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WAR (O. Eng. werre, Fr. guerre, of Te...
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See also:WAR (O. Eng. werre, Fr. guerre, of See also:Teutonic origin; cf. O.H.G. werran, to confound) , the armed conflict of states, in which each seeks to impose its will upon the other by force . See also:War is the opposite of See also:Peace (q.v.), and is the subject of the military See also:art . In See also:separate sections below the See also:general principles of the art of war are discussed, and the See also:laws which have gradually become accepted among civilized peoples for the regulation of its conditions . The details concerning the See also:history of individual See also:wars, and the various weapons and See also:instruments of war, are given in separate articles . See See also:ARMY, See also:NAVY, See also:CONSCRIPTION, See also:STRATEGY, See also:TACTICS, See also:INFANTRY, See also:CAVALRY, See also:ARTILLERY, See also:ENGINEERS, FORTIFICATION, See also:COAST DE-FENCE, See also:OFFICERS, See also:STAFF, See also:GUARDS, See also:SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT, See also:UNIFORMS, ARMS AND See also:ARMOUR, See also:GUN, See also:RIFLE, See also:PISTOL, See also:SWORD, See also:LANCE, See also:ORDNANCE, See also:MACHINE GUNS, SUBMARINE MINES, See also:TORPEDO, &C . The important wars are dealt with under the names commonly given to them; e.g . See also:AMERICAN See also:CIVIL WAR, AMERICAN WAR OF See also:INDEPENDENCE, AMERICAN WAR OF 1812, See also:CRIMEAN WAR, DUTCH WARS, FRANCO-See also:GERMAN WAR, See also:FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WARS, See also:GREAT See also:REBELLION, See also:GREEK WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, See also:ITALIAN WARS, See also:NAPOLEONIC See also:CAMPAIGNS, PELOPONNESIAN WAR, See also:PENINSULAR WAR, PUNIC WARS, RUSSO-See also:JAPANESE WAR, RUSSO-See also:TURKISH WARS, SERVO-BULGARIAN WAR, SEVEN See also:WEEKS' WAR, SEVEN YEARS' WAR, See also:SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR, SPANISH See also:SUCCESSION WAR, See also:THIRTY YEARS' WAR . Important campaigns and battles are also separately treated (e.g . See also:WATERLOO, See also:TRAFALGAR, See also:SHENANDOAH VALLEY, See also:WILDERNESS, See also:METZ, &C.) . I . GENERAL PRINCIPLES It is not easy to detertnine whether See also:industrial progress, improved organization, the spread of See also:education or See also:mechanical inventions Modem have wrought the greater See also:change in the military art. conditions . War is first and foremost a See also:matter of See also:movement; and as such it has been considerably affected by the multiplication of See also:good roads, the introduction of See also:steam transport, and by the ease with which See also:draught animals can be collected .
In the second See also:place, war is a matter of supply; and the large See also:area of cultivation, the increase of live-stock, the vast See also:trade in See also:pro-visions, pouring the See also:food-stuffs of one See also:continent into another, have done much to lighten the inevitable difficulties of a See also:campaign
.
In the third place, war is a matter of destruction; and while the weapons of armies have become more perfect and more durable, the See also:modern substitutes for See also:gunpowder have added largely to their destructive capacity
.
Fourthly, war is not merely a See also:blind struggle between mobs of individuals, without guidance or coherence, but a conflict of well-organized masses, moving with a view to intelligent co-operation, acting under the impulse of a single will and directed against a definite See also:objective
.
These masses, however, are seldom so closely concentrated that the impulse which sets them in See also:motion can be promptly and easily communicated to each, nor can the right objective be selected without some knowledge of the enemy's strength and dispositions
.
Means of intercommunication, therefore, as well as methods of observation, are of great importance; and with the See also:telegraph, the See also:telephone, visual signalling, balloons, airships and improved See also:
The See also:idea of See also:forging generals and soldiers under the See also:hammer of war disappeared with the See also:advent of " the nation in arms." Military organization has become a See also:science, studied both by statesmen and soldiers
.
The lessons of history have not been neglected
.
Previous to 187o, in one See also:kingdom only was it recognized that See also:intellect and education See also:play a, more prominent See also:part in war than stamina and courage
.
Taught by the disasters of 1806, See also:Prussia set herself to discover the surest means of escaping humiliation for the future
.
The shrewdest of her sons undertook the task
.
