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Originally appearing in Volume V23, Page 641 of the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica.
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PERIOD C: THE PERIOD OF THE REVOLUTION (r46-49 B.C.).--In the course of little more than a century, Rome had 608 pos. become the supreme power in the civilized world. By all men, says Polybius, it was taken for granted that nothing remained but to obey the commands of the Romans.' For the future the interest of Roman history centres in her attempts to perform the two Herculean tasks which this unique position laid upon her,—the efficient government of the subject peoples, and their defence against the barbarian races which swarmed around them on all sides. They were tasks under which the old republican constitution broke down, and which finally overtaxed the strength even of the marvellous organization framed and elaborated by Augustus and his successors. Although in its outward form the old constitution had under-gone little change during the age of war and conquest from Constt- 265 to 146,2 the causes, both internal and external, tuttonat which brought about its fall had been silently at work changes, throughout. Its form was in strictness that of a 265-146- moderate democracy. The patriciate had ceased to 489-608. exist as a privileged caste,3 and there was no longer any order of nobility recognized by the constitution. The senate and the offices of state were in law open to al1,4 and the will of the people in assembly had been in the most explicit and unqualified manner declared to be supreme alike in the election of magistrates, in the passing of laws, and in all matters touching the caput of a Roman citizen. But in practice the constitution had become an oligarchy. The senate, not the assembly, ruled Rome, and both the senate and the magistracies were in the hands of a class which, in defiance of the law, arrogated to itself the title and the privileges of a nobility.° The ascendancy of the senate is too obvious and familiar a fact to need much illustra- tion here. It was but rarely that the assembly was called upon to decide questions of policy, and then the proposal was usually made by the magistrate in obedience to the express directions of the senate.° In the enormous majority of cases the matter was settled by a senatus consultum, without any reference to 1 Polyb. iii. 4. 2 The most important change was the assimilation of the division 534 by classes and centuries with that by tribes, a change possibly due to the censorship of Gaius Flaminius in 220 (Mommsen, Staatsr. iii. 270). On this point see COMITIA. 2 A few offices of a more or less priestly character were still filled only only by patricians, e.g. rex sacrorum, flamen Dialis. A plebeian first became curio maximus in 209 (Livy xxvii. 8). 4 The lectio senatus was in the hands of the censors, but whether before Sulla's time their choice was subject to legal restrictions is doubtful (see SENATE). Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, iii. 7; Lange, Rom. Alterth. ii. 1 if. ° Ex auctoritate senatus." The lex Flaminia agraria of 232 was an exception (Cie. De senect. 4; Polyb. ii. 21). In 167 B.C. a praetor brought the question of war with Rhodes directly before the assembly, but this was condemned as unprecedented (novo maloque exemplo, Liv. xlv. 21).the people at all. The assembly decides for war or peace,7 but the conduct of the war and the conditions of peace are matters left to the senate (q.v.). Now and then the assembly confers a command upon the man of its choice, or prolongs the imperium of a magistrate,8 but, as a rule, these and all questions connected with foreign affairs are settled within the walls of the senate-house .° It is the senate which year after year assigns the commands and fixes the number and disposition of the military forces, '° directs the organization of a new province," conducts negotiations, and forms alliances. Within Italy, though its control of affairs was less exclusive, we find that, besides supervising the ordinary current business of administration, the senate decides questions connected with the Italian allies, sends out colonies, allots lands, and directs the suppression of disorders. Lastly, both in Italy and abroad it managed the finances.12 Inseparably connected with this monopoly of affairs to the exclusion of the assembly was the control which in practice, if not in theory, the senate exercised over the magistrates. The latter had become what Cicero wrongly declares they were always meant to be, merely the subordinate ministers of the supreme council,13 which assigned them their departments, provided them with the necessary equipment, claimed to direct their conduct, prolonged their commands, and rewarded them with triumphs. It was now at once the duty and the interest of a magistrate to be in auctoritate senatus, " subject to the authority of the senate," and even the once formidable tribuni plebis are found during this period actively and loyally supporting the senate, and acting as its spokesmen in the assembly.'4 The causes of this ascendancy of the senate are to be found firstly in the fact that the senate was the only body capable of conducting affairs in an age of incessant war. The its voters in the assembly, a numerous, widely scattered causes. body, could not readily be called together, and when assembled were very imperfectly qualified to decide momentous questions of military strategy and foreign policy. The senate, on the contrary, could be summoned in a moment,'° and included in its ranks all the skilled statesmen and soldiers of the common-wealth. The subordination of the magistrates was equally the result of circumstances, for, as the numbers of the magistrates, and also the area of government, increased, some central controlling power became absolutely necessary to prevent collisions between rival authorities, and to secure a proper division of labour, as well as to enforce the necessary concert and co-operation 16 No such power could be found anywhere in the republican system but in the senate, standing as it necessarily did in the closest relations with the magistrate, and composed as it was increasingly of men who were or had been in office. Once more, behind both senate and magistrates, lay the whole power and influence of the new nobility." These nobiles were essentially distinct from the older and more legiti- The mate patrician aristocracy. Every patrician was of nobiles. course noble, but the majority of the " noble families " in 146 were not patrician but plebeian.18 The title 608' had been gradually appropriated, since the opening of the magistracies, by those families whose members had held curule office, and had thereby acquired the ius imaginum. It was thus in theory within the reach of any citizen who could win election even to the curule aedileship, and, moreover, it carried with it no legal privileges whatsoever. Gradually, 7 Livy xxxi. 5, xxxiii. 25, xxxvii. 55. 8 Ibid. xxx. 27, &c. 9 Polyb. (vi. 15) expressly includes the prorogation of a command among the prerogatives of the senate. '° Livy xxvi. 1, " consules de republica, de administratione belli, de provinciis exercitibusque patres consuluerunt." " Ibid. xlv. 18. f2 Ihne, Hist. of Rome, iv. 433; Polyb. vi. 13. 13 Pro Sestio 65, " quasi ministros gravissimi consilii." 14 Livy xxvii. 5, xxviii. 45. '° Ibid. xxii. 7. In 191 the senators were forbidden to leave Rome for more than a day, nor were more than five to be absent at once (Livy xxxvi. 3). 16 Ibid. xxvii. 35. 