See also:

• PSYCHOLOGY
• PSYCHOLOGY (>Guxrl, the mind or soul, and X yos, theory)

PSYCHOLOGY (>Guxrl, the mind or soul, and X yos, theory)  , the See also:

• SCIENCE (Lat. scientia, from scire; to learn, know)

science of mind, which can only be more strictly defined by an See also:

• ANALYSIS (Gr. avci and Meta, to break up into parts)

analysis of what " mind " means . I . In the several natural sciences the See also:

• SCOPE (through Ital. scopo, aim, purpose, intent, from Gr. o'KOaos, mark to shoot at, aim, o ic07reiv, to see, whence the termination in telescope, microscope, &c.)

scope and subject-See also:

• MATTER

matter of each are so evident that little preliminary discussion is called The Science for . But with See also:

• PSYCHOLOGY
• PSYCHOLOGY (>Guxrl, the mind or soul, and X yos, theory)

psychology, however much it is freed of from See also:

• METAPHYSICS
• METAPHYSICS, or METAPHYSIC (from Gr. /sera, after, d v med, things of nature, lots, i.e. the natural universe)

metaphysics, this is different . It is indeed ordinarily assumed that its subject-matter can be at once defined . " It is what you can perceive by consciousness or reflection or the See also:

• INTERNAL

internal sense, " says one, " just as the subject-matter of See also:

• OPTICS

optics is what you can perceive by sight." Or, " psychology is the science of the phenomena of mind," we are told again, " and is thus marked off from the See also:

• PHYSICAL

physical sciences, which treat only of the phenomena of matter." But, whereas nothing is simpler than to distinguish between seeing and See also:

• HEARING (formed from the verb " to hear," O. Eng. hyran, heron, &c., a common Teutonic verb; cf. Ger. Koren, Dutch hooren, &c.; the O. Tent. form is seen in Goth. hausjan; the initial h makes any connexion with " ear," Lat. audire, or Gr. &Kobew very doub

hearing, or between the phenomena of See also:

• HEAT (0. E. haktu, which like " hot," Old Eng. hat, is from the Teutonic type haita, hit, to be hot; cf. Ger. hitze, heiss; Dutch, hitte, heet, &c.)

heat and the phenomena of See also:

• GRAVITATION (from Lat. gravis, heavy)

gravitation, a very little reflection may convince us that we cannot in the same See also:

• FASHION (adapted from Fr. facon, agon, Lat. factio, making, facere, to do or make)

fashion distinguish internal from See also:

• EXTERNAL

external sense, or make clear to ourselves what we mean by phenomena of mind as distinct from phenomena of matter . To every sense there corresponds a sense-See also:

• ORGAN

organ; the several senses are distinct and See also:

• INDEPENDENT

independent, so that no one sense can add Interna/ead to or alter the materials of another: the See also:

• POSSESSION
• POSSESSION (Lat. possessio, possidere, to possess)

possession external of five senses, e.g. furnishing no data as to the See also:

• CHARACTER (Gr. xapareri7p, from xap&crew, to scratch)

character of a possible See also:

• SIXTH

sixth . Moreover, sense-impressions are passively received and occur in the first instance without regard to the feeling or volition of the recipient and without any manner of relation to the " contents of consciousness " at the moment . Now such a description will apply but very partially to the so-called " internal sense." For we do not by means of it passively receive impressions differing from all previous presentations, as the sensations of See also:

• COLOUR (Lat. color, connected with celare, to hide, the root meaning, therefore, being that of a covering)

colour for one " couched " differ from all he has experienced before: the new facts consist rather in the recognition of certain relations among pre-existing presentations, i.e. are due to our See also:

• MENTAL

mental activity and not to a See also:

• SPECIAL

special mode of what has been called our sensitivity . For when we See also:

• TASTE (from Lat. taxare, to touch sharply; tangere, to touch)

taste we cannot hear that we taste, when we see we cannot See also:

• SMELL (connected etymologically with " smoulder " and " smoke ")

smell that we see; but when we taste we may be conscious that we taste, when we hear we may be conscious that we hear . Moreover, the facts so ascertained are never independent of feeling and volition and of the contents ofconsciousness at the See also:

• TIME (0. Eng. Lima, cf. Icel. timi, Swed. timme, hour, Dan. time; from the root also seen in " tide," properly the time of between the flow and ebb of the sea, cf. O. Eng. getidan, to happen, " even-tide," &c.; it is not directly related to Lat. tempus)
• TIME, MEASUREMENT OF
• TIME, STANDARD

time, as true sensations are . Also if we consult the physiologist we learn that there is no See also:

• EVIDENCE (Lat. evidentia, evideri, to appear clearly)

evidence of any organ or " centre " that could be regarded as the " physical basis " of this inner sense; and, if self-consciousness alone is temporarily in See also:

• ABEYANCE (O. Fr. abeance, " gaping")

abeyance and a See also:

• MAN
• MAN, ISLE OF (anc. Mona)

man merely " beside himself," such See also:

• STATE
• STATE, GREAT OFFICERS OF

state of See also:

• DELIRIUM (a Latin medical term for madness, from delirare, to be mad, literally to wander from the lira, or furrow)

delirium has little See also:

• ANALOGY (Gr. avaXo-yLa, proportion)

analogy to the functional See also:

• BLINDNESS

blindness or deafness that constitutes the temporary suspension of sight or hearing .

To the concept of an internal See also:

• PERCEPTION (from Lat. percipere, to perceive)

perception or observation the preceding objections do not necessarily apply—that is to say, this concept may be so defined that they need not . But then in proportion as we See also:

• ESCAPE (in mid. Eng. eschape or escape, from the O. Fr. eschapper, modern echapper, and escaper, low Lat. escapium, from ex, out of, and cappa, cape, cloak; cf. for the sense development the Gr. iichueoOat, literally to put off one's clothes, hence to sli

escape the See also:

• CHANGE (derived through the Fr. from the Late Lat. cambium, cambiare, to barter; the ultimate derivation is probably from the root which appears in the Gr. «a urmu', to bend)

change of assuming a special sense which furnishes the material for such perception or observation, in that same proportion are we compelled to seek for some other mode of distinguishing its subject-matter . For, so far as the See also:

• MERE
• MERE, ADALBERT (1838-1909)

mere mental activity of perceiving or observing is concerned, it is not easy to see any essential difference in the See also:

• PROCESS

process whether what is observed be psychical or physical . It is quite true that the so-called psycho-logical observation is more difficult, because the facts observed are often less definite and less persistent, and admit less of actual See also:

• ISOLATION

isolation than physical facts do; but the process of recognizing similarities or See also:

• DIFFERENCES, CALCULUS OF (Theory of Finite Differences)

differences, the dangers of mal-observation or non-observation, are not materially altered on that See also:

• ACCOUNT
• ACCOUNT (through O. Fr. acont, Late Lat. comptum, cornputare, to calculate)

account . It may be further allowed that there is one difficulty peculiarly See also:

• FELT (cognate with Ger. Filz, Du. vilt, Swed. and Dan. fill; the root is unknown; the word has given Med. Lat. filtrum, " filter ")

felt in psychological observation, the one most inaccurately expressed by saying that here the observer and the observed are one . But this difficulty is surely in the first instance due to the very obvious fact that our See also:

