See also:

• PHILOSOPHY (Gr. gthos, fond of, and vo4 (a, wisdom)

PHILOSOPHY (Gr. gthos, fond of, and vo4 (a, See also:

• WISDOM, BOOK OF, or WISDOM OF SOLOMON (Sept. Io4ia IaXwµwvos; Lat. Vulg. Liber sapientiae)

wisdom)  , a See also:

• GENERAL
• GENERAL (Lat. generalis, of or relating to a genus, kind or class)

general See also:

• TERM

term whose meaning and See also:

• SCOPE (through Ital. scopo, aim, purpose, intent, from Gr. o'KOaos, mark to shoot at, aim, o ic07reiv, to see, whence the termination in telescope, microscope, &c.)

scope have varied very considerably according to the usage of different authors and different ages, It can best be explained by a survey of the steps by which See also:

• PHILOSOPHY (Gr. gthos, fond of, and vo4 (a, wisdom)

philosophy differentiated itself, in the See also:

• HISTORY

history of See also:

• GREEK
• GREEK, ETRUSCAN AND

Greek thought, from the See also:

• IDEA (Gr. Ibia, connected with i&eiv, to see; cf. Lat. species from specere, to look at)

idea of knowledge and culture in general . These steps may be traced in the See also:

• GRADUAL (Med. Lat. gradualis, of or belonging to steps or degrees; gradus, step)

gradual See also:

• SPECIFICATION (from Med. Lat. specificatio, specificare, to enumerate or mention in detail)

specification of the term . The tradition which assigns the first employment of the Greek word ¢$Xovocpia to See also:

• PYTHAGORAS
• PYTHAGORAS (6th century B.C.)

Pythagoras has hardly any claim to be regarded as See also:

• AUTHENTIC (from Gr. aOO 'rns, one who does a thing himself)

authentic; and the somewhat self-conscious modesty to which See also:

• DIOGENES

Diogenes Laertius attributes the choice of the designation is, in all See also:

• PROBABILITY (Lat. probabilis, probable or credible)

probability, a piece of See also:

• ETYMOLOGY (Gr. grvµos, true, and X6yos, "account)

etymology crystallized into narrative . It is true that, as a See also:

• MATTER

matter of fact, the earliest uses of the word (the verb 4uX000cksiv occurs in See also:

• HERODOTUS (c. 484-425 B.C.)

Herodotus and See also:

• THUCYDIDES (OovavMns)

Thucydides) imply the idea of the pursuit of knowledge; but the distinction between the voOs, or See also:

• WISE, HENRY ALEXANDER (1806-1876)
• WISE, ISAAC MAYER (1819-1900)

wise See also:

• MAN
• MAN, ISLE OF (anc. Mona)

man, and the ¢tkbvo4os, or See also:

• LOVER, SAMUEL (1797-1868)

lover of See also:

• WISDOM, BOOK OF, or WISDOM OF SOLOMON (Sept. Io4ia IaXwµwvos; Lat. Vulg. Liber sapientiae)

wisdom, appears first in the Platonic writings, and lends itself naturally to the so-called Socratic See also:

• IRONY (Gr. dipaweLa, from eipwv, one who says less than he means, eiepees, to speak)

irony . The same thought is to be found in See also:

• XENOPHON

Xenophon, and is doubtless to be attributed to the See also:

• HISTORICAL

historical See also:

• SOCRATES

Socrates . But the word soon lost this See also:

• SPECIAL

special implication . What is of real See also:

• INTEREST

interest to us is to trace the progress from the idea of the philosopher as occupied with any and every See also:

• DEPARTMENT (Fr. departement, from departir, to separate into parts)

department of knowledge to that which assigns him a special See also:

• KIND (O. E. ge-cynde, from the same root as is seen in " kin," supra)

kind of knowledge as his See also:

• PROVINCE
• PROVINCE (Lat. provincia; perhaps a contraction of providentia)

province . A specific sense of the word first meets us in See also:

• PLATO

Plato, who defines the philosopher as one who apprehends the essence or reality of things in opposition to the man who dwells in appearances and the shows of sense . The philosophers, he says, " are those who are able to grasp the eternal and immutable"; they are "those who set their affections on that which in each See also:

• CASE
• CASE, JOHN (d. 1600)

case really exists " (See also:

• REP, REPP, or REPS

Rep . 48o) . In Plato, however, this distinction is applied chiefly in an ethical and religious direction; and, while it defines philosophy, so far correctly, as the endeavour to See also:

• EXPRESS (through the French from the past participle of the Lat. exprimere, to press out, by transference used of representing objects in painting or sculpture, or of thoughts, &c. in words)

express what things are in their ultimate constitution, it is not yet accompanied by a sufficient differentiation of the subsidiary inquiries by which this ultimate question may be approached . See also:

• LOGIC (Xoy1K7, sc. rixvrt, the art of reasoning)

Logic, See also:

• ETHICS
• ETHICS, SHAFTESBURY, HOBBES

ethics and physics, See also:

• PSYCHOLOGY
• PSYCHOLOGY (>Guxrl, the mind or soul, and X yos, theory)

psychology, theory of knowledge and See also:

• METAPHYSICS
• METAPHYSICS, or METAPHYSIC (from Gr. /sera, after, d v med, things of nature, lots, i.e. the natural universe)

metaphysics are all fused together by Plato in a semi-religious See also:

• SYNTHESIS (Gr. a6vOeacs, from avvrcBivac, to put together)

synthesis .

It is not till we come to See also:

• ARISTOTLE
• ARISTOTLE (384-322 B.C.)

Aristotle—the encyclopaedist of the See also:

• ANCIENT
• ANCIENT (also spelt ANTIENT; derived, through the Fr. ancien, old, from the late Lat. antianum, from ante, before)

ancient See also:

• WORLD

world—that we find a demarcation of the different philosophic disciplines corresponding, in the See also:

• MAIN (from the Aryan root which appears in " may " and " might," and Lat. magnus, great)
• MAIN (Lat. Moenus)

main, to that still current . The earliest philosophers, or " physiologers," had occupied themselves chiefly with what we may See also:

• CALL (from Anglo-Saxon ceallian, a common Teutonic word, cf. Dutch kallen, to talk or chatter)

call cosmology; the one question which covers everything for them is that of the under-lying substance of the world around them, and they See also:

• ESSAY, ESSAYIST (Fr. essai, Late Lat. exagium, a weighing or balance; exigere, to examine; the term in general meaning any trial or effort)

essay to See also:

• ANSWER (derived from and, against, and the same root as swear)

answer this question, so to speak, by See also:

• SIMPLE

simple inspection . In Socrates and Plato, on the other See also:

• HAND
• HAND (a word common to Teutonic languages; cf. Ger. Hand, Goth. handus)
• HAND, FERDINAND GOTTHELF (1786-185r)

hand, the start is made from a See also:

• CONSIDERATION (from Lat. considerare, to look at closely, examine, generally taken to be from con-, and the base seen in sidus, sideris, a star, the word being supposed to be originally an astrological or astronomical term)

consideration of man's moral and intellectual activity; but knowledge and See also:

• ACTION

action are confused with one another, as in the Socratic See also:

• DOCTRINE

doctrine that virtue is knowledge . To this correspond the Platonic confusion of logic and ethics and the See also:

• ATTEMPT (Lat. adtemptare, attentare, to try)

attempt to substitute a theory of concepts for a metaphysic of reality . Aristotle's methodic See also:

• INTELLECT (Lat. intellectus, from intelligere, to understand)

intellect led him to See also:

• SEPARATE

separate the different aspects of reality here confounded . He became the founder of logic, psychology, ethics and See also:

• AESTHETICS

aesthetics as separate sciences; while he prefixed to all such (comparatively) special inquiries the investigation of the ultimate nature of existence as such, or of those first principles which are See also:

• COMMON

common to, and presupposed in, every narrower See also:

• FIELD (a word common to many West German languages, cf. Ger. Feld, Dutch veld, possibly cognate with O.E. f olde, the earth, and ultimately with root of the Gr. irAaror, broad)
• FIELD, CYRUS WEST (1819-1892)
• FIELD, DAVID DUDLEY (18o5-1894)
• FIELD, EUGENE (1850-1895)
• FIELD, FREDERICK (18o1—1885)
• FIELD, HENRY MARTYN (1822-1907)
• FIELD, JOHN (1782—1837)
• FIELD, MARSHALL (183 1906)
• FIELD, NATHAN (1587—1633)
• FIELD, STEPHEN JOHNSON (1816-1899)
• FIELD, WILLIAM VENTRIS FIELD, BARON (1813-1907)

field of knowledge . For this investigation Aristotle's most usual name is " first philosophy " or, as a See also:

• MODERN

modern might say, "first principles "; but there has since been appropriated to it, apparently by See also:

• ACCIDENT
• ACCIDENT (from Lat. accidere, to happen)

accident, the See also:

• TITLE (0. Fr. title, mod. titre, from Lat. titulus)

title " metaphysics." " Philosophy," as a term of general application, was not, indeed restricted by Aristotle or his successors to the disciplines just enumerated . Aristotle himself includes under the title, besides See also:

• MATHEMATICS (Gr. /saBnµar1Kil, Sc. vOcvn or E7rlQTt'µn; from p iN.La, "learning" or "science ")

mathematics, all his See also:

• PHYSICAL

physical inquiries . It was only in the Alexandrian See also:

• PERIOD
• PERIOD (Gr. irepioSos, a going or way round, circuit, aepi, round, and &Sis, way, road)

period, as See also:

• ZELLER, EDUARD (1814-1908)

Zeller points out, that the special sciences attained to See also:

• INDEPENDENT

independent cultivation Nevertheless, as the See also:

• MASS (O.E. maesse; Fr. messe; Ger. Messe; Ital. messa; from eccl. Lat. missa)
• MASS, IN

mass of knowledge accumulated, it naturally came about that the name ".philosophy " ceased to be applied to inquiries concerned with the particulars as such . The details of physics, for example, were abandoned to the scientific specialist, and philosophy restricted itself in this department to the question of the relation of the physical universe to the ultimate ground or author of things . This inquiry which was See also:

• LONG, GEORGE (1800-1879)
• LONG, JOHN DAVIS (1838– )

long called " rational cosmology," may be said to See also:

• FORM (Lat. forma)

form See also:

• PART

part of the general subject of See also:

• META

meta-physics, or at all events a See also:

• PENDANT (through Fr. from Lat. pendere, to hang)

pendant to it . By the gradual sifting out of the special sciences philosophy thus came to embrace primarily the inquiries grouped as " metaphysics " or " first philosophy." These would embrace, according to the Wolffian See also:

• SCHEME (Lat. schema, Gr. oxfjya, figure, form, from the root axe, seen in exeiv, to have, hold, to be of such shape, form, &c.)

scheme long current in philosophical textbooks, See also:

• ONTOLOGY (adapted from a modern Latin form ontologia used by Jean le Clerc 1692; Gr. 6v, Evros, pres. part. of dam, to be, and klryos, science)

ontology proper, or the See also:

• SCIENCE (Lat. scientia, from scire; to learn, know)

science of being as such, with its three-See also:

• BRANCH (from the Fr. branche, late Lat. branca, an animal's paw)

branch sciences of (rational) psychology, cosmology and (rational or natural) See also:

• THEOLOGY

theology, dealing with the three See also:

• CHIEF (from Fr. chef, head, Lat. caput)

chief forms of being—the soul, the world and See also:

• GOD

God .

Subsidiary to metaphysics, as the central inquiry, stand the sciences of logic and ethics, to which may be added aesthetics, constituting three normative sciences—sciences, that is, which do not, primarily, describe facts, but rather prescribe ends or set forth ideals . It is evident, however, that if logic deals with conceptions which may be considered constitutive of knowledge as such, and if ethics deals with the harmonious realization of human See also:

• LIFE

life, which is the highest known form of existence, both sciences must have a See also:

• GREAT

great See also:

• DEAL

deal of See also:

• WEIGHT

weight in the settling of the general question of metaphysics . In sum, then, we may say that " philosophy " has come to be' understood at least in modern times as a general term covering the various disciplines just enumerated . It has frequently tended, however, and still tends, to be used as specially convertible with the narrower term " metaphysics." This is not unnatural, seeing that it is only so far as they See also:

• BEAR
• BEAR, BLACK
• BEAR, BROWN
• BEAR, GRIZZLY
• BEAR, ISABELLINE
• BEAR, WHITE

bear on the one central question of the nature of existence that philosophy spreads its See also:

• MANTLE

mantle over psychology, logic or ethics . The particular organic conditions of See also:

• PERCEPTION (from Lat. percipere, to perceive)

perception and the associative See also:

• LAWS

laws to which the mind, as a part of nature, is subjected, are facts in themselves indifferent to the philosopher; and therefore the development of psychology into an independent science, which took See also:

• PLACE (through Fr. from Lat. platea, street; Gr. IrAar6s, wide)

place during the latter See also:

• HALF

half of the 19th See also:

• CENTURY (from Lat. centuria, a division of a hundred men)

century and may now be said to be See also:

• COMPLETE

complete, represents an entirely natural See also:

• EVOLUTION

evolution . Similarly, logic, so far as it is an See also:

• ART

art of thought or a doctrine of fallacies, and ethics, so far as it is occupied with a natural history of impulses and moral sentiments, do neither of them belong, except by See also:

• COURTESY (O. Fr. curtesie, later courtoisie)

courtesy, to the philosophic province . But, although this is so, it is perhaps hardly desirable to deprive ourselves of the use of two terms instead of one . It will not be easy to infuse into so abstract and bloodless a term as " meta-physics " the See also:

• FULLER, ANDREW (1954-1815)
• FULLER, GEORGE (1822—1884)
• FULLER, M
• FULLER, MARGARET, MARCHIONESS
• FULLER, MELVILLE WESTON (1833-1910)
• FULLER, THOMAS (16o8-1661)
• FULLER, WILLIAM (1670--c. 1717)

fuller life (and especially the inclusion of ethical considerations) suggested by the more See also:

• CONCRETE
• CONCRETE (Lat. concretes, participle of concrescere, to grow together)

concrete term "philosophy." We shall first of all, then, attempt to differentiate philosophy from the special sciences, and afterwards proceed to take up one by one what have been called the philosophical sciences, with the view of showing how far the usual subject-matter of each is really philosophical in its bearing, and how far it belongs rather to the domain of " science " strictly so called . The See also:

• ORDER
• ORDER (through Fr. ordre, for earlier ordene, from Lat. ordo, ordinis, rank, service, arrangement; the ultimate source is generally taken to be the root seen in Lat. oriri, rise, arise, begin; cf. " origin ")
• ORDER, HOLY

order in which, for clearness of exposition, it will be most convenient to consider these disciplines will be psychology, See also:

• EPISTEMOLOGY

epistemology or theory of knowledge, and metaphysics, then logic, aesthetics and ethics . Finally, the connexion of the last-mentioned with politics (or, to speak more modernly, with See also:

• JURISPRUDENCE (Lat. jurisprudenlia, knowledge of law, from jus, right, and prudentia, from providere, to foresee)
• JURISPRUDENCE, COMPARATIVE

jurisprudence and See also:

• SOCIOLOGY

sociology), with the philosophy of history and the philosophy of See also:

• RELIGION
• RELIGION, FOLKLORE, CUSTOM

religion, will call for a few words on the relation of these sciences to general philosophy . Philosophy and Natural Science.—In distinguishing philosophy from the sciences, it may not be amiss at the outset to guard against the possible misunderstanding that philosophy is concerned with a subject-matter different from, and in some obscure way transcending, the subject-matter of the sciences . Now that psychology, or the observational and experimental study of mind, may be said to have been definitively included among the See also:

• POSITIVE (or PORTABLE) ORGAN

positive sciences, there is not even the apparent ground which once existed for such an idea .

