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PHILOLOGY
, the generally accepted comprehensive name for the study of the word (Gr
.
X6'yos), or See also:languages; it designates that See also:branch of knowledge which deals with human speech, and with all that speech discloses as to the nature and See also:history of See also:man
.
Philology has two See also:principal divisions, corresponding to the two uses of " word " or " speech," as signifying either what is said or the See also:language in which it is said, as either the thought expressed—which, when recorded, takes the See also:form of literature—or the instrumentality of its expression: these divisions are the See also:literary and the linguistic
.
Not all study of literature, indeed, is philological: as when, for example, the records of the See also:ancient See also:Chinese are ransacked for notices of astronomical or meteorological phenomena, or the principles of See also:geometry are learned from the textbook of a See also:Greek See also:sage; while, on the other See also:hand, to study See also:Ptolemy and See also:Euclid for the history of the sciences represented by them is philological more than scientific
.
Again, the study of language itself has its literary See also:side: as when the vocabulary of a community (say of the ancient Indo-Europeans or See also:Aryans) is taken as a document from which to infer the range and grade of knowledge of its speakers, their circumstances and their institutions
.
The two divisions thus do not admit of See also:absolute distinction and separation, though for some See also:time past tending toward greater See also:independence
.
The literary is the older of the two; it even occupied until recently the whole See also: Philology, in all its departments, began and See also:grew up as classical; the history of our See also:civilization made the study of Greek and Latin See also:long the exclusive, still longer the predominant and regulating, occupation of See also:secular Nature of the Scleace . scholarship . The See also:Hebrew and its literature were held apart, as something of a different order, as sacred . It was not imagined that any See also:tongue to which culture and literature did not lend importance was worthy of serious See also:attention from scholars . The first essays in comparison, likewise, were made upon the classical See also:tongues, and were as erroneous in method and fertile in false conclusions as was to be expected, considering the narrowness of view and the controlling prejudices of those who made them; and the See also:admission of Hebrew to the comparison only added to the confusion . The See also:change which the past century has seen has been a part of the general scientific See also:movement of the See also:age, which has brought about the See also:establishment of so many new branches of knowledge, both See also:historical and See also:physical, by the See also:abandonment of shackling prejudices, the freedom of inquiry, the recognition of the dignity of all know-ledge, the wide-reaching assemblage of facts and their See also:objective comparison, and the resulting See also:constant improvement of method . Literary philology has had its full See also:share of See also:advantage from this movement; but linguistic philology has been actually created by it out of the crude observations and See also:wild deductions of earlier times, as truly as See also:chemistry out of See also:alchemy, or See also:geology out of diluvianism . It is unnecessary here to follow out the details of the development; but we may well refer to the decisive See also:influence of one See also:discovery, the, decisive See also:action of one See also:scholar . It was the discovery of the See also:special relationship of the See also:Aryan or Indo-European languages, depending in See also:great measure upon the introduction of the See also:Sanskrit as a term in their comparison, and demonstrated and worked out by the German scholar See also:Bopp, that founded the science of linguistic philology . While there is abundant See also:room for further improvement, it yet appears that the See also:grand features of philologic study, in all its departments, are now so distinctly See also:drawn that no revolution of its methods, but only their modification in See also:minor respects, is henceforth probable . How and for what purposes to investigate the literature of any See also:people (philology in the more proper sense), combining the knowledge thus obtained with that derived from other See also:sources; how to study and set forth the material and structure and combinations of a language (See also:grammar), or of a See also:body of related languages (comparative grammar); how to co-See also:ordinate and interpret the general phenomena of language, as variously illustrated in the infinitely varying facts of different tongues, so as to exhibit its nature as a See also:factor in human history and its methods of See also:life and growth (linguistic science)—these are what philology teaches . The study of language is a See also:division of the general science of See also:anthropology (q.v.), and is akin to all the See also:rest in respect to its Relation to See also:objects and its methods . Man as we now see him Anthropo- is a twofold being: in part the See also:child of nature, as logy to his capacities and desires, his endowments of mind and body; in part the creature of See also:education, by training in the knowledge, the arts, the social conduct, of which his predecessors have gained See also:possession . And the problem of anthropology is this: how natural man has become cultivated man; how a being thus endowed by nature should have begun and carried on the processes of acquisition which have brought him to his See also:present See also:state . The results of his predecessors' labours are not transmuted for his benefit into natural instincts, in language or in anything else . The child of the most civilized See also:race, if isolated and See also:left wholly to his own resources, aided by neither the example nor the instruction of his See also:fellows, would