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STRATEGY
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STRATEGY
, a See also:term literally meaning " the See also:art of the See also:leader or See also:general ",(Gr. oerparrtyos)
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In the strict sense the word " strategy " was originally introduced into See also:European military literature about the opening of the 18th See also:century, when the practice of warfare had settled down into an established routine, and the need of some term arose which should See also:express that See also:peculiar quality of a general's mind which rendered victory the almost certain consequence of his See also:appearance in the See also:
To defeat an enemy it was first necessary to See also: The stores for attack were also heavy and difficult to convey, hence roads developed in-creased importance, and troops had to be abstracted from the fighting force to protect them . Thus again a limit of striking radius was fixed for the invader, and in proportion as the dimensions of the invaded country exceeded•this radius, and its See also:people made the requisite sacrifices to maintain their fortifications in order, the continued existence and growth of the smaller country was assured . Broadly, this See also:equilibrium of forces remained for generations; the smallest states were eaten up, the larger ones continued to exist See also:side by side with far more powerful enemies, but only on See also:condition of their readiness to make the requisite sacrifice of their See also:personal See also:liberty and the See also:property of their constituent See also:units . Then came the introduction of See also:gunpowder and of siege See also:artillery, and a fresh readaptation of conditions, which culminated in the See also:Netherlands during the 17th century and forms the starting-point of all See also:modern practice . Essentially the change consisted in this, viz. that in spite of the superiority of the See also:cannon-See also:ball to the battering-See also:ram, yet to attack a See also:wall effectively many guns had to be employed, and while the duration of the siege was enormously shortened, a far greater See also:strain was thrown on the See also:line of supply, for not only did guns weigh as much as their predecessors but they could expend their own See also:weight of See also:ammunition in a See also:day . Hence the importance of See also:good roads became enhanced and correspondingly the incentive to attack the fortresses which guarded them . In comparison to the See also:money devoted to modern armies, the sums sunk on passive defences during the 16th and 17th centuries were See also:colossal, but they could not keep See also:pace with the progress of the attack, and once more fresh readjustment of means to end became necessary . The obvious course was to carry the war into the enemy's country from the outset, but since this transferred the See also:burden of the siege upon the aggressor, the latter was compelled to develop the See also:standing See also:mercenary See also:army, as feudal levies could not keep the field See also:long enough to reduce a fortress . Mercenary armies, however, were difficult to keep together . They had to be tactfully commanded to ensure contentment, and allowed to maintain social order amongst themselves, and the prospect of See also:loot while on active service had to be held out to them . The See also:sack of a See also:city became thus the See also:absolute and undeniable right of the soldiers . If in this or any other way their employer See also:broke his See also:contract, individuals promptly deserted to the other side . But this right of sack led to a recrudescence of the spirit of resistance in the fortresses (War of Dutch See also:Independence and See also:Thirty Years' War), and hence to a reaction in favour of greater humanity in warfare . But this was only obtained by the concession of a higher scale of pay and comfort to the men, which again threw an increased strain upon the communications, and also upon the treasure See also:chest of their employer . The growth of the mercenary See also:system, and the facility with which such men could and did change their See also:allegiance, led very rapidly to almost See also:complete uniformity in the See also:composition, training and See also:tactical methods of all armies . Every one knew in advance the degree of effort his adversary proposed to put submitted his idea to the best-known generals of his day and asked them to See also:tender for its execution . The king, on his side, generally agreed to find the bulk of the labour—his standing army, reinforced by auxiliaries to any desired extent—and as in the case of a modern government contract, the lowest tender was almost invariably accepted, with a pious exhortation to the successful competitor to spare his employer's troops- to the best of his ability . Thus the opposing generals took the field, each equally fettered by the conditions of his tender . But two such armies; alike in almost every respect, were far too closely matched to be able easily to gain a decision in the open field . Once they were committed, to a See also:battle it was impossible to See also:separate them until sheer See also:physical . exhaustion Out a stop