Philosophy, even under its most discredited name of metaphysics, has no other subject-matter than the nature of the real world, as that world lies around us in everyday life, and lies open to observers on every See also:

• SIDE
• SIDE (mod. Eski Adalia)

side . But if this is so, it may be asked what See also:

• FUNCTION

function can remain for philosophy when every pertion of the field is already lotted out and enclosed by specialists ? Philosophy claims to be the science of the whole; but, if we get the knowledge of the parts from the different sciences, what is there See also:

• LEFT

left for philosophy to tell us ? To this it is sufficient to answer generally that the synthesis of the parts is something more than that detailed knowledge of the parts in separation which is gained by the man of science . It is with the ultimate synthesis that philosophy concerns itself; it has to show that the subject-matter which we are all dealing with in detail really is a whole, consisting of articulated members . Evidently, therefore, the relation existing between philosophy and the sciences will be, to some extent, one of reciprocal See also:

• INFLUENCE (Late Lat. influentia, from influere, to flow in)

influence . The sciences may be said to furnish philosophy with its matter, but philosophical See also:

• CRITICISM
• CRITICISM (from the Gr. KpiTrlS, a judge, Kpivew, to decide, to give an authoritative opinion)

criticism reacts upon the matter thus furnished, and transforms it . Such trans-formation is inevitable, for the parts only exist and can only be fully, i.e. truly, known in their relation to the whole . A pure specialist, if such a being were possible, would be merely an See also:

• INSTRUMENT (Lat. instrumentum, from insincere, to build up, furnish, arrange, prepare)

instrument whose results had to be co-ordinated and used by others . Now, though a pure 'specialist may be an See also:

• ABSTRACTION (Lat. abs and trahere)

abstraction of the mind, the tendency of specialists in any department naturally is to lose sight of the whole in See also:

• ATTENTION (from Lat. ad-tendo, await, expect; the condition of being " stretched " or " tense ")

attention to the particular categories or modes of nature's working which happen to be exemplified, and fruitfully applied, in their own See also:

• SPHERE (Gr. vclsa?pa, a ball or globe)

sphere of investigation; and in proportion as this is the case it becomes necessary for their theories to be co-ordinated with the results of other inquirers, and set, as it were, in the See also:

• LIGHT

light of the whole . This task of co-ordination, in the broadest sense, is undertaken by philosophy; for the philosopher is essentially what Plato, in a happy moment, styled him, rvvoaTiobs, the man who takes a "synoptic" or comprehensive view of the universe as a whole . The aim of philosophy (whether fully attainable or not) is to exhibit the universe as a rational See also:

• SYSTEM

system in the See also:

• HARMONY (Gr. dpµovia, a concord of musical sounds, dpA'ew to join; &plan midi (sc. TeXvil)

harmony of all its parts; and accordingly the philosopher refuses to consider the parts out of their relation to the whole whose parts they are .

Philosophy corrects in this way the abstractions which are inevitably made by the scientific specialist, and may claim, therefore, to be the only " concrete " science, that is to say, the only science which takes See also:

• ACCOUNT
• ACCOUNT (through O. Fr. acont, Late Lat. comptum, cornputare, to calculate)

account of all the elements in the problem, and the only science whose results can claim to be true in more than a provisional sense . For it is evident from what has been said that the way in which we commonly speak of " facts " is calculated to convey a false impression . The world is not a collection of individual facts existing side by side and capable of being known separately . A fact is nothing except in its relations to other facts; and as these relations are multiplied in the progress of knowledge the nature of the so-called fact is indefinitely modified . Moreover, every statement of fact involves certain general notions and theories, so that the " facts ".of the separate sciences cannot be stated except in terms of the conceptions or hypotheses which are assumed by the particular science . Thus mathematics assumes space as an existent See also:

• INFINITE (from Lat. in, not, finis, end or limit; cf. findere, to deave)

infinite, without investigating in what sense the existence or the infinity of this Unding, as See also:

• KANT, IMMANUEL (1724-1804)

Kant called it, can be asserted . In the same way, physics may be said to assume the notion of material atoms and forces . These and similar assumptions are ultimate presuppositions or working hypotheses for the sciences themselves . But it is the See also:

• OFFICE (from Lat. officium, " duty," " service," a shortened form of opifacium, from facere, " to do," and either the stem of opes, " wealth," " aid," or opus, " work ")

office of philosophy, as a theory of knowledge, to submit such conceptionsto a See also:

• CRITICAL (in alphabetical order of authors)

critical See also:

• ANALYSIS (Gr. avci and Meta, to break up into parts)

analysis, with a view to discover how far they can be thought out, or how far, when this is done, they refute them-selves, and call for a different form of statement, if they are to be taken as a statement of the ultimate nature of the real.l The first statement may frequently turn out to have been merely provisionally or relatively true; it is then superseded by, or rather inevitably merges itself in, a less abstract account . In this the same " facts " appear differently, because no longer separated from other aspects that belong to the full reality of the known world . There is no such thing, we have said, as an individual fact; and the nature of any fact is not fully known unless we know it in all its relations to the system of the universe, or, in See also:

• SPINOZA, BARUCH (1632-1677)

Spinoza's phrase, sub specie aeternitatis . In strictness, there is but one res completa or concrete fact, and it is the business of philosophy, as science of the whole, to expound the chief relations that constitute its complex nature .

The last abstraction which it becomes the See also:

• DUTY (from " due," that which is owing, O. Fr. deu, dil, past participle of devoir; Lat. debere, debitum; cf. " debt ")

duty of philosophy to remove is the abstraction from the knowing subject which is made by all the sciences, including, as we shall see, the science of psychology . The sciences, one and all, deal with a world of See also:

• OBJECTS

objects, but the ultimate fact as we know it is the existence of an See also:

• OBJECT

object for a subject . Subject-object, knowledge, or, more widely, self-consciousness with its implicates—this unity in duality is the ultimate aspect which reality presents . It has generally been considered, therefore, as constituting in a special sense the problem of philosophy . Philosophy may be said to be the explication of what is involved in this relation, or, in Kantian phraseology, a theory of its possibility . Any would-be theory of the universe which makes its central fact impossible stands self-condemned . On the other hand, a sufficient analysis here may be expected to yield us a statement of the reality of things in its last terms, and thus to See also:

• SHED

shed a light backwards upon the true nature of our subordinate conceptions . Psychology, Epistemology and Metaphysics.—This leads to the consideration of the main divisions of philosophy—PSYCHOLOGY (q.v.), epistemology (theory of knowledge, Erkenntnisstheorie), and metaphysics (ontology; see METAPHYSIC) . A special relation has always existed between psychology and systematic philosophy, but the closeness of the connexion has been characteristic of modern and more particularly of See also:

• ENGLISH

English thought . The connexion is not difficult to explain, seeing that in psychology, or the science of mind, we study the fact of intelligence (and moral action), and have, so far, in our hands the fact to which all other facts are relative . From this point of view we may even see a truth in See also:

• JACOBI, FRIEDRICH HEINRICH (1743-1819)
• JACOBI, JOHANN GEORG (1740-1814)
• JACOBI, KARL GUSTAV JACOB (1804-1851)

Jacobi's dictum as quoted by See also:

• SIR

Sir W . See also:

• HAMILTON
• HAMILTON (GRAND or ASHUANIPI)
• HAMILTON, ALEXANDER (1757-1804)
• HAMILTON, ANTHONY, or ANTOINE (1646-1720)
• HAMILTON, ELIZABETH (1758–1816)
• HAMILTON, EMMA, LADY (c. 1765-1815)
• HAMILTON, JAMES (1769-1831)
• HAMILTON, JAMES HAMILTON, 1ST DUKE OF (1606-1649)
• HAMILTON, JOHN (c. 1511–1571)
• HAMILTON, MARQUESSES AND DUKES OF
• HAMILTON, PATRICK (1504-1528)
• HAMILTON, ROBERT (1743-1829)
• HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM
• HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM (1730-1803)
• HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM ROWAN (1805-1865)
• HAMILTON, THOMAS (1789-1842)
• HAMILTON, WILLIAM (1704-1754)
• HAMILTON, WILLIAM GERARD (1729-1796)

Hamilton: " Nature conceals God; man reveals God." Nature by itself, that is to say, is insufficient .