• POWERS, HIRAM (1805-1873)

powers of See also:

• ATTENTION (from Lat. ad-tendo, await, expect; the condition of being " stretched " or " tense ")

attention are limited, so that we cannot alter the See also:

• DISTRIBUTION (Lat. distribuere, to deal out)

distribution of attention at any moment without altering the contents of consciousness at that moment . Accordingly, where there are no other ways of surmounting this difficulty, the psycho-logical observer must either See also:

• TRUST

trust to representations at a later time, or he must acquire the See also:

• POWER [WILLIAM GRATTAN] TYRONE (1797-1841)

power of taking momentary glances at the psychological aspects of the phase of consciousness in question . And this one with any aptitude for such studies can do with so slight a diversion of attention as not to disturb very seriously either the given state or that which immediately succeeds it . But very similar difficulties have to be similarly met by physical observers in certain special cases, as, e.g. in observing and registering the phenomena of See also:

• SOLAR, SOLLER (Lat. solarium, Fr.• galetas, Ital. solaio)

solar See also:

• ECLIPSE (Gr. €uheo,tis, falling out of place, failing)

eclipse; and similar aptitudes in the distribution of attention have to be acquired, say, by extempore orators or skilful surgeons . Just as little, then, as there is anything that we can with propriety See also:

• CALL (from Anglo-Saxon ceallian, a common Teutonic word, cf. Dutch kallen, to talk or chatter)

call an inner sense, just so little can we find in the process of inner perception any satisfactory characteristic of the subject-matter of psychology . The question still is: What is it that is perceived or observed ? and the readiest See also:

• ANSWER (derived from and, against, and the same root as swear)

answer of course is: Internal experience as distinguished from external, what, takes See also:

• PLACE (through Fr. from Lat. platea, street; Gr. IrAar6s, wide)

place in the mind as distinct from what takes place without . This answer, it must be at once allowed, is adequate for most purposes, and a See also:

• GREAT

great See also:

• DEAL

deal of excellent psychological See also:

• WORK

work has been done without ever calling it in question .

But the distinction between internal and external experience is not one that can be See also:

• DRAWN

drawn from the standpoint of psychology, at least not at the outset . From this standpoint it appears to be either (i) inaccurate or (2) not extra-psychological . As to (I), the boundary between the internal and the external was, no doubt, originally the See also:

• SURFACE

surface of the See also:

• BODY

body, with which the subject or self was identifed; and in this sense the terms are of course correctly used . For a thing may, in the same sense of the word, be in one space and therefore not in—i.e. out of—another; but we See also:

• EXPRESS (through the French from the past participle of the Lat. exprimere, to press out, by transference used of representing objects in painting or sculpture, or of thoughts, &c. in words)

express no intelligible relation if we speak of two things as being one in a given See also:

• ROOM

room and the other in last See also:

• WEEK (from A.S. wicu, Germanic *wikon, probably=change, turn)

week . Any one is at See also:

• LIBERTY (Lat. libertas, from liber, free)

liberty to say if he choose that a certain thing is " in his mind "; but if in this way he distinguishes it from something else not in his mind, then to be intelligible this must imply one of two statements—either that the something else is actually or possibly in some other mind, or, his own mind being alone considered, that at the time the something else does not exist at all . Yet, evident as it seems that the correlatives in and not-in must apply to the same See also:

• CATEGORY (Gr. Karrlyopia, " accusation ")

category, whether space, time, presentation (or non-presentation) to a given subject, and so forth, we still find psychologists more or less consciously confused between " internal," meaning " presented " in the psychological sense, and " external, meaning not " not-presented " but corporeal or oftener extra-corporeal . But (2), when used to distinguish between presentations (some of which, or some relations of which with respect to others, are called " internal," and others or other relations, " external "), these terms are at all events accurate; only then they cease to See also:

• MARK
• MARK, CARL (1858– )
• MARK, GOSPEL OF ST
• MARK, ST

mark off the psychological from the extra-psychological, inasmuch as psychology has to analyse this distinction and to exhibit the steps by which it has come about . But we have still to examine whether the distinction of phenomena of Matter and phenomena of Mind furnishes a better dividing See also:

• LINE

line than the distinction of internal and external . A phenomenon, as commonly understood, is what is See also:

• MANIFEST (Lat. manifestus, clear, open to view)

manifest, sensible, evident, the implication being that there are eyes to see, ears to hear, and so forth—in other words, that there is See also:

• MENIAL

menial and presentation to a subject; and wherever there is presenta- Material . tion to a subject it will be allowed that we are in the domain of psychology . But in talking of physical phenomena we, in a way, abstract from this fact of presentation . Though consciousness should cease, the physicist would consider the sum See also:

• TOTAL

total of See also:

• OBJECTS

objects to remain the same: the See also:

• ORANGE
• ORANGE (Citrus Aurantium)
• ORANGE, HOUSE OF

orange would still be See also:

• ROUND (O. Fr. rond, Lat. rotundus, the Fr. is the source also of Du. rond; Ger., Swed., Dan. and Nor. rond)

round, yellow and fragrant as before .

For the physicist—whether aware of it or not—has taken up a position which for the See also:

• PRESENT

present may be described by saying that phenomenon with him means See also:

• APPEARANCE (from Lat. apparere, to appear)

appearance or manifestation, or—as we had better say—See also:

• OBJECT

object, not for a See also:

• CONCRETE
• CONCRETE (Lat. concretes, participle of concrescere, to grow together)

concrete individual, but rather for what See also:

• KANT, IMMANUEL (1724-1804)

Kant called Bewusstsein iiberhaupt, or, as some render it, the See also:

• OBJECTIVE, or OBJECT GLASS

objective consciousness, i.e. for an imaginary subject freed from all the limitations of actual subjects See also:

• SAVE, or SAVA (Ger. Sau; Hungarian Szdva; Lat. Savus)

save that of depending on " sensibility " for the material of experience . However, this is not all, for, as we shall see presently, the psychologist also occupies this position; at least if he does not his is not a true science . But, further, the physicist leaves out of sight altogether the facts of attention, feeling, and so forth, all of which actual presentation entails . From the psycho-logical point of view, on the other See also:

• HAND
• HAND (a word common to Teutonic languages; cf. Ger. Hand, Goth. handus)
• HAND, FERDINAND GOTTHELF (1786-185r)

hand, the removal of the subject removes not only all such facts as attention and feeling, but all presentation or possibility of presentation whatever . Surely, then, to call a certain object, when we abstract from its presentation, a material phenomenon, and to call the actual presentation of this object a mental phenomenon, is a clumsy and confusing way of representing the difference between the two points of view . For the terms " material " and " mental " seem to imply that the two so-called phenomena have nothing in See also:

• COMMON

common, whereas the same object is involved in both, while the See also:

• TERM

term " phenomenon " implies that the point of view is in each See also:

• CASE
• CASE, JOHN (d. 1600)

case the same, when in truth what is emphasized by the one the other ignores . 2 . Paradoxical though it may be, we must then conclude that psychology cannot be defined by reference to a special subject-Standpoint matter as such concrete sciences, for example, as of Psycho- See also:

• MINERALOGY

mineralogy and See also:

• BOTANY (from Gr. l3or6v17, plant; ,66vicety, to graze)

botany can be; and, since it deals in logy. some sort with the whole of experience, it is obviously not an abstract science in any See also:

• ORDINARY (med. Lat. ordinarius, Fr. ordinaire)

ordinary sense of that term . To be characterized at all, therefore, apart from metaphysical assumptions, it must be characterized by the standpoint from which this experience is viewed . It is by way of expressing this that widely different See also:

• SCHOOLS

schools of psychology define it as subjective, all other See also:

• POSITIVE (or PORTABLE) ORGAN

positive sciences being distinguished as objective . But this seems scarcely more than a first approximation to the truth, and, as we have seen incidentally, is See also:

• APT

apt to be misleading . The distinction rather is that the standpoint of psychology is what is sometimes termed " individualistic," that of the so-called object-sciences beiAg " universalistic," both alike being objective in the sense of being true for all, consisting of what Kant would call judgments of experience .