17 Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, in. 7 if. ' E.g. Livii, Sempronii, Caecilii, Licinii, &c. Ascendancy of the senate. however, the ennobled plebeian families drew together, and combined with the older patrician genies to form a distinct order. Office brought wealth and prestige, and both wealth and prestige were liberally employed in securing for this select circle a monopoly of political power, and excluding new men.' Already by the close of the period it was rare for any one but a noble to find his way into high office or into the senate. The senate and magistrates are the mouthpieces of this order, and identified with it in policy and interest. Lastly, it must be allowed that both the senate and the nobility had to some extent justified their power by the use they made of it. It was their tenacity of purpose and devoted patriotism which had carried Rome through the dark days of the Hannibalic War. The heroes of the struggle with Carthage belonged to the leading families; the disasters at the Trasimene Lake and at Cannae were associated with the blunders of popular favourites. From the first, however, there was an inherent weakness in this senatorial government. It had no sound constitutional weakness basis, and with the removal of its accidental supports of the it fell to the ground. Legally the senate had no senatorial positive authority. It could merely advise the magis- govern- trate when asked to do so, and its decrees were strictly meat. only suggestions to the magistrate, which he was at liberty to accept or reject as he chose.2 It had, it is true, become customary for the magistrate not only to ask the senate's advice on all important points, but to follow it when given. But it was obvious that if this custom were weakened, and the magistrates chose to act independently, the senate was powerless. It might indeed anathematize the refractory official, or hamper him if it could by setting in motion against him a colleague or the tribunes, but it could do no more, and these measures failed just where the senate's control was most needed and most difficult to maintain—in its relations with the generals and governors of provinces abroad. The virtual in- 608_ dependence of the proconsul was before 146 already exciting the jealousy of the senate and endangering its supremacy.° Nor again had the senate any legal hold over the assembly. Except in certain specified cases, it rested with the magistrate to decide whether any question should be settled by a decree of the senate or a vote of the assembly.' If he decided to make a proposal to the assembly, he was not bound except by custom to obtain the previous approval of the senate,' and the constitution set no limits to the power of the assembly to decide any question whatsoever that was laid before it. 587 From 167, at least, onwards, there were increasing indications that both the acquiescence of the people in senatorial government and the loyalty of the magistrates to the senate were failing. The absorbing excitement of the great wars had died away; the economic and social disturbance and distress which they produced were creating a growing feeling of discontent; and at the same time the senate provoked inquiries into its title to govern by its failure any longer to govern well. In the East there was confusion; in the West a single native chieftain defied the power which had crushed Carthage. At Livy xxii. 34, " plebeios nobiles . . . contemnere plebem, ex quo contemni a patnbus desierint, coepisse "; cf. Sall, Jug. 41, " paucorum arbitrio belli domique agitabatur; penes eosdem aerarium, provinciae, magistratus." Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, iii. 15 n. The number of new families ennobled dwindles rapidly after 200 B.c.; Willems, Le Senat de la republique romaine, i. 366 seq. (Paris, 1878). 2 The senators' whole duty is " sententiam dicere." The senator was asked " quid censes?" the assembly "quid velitis jubeatis?" Cf. also the saving clause, " Si eis videretur " (sc. consulibus, &c.) in Seta., e.g. Cic. Phil. v. 19, 53. 2 By declaring his action to be " contra rempublicam." The force of this anathema varied with circumstances. It had no legal value. ' Livy xxxviii. 42, of Cn. Manlius Vulso in Asia, 189 B.c.; cf. also the position of the two Scipios. ' Hence the same things, e.g. founding of colonies, are done in one year by a Sctum., in another by a lex; cf. Cic. De rep. ii. 32, 56; Phil. i 2, 6, of Antony as consul, " mutata omnia, nihil per senatum, omnia per populum." ',There was no legal necessity, before Sulla's time, for getting the senatus auctoritas for a proposal to the assembly.home the senate was becoming more and more simply an organ of the nobility, and the nobility were becoming every year more exclusive, more selfish, and less capable and unanimous.' But if the senate was not to govern, the difficulty arose of finding an efficient substitute, and it was this difficulty that mainly determined the issue of the struggles which convulsed Rome from 133 to 49. As the event showed, neither the assembly 621705. nor the numerous and disorganized magistracy was equal to the work; the magistrates were gradually pushed aside in favour of a more centralized authority, and the former became only the means by which this new authority was first encouraged in opposition to the senate and finally established in a position of impregnable strength. The assembly which made Pompey and Caesar found out too late that it could not unmake them. It is possible that these constitutional and administrative difficulties would not have proved so rapidly fatal to the Effects of Republic had not its very foundations been sapped conquest by the changes which followed more or less directly on on Roman the conquests of the 3rd and 2nd centuries B.C. For society: the opening of the world to Rome, and of Rome to the new the world, produced a radical change in the structure wealth. of Roman society. The subjugation of the Mediterranean countries, by placing at the disposal of Rome the vast natural resources of the West and the accumulated treasures of the East, caused a rapid rise in the standard of wealth and a marked change in its distribution. The Roman state was enabled to dispense with the direct taxation of its citizens,' since it derived all the revenue which it needed from the subject countries. But the wealth drawn from the provinces by the state was trifling in amount compared with that which flowed into the pockets of individual citizens. Not only was the booty taken in war largely appropriated by the Roman commanders and their men, but a host of money-makers settled upon the conquered provinces and exploited them for their profit. The nobles engaged in the task of administration, the contractors (publican) who farmed the revenues, and the " men of business " (negotiatores) who, as money-lenders, merchants or speculators, penetrated to every corner of the Empire, reaped a rich harvest at the expense of the provincials. Farming in Italy on the old lines became increasingly laborious and unprofitable owing to the importation of foreign corn and foreign slaves,' and capitalists sought easier methods of acquiring wealth. If this had meant that capital was expended in developing the natural re-sources of the provinces, the result would have been to increase the prosperity of the countries subject to Rome; but it was not so. The Roman negotiatores, who were often merely the agents of the great families of Rome, drained the accumulated wealth of the provinces by lending money to the subject communities at exorbitant rates of interest. Cicero, for example, found when governor of Cilicia that M. Junius Brutus had lent a large sum to the people of Salamis in Cyprus at 48% compound interest; and we cannot suppose that this was an exceptional case. Such practices as these, together with the wasteful and oppressive system of tax-farming, and the de-liberate extortions carried on by senatorial governors, reduced the flourishing cities of the Greek East, within the space of two generations, to utter economic exhaustion. But the reaction of the same process on Rome herself had far more important consequences: The whole structure of Roman society was altered, and the equality and homogeneity Accent. which had once been its chief characteristics were nation of destroyed. The Roman nobles had not merely ceased, class (Hs. as in old days, to till their own farms; they had found "'caw' a means of enriching themselves beyond the dreams of avarice, ' See generally Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, i. bk. iii. cap. 6 ;Lange, Rom. Alterth. vol. ii.; Ihne, bk. v. cap. i. The first law against bribery at elections was passed in 181 B.C. (Livy xl. 19), and against magisterial extortion in the provinces in 149 (Lex Calpurnia de j ecuniis repetundis). The senators had special seats allotted to them in the theatre in 194 B.C.; Livy xxxiv. 