The ultimate explanation of things cannot be given by any theory which excludes from its survey the intelligence in which nature, as it were, gathers herself up . But knowledge, or the mind as knowing, willing, &c., may be looked at in two different ways . It may be regarded simply as a fact; in which case the evolutions of mind may be traced and reduced to laws in the same way as the phenomena treated by the other sciences . This study gives us the science of empirical psychology, or, as it is now termed, psychology sans phrase . In order to give an adequate account of its subject-matter, psychology may require higher or more complex categories than are employed in the other sciences, just as See also:

• BIOLOGY (Gr. Qios, life)

biology, for example, cannot See also:

• WORK

work with See also:

• MECHANICAL

mechanical categories alone, but introduces the conception of development or growth . But the See also:

• AFFINITIES

affinities of such a study are manifestly with the sciences as such rather than with philosophy; and the definitive See also:

• ESTABLISHMENT (0. Fr. establissement, Fr. etablissement, late Norm. Fr. establishement, from O. Fr. establir, Fr. etablir, Lat. stabilire, to make stable)

establishment of psychology as an independent science has already been alluded to . Since it has been taken up by specialists, psychology is being established on a broader basis of See also:

• INDUCTION (from Lat. inducere, to lead into; cf. Gr. ilrayu yli)

induction, and with the See also:

• ADVANTAGE

advantage, in some departments, of the employment of experimental methods of measurement . But it is not of mind in this aspect 1 The revisional office which philosophy here assumes constitutes her the critic of the sciences . It is in this connexion that the meaning of the See also:

• DEFINITION (Lat. definitio, from de-finire, to set limits to, describe)

definition of philosophy as " the science of principles " can best be seen . This is perhaps the most usual definition, and. though vague, one of the least misleading . that such assertions can be made as those quoted above . Mind, we return to the distinction between epistemology and psycholas studied by the psychologist—mind as a See also:

• MERE
• MERE, ADALBERT (1838-1909)

mere fact or pheno- menon—grounds no inference to anything beyond itself .

The distinction between mind viewed as a See also:

• SUCCESSION (Lat. successio, from succedere, to follow after)

succession of "states of consciousness " and the further aspect of mind which philosophy considers was very clearly put by Croom See also:

• ROBERTSON, FREDERICK WILLIAM (1816-1853)
• ROBERTSON, GEORGE CROOM (1842-1892)
• ROBERTSON, JOSEPH (1810-1866)
• ROBERTSON, THOMAS WILLIAM (1829-1871)
• ROBERTSON, WILLIAM BRUCE (182o-1886)

Robertson, who also made a happy See also:

• SUGGESTION

suggestion of two terms to designate the' See also:

• DOUBLE
• DOUBLE (from the Mid. Eng. duble, the form which gives the present pronunciation, through the Old Er. duble, from Lat. duplus, twice as much)

double point of view: " We may view knowledge as mere subjective function, but it has its full meaning only as it is taken to represent what we may call See also:

• OBJECTIVE, or OBJECT GLASS

objective fact, or is such as is named (in different circumstances) real, valid, true . As mere subjective function, which it is to the psychologist, it is best spoken of by an unambiguous name, and for this there seems none better than Intellection . We may then say that psychology is occupied with the natural function of Intellection, seeking to discover its laws and distinguishing its various modes (perception, representative See also:

• IMAGINATION

imagination, conception, &c.) according to the various circumstances in which the laws are found at work . Philosophy, on the other hand, is theory of Knowledge (as that which is known).' —" Psychology and Philosophy," Mind (1883), pp . 15, 16 . The confusion of these two points of view has led, and still leads, to serious philosophical misconception . It is hardly an exaggeration to say that, in the English school since See also:

• HUME, ALEXANDER (c. 1557-1609)
• HUME, DAVID (1711-1776)
• HUME, JOSEPH (1777-1855)

Hume, psychology superseded properly philosophical inquiry . And we find even a thinker with a wider See also:

• HORIZON (Gr. 6pfTwv, dividing)

horizon like Sir W . Hamilton encouraging the confusion by speaking of " psychology or meta-physics," while his lectures on metaphysics are mainly taken up with what belongs in the strictest sense to psychology proper, with an occasional excursus (as in the theory of perception) into epistemology . The distinction between psychology and theory of knowledge was first clearly made by Kant, who repeatedly insisted that the Critique of Pure See also:

• REASON (Lat. ratio, through French raison)

Reason was not to be taken as a psychological inquiry . He defined his problem as the quid See also:

• JURIS

juris or the question of the validity of knowledge, not its quid facti or the laws of the empirical See also:

• GENESIS
• GENESIS (Gr. 'ybeo-es, becoming; the term being used in English as a synonym for origin or process of coming into being)

genesis and evolution of intellection (to use Croom Robertson's phraseology) . Since Kant philosophy has chiefly taken the form of theory of knowledge or of a criticism of experience .

Not, indeed, a preliminary criticism of our faculties or conceptions such as Kant himself proposed to See also:

• INSTITUTE (from Lat. instituere, to establish or set up)

institute, in order to determine the limits of their application; such a criticism ab extra of the nature of our experience is essentially a thing impossible . The only criticism which can be applied in such a case is the immanent. criticism which the conceptions, or categories exercise upon one another . The organized criticism of these conceptions is really nothing more than the full explication of what they mean and of what experience in its full nature or notion is . This constitutes the theory of knowledge in the only tenable sense of the term, and it See also:

• LAYS

lays down, in Kantian See also:

• LANGUAGE (adapted from the Fr. langage, from langue, tongue, Lat. lingua)

language, the conditions of the possibility of experience . These conditions are the conditions of knowledge as such, or, as it may be put, of objective consciousness—of a self-consciousness of a world of objects and through them conscious of itself . The inquiry is, therefore, logical or transcendental in its nature, and does not entangle us in any decision as to the conditions of the genesis of such consciousness in the individual . When we inquire into subjective conditions we are thinking of facts causing other facts . But the logical or transcendental conditions are not causes or even factors of knowledge; they are the statement of its idea . Hence the dispute between evolutionist and transcendentalist rests, in general, on an ignoratio elenchi; for the history of the genesis of an idea (the historical or genetic method) does not contain an answer to—though it may throw light on—the philosophical question of its truth or validity . Speaking of this transcendental consciousness, Kant goes so far as to say that it is not of the slightest consequence " whether the idea of it be clear or obscure (in empirical consciousness), no, not even whether it really exists or not . But the possibility of the logical form of all knowledge rests on its relation to this See also:

• APPERCEPTION (Lat. ad and percipere, perceive)

apperception as a See also:

• FACULTY (through the French, from the Lat. facultas, ability to do anything, from facilis, easy, facere, to do; another form of the word in Lat. facilitas, facility, ease, keeps the original meaning)

faculty or potentiality " (Werke, ed . Hartenstein, 578 See also:

• NOTE
• NOTE (Lat. nota, mark, sign, from noscere, to know)

note) .

Or, if It is true that he afterwards modifies this misleading See also:

• IDENTIFICATION (Lat. idem, the same)

identification by introducing the distinction between empirical psychology or the phenomenology of mind and inferential psychology or ontology, i.e. metaphysics proper . But he continues to use the terms ': philosophy," ' metaphysics," and " See also:

• MENTAL

mental science " as synonymous.ogy, by way of illustrating the nature of the former, we may take the following summing up by See also:

• PROFESSOR (the Latin noun formed from the verb profiteri, to declare publicly, to acknowledge, profess)

Professor See also:

• JAMES
• JAMES (Gr. 'IlrKw,l3or, the Heb. Ya`akob or Jacob)
• JAMES (JAMES FRANCIS EDWARD STUART) (1688-1766)
• JAMES, 2ND EARL OF DOUGLAS AND MAR(c. 1358–1388)
• JAMES, DAVID (1839-1893)
• JAMES, EPISTLE OF
• JAMES, GEORGE PAYNE RAINSFOP
• JAMES, HENRY (1843— )
• JAMES, JOHN ANGELL (1785-1859)
• JAMES, THOMAS (c. 1573–1629)
• JAMES, WILLIAM (1842–1910)
• JAMES, WILLIAM (d. 1827)

James See also:

• WARD
• WARD, ADOLPHUS WILLIAM (1837- )
• WARD, ARTEMUS
• WARD, EDWARD MATTHEW (1816-1879)
• WARD, ELIZABETH STUART PHELPS (1844-1911)
• WARD, JAMES (1769--1859)
• WARD, JAMES (1843– )
• WARD, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS (1830-1910)
• WARD, LESTER FRANK (1841– )
• WARD, MARY AUGUSTA [MRS HUMPHRY WARD]
• WARD, WILLIAM (1766-1826)
• WARD, WILLIAM GEORGE (1812-1882)