For psychology is not a See also:

• BIOGRAPHY (from the Gr. (3ios, life, and yp&4 , writing)

biography in any sense, still less a biography dealing with idiosyncrasies, and in an See also:

• IDIOM (Gr. t&%wµa, something peculiar and personal; lbws, one's own, personal)

idiom having an See also:

• INTEREST

interest and a meaning for one subject only, and incommunicable to any other . See also:

• LOCKE, GOTTFRIED CHRISTIAN FRIEDRICH (1791–1855)
• LOCKE, JOHN (1632-1704)
• LOCKE, MATTHEW (c. 1630-1677)

Locke, See also:

• BERKELEY
• BERKELEY, GEORGE (1685–1753)
• BERKELEY, MILES JOSEPH (1803-1889)
• BERKELEY, SIR WILLIAM (c. 1608-1677)

Berkeley and See also:

• HUME, ALEXANDER (c. 1557-1609)
• HUME, DAVID (1711-1776)
• HUME, JOSEPH (1777-1855)

Hume have been severely handled because they regarded the See also:

• CRITICAL (in alphabetical order of authors)

critical investigation of knowledge as a psychological problem, and set to work to study the individual mind simply for the See also:

• SAKE

sake of this problem . But none the less their standpoint was the proper one for the science of psychology itself; and, however surely their See also:

• PHILOSOPHY (Gr. gthos, fond of, and vo4 (a, wisdom)

philosophy was foredoomed to a collapse, there is no denying a steady psychological advance as we pass from Locke to Hume and his See also:

• MODERN

modern representatives . By " See also:

• IDEA (Gr. Ibia, connected with i&eiv, to see; cf. Lat. species from specere, to look at)

idea " Locke tells us he means " Whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks " (i.e. is conscious), and having, as it were, shut himself within such a circle of ideas he finds himself powerless to explain his knowledge of a See also:

• WORLD

world that is assumed to be independent of it; but he is able to give a very See also:

• GOOD, JOHN MASON (1764-1827)

good account of some of these ideas themselves . He cannot justify his belief in the world of things whence certain of his See also:

• SIMPLE

simple ideas " were conveyed " any more than See also:

• ROBINSON, EDWARD (1794–1863)
• ROBINSON, HENRY CRABB (1777–1867)
• ROBINSON, JOHN (1575–1625)
• ROBINSON, JOHN (1650-1723)
• ROBINSON, JOHN THOMAS ROMNEY (1792–1882)
• ROBINSON, MARY [" Perdita "] (1758–1800)
• ROBINSON, SIR JOHN BEVERLEY, BART
• ROBINSON, SIR JOSEPH BENJAMIN (1845– )
• ROBINSON, THEODORE (1852-1896)

Robinson Crusoe could have explored the continents whose products were drifted to his See also:

• DESERT

desert See also:

• ISLAND (O.E. ieg =isle, +land')

island, though he might perhaps survey the island itself well enough . Berkeley accordingly, as See also:

• PROFESSOR (the Latin noun formed from the verb profiteri, to declare publicly, to acknowledge, profess)

Professor See also:

• FRASER
• FRASER, ALEXANDER CAMPBELL (1819– )
• FRASER, JAMES (1818-1885)
• FRASER, JAMES BAILLIE (1783--1856)
• FRASER, SIR WILLIAM AUGUSTUS

Fraser happily puts it, abolished Locke's hypothetical See also:

• OUTER

outer circle . Thereby he made the psychological standpoint clearer than ever—hence the truth of Hume's remark, that Berkeley's arguments " admit of no answer "; at the same time the epistemological problem was as hopeless as before—hence again the truth of Hume's remark that those arguments " produced no conviction." Of all the facts with which he deals, the psychologist may truly say that their esse is percipi, inasmuch as all his facts are facts of presentation, are ideas in Locke's sense, or objects which imply a subject . Before we became conscious there was no world for us; should our consciousness cease, the world for us ceases too; had we been See also:

• BORN, IGNAZ, EDLER VON (1742–1791)

born See also:

• BLIND, MATHILDE (1841—1896)

blind, the world would for us have had no colour; if See also:

• DEAF

deaf, it would have had no sounds; if idiotic, it would have had no meaning . Psychology, then, never transcends the limits of the individual . But now, though this Berkeleyan standpoint is the standpoint of psychology, psychology is not pledged to the method employed by Berkeley and by Locke . Psychology may be individualistic without being confined exclusively to the introspective method . There is nothing to hinder the psychologist from employing materials furnished by his observations of other men, of infants, of the See also:

• LOWER

lower animals, or of the insane; nothing to hinder him taking counsel with the philologist or even the physiologist, provided always he can show the psychological See also:

• BEARINGS

bearings of those facts which are not directly psychological .

The standpoint of psychology is individualistic; by whatever methods, from whatever See also:

• SOURCES

sources its facts are ascertained, they must—to have a psychological import—be regarded as having place in, or as being See also:

• PART

part of, some one's consciousness or experience . In this sense, i.e. as presented to an individual, " the whole See also:

• CHOIR (0. Fr. cuer from Lat. chorus; pronounced quire, and until the end of the 17th century so spelt, the spelling being altered to agree with the Fr. chceur)

choir of See also:

• HEAVEN (0. Eng. hefen, heofon, heofone; this word appears in O.S. hevan; the High. Ger. word appears in Ger. Himmel, Dutch hemel; there does not seem to be any connexion between the two words, and the ultimate derivation of the word is unknown; the sugges

heaven and See also:

• FURNITURE (from " furnish," Fr. fournir)

furniture of See also:

• EARTH
• EARTH (a word common to Teutonic languages, cf. Ger. Erde, Dutch aarde, Swed. and Dan. jord; outside Teutonic it appears only in the Gr. 'pq'e, on the ground; it has been connected by some etymologists with the Aryan root ar-, to plough, which is seen in
• EARTH, FIGURE OF
• EARTH, FIGURE OF THE

earth " may belong to psychology, but otherwise they are psychological nonentities . In defining psychology, however, the propriety of avoiding the terms mind or soul, which it implies, is widely acknowledged; mind because of the disastrous See also:

• DUALISM (from rare Lat. dualis, containing two, from duo)

dualism of mind and matter, soul because of its metaphysical associations . Hence F . A . See also:

• LANGE, ANNE FRANCOISE ELIZABETH (1772—1816)
• LANGE, ERNST PHILIPP KARL (1813—1899)
• LANGE, FRIEDRICH ALBERT (1828—1875)
• LANGE, JOHANN PETER (1802-1884)

Lange's famous mot : modern psychology is Psychologie ohne Seele . But consciousness, which is the most frequent substitute, is continually confused with self-consciousness, and so is apt to involve undue stress on the subjective as opposed to the objective, as well as to emphasize the cognitive as against the conative factors . Experience, it is maintained, is a more fundamental and less ambiguous term . Psychology then is the science of individual experience . The problem of psychology, in dealing with this complex subject-matter, is in See also:

• GENERAL
• GENERAL (Lat. generalis, of or relating to a genus, kind or class)

general—first, to ascertain its ultimate constituents, and, secondly, to determine and explain the See also:

• LAWS

laws of their interaction . General Analysis . 3 .

In seeking to make a first general analysis of experience, we must start from individual human experience, for this alone is what we immediately know . From this standpoint we must endeavour to determine the " irreducible minimum " involved, so that our concept may apply to all lower forms of experience as well . Etymologically experience connotes See also:

• PRACTICAL

practical acquaintance, efficiency and skill as the result of trial—usually repeated trial—and effort . Many See also:

• RECENT

recent writers on See also:

• COMPARATIVE

comparative psychology propose to make evidence of experience in this sense the criterion of psychical See also:

• LIFE

life . The ox knoweth his owner and the See also:

• ASS (O.E. assa; Lat. asinus)
• ASS, FEAST OF THE

ass his See also:

• MASTER (Lat. magister, related to tnagis, more, as the corresponding minister is to minus, less; the English form is due partly to the O. Eng. maegister, and partly to O. Fr. maistre, mod. maitre; cf. Du. meester, Ger. Meister, Ital. maestro)

master's See also:

• CRIB (a word common to some Teutonic languages, cf. Dutch krib and Ger. Krippe; it has a common origin with the O. Eng. " cratch," a manger or crib, cf. Fr. creche)

crib, and so would pass See also:

• MUSTER (Mid. Eng. mostre, moustre, adapted from the similar O. Fr. forms; Lat. monstrare)

muster; but the See also:

• ANT
• ANT (O. Eng. aemete, from Teutonic a, privative, and maitan, cut or bite off, i.e. " the biter off "; aemete in Middle English became differentiated in dialect use to (mete, then amte, and so ant, and also to emete, whence the synonym " emmet," now only u

ant and the See also:

• BEE (Sanskrit blza, AS. ben, Lat. apis)

bee, who are said to learn nothing, would, in spite of their marvellous instinctive skill, be regarded as mere automata in See also:

• DESCARTES, RENE (1596-1650)

Descartes's sense . That this criterion is decisive on the positive See also:

• SIDE
• SIDE (mod. Eski Adalia)

side will hardly be denied; the question how far it is available negatively we must examine later on . But it will be well first briefly to See also:

• NOTE
• NOTE (Lat. nota, mark, sign, from noscere, to know)

note some of the implications of this positive criterion: Experience is the process of becoming See also:

• EXPERT (Lat. expertus, from experiri, to try)

expert by experiment . The See also:

• CHIEF (from Fr. chef, head, Lat. caput)

chief implication, no doubt, is that which in psycho-logical See also:

• LANGUAGE (adapted from the Fr. langage, from langue, tongue, Lat. lingua)

language we express as the duality of subject and object . Looking at this relation as the comparative psychologist has to do, we find that it tallies in the See also:

• MAIN (from the Aryan root which appears in " may " and " might," and Lat. magnus, great)
• MAIN (Lat. Moenus)

main with the biological relation of organism and environment . The individuality of the organ-ism corresponds to, though it is not necessarily identical with, the psychological subject, while to the environment and its changes corresponds the objective continuum or totum objectivum as we shall call it . This See also:

• CORRESPONDENCE
• CORRESPONDENCE (from med. scholastic Lat. correspondentia, corrcspondere, compounded of Lat. cum, with, and respond ere, to answer; cf. Fr. correspondance)

correspondence further See also:

• HELPS, SIR ARTHUR (1813-1875)

helps us to see still more clearly the See also:

• ERROR (Lat. error, from errare, to wander, to err)

error of regarding individual experience as wholly subjective, and at the same time helps us to find some measure of truth in the naive See also:

• REALISM (from Low Lat. realis, appertaining to res, things, as opposed to ideas and imaginations)

realism of Common Sense . As these points have an important bearing on the connexion of psychology and See also:

• EPISTEMOLOGY

epistemology, we may See also:

• ATTEMPT (Lat. adtemptare, attentare, to try)

attempt to elucidate them more fully .

Though it would be unwarrantable to resolve a thing, as some have done, into a mere See also:

• MEETING (from " to meet," to come together, assemble, 0. Eng. metals ; cf. Du. moeten, Swed. mota, Goth. gamotjan, &c., derivatives of the Teut. word for a meeting, seen in O. Eng. Wit, moot, an assembly of the people; cf. witanagemot)

meeting-point of relations, yet it is perhaps as great a See also:

• MISTAKE (i.e. take amiss)

mistake to assume that it can be anything determinate in itself apart from all relations to other things . By the physicist this mistake can hardly be made: for him See also:

• ACTION

action and reaction are strictly correlative: a material See also:

• SYSTEM

system can do no work on itself . For the biologist, again, organism and environment are invariably complementary . But in psychology, when presentations are regarded as subjective modifications, we have this mistaken isolation in a glaring See also:

• FORM (Lat. forma)

form, and all the hopeless difficulties of what is called " subjective See also:

• IDEALISM (from Gr. i5Ea, archetype or model, through been urged of the truth of its point of view is the persistency Fr. idealisme)

idealism " are the result . Subjective modifications no doubt are always one constituent of individual experience, but always as correlative to objective modifications or change in the objective continuum . If experience were throughout subjective, not merely would the term subjective itself be meaningless, not merely would the conception of the objective never arise, but the entirely impersonal and intransitive process that remained, though it might be described as See also:

• ABSOLUTE (Lat. absolvere, to loose, set free)

absolute becoming, could not be called even See also:

• SOLIPSISM (Lat. solus, alone, ipse, self)

solipsism, least of all real experience . Common Sense, then, is right in positing, wherever experience is inferred, (I) a See also:

• FACTOR (from Lat. facere, to make or do)

factor answering to what we know as self, and (2) another factor answering to what each of us knows as the world . It is further right in regarding the world which each one immediately knows as a coloured, See also:

• SOUNDING (for derivation see SOUND above)

sounding, tangible world, more exactly as a world of sensible qualities . The See also:

• ASSUMPTION, FEAST OF

assumption of na5ve realism, that the world as each one knows it exists as such independently of him, is questionable . But this assumption goes beyond individual experience, and does not, indeed could not, arise at this standpoint . Answering to the individuality and unity of the subjective factor, there is a corresponding unity and individuality of the objective . Every Ego has its correlative Non-Ego, whence in the end such See also:

• FAMILIAR (through the Fr. familier, from Lat. familiaris, of or belonging to the familia, family)

familiar saying as quot homilies tot sententiae and the like .