to the slaughter, and these highly trained men were difficult and expensive to replace . Naturally, then, the generals sought to destroy the existing equilibrium by other means . Primarily they took to strong entrenchments, but the See also:building of these being a See also:matter of tithe, the communications grew in importance and attempts against them became more serious . One side or the other, consequently, to See also:cover its communications, so extended its front that at length lines stretched right across whole frontiers till their flanks rested on the See also:sea, or on some great fortress or neutral territory . The two armies would then See also:face one another for months, each exhausting every See also:device to induce the other to concentrate on one See also:part of his front whilst an See also:attempt was made by a rapid move to carry a relatively unguarded point elsewhere, e.g . See also:Marlborough's surprise of the Ne plus ultra lines (see See also:SPANISH See also:SUCCESSION) . During such periods of immobility the works grew to the solidity of permanent fortifications, with wide and deep ditches, and with every obstacle known'to See also:engineers, whilst to render them defensible by the minimum number of muskets, they were laid out so as to See also:cross their fire over and over again opposite every weak point in tlibir tracing . No amount of battering could alter their general trace, and so they remained defensible as long as their garrisons could be trusted to line the parapets at all . This See also:state of things must have continued until progress in artillery had evolved a weapon with sufficient accuracy and See also:shell power to drive the defenders from their parapets and keep them away till the last moment preceding See also:assault, had not fresh factors evolved themselves from causes at See also:work under totally different topographical limitations and conditions . - First amongst these comes the See also:accession to the See also:throne of See also:Prussia of a king who was commander-in-chief of his own army, and as such responsible to no one for the use he See also:chose to make of it . This would really remove him at once from the See also:category of strategists in the restricted sense in which the term is now employed, but since no - convenient word exists to define the action of a ruler playing the See also:double part of soldier and See also:governor, it is convenient both in his case and in that of Napoleon to use the expression to cover the wider See also:sphere . The permanence of the association between king and army enabled See also:Frederick the Great to See also:train his men specifically for the work he intended them to perform . Realizing to the full the value of the See also:foundation laid by his See also:father in developing to its utmost the fire power of the See also:infantry, he devoted special attention to imparting to them a skill and rapidity in manoeuvre which ensured that in the open field his generals would always be able to See also:place the muskets at their disposal in the best positions relatively to the enemy; and his See also:cavalry were trained to such a See also:pitch of mobility and precision in See also:drill that they could be relied on to arrive at the appointed time and place to reap the fruits which the infantry fire had sown . To these startling innovations the Austrians had no new ideas to oppose . The old school, the survival of the fittest in the special theatre df its growth, i.e. the Netherlands and the See also:Rhine, could not See also:deal with the complete change in topographic surroundings—the far wider See also:area of operations, the See also:comparative scarcity of fortresses and the general practicability of the country for the See also:movement of troops—not trains—off the roads . Frederick, relying absolutely on the See also:intrinsic superiority of his army, knew that if he could catch his enemy in the open victory was a foregone conclusion . If the enemy, in accordance with precedent, fortified a position, a See also:threat to his communications would force him to come out on See also:pain of being surrounded (See also:Pirna 1756, See also:Prague 1757) . He followed this principle (see SEVEN YEARS' WAR) until the accession, first of See also:France and the See also:South See also:German states, and afterwards of See also:Russia, to the See also:list of his enemies compelled him to give one enemy time to prepare a position whilst he was engaged against another . Before deliberately prepared positions his men were shot down in thousands, as they would have been in the Netherlands, and at length he was compelled, for want of an adequate artillery, to adopt the same See also:procedure as his adversary . Thus the war ultimately came to an end by a See also:process of mutual exhaustion . But it had brought out conspicuously the value of highly disciplined soldiery, and a fresh fetter was prepared for those on whom, after Frederick's See also:death, the responsibility of command was to fall, and practically all See also:Europe went back to the warfare by contract of the previous See also:generation . Meanwhile in France events were at work preparing the See also:instrument Napoleon was destined to wield . Contrary to the prevailing See also:opinion amongst modern