Ward in a valuable See also:

• ARTICLE (from Lat. articulus, a joint)

article on " Psychological Principles " in Mind (See also:

• APRIL

April 1883, pp . 166, 167): " Comparing psychology and epistemology, then, we may say that the former is essentially genetic in its method, and might, if we had the See also:

• POWER [WILLIAM GRATTAN] TYRONE (1797-1841)

power to revise our existing terminology, be called biology; the latter, on the other hand, is essentially devoid of everything historical, and treats, sub specie aeternitatis, as Spinoza might have said, of human knowledge, conceived as the See also:

• POSSESSION
• POSSESSION (Lat. possessio, possidere, to possess)

possession of mind in general." Kant's problem is not, in its wording, very different from that which See also:

• LOCKE, GOTTFRIED CHRISTIAN FRIEDRICH (1791–1855)
• LOCKE, JOHN (1632-1704)
• LOCKE, MATTHEW (c. 1630-1677)

Locke set before him when he resolved to " inquire into the See also:

• ORIGINAL

original, certainty and extent of human knowledge together with the grounds and degrees of belief, See also:

• OPINION (Lat. opinio, from opinari, to think)

opinion and assent." Locke's Essay is undoubtedly, in its intention, a contribution to the theory of knowledge . But, because See also:

• TIME (0. Eng. Lima, cf. Icel. timi, Swed. timme, hour, Dan. time; from the root also seen in " tide," properly the time of between the flow and ebb of the sea, cf. O. Eng. getidan, to happen, " even-tide," &c.; it is not directly related to Lat. tempus)
• TIME, MEASUREMENT OF
• TIME, STANDARD

time had not yet made the matter clear, Locke suffered himself to digress in his second See also:

• BOOK

book into the psychological question of the origin of our ideas; and his theory of knowledge is ruined by the failure to distinguish between the epistemological sense of " idea " as significant content and the psychological sense in which it is applied to a fact or See also:

• PROCESS

process in the individual mind . The same confusion runs through See also:

• BERKELEY
• BERKELEY, GEORGE (1685–1753)
• BERKELEY, MILES JOSEPH (1803-1889)
• BERKELEY, SIR WILLIAM (c. 1608-1677)

Berkeley's arguments and vitiates his conclusions as well as those of Hume . But appearing with these thinkers as the problem of perception, epistemology widens its scope and becomes, in Kant's hands, the question of the possibility of experience in general . With See also:

• HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1770-1831)

Hegel it passes into a completely articulated " logic," which apparently claims to be at the same time a metaphysic, or an ultimate expression of the nature of the real . This introduces us to the second part of the question we are seeking to determine, namely the relation of epistemology to metaphysics . It is evident that philosophy as theory of know-ledge must have for its See also:

• COMPLEMENT (Lat. complementum, from complere, to fill up)

complement philosophy as metaphysics (ontology) or theory of being . The question of the truth of our knowledge, and the question of the ultimate nature of what we know, are in reality two sides of the same inquiry; and therefore our epistemological results have to be ontologically expressed . But it is not every thinker that can see his way with Hegel to assert in set terms the identity of thought and being . Hence the theory of knowledge becomes with some a theory of human See also:

• IGNORANCE (Lat. ignorantia, from ignorare, not to know); want of knowledge, a state of mind which in law has important consequences. A well-known legal maxim runs: ignorantia juris non excusat ("ignorance of the law does not excuse")

ignorance .

This is the case with See also:

• HERBERT (FAMILY)
• HERBERT, GEORGE (1593-1633)
• HERBERT, HENRY WILLIAM
• HERBERT, SIR THOMAS (1606-1682)

Herbert See also:

• SPENCER
• SPENCER, HERBERT (1820-1903)
• SPENCER, JOHN CHARLES SPENCER, 3RD EARL (1782-1845)
• SPENCER, JOHNPOYNTZ SPENCER
• SPENCER, WILLIAM ROBERT (1769-1834)

Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable, which he advances as the result of epistemological considerations in the philosophical prolegomena to his system . Very similar positions were maintained by Kant and See also:

• COMTE, AUGUSTE [ISIDORE AUGUSTE MARIE FRANCOIS XAVIER] (1798-1857)

Comte; and, under the name of " See also:

• AGNOSTICISM

agnosticism " (q.v.), the theory has popularized itself in the See also:

• OUTER

outer courts of philosophy, and on the shifting borderland of philosophy and literature . The truth is that the See also:

• HABIT (through the French from Lat. habitus, from habere, to have, hold, or, in a reflective sense, to be in a certain condition; in many of the English senses the French use habitude, not habit)

habit of thinking exclusively from the standpoint of the theory of knowledge tends to beget an undue subjectivity of See also:

• TEMPER (from Lat. temperare, to mingle or compound in due proportion, to qualify, rule, regulate, to be moderate, formed from tempos, time, fit or due season)

temper . And the fact that it has become usual for men to think from this standpoint is very plainly seen in the almost universal description of philosophy as an analysis of " experience," instead of its more old-fashioned designation as an inquiry into " the nature of things." As it is matter of universal agreement that the problem of being must be attacked indirectly through the problem of knowledge, this substitution may be regarded as an advance, more especially as it implies that the fact of experience, or of self-conscious existence, is the chief fact to be dealt with . But if so, then self-consciousness must be treated as itself real, and as organically related to the See also:

• REST (O. Eng. rest, reste, bed, cognate with other Teutonic forms, e.g. Ger. Rast, Riiste, rest, and probably Gothic Rasta, league, i.e. resting or stopping place)

rest of, existence . If self-consciousness be treated in this objective See also:

• FASHION (adapted from Fr. facon, agon, Lat. factio, making, facere, to do or make)

fashion, then we pass naturally from epistemology to metaphysics or ontology . (For, although the term " ontology" has been as See also:

• GOOD, JOHN MASON (1764-1827)

good as disused, it still remains true that the aim of philosophy must be to furnish us with an ontology or a coherent and adequate theory of the nature of reality.) But if, on the other hand, knowledge and reality be ab injtio opposed to one another—if consciousness be set on one side as over against reality, and merely holding up a See also:

• MIRROR (through O. Fr. mirour, mod. miroir, from a sup-posed Late Lat. miratorium, from mirari, to admire)

mirror to it—then it follows with equal naturalness that the truly real must be something which lurks unrevealed behind the subject's See also:

• REPRESENTATION

representation of it . Hence come the different varieties of a so-called phenomenalism . The upholders of such a theory would, in general, deride the term metaphysics " or " ontology "; but it is evident, none the less, that their position itself implies a certain theory of the universe and of our own place in it, and the establishment of this theory constitutes their metaphysics . Without See also:

• PREJUDICE (Lat. praejudicium)

prejudice, then, to the claim of epistemology to constitute the central philosophic discipline, we may simply note its liability to be pressed too far . The exclusive pre-occupation of men's minds with the question of knowledge during the neo-Kantian revival in the 'seventies of the last century See also:

• DREW
• DREW, SAMUEL (1765-1833)

drew from See also:

• LOTZE, RUDOLF HERMANN (1817-1881)

Lotze the See also:

• CAUSTIC (Gr. rcavvraubs, burning)

caustic criticism that " the continual sharpening of the See also:

• KNIFE (0. E. cuff, a word appearing in different forms in many Teutonic languages, cf. Du. knijf, Ger. Kneif, a shoe-maker's knife, Swed. knif; the ultimate origin is unknown; Skeat finds the origin in the root of " nip," formerly " knip "; Fr. canif is a

knife becomes tiresome, if, after all, we have nothing to cut with it." See also:

• STILLINGFLEET, EDWARD (1635—1699)

Stillingfleet's complaint against Locke was that he was " one of the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning that have almost discarded substance out of the reason-able part of the world." The same may be said with greater truth of the devotees of the theory of knowledge; they seem to have no need of so old-fashioned a commodity as reality . Yet, after all, See also:

• FICHTE, IMMANUEL HERMANN (originally HARTMANN) VON (1797-1879)
• FICHTE, JOHANN GOTTLIEB (1762-1814)

Fichte's dictum holds good that knowledge as knowledge—i.e. so long as it is looked at as knowledge—is, ipso facto, not reality .