no more speak the speech of his ancestors than he would build their houses, See also:fashion their clothes, practise any of their arts, inherit their knowledge or See also:wealth . In fact, he would possess no language, no arts, no wealth, but would have to go to See also:work to acquire them, by the same processes which began to win them for the first human beings . One advantage he would doubtless enjoy: the descendant of a cultivated race has an enhanced aptitude for the reception of cultivation; he is more cultivable; and this is an See also:element that has to be allowed for in comparing present conditions with past, as influencing the See also:rate of progress, but nothing more . In all other respects it is man with the endowments which we now find him possessed of, but destitute of the gradually accumulated results of the exercise of his faculties, whose progress we have to explain . And it is, as a See also:matter of See also:necessity, by studying recent observable modes of acquisition, and transferring them, with due See also:allowance for different circumstances, to the more See also:primitive periods, that the question of first acquisition or origin is to be solved, for language as for tools, for arts, for See also:family and social organization, and the rest . There is just as much and just as little See also:reason for assuming miraculous interference and aid in one of these departments as in another . If men have been left to themselves to make and improve See also:instruments, to form and perfect modes of social organization, by implantedpowers directed by natural desires, and under the pressure of circumstances, then also to make and change the signs that constitute their speech . All expressions, as all instruments, are at present, and have been ,through the known past, made and changed by the men who use them; the same will have been the See also:case in the unknown or prehistoric past . And we command now enough of the history of language, with the processes of its life and growth, to determine with confidence its mode of origin—within certain limits, as will appear below . It is beyond all question, in the first See also:place, that the See also:desire of communication was the only force directly impelling men to the See also:production of language . Man's sociality, cause of his disposition to See also:band together with his fellows, Language-for See also:lower and for higher purposes, for mutual help makink and for sympathy, is one of his most fundamental characteristics . To understand those about one and to be understood by them is now, and must have been from the very beginning, a See also:prime necessity of human existence; we cannot conceive of man, even in his most undeveloped state, as without the recognition of it . Communication is still the universally recognized office of speech, and to the immense See also:majority of speakers the only one; the common man knows no other, and can only with difficulty and imperfectly be brought to see that there is any other; of the added distinctness and reach of See also:mental action which the possession of such an instrumentality gives him he is wholly unconscious: and it is obvious that what the comparatively cultivated being of to-See also:day can hardly be made to realize can never have acted upon the first men as a See also:motive to action . It may perhaps be made a question which of the two uses of speech, communication or the facilitation of thought is the higher; there can be no question, at any rate, that the former is the broader and the more fundamental . That the kind and degree of thinking which we do nowadays would be impossible without language-signs is true enough; but so also it would be impossible without written signs . That there was a time when men had to do what mental work they could without the help of See also:writing, as an See also:art not yet devised, we have no difficulty in realizing, because the art is of comparatively recent See also:device, and there are still communities enough that are working without it; it is much harder to realize that there was a time when speaking also was an art not yet attained, and that men had to carry on their See also:rude and rudimentary thinking without it . Writing too was devised for conscious purposes of communication only; its See also:esoteric uses, like those of speech, were at first unsuspected, and incapable of acting as an inducement; they were not noticed until made experience of, and then only by those who look beneath the See also:surface of things . There is no See also:analogy closer and more instructive than this between speech and writing . But analogies are abundant elsewhere in the history of human development . Everywhere it is the lower and more obvious inducements that are first effective, and that See also:lead gradually to the possession of what serves and stimulates higher wants . All the arts and See also:industries have grown out of men's effort to get enough to eat and See also:protection against See also:cold and See also:heat-just as language, with all its uses, out of men's effort to communicate with their fellows . As a solitary man now would never form even the beginnings of speech, as one separated from society unlearns his speech by disuse and becomes virtually dumb, so See also:early man, with all his See also:powers, would never have acquired speech, See also:save as to those powers was added sociality with the needs it brought . We might conceive of a solitary man as See also:housing and dressing himself, devising rude tools, and thus lifting himself a step from wildness toward cultivation; but we cannot conceive of him as ever learning to talk . Recognition of the impulse to communication as the efficient cause of language-making is an element of See also:primary importance in the theory of the origin of language . No one who either leaves it out of See also:account or denies it will, however ingenious and entertaining his speculations, See also:cast any real light on the earliest history of speech . To inquire under what See also:peculiar circumstances, in connexion with what