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OPINION ( See also: term used loosely in ordinary speech for an idea or an explanation of facts which is regarded as being based on evidence which is See also: good but not conclusive
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In logic it is used as a See also: translation of Gr
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6b a, which plays a prominent See also: part in See also: Greek philosophy as the opposite of knowledge (iirurr lµrt or aXi7Beta)
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The distinction is See also: drawn by Parmenides, who contrasts the sphere of truth or knowledge with that of opinion, which deals with See also: mere appearance, error, not-being
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So See also: Plato places Sofia between alvtrl61s and &See also: Avoca, as dealing with phenomena contrasted with non-being and being respectively
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Thus Plato confines opinion to that which is subject to change
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See also: Aristotle, retaining the same idea, assigns to opinion (especially in the See also: Ethics) the sphere of things contingent, i.e. the future: hence opinion deals with that which is probable
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More generally he uses
xx• 5popular opinion—that which is generally held to be true (6oKeiv) —as the starting-point of an inquiry
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In See also: modern philosophy the term has been used for various conceptions all having much the same See also: connotation
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The See also: absence of any universally acknowledged definition, especially such as would contrast " opinion " with " belief," " faith " and the like, deprives it of any status as a philosophic term
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