The See also:

• DOCTRINE

doctrine of See also:

• LEIBNITZ (LEIBNIZ), GOTTFRIED WILHELM

Leibnitz, that " each See also:

• MONAD (Gr. µovas, unit, from µovos, alone)

monad is a living See also:

• MIRROR (through O. Fr. mirour, mod. miroir, from a sup-posed Late Lat. miratorium, from mirari, to admire)

mirror . . . representative of the universe according to its point of view," will, with obvious reservations, occur to many as illustrative here . In particular, Leibnitz emphasized one point on which psychology will do well to insist . "Since the world is a plenum," he begins, " all things are connected together and everybody acts upon every other, more or less, according to their distance, and is affected by their reaction; hence each monad is a living mirror,"1 &c . Subject and Object, or (as it will be clearer in this connexion to say) Ego and Non-Ego, are then not merely logically a universe, but actually the universe, so that, as Leibnitz put it, " He who See also:

• SEES

sees all could read in each what is happening everywhere " (Monadology, § 61) . Though every individual experience is unique, yet the more Ego' is similar to Ego2 the more their complementaries Non-Ego1, Non-Ego2 are likewise similar; much as two See also:

• PERSPECTIVE (Lat. peespicere, to see through)

perspective projections are more similar the more adjacent their points of sight, and more similar as regards a given position the greater its distance from both points . No doubt we must also make a very extensive use of the See also:

• HYPOTHESIS (from Gr. inrorcOivat, to put under; cf. Lat. suppositio, from sub-ponere)

hypothesis of subconsciousness, just as Leibnitz did, before we can say that the universe is the objective factor in each and every individual's experience . But we shall have in any case to allow that, besides the strictly limited " content " rising above the See also:

• THRESHOLD

threshold of consciousness, there is an indefinite See also:

• EXTENSION (Lat. ex, out ; tendere, to stretch)

extension of the presentational continuum beyond it . And the Leibnitzian Monadology helps us also to clear up a certain See also:

• CON

con-See also:

• FUSION

fusion that besets terms such as " content of consciousness," or " finite centre of experience " —a barbarous but intelligible phrase that has recently appeared—the confusion, that is, with a See also:

• MOSAIC (corresponding to Lat. opus musivum, from Gr. µovoeiov, an artificial grotto often decorated with mosaics; the word is only found in the sense of mosaic in late Greek, which generally uses k oXI yrlµa)

mosaic of mutually exclusive areas, or with a See also:

• SCHEME (Lat. schema, Gr. oxfjya, figure, form, from the root axe, seen in exeiv, to have, hold, to be of such shape, form, &c.)

scheme of mutually exclusive logical compartments . Consciousnesses, though in one respect mutually exclusive, do not limit each other in this fashion . For there is a sense in which all individual experiences are absolutely the same, though relatively different as to their point of view, i.e. as to the manner in which for each the same absolute whole is sundered into subjective and objective factors . This way of looking at the facts of mind helps, again, to dispel the obscurity investing such terms as subjective, intersubjective, 1 Principles of Nature and See also:

• GRACE (Fr. grace, Lat. gratia, from grates, beloved, pleasing; formed from the root cra-, Gr. xav-, cf. xaipw, x6p,ua, Xapts)
• GRACE, WILLIAM GILBERT (1848– )

Grace, § 3 .

transsubjective and objective, as these occur in psychological or epistemological discussions . For the psychologist must maintain that no experience is merely subjective: it is only epistemologists (notably Kant) who so describe individual experience, because objects experienced in their concrete particularity pertain, like so many idiosyncrasies, to the individual alone . In contrast with this, epistemologists then describe universal experience—the objects in which are the same for every experient —as objective experience See also:

• PAR (Lat. par, equal)

par excellence . And so has arisen the time-honoured opposition of Sense-knowledge and Thought-knowledge: so too has arisen the dualism of See also:

• EMPIRICISM (from Gr. Eµrretpor, skilled in, from sreipa, experiment)

Empiricism and See also:

• RATIONALISM (from Lat. rationalis, pertaining to reason, ratio)

Rationalism, which Kant sought to surmount by logical analysis . It is in the endeavour to supplement this analysis by a psycho-logical See also:

• GENESIS
• GENESIS (Gr. 'ybeo-es, becoming; the term being used in English as a synonym for origin or process of coming into being)

genesis that the terms intersubjective and transsubjective prove useful . The problem for psychology is to ascertain the successive stages in the advance from the one form of experience or knowledge to the other . " When ten men look at the See also:

• SUN
• SUN (0. Eng. sonne, Ger. sonne. Fr. soleil, Lat. sol, Gr. ijXior, from which comes helio- in various English compounds)

sun or the See also:

• MOON (a common Teutonic word, cf. Ger. Mond, Du. maan, Dan. maane, &c., and cognate with such Indo-Germanic forms as Gr. µlip, Sans. ma's, Irish mi, &c.; Lat. uses luna, i.e. lucna, the shining one, lucere, to shine, for the moon, but preserves the word i
• MOON, SIR RICHARD, 1ST BARONET (1814-1899)

moon," said See also:

• REID, ROBERT (1862– )
• REID, SIR GEORGE (1841- )
• REID, SIR ROBERT GILLESPIE (184o-19o8)
• REID, SIR WILLIAM (1791-1858)
• REID, THOMAS (1710-1796)
• REID, THOMAS MAYNE (1818-1883)
• REID, WHITELAW (1837- )

Reid, " they all see the same individual object." But according to See also:

• HAMILTON
• HAMILTON (GRAND or ASHUANIPI)
• HAMILTON, ALEXANDER (1757-1804)
• HAMILTON, ANTHONY, or ANTOINE (1646-1720)
• HAMILTON, ELIZABETH (1758–1816)
• HAMILTON, EMMA, LADY (c. 1765-1815)
• HAMILTON, JAMES (1769-1831)
• HAMILTON, JAMES HAMILTON, 1ST DUKE OF (1606-1649)
• HAMILTON, JOHN (c. 1511–1571)
• HAMILTON, MARQUESSES AND DUKES OF
• HAMILTON, PATRICK (1504-1528)
• HAMILTON, ROBERT (1743-1829)
• HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM
• HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM (1730-1803)
• HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM ROWAN (1805-1865)
• HAMILTON, THOMAS (1789-1842)
• HAMILTON, WILLIAM (1704-1754)
• HAMILTON, WILLIAM GERARD (1729-1796)

Hamilton this statement is not " philosophically correct . . . the truth is that each of these persons sees a different object . . . . It is not by perception but by a process of reasoning that we connect the objects of sense with existences beyond the See also:

• SPHERE (Gr. vclsa?pa, a ball or globe)

sphere of immediate knowledge." 2 Now it is to this " beyond " that the term transsubjective is applied, and the question before us is: How do individual subjects thus get beyond the See also:

• IMMANENCE (from Lat. in-manere to dwell in, remain)

immanence or immediacy with which all experience begins ? By a " process of reasoning," it is said . But it is at least true in fact, whether necessarily true or not, that such reasoning is the result of social intercourse .