mode of individual or combined action, a first outburst of oral expression may have taken place, is, on the other hand, quite futile . The needed circumstances were always present when human beings were in one another's society; there was an incessant See also:drawing-on to attempts at mutual understanding which met with occasional, and then ever more frequent and See also:complete success . There inheres in most reasoning upon this subject the rooted See also:assumption, governing See also:opinion even when not openly upheld or consciously made, that conceptions have real natural names, and that in a state of nature these will somehow break forth and reveal themselves under favouring circumstances . The falsity of such a view is shown by our whole further discussion . The See also:character of the motive force to speech determined the character of the beginnings of speech . That was first signified Beginnings which was most capable of intelligible signification, of speech not that which was first in order of importance, See also:anti writing. as judged by any See also:standard which we can apply to it, or first in order of conceptional development . All attempts to determine the first spoken signs by asking what should have most impressed the mind of primitive man are and must be failures . It was the exigencies and possibilities of See also:practical life, in conditions quite out of reach of our distinct conception, that prescribed the earliest signs of communication . So, by a true and instructive analogy, the beginnings of writing are rude depictions of visible objects; it is now thoroughly recognized that no See also:alphabet, of whatever present character, can have originated in any other way; everything else is gradually arrived at from that—as, indeed, in the ingeniously shaping hands of man, from any central body of signs, though but of small extent, all else is attainable by processes of analogy and See also:adaptation and See also:transfer . Now what is it that is directly signifiable in the See also:world about us ? Evidently the See also:separate acts and qualities of sensible objects, and nothing else . In writing, or signification to the See also:eye, the first element is the rude depiction of the outline of an See also:object, or of that one of the sum of its characteristic qualities which the eye takes See also:note of and the hand is capable of intelligibly reproducing; from that the mind understands the whole complex object itself, and then whatever further may in the circumstances of its use be suggested by it . So, for example, the picture of a See also:tree signifies primarily a tree, then perhaps See also:wood, something made of wood, and so on; that of a pair of outstretched wings signifies secondarily See also:flight, then soaring, height, and whatever else these may lead to . No See also:concrete thing is signifiable in its totality or otherwise than by a facile See also:analysis of its constituent qualities and a selection of the one which is both sufficiently characteristic in itself and capable of being called up by a sign before the mind addressed . And what quality shall be selected depends in great measure upon the instrumentality used for its signification . Of such fnstrumen• instrumentalities men possess a considerable variety. tames of We must leave out of account that of depiction, as Expression, just instanced, because its employment belongs to a much more advanced state of cultivation, and leads the way to the invention not of speech but of the analogous and auxiliary art of writing . There remain gesture, or changes of position of the various parts of the body, especially of the most See also:mobile parts, the arms and hands; grimace, or the changes of expression of the features of the countenance (in strictness, a variety of the preceding); and utterance, or the production of audible See also:sound . It cannot be doubted that, in the first stages of communicative expression, all these three were used together, each for the particular purposes which it was best calculated to serve . The nearest approach to such action that is now possible is when two persons, wholly ignorant of one another's speech, meet and need to communicate—an imperfect See also:correspondence, because each is trained to habits of expression and See also:works consciously, and with the advantage of long experience, towards making himself understood; yet it is See also:good for its See also:main purpose . What they do, to reach mutual comprehension, is like what the first speechless men, unconsciously and infinitely more slowly, learned to do: See also:face, hands, body, See also:voice, are all put to use . It is altogether probable that gesture at first performed the principal part, even to such extent that theearliest human language may be said to have been a language of gesture signs; indeed, there exist at the present day such gesture-languages as those in use between roving tribes of different speech that from time to time meet one another (the most noted example is that of the gesture-language, of a very considerable degree of development, of the See also:prairie tribes of See also:American See also:Indians); or such signs as are the natural resort of those who by deafness are cut off from See also:ordinary spoken inter-course with their fellows . Yet there never can have been a See also:stage or See also:period in which all the three instrumentalities were not put to use together . In fact, they are still all used together; that is even now an ineffective speaking to which grimace and gesture (" action," as See also:Demosthenes called them) are not added as enforcers; and the lower the grade Of development and culture of a language, the more important, even for intelligibility, is their addition . But voice has won to itself the The voice, See also:chief and almost exclusive part in communication, insomuch that we See also:call all communication " language " (i.e . "tonguiness") just as a race of mutes might call it "handiness" and talk (by gesture) of a handiness of grimace . This is not in the least because of any closer connexion