak of (a) differences in intensity between sensations supposed to be qualitatively identical, as e.g. between the See also:taste of strong and weak See also:tea; or of (b) differences in quality between presentations of the same sense, as e.g. between red and green; or of (c) differences between presentations of distinct senses, as e.g. between blue and bitter . Now as regards (a) and (b), it will be found that the difference between two intensities of the same quality, or between two qualities of the same See also:order, may be itself a distinct pre- ' Other See also:languages give more prominence to this distinction; compare yvanes& and ei&Evae, noscere and scire, kennen and wissen, connaitre and savoir . On this subject there are some acute remarks in a little-known See also:book, the Exploratio philosophica, of See also:Professor J . See also:Grote . Hobbes, too, was well awake to this difference, as e.g. when he says, " There are two kinds of knowledge; the one, sense or know-ledge original and remembrance of the same; the other, science or knowledge of the truth of propositions, derived from understanding." Bain, See also:Logic, i . 3.sentation, that is to say, in passing from a load of io lb to one of 20 lb, for example, or from the sound of a note to that of its See also:octave, it is possible to experience the change continuously, and to estimate it as one might the distance between two places on the same road . But nothing of this kind holds of (c).3 In passing from the See also:scent of a See also:rose to the sound of a See also:gong or a sting from a See also:bee we have no such means of bringing the two into relation—scarcely more than we might have of measuring the length of a See also:journey made partly on the common earth and partly through the looking-See also:glass . In (c), then, we have only a diversity of presentations, but not a special presentation of difference; and we only have more than this in (a) or (b) provided the selected presentations occur together . We say that we know the difference between a sound and a taste; but what we mean is simply that we know what it is to pass from attending to the one to attending to the other . It is simply an experience of change . Change, however, implies continuity, and there is continuity here in the movement of attention and the affective state consequent on that, but not directly in the qualities themselves . c . If red follows green we may be aware of a greater difference than we could if red followed orange; and we should ordinarily call a ro lb load heavy after one of s lb and light after one of 20 lb . Facts like these it is which make the differential theory of presentations plausible . On the strength of such facts Wundt has formulated a law of relativity, See also:free, apparently, from the objections just urged against Bain's doctrine . It runs thus: " Our sensations afford no absolute but only a relative measure of See also:external impressions . The intensities of stimuli, the See also:pitch of tones, the qualities of light, we apprehend (empfinden) in general only according to their mutual relation, not according to any unalterably fixed unit given along with or before the impression itself."' But if true this law would make it quite immaterial what the impressions themselves were: provided the relation continued the same, the sensation would be the same too, just as the ratio of 2 to 1 is the same whether our unit be See also:miles or millimetres . In the case of intensities, e.g. there is a minimum sensibile and a maximum sensibile . The existence of such extremes is alone sufficient to turn the flank of the thoroughgoing relativists; but there are instances enough of intermediate intensities that are directly recognized . A See also:letter-sorter, for example, who identifies an See also:ounce or two ounces with remarkable exactness identifies each for itself and not the first as half the second; of an ounce and a half or of three ounces he may have a comparatively vague idea . And so generally within certain limits of error, indirectly ascertained, we can identify intensities, each for itself, neither referring to a common See also:standard nor to one that varies from time to time—to any intensity, that is to say, chat chances to be simultaneously presented; just as an enlisting sergeant will recognize a man See also:fit for the See also:Guards without a yard measure and whether the man's comrades are tall or short . As regards the qualities of sensations the outlook of the relativists is, if anything, worse . In what is called See also:Meyer's experiment (described under See also:Vision) what appears greenish on a red ground will appear of an orange tint on a ground of blue; but this contrast is only possible within certain very narrow limits . In fact, the phenomena of colour-contrast, so far from proving, distinctly disprove that we apprehend the qualities of light only according to their mutual relation . In the case of tones it is very questionable whether such contrasts exist at all . Summing up on the particular doctrine of relativity of which Wundt is the most distinguished adherent, the truth seems to be that, in some cases where two presentations whose difference is itself present-able occur in close connexion, this difference—as we indirectly learn—exerts a certain See also:bias on the assimilation or See also:identification ' Common See also:language seems to recognize some connexion even here or we should not speak of harsh tastes and harsh sounds, or of dull sounds and dull colours and so forth . All this is, however, super-added to the sensation, probably on the ground of similarities in the accompanying organic sensations . Physiologische Psychologie, 1st ed., p . 421; the doctrine reappears in later See also:editions, but no equally general statement of it is given . of one or both of the presentations . There is no " unalterably fixed unit " certainly, but, on the other hand, " the mutual relations of impressions " are not everything . 15 . The term " field of consciousness " has occurred sundry times in the course of this exposition: it is one of several em-.Subcon- ployed in describing what have been incidentally sciousness. referred to as " degrees or grades of consciousness " —a difficult and perplexing topic that we must now endeavour further to elucidate . Sailors steering by See also:night are said to look at the See also:pole-See also:star, " the See also:cynosure of every eye," but this does not prevent them from seeing the rest of the starry vault .
At a conversazione we may listen to some one See also:speaker while still See also:hearing the murmur of other voices, and while listening we may also see the speaker and thereby identify him the better
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What in these instances is looked at or listened to has been called the " See also:focus " of consciousness, the rest of what is heard or seen or otherwise presented being called the " field " within which attention is thus concentrated or brought to a point
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Of these objects beyond the focus we have then only a lower degree of consciousness, and the more " distant " they are from the centre of interest the fainter and obscurer they are supposed to be or to become
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Now, it is obvious that the continuity here implied, if strictly taken, logically commits us to a field of consciousness extending with ever diminishing intensity ad indefinitum
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But we have next to notice certain new 'features that have led psychologists to give to the term field of consciousness a more restricted meaning
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A See also:meteor flashing across the sky would certainly divert the helmsman's attention, and for the nonce he would look at that and not at the star in the Little See also:Bear's tail; a See also:voice at our See also:elbow accosting us, we should turn to the new speaker and listen to him, still hearing it may be, but no longer " following," the discourse thus for us interrupted
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In these cases a change in the field of consciousness brings about a non-voluntary change in the focus
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But it only does so provided it is sufficiently intense and abrupt, and the more attention is already concentrated the less effective a given disturbance will be
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A whole swarm of meteors might have streaked the sky unheeded while Ulysses, life in hand, steered between Scylla and Charybdis, just as all the din of the See also:siege failed to distract See also:Archimedes bent over his figures in the sand
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On the other hand, we can voluntarily See also: |