Further, it will be generally allowed that Kant's Analytik, before referred to, has made See also:

• PLAIN (O. Fr. plain, from Lat. plenum)

plain the insufficiency of merely formal reasoning to yield the categories of Substance, Cause and End, by which we pass from mere perceptual experience to that wider experience which transcends it . And psychology, again, may claim to have shown that in fact these categories are the result of that reflective self-consciousness to which social intercourse first gives rise . But such intercourse, it has been urged, presupposes the common ground between subject and subject which it is meant to explain . How, it is asked, if every subject is confined to his own unique experience, does this intersubjective intercourse ever arise ? If no progress towards intellective See also:

• SYNTHESIS (Gr. a6vOeacs, from avvrcBivac, to put together)

synthesis were possible before inter-subjective intercourse began, such intercourse, as presupposing something more than immediate sense-knowledge, obviously never could begin.' Let us illustrate by an analogy which Leibnitz's association of experience with a " point of view " at once suggests . If it were possible for the terrestrial astronomer to obtain observations of the heavens from astronomers in the neighbouring stars, he would be able to See also:

• MAP
• MAP (or MAPES), WALTER (d. c. 1208/9)

map in three dimensions constellations which now he can only represent in two . But unless he had ascertained unaided the See also:

• HELIOCENTRIC

heliocentric See also:

• PARALLAX (Gr. aapa?X6, alternately)

parallax of these neighbouring stars, he would have no means of distinguishing them as near from the distant myriads besides, or of understanding the data he might receive; and unless he had first of all determined the still humbler See also:

• GEOCENTRIC

geocentric parallax of our sun, those heliocentric parallaxes would have been unattainable . So in like manner we may say " intersubjective parallax " presupposes what we may call " subjective parallax," and even this the psychological duality of object and subject . But such subjective parallax or acquaintance with other like selves is the See also:

• DIRECT

direct outcome of the extended range in time which memory proper secures; and when in this way self has become an object, resembling objects become other selves or " ejects," to adopt with slight modification a term originated by the See also:

• LATE

late W . K . See also:

• CLIFFORD
• CLIFFORD, JOHN (1836- )
• CLIFFORD, WILLIAM KINGDON (1845-1879)

Clifford . We may be quite sure that his faithful See also:

• DOG

dog is as little of a solipsist as the See also:

• NOBLE, SIR ANDREW (1832- )

noble See also:

• SAVAGE
• SAVAGE, MINOT JUDSON (1841– )
• SAVAGE, RICHARD (d. 1743)

savage whom he accompanies .

Indeed, the rudiments of the social factor are, if we may See also:

• JUDGE (Lat. judex, Fr. juge)

judge by biological evidence, to be found very See also:

• EARLY
• EARLY, JUBAL ANDERSON (1816-1894)

early . Sexual See also:

• UNION
• UNION (known locally as Union Hill and officially as Town of Union)

union in the physiological sense occurs in all but the lowest Metazoa, pairing and courtship are frequent among See also:

• INSECTS

insects, while " among the See also:

• COLD (in O. Eng. cald and ceald, a word coming ultimately from a root cognate with the Lat. gelu, gelidus, and common in the Teutonic languages, which usually have two distinct forms for the substantive and the adjective, cf. Ger. Kolte, kalt, Dutch koude

cold-blooded fishes the See also:

• BATTLE

battle of the See also:

• STICKLEBACK

stickleback with his rivals, his captivating manoeuvres to See also:

• LEAD
• LEAD (pronounced iced)

lead the See also:

• FEMALE

female to the See also:

• NEST

nest which he has built, his mad See also:

• DANCE
• DANCE (Fr. danse; of obscure origin, connected with Old High Ger. danson, to stretch)

dance of See also:

• PASSION (post-classical Lat. passio, formed from pati, passus, to suffer, endure)

passion around her, and his subsequent jealous guarding of the nest, have often been observed and admired." ' Among birds and mammals 2 Lectures on Metaphysics, ii . 153 . And it is precisely for want of this See also:

• MEDIATION (Lat. medius, middle)

mediation that Kant's " two stems of human knowledge, which perhaps may See also:

• SPRING (from " to spring," " to leap or jump up," " burst out," O. Eng., springau, a common Teut. word, cf. Ger. springer, possibly allied to Gr. QnrFpxecOac, to move rapidly)

spring from a common but to us unknown See also:

• ROOT (late O.E. rot, adopted from Scand., cf. Norw. and Swed. rot, Dan. rod; the true O.E. word was wyrt, plant, represented in Ger. Wurz or Wurzel; the ultimate root is the same in both words, and is seen in Lat. radix)
• ROOT, ELIHU (1845– )

root," leave epistemology still more or less hampered with the old dualism of sense and understanding . See also:

• EVOLUTION

Evolution of See also:

• SEX (Lat. sexes; possibly connected with secure, to cut)

Sex, by See also:

• GEDDES, ALEXANDER (1737-1802)
• GEDDES, ANDREW (1783-1844)
• GEDDES, JAMES LORRAINE (1827-1887)
• GEDDES, SIR WILLIAM DUGUID (1828-1900)

Geddes and See also:

• THOMSON, JAMES (1822-1892)
• THOMSON, JAMES (1834-1882)
• THOMSON, JAMES (r700-1748)
• THOMSON, JOHN (1778-184o)
• THOMSON, JOSEPH (1858-1895)
• THOMSON, SIR CHARLES WYVILLE (1830-1882)
• THOMSON, THOMAS (1773-1852)
• THOMSON, WILLIAM (1819-189o)

Thomson, 1st ed. p . 265 . we find not merely that these psychological aspects of sexual life are greatly extended, but we find also prolonged See also:

• EDUCATION

education of off-spring by parents and See also:

• IMITATION (Lat. imitatio, from intitari, to imitate)

imitation of the parents by offspring . Even language, or, at any See also:

• RATE

rate " the linguistic impulse," is not wholly absent among brutes.' Thus as the sensori-motor adjustments of the organism to its environment generally advance in complexity and range, there is a concomitant advance in the variety and intimacy of its relations specially with individuals of its See also:

• KIND (O. E. ge-cynde, from the same root as is seen in " kin," supra)

kind . It is therefore reasonable to assume no discontinuity between phases of experience that for the individual are merely objective and phases that are also ejective as well; and once the ejective level is attained, some interchange of experience is possible . So disappears the great gulf fixed betwixt subjective or individual and intersubjective or universal experience by See also:

• RIVAL

rival systems in philosophy . 4 . From this preliminary epistemological discussion we may pass on to the psychological analysis of experience itself .