historians, it is the fact that at no time in history was the art of war, and of all things appertaining to it, more closely studied than during the last years of the old royal army of France . See also:Gribeauval paved the way for the creation of the artillery destined to win for Napoleon his greatest victories, and authors and generals such as the See also:prince de Ligne (q.v.), the duc de See also:Broglie, See also:Guibert (q.v.), Bosroger, du Tell and many others, pointed out clearly the line reform must take if the existing deadlock between attack and defence was to be removed; but none could suggest the first practical steps to apply, because the existing conditions were too closely interwoven and consolidated . In fact reform was impossible until the See also:dissolution of society itself gave its ultimate particles freedom to combine in more suitable formations . Broadly, however, all were agreed that the protracted and indecisive operations of former See also:wars were economically disastrous . A crushing and decisive victory was the aim for which all should strive; as a first step towards this object decentralization of command was essential, for freedom of manoeuvre, the only See also:answer to Frederician methods, was impossible without it . This led to the idea of the permanently organized See also:division of all arms; and events had reached this point when the See also:deluge of the See also:French Revolution overwhelmed them, and in face of a See also:coalition of all Europe it became necessary to build up a new army from the very foundations . The steps by which it was sought to provide the men are dealt with in the See also:article See also:CONSCRIPTION; it is only necessary to point out here that it was not till 1799 that the See also:laws became sufficiently defined to ensure a See also:regular See also:annual increment of recruits, and it was this regularity of supply, and not the fact that compulsion was needed to enforce it, which rendered expedient the complete revolution in warfare which Napoleon was destined to effect . Until this reform was complete the revolutionary commanders were compelled to make war as best they could under pressure of the See also:law of self-preservation, with the consequence that the whole army became habituated to the fact that orders in the field had to be obeyed at any sacrifice of See also:life and comfort, and that neither See also:hunger nor want of shoes, even of muskets, could be accepted as an excuse for hesitation to advance and to fight . Threatened on all sides, France was at first compelled to guard every See also:avenue of approach by small separate forces taking their instructions only from a central authority in See also:Paris, and thus the " division," a See also:mobile force of all arms, which the earlier reformers had demanded, came spontaneously into existence to meet the requirements of the moment, and, thrown on its own resources, developed the See also:brain and See also:nervous system, i.e. the See also:staff, necessary to co-See also:ordinate the action of its limbs . The next step in evolution came from the obvious See also:advantage which must arise if these units, though starting from different bases, operated towards the attainment of a See also:common purpose . The realization of this ideal, the starting-point of modern strategy, was the creation of See also:Carnot, whose ideas, though far inadvance both of contemporary opinion and of the technical means of execution then available (especially in the matter of imperfect means of telegraphy), formed a necessary step in the preparation of the machinery Napoleon was to inherit . These, therefore, were the materials placed at his disposal when he began to practise the art of the leader: (I) a practically inexhaustible supply of men (the law in fact was not passed till two years later, but the idea was sufficiently evident); (2) divisional units and commanders, trained to unhesitating obedience to field orders, and accustomed to solve the problems presented to them in their own way, without guidance from See also:superior authority; (3) the idea of co-operation between separate columns for a common purpose; and (4) a tradition that the word "impossible" did not exist for French soldiers . The equipment of the See also:allies started from very different foundations . To them the individual soldier was a valuable See also:possession, representing an investment of See also:capital generally estimated at £200 See also:cash (as great a strain on the See also:exchequer then as £2,000 would be to-day) ; and not only was he exposed to the See also:risk of death in action, but he might See also:die of disease or exhaustion on the march, and could always See also:desert if he felt discontented . Moreover, the last campaigns of the Seven Years' War seemed altogether to justify methods of evasion and " strong positions." Frederick the Great; beginning with the most audacious offensive, had ended by copying the caution of his antagonists, and each side had learnt to See also:gauge the fighting value of a single See also:battalion so accurately that to move a force, recognized by both as adequate for its purpose, into a threatening position, sufficed of itself to induce the adversary to accept the situation thus created . Since the value of a fortified