44, 54. ' The tributum was no longer levied after 167 B.c. (Cic. Off. ii. 22; Plin. H.N. xxxiii. 56). 9 See, however, p. 637, note 1 and refl. and when they returned from the government of a province it was to build sumptuous villas, filled with the spoils of Greece and Asia, to surround themselves with troops of slaves and dependents, and to live rather as princes than as citizens of a republic. The publicani and negotiatores formed a second order in the state, which rivalled the first in wealth and coveted a share in its political supremacy; while the third estate, the plebs urbana, was constantly increasing in numbers and at the same time sinking into the condition of an idle proletariat. The accentuation of class distinctions is indeed inevitable in a capitalist society, such as that of Rome was now becoming. But the process was fraught with grave political danger owing to the peculiarities of the Roman constitution, which rested in theory on the ultimate sovereignty of the people, who were in practice represented by the city mob. To win the support of the plebs became a necessity for ambitious politicians, and the means employed for this end poisoned the political life of Rome. The wealth derived from the provinces was freely spent in bribery,' and the populace of Rome was encouraged to claim as the price of its support a share in the spoils of empire. It was not only the structure and composition of Roman society that underwent a transformation. The victory of The new Rome in her struggle for supremacy in the Medilearning terranean basin had been largely due to the powerful and conservative forces by which her institutions were manners. preserved from decay. Respect for the mos majorum, or ancestral custom, imposed an effective check on the desire for innovation. Though personal religion, in the deeper sense, was foreign to the Roman temperament, there was a genuine belief in the gods whose favour had made Rome great in the past and would uphold her in the future so long as she trod in the old paths of loyalty and devotion. Above all, the healthy moral traditions of early Rome were maintained by the discipline of the family, resting on the supreme authority of the father—the patria potestas—and the powerful influence of the mother, to whom the early training of the child was entrusted.' Finally, the institution of the censorship, backed as it was by the mighty force of public opinion, provided a deterrent which prevented any flagrant deviation from the accepted standard of morals. All this was changed by the influence of Greek civilization, with which Rome was first brought face to face in the 3rd century B.C. owing to her relations with Magna Graecia. At first the results of contact with the older and more brilliant culture of Hellas were on the whole good. In the and century B.C., when constant intercourse was established with the communities of Greece proper and of Asia Minor, " philhellenism " became a passion, which was strongest in the best minds of the day and resulted in a quickened intellectual activity, wider sympathies and a more humane life. But at the same time the "new learning" was a disturbing and unsettling force. The Roman citizen was confronted with new doctrines in politics and religion, and initiated into the speculations of critical philosophy.' Under the influence of this powerful solvent the fabric of tradition embodied in the mos majorum fell to pieces; a revolt set in against Roman discipline and Roman traditions of self-effacement, and the craving for individual distinction asserted itself with irresistible vehemence. As it had been in the days of the " Sophistic " movement at Athens, so it was now with Rome; a higher education, which, owing to its expense, was necessarily confined to the wealthier classes, interposed between the upper and lower ranks of society a barrier even more effectual than that set up by differences of material condition, and by releasing the individual from the trammels of traditional morality, gave his ambition free course. The effect on private morals may be gauged by the vehemence with which the reactionary opposi- 1 From 181 B.C. onwards a succession of laws de ambitu were passed to prevent bribery, but without effect. ' Cf. Tacitus's account of Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi, and Aurelia, the mother of Julius Caesar, in the dialogue De oratoribus, C. 28. 3 It is to be noted that these subjects were, generally speaking, taught by freedmen or slaves.tion, headed by M. Porcius Cato (consul, 195 B.C.; censor, 184 B.c.), inveighed against the new fashions, and by the 559,570. list of measures passed to check the growth of luxury and licence, and to exclude the foreign .teachers of the new learning.' It was all in vain. The art of rhetoric, which was studied through the medium of Greek treatises and Greek models, furnished the Roman noble with weapons of attack and defence of which he was not slow to avail himself in the forum and the senate-house. In the science of money-making, which had been elaborated under the Hellenistic monarchies, the Roman capitalists proved apt pupils of their Greek teachers. Among the lower classes, contact with foreign slaves and freed-men, with foreign worships and foreign vices, produced a love of novelty which no legislation could check. Even amongst women there were symptoms of revolt against the old order, which showed itself in a growing freedom of manners and impatience of control,' the marriage tie was relaxed,s and the respect for mother and wife, which had been so powerful a factor in the maintenance of the Roman standard of morals, was grievously diminished. Thus 'Rome was at length brought face to face with a moral and economic crisis which a modern historian has described in the words: " Italy was living through the fever of moral disintegration and incoherence which assails all civilized societies that are rich in the manifold resources of culture and enjoyment, but tolerate few or no restraints on the feverish struggle of contending appetites." In this struggle the Roman Republic perished, and personal government took its place. The world had outgrown the city-state and its political machinery, and as the notions of federalism (on any large scale) and representative government had not yet come into being, no solution of the problem was possible save that of absolutism. But a far stronger resistance would have been opposed to political revolution by the republican system had not public morals been sapped by the influences above described. Political corruption was reduced to a science.' for the benefit of individuals who were often faced with the alternatives of ruin or revolution; 8 there was no longer any body of sound public opinion to which, in the last resort, appeal could be made; and, long before the final catastrophe took place, Roman society itself had become, in structure and temper, thoroughly unrepublican. The first systematic attack upon the senatorial government is connected with the names of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus (q.v.! - and its immediate occasion was an attempt to The deal with no less a danger than the threatened dis- Gracchi, appearance of the class to which of all others Rome 133-21-owed most in the past .9 The small landholders 621-33. throughout the greater part of Italy were sinking deeper into ruin under the pressure of accumulated difficulties. The Hannibalic war had laid waste their fields and thinned their numbers, nor when peace returned to Italy did it bring with it any revival of prosperity. The heavy burden of military service still pressed ruinously upon them,'° and in addition they were called upon to compete with the foreign corn 4 In 161 B.C. a decree of the senate was passed against" philosophiet rhetores Latini, uti Romae ne essent " (Gel'. xv. II). In 155 B.C. the philosopher Carneades was expelled from Rome (Plut. Cato. 22). ' The elder Cato complained of this as early as 195 B.C. (Liv. xxxiv. 