See also:

• TORT (Fr. for wrong, from Lat. tortus, twisted, participle of torquere)

TORT (Fr. for wrong, from See also:

• LAT

Lat. tortus, See also:

• TWISTED

twisted, participle of torquere)  , the technical See also:

• TERM

term, in the See also:

• LAW
• LAW (0. Eng. lagu, M. Eng. lawe; from an old Teutonic root lag, " lie," what lies fixed or evenly; cf. Lat. lex, Fr. loi)
• LAW, JOHN (1671—1729)
• LAW, WILLIAM (1686-1761)

law of See also:

• ENGLAND
• ENGLAND, THE CHURCH OF

England, of those dominions and possessions of the See also:

• BRITISH

British See also:

• EMPIRE

Empire where the See also:

• COMMON

common law has been received or practically adopted in See also:

• CIVIL

civil affairs, and of the See also:

• UNITED

United States, for a civil wrong, i.e. the See also:

• BREACH (Mid. Eng. breche, derived from the common Teutonic root brec, which appears in " break," Ger. brechen, &c.)

breach of a See also:

• DUTY (from " due," that which is owing, O. Fr. deu, dil, past participle of devoir; Lat. debere, debitum; cf. " debt ")

duty imposed by law, by which breach some See also:

• PERSON, OFFENCES AGAINST THE

person becomes entitled to See also:

• SUE, EUGENE [JosEPH MARIE] (1804—1857)

sue for See also:

• DAMAGES (through O. Fr. damage, mod. Fr. dommage, from Lat. damnum, loss)

damages . A See also:

• TORT (Fr. for wrong, from Lat. tortus, twisted, participle of torquere)

tort must, on theone See also:

• HAND
• HAND (a word common to Teutonic languages; cf. Ger. Hand, Goth. handus)
• HAND, FERDINAND GOTTHELF (1786-185r)

hand, be an See also:

• ACT (Lat. actus, actum)

act which violates a See also:

• GENERAL
• GENERAL (Lat. generalis, of or relating to a genus, kind or class)

general duty . The See also:

• RULE

rule which it breaks must be one made by the law, not, as in the See also:

• CASE
• CASE, JOHN (d. 1600)

case of a See also:

• MERE
• MERE, ADALBERT (1838-1909)

mere breach of See also:

• CONTRACT
• CONTRACT (Lat. contract us, from contrahere, to draw together, to bind)

contract, a rule which the law protects because the parties have made it for themselves . On the other hand, a tort is essentially the source of a private right of See also:

• ACTION

action . An offence which is punishable, but for which no one can bring a civil action, is not a tort . It is quite possible for one and the same act to be a tort and a breach of contract, or a tort and a See also:

• CRIME (Lat. crimen, accusation)

crime; it is even possible in one class of cases for the See also:

• PLAINTIFF

plaintiff to have the See also:

• OPTION (Lat. optio, choice, choosing, optare, to choose)

option—for purposes of procedural See also:

• ADVANTAGE

advantage—of treating a real tort as a fictitious contract; but there is no necessary or general connexion . Again, it is not the case that pecuniary damages are always or necessarily the only remedy for a tort; but the right to bring an action in common law See also:

• JURISDICTION
• JURISDICTION, CRIMINAL LAW, DIVORCE

jurisdiction, as distinct from See also:

• EQUITY (Lat. aequitas)

equity, matrimonial or See also:

• ADMIRALTY, HIGH COURT OF

admiralty jurisdiction, with the consequent right to damages, is invariably See also:

• PRESENT

present where a tort has been committed . This technical use of the See also:

• FRENCH
• FRENCH, DANIEL CHESTER (1850– )
• FRENCH, NICHOLAS (1604-1678)

French word tort (which at one See also:

• TIME (0. Eng. Lima, cf. Icel. timi, Swed. timme, hour, Dan. time; from the root also seen in " tide," properly the time of between the flow and ebb of the sea, cf. O. Eng. getidan, to happen, " even-tide," &c.; it is not directly related to Lat. tempus)
• TIME, MEASUREMENT OF
• TIME, STANDARD

time was near becoming a synonym of wrong in See also:

• LITERARY

literary See also:

• ENGLISH

English) is not very See also:

• ANCIENT
• ANCIENT (also spelt ANTIENT; derived, through the Fr. ancien, old, from the late Lat. antianum, from ante, before)

ancient, and anything like systematic treatment of the subject as a whole is very See also:

• MODERN

modern . Since about the See also:

• MIDDLE

middle of the 19th See also:

• CENTURY (from Lat. centuria, a division of a hundred men)

century there has been a current See also:

• ASSUMPTION, FEAST OF

assumption that all civil causes of action must be founded on either contract or tort; but there is no See also:

• HISTORICAL

historical See also:

• FOUNDATION (Lat. fundatio, from fundare, to found)

foundation for this See also:

• DOCTRINE

doctrine, though modified forms of the action of trespass—actions in consimili casu, or " on the case " in the accustomed English phrase—did in practice largely supplant other more archaic forms of action by See also:

• REASON (Lat. ratio, through French raison)

reason of their greater convenience . The old forms were designed as penal remedies for See also:

• MANIFEST (Lat. manifestus, clear, open to view)

manifest breach of the See also:

• PEACE
• PEACE, BREACH OF THE

peace or corruption of See also:

• JUSTICE (Lat. justitia)

justice; and traces of the penal See also:

• ELEMENT (Lat. elementum)

element remained in them See also:

• LONG, GEORGE (1800-1879)
• LONG, JOHN DAVIS (1838– )

long after the substance of the See also:

• PROCEDURE (Fr. procedure, from Lat. procedere, to go for-ward)

procedure had become private and merely civil . The transition belongs to the general See also:

• HISTORY

history of English law . In England the general See also:

• SCOPE (through Ital. scopo, aim, purpose, intent, from Gr. o'KOaos, mark to shoot at, aim, o ic07reiv, to see, whence the termination in telescope, microscope, &c.)

scope of the law of torts has never been formulated by authority, the law having in fact been See also:

• DEVELOPED

developed by a See also:

• SERIES (a Latin word from serere, to join)

series of disconnected experiments with the various forms of action which seemed from time to time to promise the widest and most useful remedies .

But there is no doubt that the duties enforced by the English law of torts are broadly those which the See also:

• ROMAN

Roman institutional writers summed up in the See also:

• PRECEPT (Lat. praeceptum, a rule, from praecipere, literally to take beforehand, to give rules, instructions or orders)

precept Alterum non laedere . Every member of a civilized See also:

• COMMONWEALTH

commonwealth is entitled to require of others a certain amount of respect for his person, reputation and See also:

• PROPERTY

property, and a certain amount of care and caution when they go about undertakings attended with See also:

• RISK

risk to their neighbours . Under the modern law, it is submitted, the question arising when one See also:

• MAN
• MAN, ISLE OF (anc. Mona)

man wilfully or recklessly See also:

• HARMS, CLAUS (1778-1855)

harms another is not whether some technical See also:

• FORM (Lat. forma)

form of action can be found in which he is liable, but whether he can justify or excuse himself . This view, at any See also:

• RATE

rate, is countenanced by a See also:

• JUDGMENT

judgment of the Supreme See also:

• COURT
• COURT (from the O. Fr. court, Late Lat. cortis, curtis, a popular form of class. Lat. cohors, gen. cohortis; the mod. Fr. form tour is due to the influence of the Lat. curia, the word used in medieval documents to translate " court " in the feudal sense)
• COURT, ANTOINE (1696-176o)

Court of the United States delivered in 1904 . If it be right, the controverted question whether See also:

• CONSPIRACY (from Lat. conspirare, literally to breathe together, to agree, combine, and especially to form a secret plot)

conspiracy is or is not a substantive cause of action seems to lose most of its importance . Instead of the doubtful proposition of law that some injuries become unlawful only when inflicted by concerted action, we shall have the See also:

• PLAIN (O. Fr. plain, from Lat. plenum)

plain proposition of fact that some kinds of injury cannot, as a rule, be inflicted by one person with such effect as to produce any damage See also:

• WORTH
• WORTH, CHARLES FREDERICK (1825-1895)

worth suing for . The precise amount of responsibility can be determined only by full See also:

• CONSIDERATION (from Lat. considerare, to look at closely, examine, generally taken to be from con-, and the base seen in sidus, sideris, a star, the word being supposed to be originally an astrological or astronomical term)

consideration in each class of cases . It is important to observe, however, that a law of responsibility confined to a man's own See also:

• PERSONAL

personal acts and defaults would be of next to no See also:

• PRACTICAL

practical use under the conditions of modern society . What makes the law of torts really effective, especially with regard to redress for harm suffered by See also:

• NEGLIGENCE (Lat. negligentia, from negligere, to neglect, literally " not to pick up ")

negligence, is the universal rule of law that every one is answerable for the acts and defaults of his servants (that is, all persons acting under his direction and taking their orders from him or some one representing him) in the course of their employment . The person actually in See also:

• FAULT (Mid. Eng. faute, through the French, from the popular Latin use of fallere, to fail; the originallof the Latin being replaced in English in the 15th century)

fault is not the less answerable, but the remedy against him is very commonly not worth pursuing . But for this rule corporations could not be liable for any negligence of their servants, however disastrous to See also:

• INNOCENT (INNOCENTIUS)
• INNOCENT (POPES)

innocent persons, except so far as it might happen to constitute a breach of some See also:

• EXPRESS (through the French from the past participle of the Lat. exprimere, to press out, by transference used of representing objects in painting or sculpture, or of thoughts, &c. in words)

express undertaking . We have spoken of the rule as universal, but, in the case of one servant of the same employer being injured by the See also:

• DEFAULT (Fr. defaut, from defailler, to fail, Lat. fallere)

default of another, an unfortunate See also:

• ABERRATION (Lat. ab, from or away, errare,, to wander)

aberration of the courts, which started about two generations ago from small beginnings, was pushed to extreme results, and led to See also:

• GREAT

great hardship .

A partial remedy was applied in r88o by the Employers' Liability Act; and in 1897 a much bolder step was taken by the Workmen's See also:

• COMPENSATION (from Lat. compensare, to weigh one thing against another)

Compensation Act (superseded by a more comprehensive act in 1906) . But, as the common law and the two acts (which proceed on entirely different principles) See also:

• COVER (from the Fr. convert, from couvrir, to cover, Lat. cooperire)

cover different See also:

• FIELDS, JAMES THOMAS (1817-1881)

fields, with a See also:

• GOOD, JOHN MASON (1764-1827)

good See also:

• DEAL

deal of overlapping, and the acts are full of complicated provisos and exceptions, and contain very See also:

• SPECIAL

special provisions as to procedure, the improvement in substantial justice has been bought, so far, at the See also:

• PRICE
• PRICE, BARTHOLOMEW (1818–1898)
• PRICE, BONAMY (1807-1888)
• PRICE, RICHARD (1723-1791)

price of great confusion in the form of the law, and considerable difficulty in ascertaining what it is in any but the most obvious cases . The Workmen's Compensation Act includes cases of pure See also:

• ACCIDENT
• ACCIDENT (from Lat. accidere, to happen)

accident, where there is no fault at all, or none that can be proved, and therefore goes beyond the reasons of liability with which the law of torts has to do . In fact, it establishes a See also:

• KIND (O. E. ge-cynde, from the same root as is seen in " kin," supra)

kind of compulsory See also:

• INSURANCE

insurance, which can be justified only on wider grounds of policy . A novel and extraordinary exception to the rule of responsibility for agents was made in the case of See also:

• TRADE (O. Eng. trod, footstep, from tredan, to tread; in M. Eng. the forms teed, trod and trade appear, the last in the sense of a beaten track)
• TRADE, BOARD OF

trade combinations by the Trade Disputes Act 1906 . This has no See also:

• INTEREST

interest for law as a See also:

• SCIENCE (Lat. scientia, from scire; to learn, know)

science . There are kinds of cases, on the other hand, in which the law, without aid from legislation, has imposed on occupiers and other persons in analogous positions a duty stricter than that of being answerable for themselves and their servants . Duties of this kind have been called " duties of insuring safety." Gene-rally they extend to having the See also:

• BUILDING

building, structure, or See also:

• WORKS

works in such See also:

• ORDER
• ORDER (through Fr. ordre, for earlier ordene, from Lat. ordo, ordinis, rank, service, arrangement; the ultimate source is generally taken to be the root seen in Lat. oriri, rise, arise, begin; cf. " origin ")
• ORDER, HOLY

order, having regard to the nature of the case, as not to create any danger to persons lawfully frequenting, using, or passing by them, which the exercise of reasonable care and skill could have avoided; but in some cases of " extra-hazardous " risk, even See also:

• PROOF (in M. Eng. preove, proeve, preve, &°c., from O. Fr . prueve, proeve, &c., mod. preuve, Late. Lat. proba, probate, to prove, to test the goodness of anything, probus, good)

proof of all possible See also:

• DILIGENCE

diligence—according to English authority, which is not unanimously accepted in See also:

• AMERICA

America—will not suffice . There has lately been a notable tendency to extend these principles to the duties incurred towards the public by See also:

• LOCAL

local authorities who undertake public works . See also:

• POSITIVE (or PORTABLE) ORGAN

Positive duties created by See also:

• STATUTE

statute are on a similar footing, so far as the breach of them is capable of giving rise to any private right of action . The See also:

• CLASSIFICATION (Lat. classis, a class, probably from the root cal-, cla-, as in Gr. icaMce, clamor)

classification of actionable wrongs is perplexing, not because it is difficult to find a See also:

• SCHEME (Lat. schema, Gr. oxfjya, figure, form, from the root axe, seen in exeiv, to have, hold, to be of such shape, form, &c.)

scheme of See also:

• DIVISION (from Lat. dividere, to break up into parts, separate)

division, but because it is easier to find many than to adhere to any one of them . We may start either from the See also:

• CHARACTER (Gr. xapareri7p, from xap&crew, to scratch)

character of the See also:

• DEFENDANT

defendant's act or omission, with regard to his knowledge, intention and otherwise; or from the character of the harm suffered by the plaintiff .

Whichever of these we take as the See also:

• PRIMARY

primary See also:

• LINE

line of distinction, the results can seldom be worked out without calling in the other . Taking first the defendant's position, the widest governing principle is that, apart from various recognized grounds of See also:

• IMMUNITY (from Lat. immunis, not subject to a munus or public service)

immunity, a man is answerable for the " natural and probable " consequences of his acts; i.e. such consequences as a reasonable man in his See also:

• PLACE (through Fr. from Lat. platea, street; Gr. IrAar6s, wide)

place should have foreseen as probable . Still more is he See also:

• ANSWER (derived from and, against, and the same root as swear)

answer-able for what he did actually foresee and intend . Knowledge of particular facts may be necessary to make particular kinds of conduct wrongful . Such is the rule in the case of See also:

• FRAUD (Lat. fraus, deceit)

fraud and other allied wrongs, including what is rather unhappily called " See also:

• SLANDER

slander of See also:

• TITLE (0. Fr. title, mod. titre, from Lat. titulus)

title," and what is now known as " unfair competition " in the See also:

• MATTER

matter of trade names and descriptions, See also:

• SHORT, FRANCIS JOB (1857– )

short of actual piracy of trade-marks . But where an See also:

• ABSOLUTE (Lat. absolvere, to loose, set free)

absolute right to See also:

• SECURITY (Lat. securus, free from care, safe)

security for a man's person, reputation or goods is interfered with, neither knowledge nor specific intention need be proved . In these cases we trespass altogether at our peril . It is in general the See also:

• HABIT (through the French from Lat. habitus, from habere, to have, hold, or, in a reflective sense, to be in a certain condition; in many of the English senses the French use habitude, not habit)

habit of the law to See also:

• JUDGE (Lat. judex, Fr. juge)

judge acts by their apparent tendency, and not by the actor's feelings or desires .