position depended largely on the ground, the cult of topography became a See also:mania, and (as See also:Clausewitz puts it) the See also:world lost itself in debating whether " the battalion defended the See also:mountain or the mountain defended the battalion." The care for the comfort of the private soldier was pushed to such a degree that commanders would not See also:report their units See also:fit for action until complete to the last gaiter See also:button and provided in advance with the regulation scale of rations for a fixed number of days . Over-centralization continued; though the expressions " divisions " and " See also:corps " were already known, the idea these words now convey had not yet even come into existence . Though a certain number of units might be assigned to a subordinate commander, they still received all orders, except on the battlefield, from the central authority, and were, moreover, considered interchangeable . There was no personal See also:bond between them and their general . To what lengths this system was pushed, and the consequences which flowed from it, may best be gauged from the fact that in 18o5 Mack, when See also:writing his defence for his failure at See also:Ulm (see NAPOLEONIC CAMPAIGNS), thought it quite natural to explain the delay in his movements on the day of See also:Elchingen by the fact that when See also:news of the French attack was received he was busy writing out the orders for the following day, which occupied fourteen pages of See also:foolscap and " did not contain one superfluous word." Further, the idea prevailed in See also:middle Europe that war was a matter concerning the contending governments in which the See also:ordinary See also:citizen had no See also:interest whatever . It was true that the result of a war might See also:transfer his allegiance from one See also:crown to another, but this was scarcely more to the people than a change of landlords . Consequently they took little if any interest in the progress of a war, and on the whole were most inclined to help the army which most respected their private property and was willing to pay highest for its See also:accommodation while billeted in their towns and villages . Since the See also:goodwill of inhabitants is always valuable, commanders vied with one another in their efforts to See also:purchase it, and respect for private property and rights reached an unprecedented level . Thus, during the whole of the campaign of the Netherlands in 1793 the Austrians paid hire to the owners of the See also:fields in which they camped; and when on one occasion See also:payment for lodgings hired for the wounded was in arrear, the wretched men were flung out on. the streets . Yet another, and in a way more remarkable, See also:illustration of this tendency occurred at the See also:capture of See also:Mainz by the French (1794) . A strong armed party of Austrians, endeavouring to See also:escape across the Rhine to Kastel, were refused the use of the See also:ferry boats until the regular payment was made, and actually laid down their arms to the enemy'rather than break the law and seize the boats . The cumulative See also:influence of all these forces of retardation is easily followed . To avoid the cost of innumerable See also:petty cash transactions with the inhabitants the troops were compelled to have recourse to the See also:magazine system, which in turn tied them absolutely to the See also:main roads; and the roads being numerous the army had to be broken up into small detachments to guard them . Thus the so-called " See also:cordon " system grew out of its surroundings in a perfectly natural way, and was not due to the imbecility of the generals who employed it, but to the restraints placed upon them by See also:custom and public feeling . Nothing more fortunate for the French could be imagined . Destitute of all the See also:paraphernalia hitherto considered necessary, and compelled to fight at any cost in order to live, they found in these accumulated magazines and moving convoys the best possible bait to attract their starving men; relieved of all impedimenta, they could move freely through forests and marshes generally considered impracticable; and since from the magnitude of front covered, and the relatively small number of troops available, the allies could not oppose an unbroken front to their raids, they could swarm around the flanks of the positions and thus compel their evacuation . This struggle to safeguard or turn the flanks of positions led, as before in Marlborough's time and in our own day in See also:Manchuria and South See also:Africa, to a competition in See also:extension, and at Napoleon's See also:advent it was common to find armies of 20,000 to 30,000 men fighting desultory actions over a front of 20 to 30 M . This over-extension gave him his first opportunity, when the fire and See also:energy he threw into his work, and the reckless disregard of human life he immediately displayed, stamped him at once as a See also:born leader of men, and laid the foundation of that confidence in his guidance on the part of his troops which to the last proved his truest See also:talisman of victory . For the details of Napoleon's evolution the reader is referred to the articles FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WARS