As to this, there is in the main substantial agreement; the elementary facts of mind cannot be expressed in less than three propositions—" I feel somehow," " I know something," " I do something." But here at once there arises an important question, viz . What after all are we to understand by the subject of these propositions ? The proposition " I feel somehow " is not See also:

• EQUIVALENT

equivalent to " I know that I feel somehow." To identify the two would be to confound consciousness with self-consciousness . We are no more confined to our own immediate observations here than elsewhere; but the point is that, whether seeking to analyse one's own consciousness or to infer that of a See also:

• LOBSTER (O.E. lopustre, lopystre, a corruption of Lat. locusta, lobster or other marine shell-fish; also a locust)

lobster, whether discussing the association of ideas or the expression of emotions, there is always an individual self or " subject " in question . It is not enough to talk of feelings or volitions: what we mean is that some individual—man or See also:

• WORM

worm—feels, strives, acts, thus or thus . Obvious as this may seem, it has been frequently either forgotten or gainsaid . It has been forgotten among details or through the assumption of a medley of faculties, each treated as an individual in turn, and among which the real individual was lost . Or it has been gainsaid, because to admit that all psychological facts pertain to an experiencing subject or experient seemed to imply that they pertained to a particular spiritual substance, which was simple, indestructible, and so forth; and it was manifestly desirable to exclude such assumptions from psychology as a science aiming only at a systematic exposition of what can be known and verified by observation . But, however, 'much assailed or disowned, the concept of a " mind " or conscious subject is to be found implicitly or explicitly in all psychological writers whatever—not more in Berke-ley, who accepts it as a fact, than in Hume, who treats it as a fiction . This being so, we are far more likely to reach the truth eventually if we openly acknowledge this inexpugnable assumption, if such it prove, instead of resorting to all sorts of devious periphrases to hide it . Now wherever the word Subject, or its derivatives, occurs in psychology we might substitute the word Ego and analogous derivatives, did such exist . But Subject is almost always the preferable term; its impersonal form is an See also:

• ADVANTAGE

advantage, and it readily recalls its modern correlative Object .

Moreover, Ego has two senses, distinguished by Kant as pure and empirical, the latter of which was, of course, an object, the Me known, while the former was subject always, the I knowing . By pure Ego or Subject it is proposed to denote here the simple fact that everything experienced is referred to a Self experiencing . This psychological concept of a self or subject, then, is after all by no means identical with the metaphysical concepts of a soul or mind-See also:

• ATOM (Gr. &rows, indivisible, from a- privative, and TE,aPfw, to cut)

atom, or of mind-stuff not atomic; it may be kept as See also:

• FREE

free from metaphysical implications as the concept of the biological individual or organism with which it is so intimately connected . The attempt, indeed, has frequently been made to resolve the former into the latter, and so to find in mind only such an indiattemptstoviduality as has an obvious counterpart in this individuextrude the ality of the organism, i.e. what we may call an objective Ego, individuality . But such See also:

• PROCEDURE (Fr. procedure, from Lat. procedere, to go for-ward)

procedure owes all its plausi- bility to the fact that it leaves out of sight the difference between the biological and the psychological standpoints . All that the biologist means by a dog is " the sum of the phenomena I Cf . See also:

• DARWIN, CHARLES ROBERT (1809-1882)
• DARWIN, ERASMUS (1731-1802)

Darwin, Descent of Man, i . 56 . which make up its corporeal existence." 2 And, inasmuch as its presentation to any one in particular is a point of no importance, the fact of presentation at all may be very well dropped out of account . Let us now turn to psychology: Why should we not here follow See also:

• HUXLEY, THOMAS HENRY (1825–1895)

Huxley and take the word ' soul ' simply as a name for the See also:

• SERIES (a Latin word from serere, to join)

series of mental phenomena which make up an individual mind " ? 3 Surely the moment we try distinctly to under-stand this question we realize that the cases are different . " Series of mental phenomena " for whom ?

For any passer-by such as might take stock of our biological dog ? No, obviously only for that individual mind itself ; yet that is supposed to be made up of, to be nothing different from, the series of phenomena . Are we, then, (I) quoting J . S . See also:

• MILL
• MILL (O. Eng. mylen, later myln, or miln, adapted from the late Lat. molina, cf. Fr. moulin, from Lat. mola, a mill, molere, to grind; from the same root, mol, is derived " meal;" the word appears in other Teutonic languages, cf. Du. molen, Ger. muhle)
• MILL, JAMES (1773-1836)
• MILL, JOHN (c. 1645–1707)
• MILL, JOHN STUART (1806-1873)

Mill's words, " to accept the See also:

• PARADOX (Gr. treat, beyond, contrary to, Sofia, opinion)

paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series " ? 4 Or (2) shall we say that the several parts of the series are mutually phenomenal, much as A may look at B, who was just now looking at A ? Or (3) finally, shall we say that a large part of the so-called series, in fact every term but one, is phenomenal for the See also:

• REST (O. Eng. rest, reste, bed, cognate with other Teutonic forms, e.g. Ger. Rast, Riiste, rest, and probably Gothic Rasta, league, i.e. resting or stopping place)

rest—for that one ? As to the first, paradox is too mild a word for it; even See also:

• CONTRADICTION, PRINCIPLE OF (principium contradictionis)

contradiction will hardly suffice . It is as impossible to express " being aware of " by one term as it is to express an See also:

• EQUATION (from Lat. aequatio, aequare, to equalize)

equation or any other relation by one term: what knows can no more be identical with what is known than a See also:

• WEIGHT

weight with w at it weighs . If a series of feelings is what is known or presented, then what knows, what it is presented to, cannot be that series of feelings, and this without regard to the point Mill mentions, viz. that the infinitely greater part of the series is either past or future . The question is not in the first instance one of time or substance at all, but simply turns upon the fact that knowledge or consciousness is unmeaning except as it implies some-thing knowing or conscious of something But it may be replied: Granted that the See also:

• FORMULA
• FORMULA (Lat. diminutive of forma, shape, pattern, &c., especially used of rules of judicial procedure)

formula for consciousness is something doing some-thing, to put it generally; still, if the two somethings are the same when I See also:

• TOUCH (derived through Fr. toucher from a common Teutonic and Indo-Germanic root, cf. " tug," " tuck," O. H. Ger. zucchen, to twitch or draw)

touch myself or when I see myself, why may not See also:

• AGENT (from Lat. agere, to act)

agent and patient be the same when the action is knowing or being aware of ; why may I not know myself—in fact, do I not know myself ? Certainly not; agent and patient never are the same in the same See also:

• ACT (Lat. actus, actum)

act; such terms as self-caused, self-moved, self-known, et id genus omne, either connote the incomprehensible or are abbreviated expressions —as, e.g. touching oneself when one's right hand touches one's See also:

• LEFT

left .