The result of the foregoing, however, is to show that, as soon as epistemology draws its conclusion, it becomes meta-physics; the theory of knowledge passes into a theory of being . The ontological conclusion, moreover, is not to be regarded as something added by an See also:

• EXTERNAL

external process; it is an immediate implication . The metaphysic is the epistemology from another point of view—regarded as completing itself, and explaining in the course of its exposition that relative or See also:

• PRACTICAL

practical separation of the individual knower from the knowable world, which it is a sheer See also:

• ASSUMPTION, FEAST OF

assumption to take as See also:

• ABSOLUTE (Lat. absolvere, to loose, set free)

absolute . This, not the so-called assumption of the implicit unity of being and thought, is the really unwarrantable postulate; for it is an assumption which we are obliged to retract See also:

• BIT (from the verb " to bite," either in the sense of a piece bitten off, or an act of biting, or a thing that bites or is bitten)

bit by bit, while the other offers the whole doctrine of knowledge as its See also:

• VOUCHER (from " to vouch," to warrant, answer for, O. Fr. voucher, to cite, call in aid, Lat. vocare, to call, summon)

voucher . Logic, Aesthetics and Ethics.—If the theory of knowledge thus passes insensibly into metaphysics it becomes somewhat difficult to assign a distinct sphere to logic (q.v.) . See also:

• UEBERWEG, FRIEDRICH (1826-1871)

Ueberweg's definition of it as " the science of the regulative laws of thought " (or " the normative science of thought ") comes near enough to the traditional sense to enable us to compare profitably the usual subject-matter of the science with the definition and end of philosophy . The introduction of the term " regulative " or " normative " is intended to differentiate the science from psychology as the science of mental processes or events . In this reference logic does not tell us how our intellections connect themselves as mental phenomena, but how we ought to connect our thoughts if they are to realize truth (either as consistency with what we thought before or as agreement with observed ??acts) . Logic, therefore, agrees with epistemology (and differs from psychology) in treating thought not as mental fact but as knowledge, as idea, as having meaning in relation to an objective world . To this extent it must inevitably form a part of the theory of knowledge . But, if we See also:

• DESIRE

desire to keep by older landmarks and maintain a distinction between the two disciplines, a ground for doing so may be found in the fact that all the main See also:

• DEFINITIONS

definitions of logic point to the investigation of the laws of thought in a subjective reference—with a view, that is, by an analysis of the operation, to ensure its more correct performance . According to the old phrase, logic is the art of correct thinking .

Moreover we commonly find the logician assuming that the process of thought has advanced a certain length before his examination of it begins; he takes his material full-formed from perception, without, as a See also:

• RULE

rule, inquiring into the nature of the conceptions which are involved in our perceptive experience . Occupying a position, therefore, within the wider sphere of the general theory of knowledge, See also:

• ORDINARY (med. Lat. ordinarius, Fr. ordinaire)

ordinary logic consists in an analysis of the nature of general statement, and of the conditions under which we pass validly from one general statement to another . But the logic of the See also:

• SCHOOLS

schools is eked out by contributions from a variety of See also:

• SOURCES

sources (e.g. from See also:

• GRAMMAR (from Lat. grammatica, sc. ars; Gr. ypaµ)

grammar on one side and from psychologyon another), and cannot claim the unity of an independent science . Aesthetics (q.v.) may be treated as a department of psychology or See also:

• PHYSIOLOGY (from Gr. 4 i s, nature, and koyos, discourse)

physiology, and in See also:

• ENGLAND
• ENGLAND, THE CHURCH OF

England this is the mode of treatment that has been most general . To what See also:

• PECULIAR

peculiar excitation of our bodily or mental organism, it is asked, are the emotions due which make us declare an object beautiful or See also:

• SUBLIME (Lat. sublimis, exalted)

sublime ? And, the question being put in this form, the attempt has been made in some cases to explain away any peculiarity in the emotions by analysing them into simpler elements, such as See also:

• PRIMITIVE

primitive organic pleasures and prolonged associations of usefulness or fitness . But, just as psychology in general cannot do duty for a theory of knowledge, so it holds true of this particular application of psychology that a mere reference of these emotions to the mechanism and interactive See also:

• PLAY

play of our faculties cannot be regarded as an account of the nature of the beautiful . Perhaps by talking of " emotions " we tend to give an unduly subjective See also:

• COLOUR (Lat. color, connected with celare, to hide, the root meaning, therefore, being that of a covering)

colour to the investigation; it would be better to speak of the perception of the beautiful . See also:

• PLEASURE (through Fr. plaisir from Lat. placere, to please; Gr. rlbovii)

Pleasure in itself is unqualified, and affords no differentia . In the case of a beautiful object the resultant pleasure borrows its specific quality from the presence of determinations essentially objective in their nature, though not reducible to the categories of science . Unless, indeed, we conceive our faculties to be constructed on some arbitrary See also:

• PLAN
• PLAN (from Lat. planes, flat)

plan which puts them out of relation to the facts with which they have to deal, we have a prima facie right to treat beauty as an objective determination of things . The question of aesthetics would then be formulated—What is it in things that makes them beautiful, and what is the relation of this aspect of the universe to its ultimate nature, as that is expounded in metaphysics ?

The answer constitutes the substance of aesthetics, considered as a branch of philosophy . But it is not given simply in abstract terms: the philosophical treatment of aesthetics includes also an exposition of the concrete phases of art, as these have appeared in the history of the world, See also:

• RELATING

relating themselves to different phases of human culture . Of ethics (q.v.) it may also be said that many of the topics commonly embraced under that title are not strictly philosophical in their nature . They are subjects for a scientific psychology employing the historical method with the conceptions of See also:

• HEREDITY

heredity and development, and calling to its aid, as such a psychology will do, the investigations of all the sociological sciences . To such a psychology must be relegated all questions as to the origin and development of moral ideas . Similarly, the question debated at such length by English moralists as to the nature of the moral faculty (moral sense, See also:

• CONSCIENCE (Lat. con-scientia, literally " knowledge of a thing shared with another person " or " complete knowledge," and derivatively " consciousness in general)
• CONSCIENCE, HENDRIK (1812-1883)

conscience, &c.) and the controversy concerning the freedom of the will belong entirely to psychology . If we exclude such questions in the interest of systematic correctness, and seek to determine for ethics a definite subject-matter, the science may be said to fall into two departments . The first of these deals with the notion of duty, and endeavours to define the good or the ultimate end of action; the second lays out the scheme of concrete duties which are deducible from, or which, at least, are covered by, this abstractly stated principle . The second of these departments is really the proper subject-matter of ethics considered as a separate science; but it is often conspicuous by its See also:

• ABSENCE (Lat. absentia)

absence from ethical See also:

• TREATISES

treatises . How-ever moralists may differ on first principles, there seems to be remarkably little practical divergence when they come to See also:

• LAY

lay down the particular laws of morality . It maybe added that, where a systematic account of duties is actually given, the connexion of the particular duties with the universal See also:

• FORMULA
• FORMULA (Lat. diminutive of forma, shape, pattern, &c., especially used of rules of judicial procedure)

formula is in general more formal than real . It is only under the See also:

• HEAD (in 0. Eng. heafad; the word is common to Teutonic languages; cf. Dutch hoofd, Ger. Haupt, generally taken to be in origin connected with Lat. caput, Gr. KerbOvi7)
• HEAD, SIR EDMUND WALKER, BART
• HEAD, SIR FRANCIS BOND, BART

head of See also:

• CASUISTRY (from the Lat. casus, a point of law)

casuistry (q.v.) that ethics has been much cultivated as a separate science .