The nature of war was analysed until the secrets of success and failure were laid See also:bare; and on these investigations a See also:system of organization and of training was built up which, not only from a military, but from a See also:political, and even an economical point of view, is the most striking product of the 19th century
.
The keynote of this system is that the best brains in the See also:state shall be at the service of the war See also:lord
.
None, therefore, but thoroughly competent soldiers are entrusted with the responsibility of command; and the education of the officer is as thorough, as systematic and as See also:uniform as the education of the lawyer, the diplomatist and the See also:doctor
.
In all ages the See also:power of intellect has asserted itself in war
.
It was not courage and experience only that made See also:Hannibal, See also: Other wars had shown the value of an educated general; these showed the value of an educated army . It is true that See also:Moltke, in See also:mental power and in knowledge, was in no See also:wise inferior to the great captains who preceded him; but the remarkable point of his campaigns is that so many capable generals had never before been gathered together under one See also:flag . No campaigns have been submitted to such searching See also:criticism . Never have mistakes been more sedulously sought for or more frankly exposed . And yet, compared with the mistakes of other campaigns, even with that of 1815, where hardly a See also:superior officer on either See also:side had not seen more battles than Moltke and his comrades had seen field-days, they were astonishingly few . It is not to be denied that the foes of Prussia were hardly worthy of her See also:steel . Yet it may be doubted whether either See also:Austria or See also:France ever put two finer armies into the field than the army of Bohemia in 1866 and the army of the See also:Rhine in 187o . Even their generals of divisions and brigades had more actual experience than those who led the German army See also:corps . Compared with the German See also:rank and See also:file, a great part of their non-commissioned officers and men were veterans, and veterans who had seen much service . Their See also:chief officers were practically See also:familiar with the methods of moving, supplying and manoeuvring large masses of troops; their marshals were valiant and successful soldiers . And yet the history of modern warfare records no defeats so See also:swift and so See also:complete as those of See also:Koniggratz and See also:Sedan . The great See also:host of Austria was shattered to fragments in seven weeks; the French Imperial army was destroyed in seven weeks and three days; and to all See also:intent and purpose the resistance they had offered was not much more effective than that of a respectable See also:militia . But both the See also:Austrian and the French armies were organized and 'trained under the old system . Courage, experience and professional See also:pride they possessed in abundance . See also:Man for man, in all virile qualities, neither officers nor men were inferior to their foes . But one thing their generals lacked, and that was education for war . Strategy was almost a sealed See also:book to them; organization a matter of secondary importance . It was no part of their See also:duty, they declared, to See also:train the See also:judgment of their subordinates; they were soldiers, and not pedagogues . Know-ledge of See also:foreign armies and their methods they considered useless; and of war prepared and conducted on " business principles " they had never even dreamt . The popular idea that war is a See also:mere matter of See also:brute force, redeemed only by valour and discipline, is responsible for a greater evil than the complacency of the See also:amateur . Statesmen It blinds both the See also:people and its representatives to and war . their bounden duties . War is something more than a mere outgrowth of politics . It is a political See also:act, initiated and controlled by the See also:government, and it is an act of which the issues are far more momentous than any other . No See also:branch of political science requires more careful study . It is not pretended that if military history were thoroughly studied all statesmen would become Moltkes, or that every See also:citizen would be competent to set squadrons in the field . War is above all a See also:practical art, and the application of theory to practice is not to be taught at a university or to be learned by those who have never rubbed shoulders with the men in the ranks . But if war were more generally and more thoroughly studied, the importance of organization, of training, of education and of readiness would be more generally appreciated; abuses would no longer be regarded with lazy tolerance; efficiency would be something more than a political catchword, and soldiers would be given ample opportunities of becoming masters of every detail of their profession . Nor is this all . A nation that understood something about war would hardly suffer the fantastic tricks which have been played so often by the best-meaning statesmen . And statesmen them-selves would realize that when war is afoot their interference is worse than useless; that preparation for See also:defence, whether by the multiplication of roads, the construction of See also:railways, of arsenals, See also:dockyards, fortresses, is not the smallest of their duties; and lastly, that so far as possible See also:diplomacy and strategy should keep step . Each one of these is of far greater importance than in the past . In the wars of the 18th century, See also:English cabinets and Dutch deputies could See also:direct strategical operations without bringing ruin on their respective countries . The armies of Austria in 1792-1795, controlled as they were by the Aulic See also:Councils, were more formidable in the field than those of the French See also:Republic . In the campaigns of 1854 and 1859 the plans of See also:Newcastle and Napoleon III. worked out to a successful issue; and if See also:Lincoln and See also:Stanton, his Secretary of War, imperilled the See also:Union in 1862, they saw the downfall of the See also:Southern Confederacy in 1865 . But in every See also:case amateur was pitted against amateur .
