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REASON ( See also: process of See also: drawing logical inferences
.
Thus we speak of See also: man as essentially a rational animal, it being implied that man differs from all other animals in that he can consciously draw inferences from premises
.
It is, however, exceedingly difficult in this respect to draw an absolute distinction between men and animals, observation of which undoubtedly suggests that the latter have a certain power of making inferences
.
Between the higher animals and the See also: lower types of mankind the distinction is so hard to draw that many psychologists argue that the difference is one of degree rather than of kind (see also See also: INSTINCT)
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There can be little doubt, however, that inference by man differs from that of the brute creation in respect of self-consciousness, and, though there can be no doubt that some animals dream, it is difficult to find evidence for the presence of ideal images in the minds of
any but the highest animals
.
In the nature of the See also: case satisfactory conclusions as to the rationality which may be predicated of animals are impossible
.
The See also: term " reason " is also used in several narrower senses
.
Thus reason is opposed to sensation, perception, feeling, See also: desire, as the faculty (the existence of which is denied by empiricists) by which fundamental truths are intuitively apprehended
.
These fundamental truths are the causes or " reasons " (apXai) of all derivative facts
.
With See also: Kant, reason (Vernunft) is the power of synthesizing into unity, by means of comprehensive principles, the concepts provided by the intellect (Verstand)
.
The reason which gives a priori principles Kant calls " Pure Reason " (cf. the Kritik der reinen Vernunft), as distinguished from the " See also: Practical Reason " (praktische Vernunft) which is specially concerned with the performance of particular actions
.
In formal logic the drawing of inferences (frequently called " ratiocination," from See also: Lat. ratiocinari, to use the reasoning faculty) is classified from See also: Aristotle downwards as deductive (from generals to particulars) and inductive (from particulars to generals); see LOGIC, INDUCTION, SYLLOGISM
.
In See also: theology, reason, as distinguished from faith, is the human intelligence exercised upon religious truth whether by way of See also: discovery or by way of explanation
.
The limits within which the reason may be used have been laid down differently in different churches and periods of thought: on the whole, See also: modern See also: Christianity, especially in the See also: Protestant churches, tends to allow to reason a wide See also: field, reserving, however, as the sphere of faith the ultimate (supernatural) truths of theology
.
The
See also: Greek words for reason are vows and X yos, both vaguely used
.
In Aristotle the Xiyos of a thing is its definition, including its formal cause, while the ultimate principles of a science are apXai, the " reasons " (in a See also: common modern sense) which explain all its particular facts.' Novs in See also: Plato and Aristotle is used both widely for all the meanings which " reason " can have, and strictly for the faculty which apprehends intuitively
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Thus, in the Republic, vows is the faculty which apprehends necessary truth, while See also: Sofa (opinion) is concerned with phenomena
.
For the Stoic and Neoplatonic uses of Abyss, as also for those of See also: Philo Judaeus and the Fathers, see Locos
.
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