The first department of ethics, on the other hand, is the branch of the subject in virtue of which ethics forms part of philosophy . As described above, it ought rather to be called, in Kant's phrase, the metaphysic of ethics . A theory of See also:

• OBLIGATION

obligation is ultimately found to be inseparable from a metaphysic of See also:

• PERSONALITY (from Lat. persona, originally an actor's mask, from personare,1 to sound through)

personality . The connexion of ethics with metaphysics will be patent as a matter of fact, if it be remembered how Plato's philosophy is summed up in the idea of the good, and how Aristotle also employs the essentially ethical notion of end as the ultimate See also:

• CATEGORY (Gr. Karrlyopia, " accusation ")

category by which the universe may be explained or reduced to unity . But the See also:

• NECESSITY (Lat. necessitas)

necessity of the connexion is also apparent, unless we are to suppose that, as regards the course of universal nature, man is altogether an imperium in imperio, or rather (to adopt the forcible phrase of See also:

• MARCUS

Marcus Aurelius) an See also:

• ABSCESS (from Lat. abscedere, to separate)

abscess or excrescence on the nature of things . If, on the contrary, we must hold that man is essentially related to what the same writer calls " a common nature," then it is a legitimate corollary that in man as intelligence we ought to find the See also:

• KEY
• KEY (in O. Eng. tang; the ultimate origin of the word is unknown; it appears only in Old Frisian kei of other Teutonic languages; until the end of the 17th century the pronunciation was kay, as in other words in O. Eng. ending in aeg; cf. daeg, day; clang
• KEY (the phraseograms being indicated by hyphens)
• KEY, SIR ASTLEY COOPER (1821-1888)
• KEY, THOMAS HEWITT (1799-1875)

key of the whole fabric . At all events, this method of approach must be truer than any which, by restricting itself to the external aspect of phenomena as presented in space, leaves no scope for inwardness and life and all that, in Lotze's language, gives " value " to the world . The See also:

• ARGUMENT

argument ex analogic hominis has often been carried too far; but if a " chief end of man " be discoverable—c vOpee nvov h7aObv, as Aristotle wisely insisted that the ethical end must be determined—then it may be assumed that this end cannot be irrelevant to that ultimate " meaning " of the universe which, according to Lotze, is the quest of philosophy . If " the idea of humanity," as Kant called it, has ethical perfection at its core, then a universe which is really an organic whole must be ultimately representable as a moral order or a spiritual See also:

• KINGDOM

kingdom such as See also:

• LEIBNITZ (LEIBNIZ), GOTTFRIED WILHELM

Leibnitz named, in words borrowed from St See also:

• AUGUSTINE, SAINT (354-430)
• AUGUSTINE, SAINT (d. c.613)

Augustine, a See also:

• CITY (through Fr. cite, from Lat. civitas)

city of God . Philosophy of the See also:

• STATE
• STATE, GREAT OFFICERS OF

State (See also:

• POLITICAL

Political Philosophy), Philosophy of History, Philosophy of Religion.—In Plato and Aristotle ethics and politics are indissolubly connected . In other words, seeing that the highest human good is realizable only in a community, the theory of the state as the See also:

• ORGAN

organ of morality, and itself in its structure and institutions the expression of ethical ideas or qualities, becomes an integral part of philosophy . The difficulty already hinted at, which individualistic systems of ethics experience in connecting particular duties with the abstract principle of duty is a See also:

• PROOF (in M. Eng. preove, proeve, preve, &°c., from O. Fr . prueve, proeve, &c., mod. preuve, Late. Lat. proba, probate, to prove, to test the goodness of anything, probus, good)

proof of the failure of their method .

For the content of morality we are necessarily referred, in great part, to the experience crystallized in laws and institutions and to the unwritten See also:

• LAW
• LAW (0. Eng. lagu, M. Eng. lawe; from an old Teutonic root lag, " lie," what lies fixed or evenly; cf. Lat. lex, Fr. loi)
• LAW, JOHN (1671—1729)
• LAW, WILLIAM (1686-1761)

law of See also:

• CUSTOM (from O. Fr. costume, costume or coustume; Low Lat. costuma, a shortened form of consuetudo)

custom, See also:

• HONOUR (Lat. honos or lwnor, honoris; in English the word was spelled with or without the u indifferently until the 17th century, but during the 18th century it became fashion-able to spell the word " honor "; Johnson's and Webster's Dictionaries stereoty

honour and good breeding, which has become organic in the society of which we are members . Plato's See also:

• REPUBLIC (Lat. respublica, a commonweal or common-wealth)

Republic and Hegel's Philosophic See also:

• DES

des Rechts are the most typical examples of a fully See also:

• DEVELOPED

developed philosophy of the state, but in the earlier modern period the prolonged discussion of natural rights and the social See also:

• CONTRACT
• CONTRACT (Lat. contract us, from contrahere, to draw together, to bind)

contract must be regarded as a contribution to such a theory . Moreover, if philosophy is to complete its constructive work; it must bring the course of human history within its survey, and exhibit the sequence of events as an evolution in which the purposive action of reason is traceable . This is the task of the philosophy of history, a peculiarly modern study, due to the growth of a humanistic and historical point of view . See also:

• LESSING, GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM (1729–1781)

Lessing's conception of history as an " See also:

• EDUCATION

education of the human See also:

• RACE

race " is a typical example of this See also:

• INTERPRETATION (from Lat. interpretari, to expound, explain, inter pres, an agent, go-between, interpreter; inter, between, and the root pret-, possibly connected with that seen either in Greek 4 p4'ew, to speak, or irpa-rrecv, to do)

interpretation of the facts, and was indeed the precursor which stimulated many more elaborate See also:

• GERMAN
• GERMAN, DUTCH AND SCANDINAVIAN

German theories . The philosophy of history differs, it will be observed, from the purely scientific or descriptive studies covered by the general title of sociology . Sociology conceives itself as a natural science elucidating a factual sequence . The philosophy of history is essentially teleological; that is to say, it seeks to interpret the process as the realization of an immanent end . It may be said, therefore, to involve a complete metaphysical theory . Social institutions and customs and the different forms of state-organization are judged according to the degree in which they promote the realization of the human ideal . History is thus represented by Hegel, for example, as the realization of the idea of freedom, or rather as the reconciliation of individual freedom and the play of cultured interests with the See also:

• STABLE

stable objectivity of law and an abiding consciousness of the greater whole in which we move . So far as the course of universal history can be truly represented as an approximation to this reconciliation by a widening and deepening of both the elements, we may claim to possess a philosophy of history .

But although the possibility of such a philosophy seems implied in the postulated See also:

• NATIONALITY

nationality of the universe,many would hold that it remains as yet an unachieved ideal . There only remains to be briefly noticed the relation of philosophy to theology and the nature of what is called Philosophy of Religion . By theology is commonly understood the systematic presentation of the teaching of some positive or historical religion as to the existence and attributes of a Supreme Being, including his relation to the world and especially to man . But these topics have also been treated by philosophers and religious thinkers, without dependence on any historical data or special divine See also:

• REVELATION, BOOK OF

revelation, under the title of Natural Theology . Natural Theology is specially associated with the Stoic theories of See also:

• PROVIDENCE

providence in ancient times and with elaborations of the argument from See also:

• DESIGN (Fr. desiin, drawing; Lat. designare, to mark out)

design in the 18th century . But there is no See also:

• WARRANT (Med. Lat. warantum; O. Fr. garant, warant, derived from O.H.G. root represented in modern German bygewdhren)

warrant for restricting the term to any special mode of approaching the problems indicated; and as these form the central subject of metaphysical inquiry, no valid distinction can be See also:

• DRAWN

drawn between natural theology and general metaphysics . The philosophy of religion, on the other hand, investigates the nature of the religious consciousness and the value of its pronouncements on human life and man's relation to the ground of things . Unity, reconciliation, See also:

• PEACE
• PEACE, BREACH OF THE

peace, joy, " the victory that overcometh the world "—such, in slightly varying phrases, is the content of religious faith . Does this consciousness represent an authentic insight into ultimate fact, or is it a pitiful illusion of the nerves, See also:

• BORN, IGNAZ, EDLER VON (1742–1791)

born of man's hopes and fears and of his fundamental ignorance ? The philosophy of religion assumes the first alternative . The function of philosophy in general is the reflective analysis of experience, and the religious experience of mankind is prima facie entitled to the same consideration as any other form of conscious activity . The certainties of religious faith are matter of feeling or immediate assurance, and are expressed in the pictorial language of imagination .