2). 8 Divorce was unknown at Rome until 231 B.C. (Dionys. ii. 25). In the last century of the Republic it was of daily occurrence. ' In the Ciceronian period the lower classes of Rome, with whom the voting power in the comitia rested, were openly organized for purposes of bribery by means of collegia and sodalicia, nominally religious bodies. 8 Caesar had accumulated debts amounting to £800,000 by the time of his praetorship. Catiline and his fellow-bankrupts, amongst whom were several women, including a certainSempronia who, as we are told by Sallust, " danced and played better than an honest woman need do," hoped to bring about a cancelling of debts (novae tabular). (9 For authorities, see under GRACCHUS. 10 To Spain alone more than 15o,000 men were sent between 196 and 169 (Ihne iii. 319) ; compare the reluctance of the people to declare war against Macedon in 200 B.c., and also the case of Spurius Ligustinus in I7I (Livy, xlii. 34). imported from beyond the sea, and with the foreign slave-labour purchased by the capital of wealthier men.' Farming became unprofitable, and the hard laborious life with its scanty returns was thrown into still darker relief when compared with the stirring life of the camps with its opportunities of booty, or with the cheap provisions, frequent largesses and gay spectacles to be had in the large towns. The small holders went off to follow the eagles or swell the proletariat of the cities, and their holdings were left to run waste or merged in the vineyards, oliveyards and above all in the great cattlefarms of the rich, and their own place was taken by slaves. The evil was worst in Etruria and in southern Italy; but everywhere it was serious enough to demand the earnest attention of Roman statesmen. Of its existence the government had received plenty of warning in the declining numbers of able-bodied males returned at the census,' in the increasing difficulties of recruiting for the legions,' in servile outbreaks in Etruria and Apulia,' and between 200 and 16o a good deal was attempted by way of remedy. In addition to the foundation of twenty colonies,' there were frequent allotments of land to veteran soldiers, especially in Apulia and Samnium.6 In 18o, 40,000 Ligurians were removed from their homes and settled on vacant lands once the property of a Samnite tribe,' and in 16o the Pomptine marshes were drained for the purpose of cultivation.' But these efforts were only partially successful. The colonies planted in Cisalpine Gaul and in Picenum flourished, but of the others the majority slowly dwindled away, and two required re-colonizing only eight years after their foundation.' The veterans who received land were unfitted to make good farmers; and large numbers, on the first opportunity, gladly returned 594 as volunteers to a soldier's life. Moreover, after 16o even these efforts ceased, and with the single exception 597. of the colony of Auximum in Picenum (157) nothing 621. was done to check the spread of the evil, until in 133 Tiberius Gracchus, on his election to the tribunate, set his hand to the work. The remedy proposed by Gracchus10 amounted in effect to the resumption by the state of as much of the " common land " as was not held in occupation by authorized persons renewed on a wider scale, and with a more deliberate aim by his brother Gaius,who on his election to the tribunate (123) Galas at Ice came forward as the avowed enemy of the Gracchus. senate.12 The latter suddenly found its control of 631. the administration threatened at a variety of points. On the invitation of the popular tribune the assembly proceeded to restrict the senate's freedom of action in assigning the provinces." It regulated the taxation of the province of Asia'4 and altered the conditions of military service." In home affairs it inflicted two serious blows on the senate's authority by declaring the summary punishment of Roman citizens by the consuls on the strength of a senates consultum to be a violation of the law of appeal,16 and by taking out of the senate's hands the control of the newly established court for the trial of cases of magisterial misgovernment in the provinces 17 Tiberius had committed the mistake of relying too exclusively on the support of one section only of the community; his brother endeavoured to enlist on the popular side every avail-able ally. The Latins and Italians had opposed an agrarian scheme which took from them land which they had come to regard as rightfully theirs, and gave them no share in the benefit of the allotments." Gaius not only removed this latter grievance,19 but ardently supported and himself brought forward the first proposals made in Rome for their enfranchisement.20 The indifference of the city populace, to whom the prospect of small holdings in a remote district of Italy was not a tempting one, was overcome by the establishment of regular monthly doles of corn at a low price.'' Finally, the men of business—the publicans, merchants and money-lenders-were conciliated by the privilege granted to them of collecting the tithes of the new province of Asia, and placed in direct rivalry with the senate by the substitution of men of their own class as judges in the " quaestio de repetundis," in place of senators." The organizer of this concerted attack upon the position of the senate fell, like his brother, in a riot. The agrarian reforms of the two Gracchi had little permanent effect." Even in the lifetime of Gaius the clause in his brother's law rendering the new holdings inalienable was re-pealed, and the process of absorption recommenced. In 118 a stop was put to further allotment of occupied lands, and finally, in III, the whole position of the agrarian question was altered by a law which converted all land still held in occupation into private land.24 The old controversy as to the proper use of the lands of the community was closed by this act of alienation. The controversy in future turns, not on the right of the poor 12 On the legislation of C. Gracchus, see Warde Fowler in Eng. Hist. Review (1905), pp. 209 seq., 417 seq. Lex Sempronia de provinciis consularibus; Cie. Pro do:no, 9, 24; De Prov. Cons. 2, 3; Sallust, Jug. 27. 14 Lex de provincia Asia; Cic. Verr. 3, 6, 12; Fronto, Ad Ver. ii. 125. '' Plut. C.G. 5; Died. xxxiv. 25. 16 Plut. C.G. 4; Cic. Pro domo, 31, 82; Pro Rob. Perd. 4, 12. 17 Quaestio de repetundis, est. 149 B.C. See Plut. C.G. 5; Livy, Epit. lx.; Tac. Ann. xii. 6o; App. B.C. i. 22. For the lex Acilia, see C.I.L. i. 189; Wordsworth, Fragm. 424; Bruns,. Fontes juris Romani, ed. 6, pp. 56 seq. 16 They had succeeded in 129 in suspending the operations of the agrarian commission. App. B.C. i. i8; Livy, Epit. lix.; Cic. De Rep. iii. 29, 41. 19 Lange, R.A. iii. 32; Lex Agr. line 21. " The rogatio Fulvia, 125 B.c.; Val. Max. ix. 5, 1; App. B.C. i. 21. Plut. C.G. 5; App. i. 21; Livy, Epit. Ix. ; Festi's, 290. 22 Hence Gaius ranked as the founder of the equestrian order. Plin. N.H. xxxiii. 34, " judicum appellatione separare eum ordinem . . . instituere Gracchi "; Varro ap. Non. 454, "bicipitem civitatem fecit." '' Traces of the work of the commission survive in the Miliarium Popilianum, CI.L. i. 551, in a few Gracchan " termini," ib. 552, 553, 554, 555, in the" limites Gracchani," Liber Colon., ed. Lachmann, pp. 209, 210, 211, 229, &c. Compare also the rise in the numbers of the census of 125 B.c.; Livy, Epit. lx. 24 See App. i. 27. The lex agraria, still extant in a fragmentary condition in the museum at Naples, is that of iii . See Mommsen, C.I.L. i. 200; Wordsworth, 441 seq.; Bruns, Fontes juris Rom. ed. 6, pp. 74 seq., and cf. the article AGRARIAN LAWS. 554-94. 574. 