And so we come to the alternative: As one hand washes the other, may not different members of the series of feelings be subject and object in turn ? Compare, for example, the state of mind of a man succumbing to temptation (as he pictures himself enjoying the coveted good and impatiently repudiates scruples of See also:

• CONSCIENCE (Lat. con-scientia, literally " knowledge of a thing shared with another person " or " complete knowledge," and derivatively " consciousness in general)
• CONSCIENCE, HENDRIK (1812-1883)

conscience or dictates of prudence) with his state when, filled with remorse, he sides with conscience and condemns this " former self "—the " better self " having meanwhile become supreme . Here the cluster of presentations and their associated sentiments and motives, which together played the role of self in the first situation, have—only momentarily it may be true, but still have—for the time the place of not-self ; and under abnormal circumstances this partial See also:

• ALTERNATION (from Lat. alternare, to do by turns)

alternation may become See also:

• COMPLETE

complete See also:

• ALIENATION (from Lat. alienus, belonging to another)

alienation, as in what is called " See also:

• DOUBLE
• DOUBLE (from the Mid. Eng. duble, the form which gives the present pronunciation, through the Old Er. duble, from Lat. duplus, twice as much)

double consciousness." Or again, the development of self-consciousness might be loosely described as taking the subject or self of one See also:

• STAGE (Fr. 6/age; from Lat. stare, to stand)

stage as an object in the next—self being, e.g. first identified with the body and afterwards distinguished from it . But all this, however true, is beside the mark; and it is really a very serious misnomer to speak, as e.g . See also:

• HERBERT (FAMILY)
• HERBERT, GEORGE (1593-1633)
• HERBERT, HENRY WILLIAM
• HERBERT, SIR THOMAS (1606-1682)

Herbert See also:

• SPENCER
• SPENCER, HERBERT (1820-1903)
• SPENCER, JOHN CHARLES SPENCER, 3RD EARL (1782-1845)
• SPENCER, JOHNPOYNTZ SPENCER
• SPENCER, WILLIAM ROBERT (1769-1834)

Spencer does, of the development of self-consciousness as a " differentiation of subject and object." It is, if anything, a differentiation of object and object, i.e. in plainer words, it is a differentiation among presentations—a differentiation every step of which implies just that relation to a subject which it is supposed to supersede . There still remains the alternative, expressed in the words of J . S . Mill, viz . " the alternative of believing that the Mind or Ego is some-thing different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them." To admit this, of course, is to admit the See also:

• NECESSITY (Lat. necessitas)

necessity of distinguishing between Mind or Ego, meaning the unity or continuity of consciousness as a complex of presentations, and Mind or Ego as the subject to which this complex is presented . In dealing with the body from the ordinary biological standpoint no such necessity arises . But, whereas there the individual organism is spoken of unequivocally, in psychology, on the other hand, the individual mind may mean either (i.) the series of feelings or " mental phenomena' above referred to; or (ii.) the subject of these feelings for whom they are phenomena; or (iii.) the subject of these feelings or phenomena plus the series of feelings or phenomena themselves, the two being in that relation to each other in which alone the one is subject and the other a series of feelings, phenomena or objects . It is in this last sense that Mind is used in empirical psychology.5 Its exclusive use in the first sense is favoured only by those who shrink from the speculative associations connected with its exclusive use in the 4 T .

H.'Huxley, Hume, " See also:

• ENGLISH

English Men of Letters Series," (1879), p . 171 . 3 Huxley, op. cit. p . 172 . 4 Examination of See also:

• SIR

Sir W . Hamilton's Philosophy, ch. xii. fin . 5 A meaning better expressed, as said above, by experience . Subject or Ego . second . But psychology is not called upon to transcend the relation of subject to object or, as we may call it, the fact of presentation . On the other hand, as has been said, the attempt to ignore one term of the relation is hopeless; and equally hopeless, even futile, is the attempt, by means of phrases such as consciousness or the unity of consciousness, to dispense with the recognition of a conscious subject . 5 .

We might now proceed to inquire more closely into the character and relations of the three invariable constituents of Feeling. psychical life which are broadly distinguished as cognitions, feelings and conations . But we should be at once confronted by a doctrine which, strictly taken, amounts almost to a denial of this tripartite See also:

• CLASSIFICATION (Lat. classis, a class, probably from the root cal-, cla-, as in Gr. icaMce, clamor)

classification of the facts of mind—the doctrine, viz. that feeling alone is primordial and invariably present wherever there is consciousness at all . Every living creature, it is said, feels, though it may never do any more; only the higher animals, and these only after a time, learn to discriminate and identify and to act with a purpose . This doctrine, as might be expected, derives its plausibility partly from the vagueness of psychological terminology, and partly from the intimate connexion that undoubtedly exists between feeling and See also:

• COGNITION (Latin cognitio, from cognoscere, to become acquainted with)

cognition on the one hand and feeling and volition on the other . As to the meaning of the term, it is plain that further See also:

• DEFINITION (Lat. definitio, from de-finire, to set limits to, describe)

definition is requisite for a word that may mean (a) a touch, as feeling of roughness; (b) an organic sensation, as feeling of See also:

• HUNGER

hunger; (c) an emotion, as feeling of anger; (d) feeling proper, as See also:

• PLEASURE (through Fr. plaisir from Lat. placere, to please; Gr. rlbovii)

pleasure or See also:

• PAIN (from Lat. poena, Gr. robin, penalty, that which must be paid: O. Fr. peine)
• PAIN, BARRY (1867– )

pain . But, even taking feeling in the last, its stricter sense, it has been maintained that all the more complex forms of consciousness are resolvable into, or at least have been See also:

• DEVELOPED

developed from, feelings of pleasure and pain . The only See also:

• PROOF (in M. Eng. preove, proeve, preve, &°c., from O. Fr . prueve, proeve, &c., mod. preuve, Late. Lat. proba, probate, to prove, to test the goodness of anything, probus, good)

proof of such position. since we cannot directly observe the beginnings of conscious life, must consist of considerations such as the following . So far as we can judge, we find feeling everywhere; but, as we work downwards from higher to lower forms of life, the possible variety and the definiteness of sense-impressions both steadily diminish . Moreover, we can directly observe in our own organic sensations, which seem to come nearest to the whole content of See also:

• PRIMITIVE

primitive or infantile experience, an almost entire See also:

• ABSENCE (Lat. absentia)

absence of any assignable quale . Finally, in our sense-experience generally, we find the See also:

• ELEMENT (Lat. elementum)

element of feeling at a maximum in the lower senses and the cognitive element at a maximum in the higher . But the so-called intellectual senses are the most used, and use (we know) blunts feeling and favours intellection, as we see in chemists, who sort the most filthy mixtures by smell and taste without discomfort . If, then, feeling predominates more and more as we approach the beginning of conscious life, may we not conclude that it is its only essential constituent ?

On the contrary, such a conclusion would be rash in the extreme . Two lines, e.g. may get nearer and nearer and yet will never meet, if the rate of approach is simply proportional to the distance . A triangle may be diminished indefinitely, and yet we cannot infer that it becomes eventually all angles, though the angles get no less and the sides do . Before, then, we decide whether pleasure or pain alone can ever constitute a complete experience, it may be well to inquire into the connexion between feeling and cognition, on the one hand, and between feeling and See also:

• CONATION (from Lat. conari, to attempt, strive)

conation on the other, so far as we can now observe . And this is an inquiry which will help us towards an answer to our main question, namely, that concerning the nature and connexions of what are commonly regarded as the three ultimate facts of mind . Broadly speaking, in any state of mind that we can directly observe, what we find is (r) that we are aware of a certain change Relation of in our sensations, thoughts or circumstances, (2) Feeling to that we are pleased or pained with the change, and Cognition Coaa- (3) that we act accordingly . We never find that and tion. feeling directly alters- i.e. without the intervention of the action of which it prompts—either our sensations or situation, but that regularly these latter with remarkable promptness and certainty alter it . We have not first a change of feeling, an