The Dutch deputies were hardly less incapable of planning or approving a See also:sound See also:plan of campaign than See also: If they were numerous, although the enemy may not have been skilful enough to take advantage of them, the outlook for the future under the same direction, but against a more practised enemy, is anything but See also:bright . As regards preparation for defence, history supplies us with numerous illustrations . The most conspicuous, perhaps, is the elaborate See also:series of fortifications which were constructed by See also:Vauban for the defence of France; =Prepaforraand there can be no question that Louis XIV., in defence. erecting this mighty barrier against invasion, gave See also:proof of statesmanlike foresight of no mean See also:order . An instance less familiar, perhaps, but even more creditable to the See also:brain which conceived it, was Wellington's preparation of See also:Portugal in 1809-1811 . Not only did the impregnable stronghold of Torres Vedras, covering See also:Lisbon, and securing for the See also:sea-power an open See also:door to the continent of See also:Europe, rise as if by magic from the See also:earth, but the whole See also:theatre of war was so dealt with that the defending army could operate wherever opportunity might offer . No less than twenty supply depots were established on different lines of the advance . Fortifications protected the See also:principal magazines . See also:Bridges were restored and roads improved . Waterways were opened up, and flotillas organized; and three See also:auxiliary bases were formed on the shores of the See also:Atlantic . Again, the famous " quadrilaterals " of See also:Lombardy and See also:Rumelia have more than fulfilled the purpose for which they were constructed; and both Austria and See also:Turkey owe much to the fortresses which so See also:long protected their vulnerable points . Nor has the neglect of preparation failed to exert" a powerful effect . Moltke has told us that the railway system of See also:Germany before 187o had been See also:developed without regard to strategical considerations . Yet the fact remains that it was far better adapted both for offence and defence than those of Austria and France; and, at the same time, it can hardly be denied that the unprovided state of the great French fortresses exercised an evil influence on French strategy . Both Metz and See also:Strassburg were so far from forming strong pivots of manoeuvres, and thus aiding the operations of the field armies, that they required those armies for their See also:protection; and the See also:retreat on Metz, which removed See also:Bazaine's army from the direct road to See also:Paris and placed it out of See also:touch with its supports, was mainly due to the unfinished outworks and deficient armament of the virgin See also:city . Since 187o it has been recognized that preparation of the theatre of war is one of the first duties of a government . Every frontier of continental Europe is covered by a See also:chain of entrenched camps . The great arsenais are amply fortified and strongly garrisoned . Strategy has as much to say to new railways as trade; and the lines of communication, whether by See also:water or by See also:land, are adequately protected from all hostile enterprises . We now come to the importance of See also:close See also:concert between strategy and diplomacy . On the continent of Europe they can easily keep See also:pace, for the theatre of war is always within easy reach . But when the ocean intervenes between two hostile states it is undoubtedly difficult to time an See also:ultimatum so that a sufficient armed force shall be at hand to enforce it, and it has been said in high places that it is practically impossible . The expedition to See also:Copenhagen in 1807, when the British ultimatum was presented by an army of 27,000 men carried on 300 transports, would appear to See also:traverse this statement . But at the beginning of the 2oth century an army and a See also:fleet of such magnitude could neither be assembled nor despatched without the whole See also:world being cognizant . It is thus perfectly true that an appreciable See also:period of time must elapse between the breaking off of negotiations and the See also:appearance on the See also:scene of an invading army .