594. Tiberius and conformably to the provisions of the Licinian Gracchus, law," and the distribution in allotments of the land thus rescued for the community from the monopoly of a few. It was a scheme which could quote in its- favour ancient precedent as well as urgent necessity. Of the causes which led to its ultimate failure something will be said later on; for the present we must turn to the constitutional conflict which it provoked. The senate from the first identified itself with the interests of the wealthy occupiers, and Tiberius found himself forced into a struggle with that body, which had been no part of his original plan. He fell back on the legislative sovereignty of the assembly; he resuscitated the half-forgotten powers of interference vested in the tribunate in order to paralyse the action of the senatorial magistrates, and finally lost his life in an attempt to make good one of the weak points in the tribune's position by securing his own re-election for a second year. But the conflict did not end with his death. It was ' Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, iii. 75 seq. Ihne, Hist. of Rome, iv. 364, argues that Mommsen has exaggerated the depressing effects of foreign competition: cf. Salvioli, Le Capitalisme clans le monde antique, chaps. v.–vii. ' Beloch, Ital. Bund. 8o seq. Livy xliii. 14; Epit. xlviii., lv. During the period the minimum qualification for service in the legion was reduced from 11,000 to 4000 asses. Livy xxxii. 26, xxxiii. 36, xxxix. 29, 41. ' Sixteen Roman and four Latin colonies. See Marquardt, Staatsverw, i. ' E.g. Livy xxxi. 4, 49, xxxii. 1. 7 Livy xl. 38. ' Livy, Epit. xlvi. 9 Sipontum and Buxentum in 186; Livy xxxix. 23. '° Plut. T. G. 9–14; Appian, B.C. i. 9–13; Livy, Epit. lviii. Compare also Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, iii. 320 seq.; Lange, Rom. Alterth. iii. 8 seq.; Nitzsch, Gracchen, 294; Greenidge, Hist. of Rome, i. (1904), pp. 110 seq. u For the details, see the article AGRARIAN LAWS. Failure of the at-tempt at agrarian reform. 636. 643. 643. tion of a consul' (III) and the crushing defeat of the proconsul Albinus.4 On the news of this crowning disgrace the storm burst, and on the proposal of the tribunes a commission of inquiry was appointed into the conduct of the war.' But the popular leaders did not stop here. Q. Caecilius 645. 1VIetellus, who as consul (toe) had succeeded to the com- mand in Numidia, was an able soldier but a rigid aristocrat; and they now resolved to improve their success by entrusting the command instead to a genuine son of the people. Their choice fell on Gaius Marius (see MARIUS), an experienced officer and administrator, but a man of humble birth, wholly illiterate, and one who, though no politician, was by temperament and training a hater of the polished and effeminate nobles who filled the senate.' He was triumphantly elected, and, in spite of a decree of the senate continuing Metellus as proconsul, he was entrusted by a vote of the assembly with the charge of the war against Jugurtha (q.v.)? Jugurtha was vanquished; and Marius, who had been a second time elected consul in his absence, arrived at Rome in 650 January 104, bringing the captive prince with him in chains.' But further triumphs awaited the popular hero. The Cimbri and Teutones were at the gates of Italy; they had four times defeated the senatorial generals, and Marius was called upon to save Rome from a second invasion of the barbarians.' After two years of suspense the victory at Aquae 652. Sextiae (102), followed by that on the Raudine plain (Ios), put an end to the danger by the annihilation of 653. the invading hordes; and Marius, now consul for the fifth time, returned to Rome in triumph. There the popular party welcomed him as a leader with all the prestige of a successful general. Once more, however, they were destined to a brief success followed by disastrous defeat. Marius became for the sixth time consul;" of the two popular leaders Glaucia became Satins- praetor and Saturninus tribune. But Marius and his ninus allies were not statesmen of the stamp of the Gracchi; and the and the laws proposed by Saturninus had evidently Appulelan no serious aim in view other than that of harassing laws. the senate. His corn law merely reduced the pricevisions." The laws were carried, but the triumph of the popular leaders was short-lived. Their recklessness and violence had alienated all classes in Rome; and their period of office was drawing to a close. At the elections fresh rioting took place, and Marius as consul was called upon by the senate to protect the state against his own partisans. Saturninus and Glaucia surrendered, but while the senate was discussing their fate they were surrounded and murdered by their opponents. The popular party had been worsted once more in their struggle with the senate, but none the less their alliance with Marius, and the position in which their votes placed him, marked an epoch in the history of the revolution. The transference of the political leadership to a consul who was nothing if not a soldier was at once a confession of the insufficiency of the purely civil authority of the tribunate and a dangerous encouragement of military interference in political controversies. The consequences were already foreshadowed by the special provisions made by Saturninus for Marius's veterans, and in the active part taken by them in the passing of his laws. Indirectly, too, Marius, though no politician, played an important part in this new departure. His military Mmtary reforms12 at once democratized the army and attached reforms it more closely to its leader for the time being. He of swept away the last traces of civil distinctions of rank marl"' or wealth within the legion, admitted to its ranks all classes, and substituted voluntary enlistment under a popular general for the old-fashioned compulsory levy. The efficiency of the legion was increased at the cost of a complete severance of the ties which bound it to the civil community and to the civil authorities. The next important crisis was due partly to the rivalry which had been growing more bitter each year between the senate and the commercial class, and partly to the long-impending question of the enfranchisement of the Italian allies. The publicani, negotiatores and others, who constituted what was now becoming known as the equestrian order (see EQuITES), had made unscrupulous use of their control of the courts and especially of the quaestio de repetundis against their natural rivals, the official class in the provinces. The threat of prosecution before a hostile jury was held over the head of every governor, legate and quaestor who ventured to interfere with their operations in the provinces. The average official preferred to connive at their exactions; the bolder ones paid with fines and even exile for their courage. In 92 the necessity for a reform was 662. proved beyond a doubt by the scandalous condemnation of P.Rutilius Rufus,13 ostensibly on a charge of extortion, in reality as the reward of his efforts to check the extortions of the Roman equites in Asia. The diffi- culties of the Italian question were more serious. That allies. the Italian allies were discontented was notorious. After nearly two centuries of close alliance, of common dangers and victories, they now eagerly coveted as a boon that complete amalgamation with Rome which they had at first resented as a dishonour. But, unfortunately, Rome had grown more exclusive in proportion as the value set upon Roman citizenship increased. During the last forty years feelings of hope and disappointment had rapidly succeeded each other; Marcus Fulvius Flaccus, Gaius Gracchus, Saturninus, had all held out promises of relief—and nothing had yet been done. On each occasion they had crowded to Rome, full of eager expectation, only to be harshly ejected from the city by the consul's orders." The justice of their claims could hardly be denied, the danger of continuing to ignore them was obvious—yet the difficulties in the way of granting them were formidable in the extreme, and from a higher than a merely selfish point of view there was much " For the leges Appuleiae, see SATURNINUS, L. APPULEIUS, and authorities there quoted. 12 Sallust, Jug. 86, " ipse interea milites scribere, non more majorum neque ex classibus, sed uti cujusque cupido erat, capite censos plerosque." For details, cf. Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, iu. 456 seq.; Madvig, Verf. ii. 468, 493; Marquardt, Staatsv. ui. 430 seq. 