of the thinking apparatus with the muscles that See also:act to produce audible sounds than with those that act to produce visible motions; not because there are natural uttered names for conceptions any more than natural gestured names . It is simply a case of " survival of the fittest," or analogous to the See also:process by which See also:iron has become the exclusive material of swords, and See also:gold and See also:silver of See also:money: because, namely, experience has shown this to be the material best adapted to this special use . The advantages of voice are numerous and obvious . There is first its See also:economy, as employing a mechanism that is available for little else, and leaving See also:free for other purposes those indispensable instruments the hands . Then there is its See also:superior perceptibleness: its See also:nice See also:differences impress themselves upon the sense at a distance at which visible motions become indistinct; they are not hidden by intervening objects; they allow the eyes of the listener as well as the hands of the See also:speaker to be employed in other useful work; they are as See also:plain in the dark as in the light; and they are able to catch and command the attention of one who is not to be reached in any other way . We might add as the third advantage a superior capability of variation and See also:combination on the part of spoken sounds; but this is not to be insisted on, inasmuch as we hardly know what a gesture-language might have become if men's ingenuity in expression had been expended through all time upon its elaboration; and the superiority, however real, can hardly have been obvious enough to serve as a motive: certainly, there are spoken languages now existing whose abundance of resources falls See also:short of what is attainable by gesture . Oral utterance is the form which expression has inevitably taken, the sum of man's endowments being what it is; but it would be a See also:mistake to suppose that a necessity of any other kind is involved in their relation . The fundamental conditions of speech are man's grade of intellectual See also:power and his social See also:instinct; these being given, his expression follows, availing itself of what means it finds best suited to its purpose; if voice had been wanting it would have taken the next best . So, in certain well-known cases, a marked See also:artistic See also:gift on the part of individuals deprived of the use of hands has found means of exercise in the feet instead . But men in general have hands, instruments of exquisite tact and power, to serve the needs of their See also:intellect; and so voice also, to provide and use the tools of thought; there is no See also:error in maintaining that the voice is given us for speech, if only we do not proceed to draw from such a dictum false conclusions as to the relation between thought and utterance . Man is created with bodily instruments suited to do the work prescribed by his mental capacities; therein lies the See also:harmony of his endowment . It is through See also:imitation that all signification becomes directly suggestive . The first written signs are (as already noticed) the depictions of visible objects, and could be nothing else; and, by the same necessity, the first uttered signs were the imitations of audible sounds . To reproduce Imitation . any sound of which the originating cause or the circumstances of production are known, brings up of course before the conception that sound, along with the originator, or circumstances of origination, or whatever else may be naturally associated with it . There are two special directions in which this mode of sign-making is fruitful: imitation of the sounds of See also:external nature (as the cries of animals and the noises of inanimate objects when in See also:motion or acted on by other objects) and imitation of human sounds . The two are essentially one in principle, although by some held apart, or even opposed to each other, as respectively the imitative or onomatopoetic and the exclamatory or interjectional beginnings of speech; they differ only in their See also:spheres of significance, the one being especially suggestive of external objects, the other of inward feelings . There are natural human tones, indicative of feeling, as there are natural gestures, poses, modes of facial expression, which either are immediately intelligible to us (as is the warning cry of the See also:hen to the day-old chicken), or have their value taught us by our earliest experiences . If we hear a cry of joy or a shriek of See also:pain, a laugh or a groan, we need no explanation in words to tell us what it signifies any more than when we see a sad face or a drooping attitude . So also the characteristic cry or act of anything outside ourselves, if even rudely imitated, is to us an effective reminder and awakener of conception . We have no reason to question that such were the suggestions of the beginnings of uttered expression . The same means have made their contributions to language even down to our own day; we call words so produced " onomatopoetic " (i.e . " name-making "), after the example of the Greeks, who could not conceive that actually new additions to language should be made in any other way . What and how wide the range of the imitative principle, and what amount of language-signs it was capable of yielding, is a subject for special investigation—or rather, of See also:speculation, since anything like exact knowledge in regard to it will never be attained; and the matter is one of altogether secondary See also:con-sequence; it is sufficient for our purpose that enough could certainly be won in this way to serve as the effective germs of speech . All the natural means of expression are still at our command, and are put to more or less use by us, and their products are as Language. intelligible to us as they have been to any See also:generation of our ancestors, back to the very first . They are analogous also to the means of communication of the lower animals; this, so far as we know, consists in observing and interpreting one another's