Events may See also: It will certainly be necessary to construct strong places, to secure the lines of communication, to establish ample magazines, to organize See also:local forces, to assemble a fleet of transports, and to keep a large See also:body of troops ready to embark at a moment's See also:notice . But there is no reason, except expense, that all this should not be done directly it becomes clear that war is probable, and that it should not be done without attracting public See also:attention . In this way strategy may easily keep pace with diplomacy; and all that is wanted is the exercise of See also:ordinary foresight, a careful study of the theatre of war, a knowledge of the enemy's resources and a resolute determination, despite some temporary inconvenience and the outcry of a thoughtless public, to give the enemy no chance of claiming first See also:blood . The Franco-German War supplies a striking example . Moltke's See also:original intention was to assemble the German armies on the western frontier . The French, he thought, inferior in See also:numbers and but See also:half prepared, would probably assemble as far back as the Moselle . But, as so often happens in war, the enemy did what he was least expected to do . Hastily leaving their garrisons, the French regiments rushed forward to the See also:Saar . The excitement in Germany was great; and even soldiers of repute, although the mobilization of the army was still unfinished, demanded that such troops as were available should be hurried forward to protect the See also:rich provinces which See also:lie between the Saar and Rhine . But the chief of the staff became as See also:deaf as he was silent . Not a single See also:company was despatched to reinforce the slender garrisons of the frontier towns; and those garrisons were ordered to retire, destroying railways and removing See also:rolling-stock, directly the enemy should See also:cross the boundary . Moltke's foresight had embraced every possible contingency .
The See also:action of the French, improbable as it was deemed, had still been provided against; and, in accordance with time-tables See also:drawn up long beforehand, the German army was disentrained on the Rhine instead of on the Saar
.
Ninety See also:miles of German territory were thus laid open to the enemy; but the temporary surrender of the border provinces, in the See also:opinion of the great strategist, was a very See also:minor evil compared with the disasters, military and political, that would have resulted from an See also:attempt to hold them
.
It is hardly necessary to observe that no civilian See also:minister,
however deeply he might have studied the art of war, could
be expected to solve for himself the strategic problems
Duties of which come before him
.
In See also:default of practical
the War knowledge, it would be as impossible for him to
Mlaister
.
decide where garrisons should be stationed, what fortifications were necessary, what roads should be constructed, or how the lines of communication should be protected, as to See also:frame a plan of campaign for the invasion of a hostile state
.
His foresight, his prevision of the accidents inevitable in war, would necessarily be far inferior to those of men who had spent their lives in applying strategical principles to See also:concrete cases; and it is exceedingly unlikely that he would be as prolific ofstrategical expedients as those familiar with their employment
.
Nevertheless, a minister of war cannot divest himself of his responsibility for the conduct of military operations
.
In the first place, he is directly responsible that plans of campaign to meet every possible contingency are worked out in time of peace
.
In the second place, he is directly responsible that the See also:advice on which he acts should be the best procurable
.
It is essential, therefore, that he should be capable of forming an See also:independent opinion on the merits of the military projects which may be submitted to him, and also on the merits of those who have to execute them
.
See also:Pitt knew enough of war and men to select See also:Wolfe for the command in See also:Canada
.
See also:Canning and Castlereagh, in spite of the opposition of the See also: The French See also:Directory had sufficient sense to accept Napoleon's project for the campaign of See also:Italy in 1796 . In the third place, strategy cannot move altogether untrammelled by politics and See also:finance . But political and See also:financial considerations may not See also:present themselves in quite the same See also:light to the soldier as to the statesman, and the latter is See also:bound to make certain that they have received due attention . If, however, modifications are necessary, they should be made before the plan of campaign is finally approved; and in any case the purely military considerations should be most carefully weighed . It should be remembered that an unfavourable political situation is best redeemed by a decisive victory, while a reverse will do more to shake confidence in the Government than even the temporary surrender of some portion of the See also:national domains . " Be sure before striking " and Reculer pour mieux sauter are both admirable See also:maxims; but their practical application requires a thorough appreciation of the true principles of war, and a very large degree of moral courage, both in the soldier who suggests and in the statesman who approves . If, however, the soldier and the statesman are supported by an enlightened public, sufficiently acquainted with war to realize that See also:patience is to be preferred to precipitation, that retreat, though inglorious, is not necessarily humiliating, their task is very considerably lightened . Nothing is more significant than a comparison between the Paris See also:press in 1870 and the American Confederate press in 1864 . In the one case, even after the disastrous results of the first encounters had proved the superior strength and readiness of the enemy, the French people, with all the See also:heat of presumptuous See also:ignorance, cried out for more battles, for an immediate offensive, for a desperate defence of the frontier provinces . So fierce was their clamour that both the generals and the government hesitated, until it was too See also:late, to advise the retreat of Bazaine's army; and when that army had been cut off at Metz, the pressure of public opinion was so great that the last reserve of France was despatched to Sedan on one of the maddest enterprises ever undertaken by a civilized state . In 1864, on the other hand, while Lee in See also:Virginia and See also:Johnston in the See also:west were retreating from position to position, and the huge hosts of the Union were gradually converging on the very See also:heart of the Confederacy, the Southern |