'a Livy, Epit. lxx..; Veil. ii. 13. 'a Lex Junia, Cic. De Off. iii. II, 47; lex Licinia Mucia, Cic. Pro Corn. f r. to; Ascon. p. 6o. citizens to the state lands, but on the expediency of purchasing other lands for distribution at the cost of the treasury.' But, though the agrarian reform failed, the political conflict it had provoked continued, and the lines on which it was waged were in the main those laid down by Gaius Gracchus. The sovereignty of the assembly continued to be the watchword of the popular party, and a free use of the tribunician powers of interference and of legislation remained the most effective means of accomplishing their aims. Ten years after the death of Gaius the populares once more summoned up courage to challenge the supremacy of the senate; but it was on a question of foreign administration that the conflict was renewed. The course of affairs in the client state of Numidia since Micipsa's death in 118 had been such as to discredit a stronger government than that of the senate .2 In defiance of Roman authority, and relying on the influence of his own well-spent gold, Jugurtha had murdered both his legitimate rivals, Hiempsal and Adherbal, and made himself master of Numidia. The 642. declaration of war wrung from the senate (112) by popular indignation had been followed by the corrup- Marius, 118400-636-54. 636. 631: fixed in 123 for the monthly dole of corn, and the main point of his agrarian law lay in the clause appended to it requiring all senators to swear to observe its pro- ' Cic. Agr. ii. 25, 65. 2 Sallust, Jug. 5 seq.; Livy, Epit. lxii., lxiv. 3 L. Calpurnius Bestia, tribune 121; Sall. Jug. 28. * Ibid. 38, 39. ' Ibid. 40. 6 Sallust, Jug. 63; Plut. Marius, 2, 3. For the question as to the position of his parents, see Madvig, Verf. i. 170; Diod. xxxiv. 38. Sallust, Jug. 73. 6Ibid. 114. For the chronology of the Jugurthine war, see Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, iii. 398; Pelham, Journ. of Phil. vii. 91; Meinel, Zur Chronologie des jugurthinischen Kriegs (1883). Livy, Epit. lxvii.; Plut. Mar. 12; Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, iii. 414 seq. 'o Livy, Epit. lxix.; Appian, B.C. i. 28 seq. Discontent of the Italian to be said against the revolution involved in so sudden and enormous an enlargement of the citizen body. Marcus Livius Drusus (q.v.), who as tribune gallantly took up the task of reform, is claimed by Cicero' as a member of that Marcus party of the centre to which he belonged himself. Livius Noble, wealthy and popular, he seems to have hoped Drusus, to be able by the weight of his position and character 91=663. to rescue the burning questions of the day from the grasp of extreme partisans and to settle them peacefully and equitably. But he, like Cicero after him, had to find to his cost that there was no room in the fierce strife of Roman politics for moderate counsels. His proposal to reform the law courts excited the equestrian order and their friends in the senate to fury. The agrarian and corn laws which he coupled with it2 alienated many more in the senate, and roused the old anti-popular party feeling; finally, his known negotiations with the Italians were eagerly misrepresented to the jealous and excited people as evidence of complicity with a widespread conspiracy against Rome. His laws were carried, but the senate pronounced The them null and void.3 Drusus was denounced in the social senate house as a traitor, and on his way home was war, struck down by the hand of an unknown assassin. His 90-89= assassination was the signal for an outbreak which 664-65. had been secretly prepared for some time before. Throughout the highlands of central and southern Italy the flower of the Italian peoples rose as one man.' Etruria and Umbria held aloof; the isolated Latin colonies stood firm; but the Sabellian clans, north and south, the Latinized Marsi and Paeligni, as well as the Oscan-speaking Samnites and Lucanians, rushed to arms. No time was lost in proclaiming their plans for the future. A new Italian state was to be formed. The Paelignian town of Corfinium was selected as its capital and re-christened with the proud name of Italica. All Italians were to be citizens of this new metropolis, and here were to be the place of assembly and the senate house. A senate of 500 members and a magistracy resembling that of Rome completed a constitution which adhered closely to the very political traditions which its authors had most reason to abjure. Now, as always in the face of serious danger, the action of Rome was prompt and resolute. Both consuls took the field; 5 with each were five legates, among them the veteran Marius and his destined rival L. Cornelius Sulla, and even freedmen were pressed into service with the legions. But the first year's campaign opened disastrously. In central Italy the northern Sabellians, and in the south the Samnites, defeated the forces opposed to them. And though before the end of the year Marius and Sulla in the north, and the consul Caesar himself in Campania, succeeded in inflicting severe blows on the enemy, and on the Marsi especially, it is not surprising that, with an empty treasury, with the insurgents' strength still unbroken, and with rumours of disaffection in the loyal districts, opinion in Rome should have turned in the direction of the more liberal policy which had been so often scornfully rejected and in favour of some compromise which should check the spread of the revolt, and possibly sow discord among their enemies. Towards the 664. close of the year 90 the consul L. Julius Caesar (killed by Fimbria in 87) carried the lex Julia,' by which the Roman franchise was offered to all communities which had not as yet revolted; early in the next year (89) the Julian law was supplemented by the lex Plazltia Papiria, introduced by two of the tribunes, M. Plautius Silvanus and C. Papirius Carbo Arvina, which 'Cie. De oral. i. 7, 24 f., and De domo, 19, 5o; Appian, B.C. i. 35; Diod. Sic. xxxvii. to; Ihne, bk. vii. cap. xiii. . 2 For the provisions of the leges Liviae, see App. B.C. i. 35; Livy, Epit. lxxi. They included, according to Pliny, N.H. xxxiii. 3, a proposal for the debasement of the coinage. 3 Cic. Pro domo, 16, 41. 4 For the Social War, see, besides Mommsen, Ihne and Lange, Kiene, Der romische Bundesgenossenkrieg (Leipzig, 1845). 6 App. B.C. i. 39–49; Livy, Epit. lxxii.–lxxvi. 6 For the lex Julia, see Cicero, Pro Balbo, 8, 21; Gel!. iv. 4; App. B.0 i. 49. For the lex Plautia Papiria,see Cic. Pro Arc/na, 4, 7, and Schol. Bob. p. 353.enacted that any citizen of an allied community then domiciled in Italy might obtain the franchise by giving in his name to a praetor in Rome within sixty days. A third law (lex Calpurnia), apparently passed at the same time, empowered Roman magistrates in the field to bestow the franchise there and then upon all who were willing to receive it. This sudden opening of the closed gates of Roman citizenship was completely successful, and its effects were at once visible in the diminished vigour of the insurgents. By the end of 89 the Samnites and 665. Lucanians were left alone in their obstinate hostility to Rome, and neither, thanks to Sulla's brilliant campaign in Samnium, had for the moment any strength left for active aggression. The termination of the Social War brought with it no peace in Rome. The old quarrels were renewed with increased bitterness, and the newly enfranchised Italians themselves complained as bitterly of the restriction7 which robbed them of their due share of political influence by allowing them to vote only in a specified number of tribes. The senate itself was distracted by violent personal rivalries—and all these feuds, animosities and grievances were aggravated by the widespread economic distress and ruin which affected all classes.' Lastly, war with Mithradates VI. had been declared; it was notorious that the privilege of commanding the force to be sent against him would be keenly contested, and that the contest would lie between the veteran Marius and L. Cornelius Sulla.9 It was in an atmosphere thus charged with the elements of disturbance