movements and natural sounds (where there are such) . But language is a step beyond this, and different from it . To make language, the See also:intent to signify must be present . A cry wrung out by pain, or a laugh of amusement, though intelligible, is not language; either of them, if consciously reproduced in order to signify to another pain or See also:pleasure, is language . So a cough within See also:hearing of any one attracts his attention; but to cough, or to produce any other sound, articulate or inarticulate, for the purpose of attracting another's attention, is to commit an act of language-making, such as in human history preceded in abundance the establishment of definite traditional signs for conceptions . Here begins to appear the division between human language and all See also:brute expression; since we do not know that any See also:animal but man ever definitely took this step . It would be highly interesting to find out just how near any come to it; and to this point ought to be especially directed the attention of those who are investigating the communication of the lower animals in its relation to human communication . Among the animals of highest intelligence that See also:associate with man and learn something of his ways, a certain amount of sign-making expressly for communication is not to be denied; the See also:dog that barks at a See also:door because he knows that somebody will come and let him in is an instance of it; perhaps, in wild life, the throwing out of See also:sentinel birds from a See also:flock, whose warning cry shall advertise their fellows of the See also:threat of danger, is as near an approach to it as is anywhere made . But the actual permanent beginnings of speech are only II common See also:species: every part of our language, as of every other, is full of such examples—but, when once the name is applied, it belongs to that to which it is applied, and no longer to its relatives by See also:etymology; its origin is neglected, and its form may be gradually changed beyond recognition, or its meaning so far altered that comparison with the See also:original shall seem a joke or an absurdity . This is a See also:regular and essential part of the process of name-making in all human speech, and from the very beginning of the history of speech: in fact (as pointed out above), the latter can only be said to have begun when this process was successfully initiated, when uttered signs began to be, what they have ever since continued to be, conventional, or dependent only on a mutual understanding . Thus alone did language gain the capacity of unlimited growth and development . The See also:sphere and See also:scope of natural expression are narrowly bounded; but there is no end to the resources of conventional sign-making . It is well to point out here that this change of the basis of men's communication from natural suggestiveness to mutual Brute understanding, and the consequent purely conven- speech tional character of all human language, in its every and Human part and particle, puts an absolute See also:line of demarca- speech. tion between the latter and the means of communication of all the lower animals . The two are not of the same kind, any more than human society in its variety of organization is of the same kind with the instinctive herding of wild See also:cattle or swarming of See also:insects, any more than human See also:architecture with the instinctive burrowing of the See also:fox and See also:nest-See also:building of the See also:bird, any more than human See also:industry and See also:accumulation of See also:capital with the instinctive hoarding of bees and beavers . In all these cases alike the action of men is a result of the adaptation of means at hand to the See also:satisfaction of See also:felt needs, or of purposes dimly perceived at first, but growing clearer with gradually acquired experience . Man is the only being that has established institutions—gradually accumulated and perfected results of the exercise of powers analogous in kind to, but greatly differing in degree from, those of the lower animals . The difference in degree of endowment does not constitute the difference in language, it only leads to it . There was a time when all existing human beings were as destitute of language as the dog; and that time would come again for any number of human beings who should be cut off (if that were practicable) from all instruction by their fellows: only they would at once proceed to recreate language, society and arts by the same steps by which their own remote ancestors created those which we now possess; while the dog would remain what he and his ancestors have always been, a creature of very superior intelligence, indeed, as compared with most, of See also:infinite intelligence as compared with many, yet incapable of rising by the acquisition of culture through the formation and development of traditional institutions . There is just the same status existent in the difference between man's conventional speech and the natural communication of the lower races as in that between men's forms of society and the instinctive associations of the lower races; but it is no greater and no other; it 's neither more absolute and characteristic nor more difficult to explain . Hence those who put forward language as the distinction between man and the lower animals, and those who look upon our language as the same in kind with the means of communication of the lower animals, only much more complete and perfect, fail alike to comprehend the true nature of language, and are alike wrong in their arguments and conclusions . No addition to or multiplication of brute speech would make anything like human speech; the two are separated by a step which no animal below man has ever taken; and, on the other hand, language is only the most conspicuous among those institutions the development of which has constituted human progress, while their possession constitutes human culture . With the question of the origin of man, whether or not See also:developed out of lower animal forms, intermediate to the anthropoid