and NAPOLEONIC CAMPAIGNS, and here it will suffice to point out the leading characteristics of those campaigns . Having swept the Austrians out of See also:Sardinia, he turned against them in eastern See also:Lombardy, and by a See also:series of outflanking attacks threw them back into the See also:Alps, defeating all their attempts to break out again by what is now known as a " series of operations on interior lines." All these were successful, not because of the See also:form the operations took, but because the enormous increment of mobility he man-aged to impart to his men deprived his adversary of all accepted data by which to time his own combinations . It cannot with See also:justice be said that the French won because they fought harder; but the rapid sequence of success confirmed both leader and men in a conviction of their combined superiority which led Napoleon in 'Soo to the very brink of disaster . In 1796 through-out he was acting fairly in accordance with the teaching he had imbibed from his studies; in 1800 he appears as if seeking to determine how many of the established rules he could afford to neglect . We find him advancing to meet his adversary on a widely extended front without even exploring the country to learn where or in what strength that adversary stood . In 1805 this See also:mistake is not repeated; a cavalry See also:screen covers his advance, and his orders are based on the intelligence it transmits . But this precaution also proves insufficient . Cavalry can only see, they cannot hold; and only a See also:combination of circumstances which he could not by any possibility have foreseen prevents his enemy from evading the See also:blow at the last moment . What the position of the French would have been had Mack carried out his intention of leaving Ulm and destroying all his See also:accumulation of supplies can only be imagined . But contemporary See also:evidence proves beyond doubt that Napoleon had already tr'ed the endurance of his men to the utmost . In 18o6 the mistake of See also:sole reliance on a cavalry screen is no longer repeated . The cavalry now is backed by a strong advanced guard, one See also:quarter of the whole army, followingbehind it at See also:short distance; and the whole command is now disposed in such a manner that no matter in what direction the enemy may appear it can concentrate in See also:forty-eight See also:hours to meet him . It is another form of the idea, prominent in See also:British campaigns in the See also:Sudan, of the advance in squares through the desert against a mobile enemy, the difference being that Napoleon's great "bataillon carree" has the advantage of mobility over its adversary . Concentration within forty-eight hours, however, would in itself be worse than useless unless the enemy stood fast to receive the intended See also:shock; and it was the special object of the strong advanced See also:guards or flank detachments to secure that he should do so . This could only be attained by a resolute offensive; no See also:mere feeling the enemy's position would suffice to compel him. to stand, and might even frighten him into See also:retreat . Hence the task devolving upon the troops thus selected was essentially distinct from that usually connected with the idea of an advanced or flank guard, and involved the conception of purchasing with their lives and by the vigour of their action the time necessary for the rest of the army to deliver a decisive blow . This is the true meaning of Napoleon's See also:maxim: On we manoeuvre qu'autour d'un point fixe, a phrase which has been much misunderstood . The troops first engaged See also:fix the enemy by the vigour of their attack, and thus constitute a See also:pivot about which the See also:remainder can manoeuvre . Hitherto, however, the French armies had been operating in a country in which roughly one square mile of area would feed one thousand men for two days . Their freedom from convoys and other impedimenta enabled them to sweep out an area sufficient for their needs from day to day . But events now led them into a region in which this relation between the day's march and their subsistence no longer obtained . The See also:emperor in fact had formed no conception of the readlessness and poverty of See also:Poland and See also:East . Prussia . His men, no longer able to pick up their day's food by a day's march, rapidly fell off in condition and discipline (for short See also:commons with the French always en-tailed marauding) . As men and horses lost in condition the day's march dwindled further, with the result that heavier demands were made on the supply columns; and these being improvised and entrusted to an untrained personnel, the sufferings of the troops became unendurable, while the mobility of the French army sank below that of the enemy . Under these conditions the system of the advanced guard could no longer be trusted to work . Moreover the Russians, though deficient in the dash necessary to win victories in attack, have always taken longer to defeat than any other See also:continental troops, and in the short See also:winter days of the first See also:half of the See also:Polish campaign the emperor had no longer time to See also:beat them into dissolution . The Russians would fight all day and retreat |