that P. Sulpicius Rufus as tribune" brought forward his laws. He proposed—(r) that the com- p. Sulmand of the Mithradatic war should be given to pietas Marius, (2) that the new citizens should be distributed Rufus, through all the tribes, (3) that the freedmen should 88=666. no longer be confined to the four city tribes, (4) that any senator owing more than 2000 denarii should lose his seat, (5) that those exiled on suspicion of complicity with the Italian revolt should be recalled. These proposals inevitably provoked a storm, and both sides were ominously ready for violent measures. The consuls, in order to prevent legislation, pro-claimed a public holiday. Sulpicius replied by arming his followers and driving the consuls from the forum. The proclamation was withdrawn and the laws carried, but Sulpicius's triumph was short-lived. From Nola in Campania, where lay the legions commanded by him in the Social War, Sulla advanced on Rome, and for the first time a Roman consul entered the city at the head of the legions of the Republic. Resistance was hopeless. Marius and Sulpicius fled," and Sulla, summoning the assembly of the centuries, proposed the measures he considered necessary for the public security, the most important being a provision that the sanction of the senate should be necessary before any proposal was introduced to the assembly." Then, after waiting in Rome long enough to hold the 667. consular elections, he left for Asia early in 87. Sulla had conquered, but his victory cost the Republic dear. He had first taught political partisans to look for final success, not to a majority of votes in the forum or campus, Marius but to the swords of the soldiery. The lesson was well and learnt. Shortly after his departure L. Cornelius Cinna. Cinna as consul revived the proposals of Sulpicius;13 his colleague, Gnaeus Octavius, at the head of an armed force fell upon the new citizens who had collected in crowds to vote, ' Vell. ii. 20; App. B.C. i. 49, 53. It is impossible to reconcile in detail the statements of these authors. 'App. B.C. i. 54, and Mithr. 22; Oros. V. 18; Livy, Epit. lxxiv. 9It had been already declared a consular province for 87, and early in 88 seems to have been assigned to Sulla by decree of the senate. 1° See SunpiclUS RUFus, P. u Marius finally escaped to Africa (see MARIUS); Sulpicius was taken and killed App. i. 6o. 12 App. B.C. i. 59, n' v get a.'irpo$obXsurov ES TOP Nitta, Eu4fpEQ80.4 For the other laws mentioned by Appian, see Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, iii. 541 f. is Livy, Epit. Ixxix. ; Veil. ii. 20. Lex Julia and lex Plautla Paplria. 665. and the forum was heaped high with the bodies of the slain.' Cinna fled, but fled, like Sulla, to the legions. When the senate declared him deposed from his consulship, he replied by invoking the aid of the soldiers in Campania in behalf of the violated rights of the people and the injured dignity of the consulship, and, like Sulla, found them ready to follow where he led. The neighbouring Italian communities, who had lost many citizens in the recent massacre, sent their new champion men and money; 2 while from Africa, whither he had escaped after Sulla's entry into Rome, came Marius with i000 Numidian horsemen. The senate had prepared for a desperate defence, but fortune was adverse, and after a brief resistance they gave way. Cinna was acknowledged as consul, the sentence of outlawry passed on Marius was revoked and Cinna and Marius entered Rome with their troops. Marius's thirst for revenge was gratified by a frightful massacre, and he lived long enough to be nominated consul for the seventh time. But he held his 668. consulship only a few weeks. Early in 86 he died, and 669, 670. for the next three years Cinna ruled Rome. Constitu- tional government was virtually suspended. For 85 and 84 Cinna nominated himself and a trusted colleague as consuls' The state was, as Cicero' says, without lawful authority.$ One important matter was carried through—the registration in all the tribes of the newly enfranchised Italians,6 but beyond this little was done. The attention of Cinna and his friends was in truth engrossed by the ever-present dread of Sulla's return from Asia. The consul of 86, L. Valerius Flaccus (who 668' had been consul with Marius in too B.C.), sent out to supersede him, was murdered by his own soldiers at Nicomedia.7 In 85 Sulla, though disowned by his government, concluded a peace with Mithradates.8 In 84, after settling affairs in Asia and crushing Flaccus's successor, C. Flavius The Fimbria, he crossed into Greece, and in the spring of return of 83 landed at Brundusium with 40,000 soldiers and a sulfa, large following of emigre nobles. Cinna was dead,9 83`671. murdered like Flaccus by his mutinous soldiers; his most trusted colleague, Cn. Papirius Carbo, was commanding as proconsul in Cisalpine Gaul; and the resistance offered to Sulla's advance was slight. At Capua, Sulla routed the forces of one consul, Gaius Norbanus; at Teanum the troops of the other went over in a body to the side of the outlawed proconsul. After a winter spent in Campania he pressed forward to Rome, 672. defeated the younger Marius (consul,82) near Praeneste, and entered the city without further opposition. In north Italy the success of his lieutenants,Q.Caecilius Metellus Pius (son of Metellus Numidicus), Cn. Pompeius and Marcus Crassus, had been fully as decisive. Cisalpine Gaul, Umbria and Etruria had all been won for Sulla, and the two principal leaders on the other side, Carbo and Norbanus, had each fled, one to Rhodes, the other to Africa. Only one foe remained to be conquered. The Samnites and Lucanians whom Cinna had conciliated, and who saw in Sulla their bitterest foe, were for the last time in arms, and had already joined forces with the remains of the Marian army close to Rome. The decisive battle was fought under the walls of the city, and ended in the complete defeat of the Marians and Italians (battle of the Colline Gate).'° For a period of nearly ten years Rome and Italy had been distracted by civil war. Sulla was now called upon to heal ' Cie. Pro Sestio, 36, 77; Catil. iii. to, 24. ' Tibur and Praeneste especially. ' The consuls of 86, 85, 84 were all nominated without election. Livy, Epit. lxxx. lxxxiii.; App. i. 75. 6 Brut. 227. 6 The nobles had fled to Salta in large numbers; Veil. ii. 23. 6 This work was accomplished apparently by the censors of 86; but cf. Lange iii. 133; Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, iv. 70; Livy, Epit. lxxxiv. 7 Livy, Epit. lxxxii; Appian. Mithr. 52; Plut. Sulla, 23. 9 Livy, Epit. lxxxiii.; Veil. i1. 23; Plut. Sulla, 24. 9 In 84; App. B.C. i. 78; Livy, Epit. lxxxiii. 10 Livy, Epit. lxxxviii., " cum Samnitibus ante portam Collinam debellavit "; Plut. Sulla, 29, and Crassus, 6. According to App. i. 913, and Livy, loc cit., 8000 captives were massacred. Floras, iii. 21, gives 4000. Praeneste surrendered, was razed to the ground, and its population put to the sword.the divisions which rent the state asunder, to set in working again the machinery of civil government and above Sulta,s all so to modify it as to meet the altered conditions, dictator-and to fortify it against the dangers which visibly ship, threatened it in the future. The real charge against 81-673. Sulla" is not that he failed to accomplish all this, for to do so was beyond the powers even of a man so able, resolute and self-confident as Sulla, armed though he was with absolute authority and backed by overwhelming military strength and the prestige of unbroken success. He stands convicted rather of deliberately aggravating some and culpably ignoring others of the evils he should have tried to cure, and of contenting himself with a party triumph when he should have aimed at the regeneration and confirmation of the whole state. His victory was instantly followed, not by any measures of con-ciliation, but by a series of massacres, proscriptions and confiscations, of which almost the least serious consequence was the immediate loss of life which they entailed.12 From this time forward the fear of proscription and confiscation