apes, language has nothing to do, nor can its study ever be made to contribute anything to the See also:solution of that question . If there once existed creatures above the apes andbelow man, who were extirpated by primitive man as his especial rivals in the struggle for existence, or became See also:extinct in any other way, there is no difficulty in supposing them to have possessed forms of speech, more rudimentary and imperfect than ours . At any rate, all existing human speech is one in the essential characteristics which we have thus far noted or shall hereafter have to consider, even as humanity is one in its distinction from the lower animals; the differences are in non-essentials . All speech is one in the sense that every human being, of whatever race he may be, is capable of Language acquiring any existing tongue, and of using it for and the same purposes for which its present possessors Culture. use it, with such power and effect as his individual capacity allows, and without any essential change in the mental operations carried on by means of speech—even as he may acquire any other of the items of culture belonging to a race not his own . The difference between employing one language and another is like that between employing one See also:instrument and another in See also:mechanical arts; one instrument may be better than another, and may enable its user to turn out better work, but the human ingenuity behind both is the same, and works in the same way . Nor has the making of language anything whatever to do with making man what he is, as an animal species having a certain physical form and intellectual endowment . Being what he is by nature, man has by the development of language and other institutions become what he is by culture . His acquired culture is the necessary result of his native endowment, not the contrary . The acquisition of the first stumbling beginnings of a superior means of communication had no more influence to raise him from a simian to a human being than the present high culture and perfected speech of certain races has to lift them up to something more than human and specifically different from the races of inferior culture . It cannot be too absolutely laid down that differences of language, down to the possession of language at all, are differences only in respect to education and culture . How long man, after he came into such being as he now is, physically and intellectually, continued to communicate with imitative signs of See also:direct significance, when the Develop. production of traditional signs began, how rapidly ment of they were accumulated, and how long any traces of Language-their imitative origin clave to them—these and the signs. like questions it is at present idle to try to See also:answer even conjecturally: just as it is to seek to determine when the first instruments were used, how soon they were shaped instead of being left crude, at what See also:epoch See also:fire was reduced to service, and so on . The stages of development and their See also:succession are clear enough; to See also:fix their See also:chronology will doubtless never be found practicable . There is much reason for holding, as some do, that the very first items of culture were hardest to win and cost most time, the rate of accumulation (as in the case of capital) increasing with the amount accumulated . Beyond all reasonable question, however, there was a positively long period of purely imitative signs, and a longer one of mixed imitative and traditional ones, the latter gradually gaining upon the former, 'before the present See also:condition of things was reached, when the production of new signs by imitation is only sporadic and of the utmost rarity, and all language-signs besides are traditional, their increase in any community being solely by variation and combination, and by borrowing from other communities . Of what nature, in various respects, this earliest language-material was is sufficiently clear . The signs, in the first place, were of the sort that we call " roots." By this is only meant that they were integral signs, significant The f''°' in their entirety, not divisible into parts, of which one signified one thing and another another thing, or of which one gave the main significance, while another was an added sign of kind or relation . In a language of developed structure like our own, we arrive at such " roots " mainly by an artificial stripping-off of the signs of relation which almost every word still has, or can be shown to have once had . In un-cost-li-ness, for example, cost is the centrally significant element; so far as English is concerned it is a See also:root, about which cluster a whole body of forms and derivatives; if we could follow its history no farther it would be to us an ultimate root, as much so as bind or sing or mean . But we can follow it up, to the Latin See also:compound con-sta, a root sta with a prefixed formative element con . Then sta, which in slightly varied forms we find in a whole body of related tongues called " Indo-European," having in them all the same significance " stand," is an Indo-European root, and to us an ultimate one, because we can follow its history no farther; but there always remains the possibility that it is as far from being actually original as is the English root cost: that is to say, it is not within our power ever to get back to the really primitive elements of speech and to demonstrate their character by See also:positive See also:evidence . The reason for accepting a primitive root-stage of language is in great part theoretical: because nothing else is reconcilable with any acceptable view of the origin of language . The See also:law of the simplicity of beginnings is an absolute one for everything of the nature of an institution, for every gradually developed product of the exercise of human faculties . That an original speech-sign should be of See also:double character, one part of it meaning this and another part that, or one part See also:radical and the other formative, is as inconceivable as that the first instruments should have had