It becomes the function of philosophy, dealing with these utterances, to relate them to the results of other See also:

• SPHERES, MUSIC OF THE

spheres of experience, and to determine their real meaning in the more exact terms of thought . The philosophy of religion also traces in the different historical forms of religious belief and practice the gradual evolution of what it takes to be the truth of the matter . Such an account may be distinguished from what is usually called the science of religion by the teleological or metaphysical presuppositions it involves . The science of religion gives a purely historical and See also:

• COMPARATIVE

comparative account of the various manifestations of the religious See also:

• INSTINCT

instinct without pronouncing on their relative truth or value and without, therefore, professing to apply the idea of evolution in the philosophical sense . That idea is fundamental in the philosophy of religion, which therefore can be written only from the standpoint of a constructive meta-physical theory . It is, indeed, only from the standpoint of such a theory that the definitions and divisions of the different philosophical disciplines adopted in this article can be said to hold good . But those who, like the positivists, agnostics and sceptics, deny the possibility of metaphysics as a theory of the ultimate nature of things, are still obliged to retain philosophy as a theory of knowledge, in order to justify the asserted See also:

• LIMITATION, STATUTES OF

limitation or See also:

• IMPOTENCE (Lat. impotentia, want of power)

impotence of human reason . BIBLIOGRAPHY—The best general histories of philosophy are by LJ E . See also:

• ERDMANN
• ERDMANN, JOHANN EDUARD (1805-1892)

Erdmann, See also:

• FRIEDRICH, JOHANN (1836— )

Friedrich Ueberweg and W . Windelband, Windelband's being probably the freshest in its treatment and point of view . Ed . Zeller's History of Greek Philosophy still holds the field as the best continuous exposition of the subject,. but more See also:

• RECENT

recent work in the See also:

• EARLY
• EARLY, JUBAL ANDERSON (1816-1894)

early period is represented by H .

Diels and J . See also:

• BURNET
• BURNET, GILBERT (1643-1715)
• BURNET, THOMAS (1635-1715)

Burnet, while Zeller's view of Plato may be said to have been superseded by the later researches of See also:

• LEWIS, HENRY CARVILL
• LEWIS, JOHN FREDERICK (180 1876)
• LEWIS, MATTHEW GREGORY (1775-1818)
• LEWIS, MERIWETHER (1774-1809)
• LEWIS, SIR GEORGE CORNEWALL, BART

Lewis See also:

• CAMPBELL, ALEXANDER (1788–1866)
• CAMPBELL, BEATRICE STELLA (Mrs PATRICK CAMPBELL) (1865– )
• CAMPBELL, GEORGE (1719–1796)
• CAMPBELL, JOHN
• CAMPBELL, JOHN (1708-1775)
• CAMPBELL, JOHN CAMPBELL, BARON (1779-1861)
• CAMPBELL, JOHN FRANCIS
• CAMPBELL, LEWIS (1830-1908)
• CAMPBELL, REGINALD JOHN (1867— )
• CAMPBELL, THOMAS (1777—1844)

Campbell, H . See also:

• JACKSON
• JACKSON, ANDREW (1767-1845)
• JACKSON, CYRIL (1746-1819)
• JACKSON, FREDERICK GEORGE (186o– )
• JACKSON, HELEN MARIA (1831–1885)
• JACKSON, MASON (c. 1820-1903)
• JACKSON, THOMAS (1579-1640)
• JACKSON, THOMAS JONATHAN (1824-1863)
• JACKSON, WILLIAM (1730-1803)

Jackson and others . T . See also:

• GOMPERZ, THEODOR (1832– )

Gomperz's Greek Thinkers is an able, if somewhat diffuse, survey of the philosophical development in connexion with the general See also:

• MOVEMENT

movement of Greek life and culture . It does not go beyond Plato . B . See also:

• HAUREAU, (JEAN) BARTHELEMY (1812-1896)

Haureau, A . StOckl and Karl See also:

• WERNER, ABRAHAM GOTTLOB (1750-1817)
• WERNER, ANTON ALEXANDER VON (1843– )
• WERNER, FRIEDRICH LUDWIG ZACHARIAS (1768–1823)

Werner give the fullest and most trustworthy histories of the See also:

• MEDIEVAL

medieval period, but the subject is very carefully treated by Erdmann and Ueberweg, and a useful compendium, written from a See also:

• ROMAN

Roman See also:

• CATHOLIC (Gr. KcaBoXuK6s, general, universal)

Catholic standpoint, is De Wulf's History of Medieval Philosophy (1900; Eng. trans., 1907) . For modern times, in addition to the general histories already named, the See also:

• WORKS

works of Kuno See also:

• FISCHER
• FISCHER, EMIL (1852– )
• FISCHER, ERNST KUNO BERTHOLD (1824–1907)

Fischer, R . Falckenberg and H . See also:

• HOFFDING, HARALD (1843– )

HOffding, and R .

See also:

• ADAMSON, PATRICK (1537-1592)
• ADAMSON, ROBERT (1852-1902)

Adamson's Lectures on the Development of Modern Philosophy, trans . ; of 73 epistles by Boissonade (See also:

• PARIS
• PARIS (also called ALEXANDROS)
• PARIS, ALEXIS PAULIN (1800-x881)
• PARIS, BRUNO PAULIN GASTON (1839-1903)
• PARIS, FRANCOIS DE (169o-1727)
• PARIS, LOUIS PHILIPPE ALBERT
• PARIS, TREATIES OF (1814-1815)

Paris, 1842) . The Life of See also:

• APOLLONIUS

Apollonius was first published by Aldus (1502); a See also:

• FRENCH
• FRENCH, DANIEL CHESTER (1850– )
• FRENCH, NICHOLAS (1604-1678)

French See also:

• TRANSLATION

translation by Blaise de Vigenere appeared in 1596; an English translation of the first two books was published in See also:

• LONDON

London (168o) by See also:

• CHARLES
• CHARLES (1270-1325)
• CHARLES (1421-1461)
• CHARLES (1525-1574)
• CHARLES (c. 1319-1364)
• CHARLES (Fr. Charles; Span. Carlos; Ital. Carlo; Ger. Karl; derived from O.H.G. Charal,latinized as Carolus, meaning originally " man ": cf. Mod.Ger., Kerl," fellow," A.S. ceorl, Mod. Eng. " churl ")
• CHARLES (KARL EITEL ZEPHYRIN LUDWIG; in Rum. CAROL)
• CHARLES [KARL ALEXANDER] (1712-1780)
• CHARLES, ELIZABETH (1828-1896)
• CHARLES, JACQUES ALEXANDRE CESAR (1746-1823)
• CHARLES, THOMAS (1755-1814)

Charles See also:

• BLOUNT (or BLUNT), EDWARD (b. 1565?)
• BLOUNT, CHARLES (1654-1693)
• BLOUNT, SIR THOMAS POPE (1649-1697)
• BLOUNT, THOMAS (1618-1679)
• BLOUNT, WILLIAM (1749-1800)

Blount, with some notes by See also:

• LORD
• LORD (O. Eng. hldford, i.e. hldfweard, the warder or keeper of bread, hlIf, loaf; the word is not represented in any other Teutonic language)
• LORD, JOHN (1810-1894)

Lord Herbert of Cherbury (prohibited in England in 1693, it was reprinted on the See also:

• CONTINENT (from Lat. continere, "to hold together "; hence " connected," " continuous ")

Continent) ; a full translation appeared in 1903 . Critical works on the Eikones are numerous: K . Frlederichs, See also:

• DIE
• DIE (Fr. de, from Lat. datum, given)

Die Philostratischen Bilder (186o); See also:

• GOETHE, JOHANN WOLFGANG VON (1749-1832)

Goethe, " Philostrats Gemalde " in Complete Works (ed . See also:

• STUTTGART

Stuttgart, 1879) ; See also:

• BRUNN (Czech Brno)

Brunn, Die Philostratischen Bilder (186o); A . Bougot, Une Galerie See also:

• ANTIQUE (Lat. antiquus, old)

antique (1881); E . See also:

• BERTRAND, HENRI GRATIEN, COMTE (1773-1844)

Bertrand, Un Critique d'art dans l'antiquite: Philostrate et son ecole (1882) ; See also:

• BERGK, THEODOR (1812—1881)

Bergk, " Die Philostrate " in Fiinf Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophic and Astronomic (1883); Schmid, Atticismus iv . 7, on the attribution of the works .