Effects recurred as a possible consequence of every political of the crisis, and it was with difficulty that Caesar himself sultan dissipated the belief that his victory would be followed proscripby a Sullan reign of terror. The legacy of hatred and lions. discontent which Sulla left behind him was a constant source of disquiet and danger. In the children of the proscribed, whom he excluded from holding office, and the dispossessed owners of the confiscated lands, every agitator found ready and willing allies." The moneyed men of the equestrian order were more than ever hostile to the senatorial government, which they now identified with the man who cherished towards them a peculiar hatred,14 and whose creatures had hunted them down like dogs. The attachment which the new Italian citizens might in time have learnt to feel for the old republican constitution was nipped in the bud by the massacres at Praeneste and Norba, by the harsh treatment of the ancient towns of Etruria, and by the ruthless desolation of Samnium and Lucania.19 Quite as fatal were the results to the economic prosperity of the peninsula. Sulla's confiscations, following on the civil and social wars, opened the doors wide for a long train of evils. The veterans whom he planted on the lands he had seized" did nothing for agriculture, and swelled the growing numbers of the turbulent and discontented.17 The "Sullan men " became as great an object of fear and dislike as the " Sullan reign." 18 The latifundia increased with startling rapidity—whole territories passing into the hands of greedy partisans.19 Wide tracts of land, confiscated but never allotted, ran to waste.20 In all but a few districts of Italy the free population finally and completely disappeared from the open country; and life and property were rendered insecure by the brigandage which now developed unchecked, and in which the herdsmen slaves played a prominent part. The outbreaks of Spartacus in 73, and of Catiline ten years later, were significant 681. commentaries on this part of Sulla's work." His con- stitutional legislation, while it included many useful tutio constf- nal administrative reforms, is marked by as violent a legisla- , spirit of partisanship, and as apparently wilful a lion of blindness to the future. The re-establishment on a legal sun' basis of the ascendancy which custom had so long accorded to the 11 Compare especially Mommsen's brilliant chapter, which is, however, too favourable (bk. iv. cap. x.), and also Lange (iii. 146 seq.). Further references will be found in the article SULLA (q.v.). " App. i. 95 seq.; Dio Cassius, fr. 109; Plut. Sulla, 31. The number of the proscribed is given as 4700 (Val. Max.), including, according to Appian, 2600 members of the equestrian order. 1a E.g. Catiline, in 63. Sall. Cat. 21, 37. For the liberi proscriptorum, see Veil. ii. 28. 14 Cic. Pro. Cluent. 55, 151. 16 Cic. Phil. v. 16, 43, " tot municipiorum maximae calamitates." Cic. Pro Domo, 30, 79; Cic. Ad Att. i. 19; Floras iii. 21; Strabo, 223, 254. 's Livy, Epit. lxxxix.; App. B.C. i. soo; Cicero, Call. ii. 79. 20. '7 Sall. Cat. 28. 16 Cic. Agr. ii. 269. "Cic. Agr. ii. 26, 69 seq.; 28, 78; iii. 2, 8—the territories of Praeneste and of the Hirpini. 20 Ibid. iii. 4, 14. 2' See especially Cicero's oration Pro Tullio. For the pastores of Apulia, Sall. Cat. 28. 669. senate was his main object. With this purpose" he had already, 666 when consul in 88, made the senatus auctoritas legally necessary for proposals to the assembly. He now as 'dictator' followed this up by crippling the power of the magistracy, which had been the most effective weapon in the hands of the senate's opponents. The legislative freedom of the tribunes was already hampered by the necessity of obtaining the senate's sanction; in addition, Sulla restricted their wide powers of interference (intercessio) to their original purpose of protecting individual plebeians,' and discredited the office by prohibiting a tribune from holding any subsequent office in the state.' The control of the courts (quaestiones perpetuae) was taken from the equestrian order and restored to the senate.' To prevent the people from suddenly installing and keeping in high office a second Marius, he re-enacted the old law against re-election,' and made legally binding the custom which required a man to mount up gradually to the consulship through the lower offices.' His increase of the number of praetors from six to eight,' and of quaestors to twenty,' though required by administrative necessities, tended, by enlarging the numbers and further dividing the authority of the magistrates, to render them still more dependent upon the central direction of the senate. Lastly, he replaced the pontifical and augural colleges in the hands of the senatorial nobles, by enacting that vacancies 650 in them should, as before the lex Domitia (104), be filled up by co-optation.' It cannot be said that Sulla was successful in fortifying the republican system against the dangers which menaced it from without. He accepted as an accomplished fact the enfranchisement of the Italians,10 but he made no provision to guard against the consequent reduction of the comitia to an absurdity," and with them of the civic government which rested upon them, or to organize an effective administrative system for the Italian communities." Of all men, too, Sulla had the best reason to appreciate the dangers to be feared from the growing independence of governors and generals in the provinces, and from the transformation of the old civic militia into a group of professional armies, devoted 1 For Sulla's dictatorship as in itself a novelty, see App. i. 98; Plut. Sulla, 33; Cic. Ad Att. 9, 15; Cic. De Legg. i. 15, 42. ' Cic. De Legg. iii. 9, 22, " injuriae faciendae potestatem ademit, auxilii ferendi reliquit." Cf. Cic. Verr. i. 6o, 155; Livy, Epit. lxxxix. 3 Cic. Pro Cornel. fr. 78; Ascon. In Corn. pp. 59, 70; Appian i. I00. 4 Veil. ii. 32 ; Tac. Ann. xi. 22 ; Cic. Verr. Act. i. 13, 37. 6 App. B.C. i. too; cf. Livy vii. 42 (342 B.C.), " ne quis eundem magistratum intra decem annos caperet.' 6 The custom had gradually established itself. Cf. Livy xxxii. 7. The " certus ordo magistratuum " legalized by Sulla was—quaestorship, praetorship, consulate; App. i. ioo. 7 Pompon. De orig. juris (Dig. i. 2, 2, 32); Veil. ii. 89. Compare also Cicero, In Pisan. 15, 35 with Cic. Pro Milone, 15, 39. The increase was connected with his extension of the system of quaestiones per petuae, which threw more work on the praetors as the magistrates in charge of the courts. 6 Tac. Ann. xi. 22. The quaestorship henceforward carried with it the right to be called up to the senate. By increasing the number of quaestors, Sulla provided for the supply of ordinary vacancies in the senate and restricted the censors' freedom of choice in filling them up. Fragments of the lex Cornelia de XX quaestoribus survive. See C.I.L. i. io8; Bruns, Fontes juris Romani (ed. 6), 1 . P 9Dio xxxvii. 37; Ps. Ascon. 102 (Orelli). He also increased their numbers; Livy, Epit. lxxxix. 10 He did propose to deprive several communities which had joined Cinna of the franchise, but the deprivation was not carried into effect; Cic. Pro domo, 3o, 79. 11 The inadequacy of the comitia as a representative body was increased by the unequal distribution of the new citizens amongst the thirty-fve tribes, each of which formed a single voting unit. Some tribes represented only a thinly populated district in the Campagna with one or two outlying communities, others included large and populous territories. See Mommsen, Staatsr. iii. 187; Hermes, xxii. 101 sqq. 12 Sulla does not appear to have passed any general municipal law; the necessary resettlement of the local constitutions after the Social War was seemingly carried out by commissioners. The fragment of a municipal charter found at Tarentum (Ephem. epigr. ix. t, Dessau, Inscr. Lat. sel. 6086) is probably a specimen of such leges datae.
End of Article: PERIOD
PERINTHUS (Turk. Eski Eregli, old Heraclea)
PERIOD (Gr. irepioSos, a going or way round, circui...

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