handles, or the first shelters a front room and a back one . But this theoretical reason finds all the historical support which it needs in the fact that, through all the observable periods of language-history we see formative elements coming from words originally independent, and not from any-thing else . Thus, in the example just taken, the-li-of costliness is a suffix of so recent growth that its whole history is distinctly traceable; it is simply our See also:adjective like, worn down in both form and meaning to a subordinate value in combination with certain words to which ii was appended, and then added freely as a suffix to any word from which it was desired to make a derivative adjective or, later but more often, a derivative adverb . The ness is much older (though only Germanic), and its history obscurer; it contains, in fact, two parts, neither of them of demonstrable origin; but there are See also:equivalent later suffixes, as See also:ship in hardship and dom in See also:wisdom, whose derivation from independent words (shape, See also:doom) is beyond question . The un- of uncostliness is still more ancient (being Indo-European), and its probably pronominal origin hardly available as an See also:illustration; but the comparatively See also:modern prefix be-, of become, belie, &c., comes from the independent preposition by, by the same process as -ly or -li- from like . And the con which has contributed its part to the making of the quasi-root cost is also in origin identical with the Latin preposition cum, " with." By all the known facts of later language-growth we are driven to the opinion that every formative element goes back to some previously existing independent word; and hence that in analysing our present words we are retracing the steps of an earlier See also:synthesis, or following up the history of our formed words toward the unformed roots out of which they have grown . The See also:doctrine of the historical growth of language-structure leads by a logical necessity to that of a root-stage in the history of all language; the only means of avoiding the latter is the assumption of a miraculous element in the former . Of what phonetic form were the earliest traditional speech-signs is, so far as essentials are concerned, to be inferred with earliest reasonable certainty . They were doubtless articu-Phonetic See also:late: that is to say, composed of alternating conso- Forms. nant and vowel sounds, like our present speech; and they probably contained a part of the same sounds which we now use . All human language is of this character; there are no sounds in any tongue which are not learned and reproduced as easily by See also:children of one race as of another; all dialects admit a like phonetic analysis, and are representable by alphabetic signs; and the leading sounds, consonant and vowel, are even practically the same in all; though every See also:dialect has its own (for the most part, readily definable and imitable) niceties of their See also:pronunciation, while certain sounds are rare, or even met with only in a single See also:group of languages or in a single language . Articulate sounds are such as are capable of being combined with others into that succession of distinct yet connectable syllables which is the characteristic of human speech-utterance . The name " articulate " belongs to this utterance, as distinguished from inarticulate human sounds and cries and from the sounds made by the lower animals . The word itself is Latin, by See also:translation from the Greek, and, though very widely misunderstood, and even deliberately misapplied in some languages to designate all sound, of whatever kind, uttered by any living creature, is a most happily chosen and truly descriptive term . It signifies " jointed," or broken up into successive parts, like a See also:limb or See also:stem; the See also:joints are the syllables; and the syllabic structure is mainly effected by the See also:alternation of closer or consonant sounds with opener or vowel sounds . The simplest syllabic combination (as the facts of language show) is that of a single consonant with a following vowel; and there are languages even now existing which reject any other . Hence there is much plausibility in the view that the first speech-signs will have had this phonetic form and been monosyllabic, or dissyllabic only by repetition (reduplication) of one syllable, such as the speech of very See also:young children shows to have a peculiar ease and naturalness . The point, however, is one of only secondary importance, and may be left to the further progress of phonetic study to See also:settle, if it can; the root-theory, at any rate, is not See also:bound to any definite form or extent of root, but only denies that there can have been any grammatical structure in language except by development in connexion with experience in the use of language . What particular sounds, and how many, made up the first spoken alphabet is also a matter of conjecture merely; they are likely to have been the closest consonants and the openest vowels, medial utterances being of later development . As regards their significant value, the first language-signs must have denoted those physical acts and qualities which are directly apprehensible by the senses; both because Character these alone are directly signifiable, and because it of early was only they that untrained human beings had Speech. the power to See also:deal with or the occasion to use . Such signs would then be applied to more intellectual uses as fast as there was occasion for it . The whole history of 'language, down to our own day, is full of examples of the reduction of physical terms and phrases to the expression of non-physical conceptions and relations; we can hardly write a line without giving illustrations of this kind of linguistic growth . So pervading is it, that we never regard ourselves as having read the history of any intellectual or moral term till we have traced it back to a physical origin . And we are still all the time drawing figurative comparisons between material and moral things and processes, a |