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WAR (O. Eng. werre, Fr. guerre, of Te...
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See also:WAR (O. Eng. werre, Fr. guerre, of See also:Teutonic origin; cf. O.H.G. werran, to confound) , the armed conflict of states, in which each seeks to impose its will upon the other by force . See also:War is the opposite of See also:Peace (q.v.), and is the subject of the military See also:art . In See also:separate sections below the See also:general principles of the art of war are discussed, and the See also:laws which have gradually become accepted among civilized peoples for the regulation of its conditions . The details concerning the See also:history of individual See also:wars, and the various weapons and See also:instruments of war, are given in separate articles . See See also:ARMY, See also:NAVY, See also:CONSCRIPTION, See also:STRATEGY, See also:TACTICS, See also:INFANTRY, See also:CAVALRY, See also:ARTILLERY, See also:ENGINEERS, FORTIFICATION, See also:COAST DE-FENCE, See also:OFFICERS, See also:STAFF, See also:GUARDS, See also:SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT, See also:UNIFORMS, ARMS AND See also:ARMOUR, See also:GUN, See also:RIFLE, See also:PISTOL, See also:SWORD, See also:LANCE, See also:ORDNANCE, See also:MACHINE GUNS, SUBMARINE MINES, See also:TORPEDO, &C . The important wars are dealt with under the names commonly given to them; e.g . See also:AMERICAN See also:CIVIL WAR, AMERICAN WAR OF See also:INDEPENDENCE, AMERICAN WAR OF 1812, See also:CRIMEAN WAR, DUTCH WARS, FRANCO-See also:GERMAN WAR, See also:FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WARS, See also:GREAT See also:REBELLION, See also:GREEK WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, See also:ITALIAN WARS, See also:NAPOLEONIC See also:CAMPAIGNS, PELOPONNESIAN WAR, See also:PENINSULAR WAR, PUNIC WARS, RUSSO-See also:JAPANESE WAR, RUSSO-See also:TURKISH WARS, SERVO-BULGARIAN WAR, SEVEN See also:WEEKS' WAR, SEVEN YEARS' WAR, See also:SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR, SPANISH See also:SUCCESSION WAR, See also:THIRTY YEARS' WAR . Important campaigns and battles are also separately treated (e.g . See also:WATERLOO, See also:TRAFALGAR, See also:SHENANDOAH VALLEY, See also:WILDERNESS, See also:METZ, &C.) . I . GENERAL PRINCIPLES It is not easy to detertnine whether See also:industrial progress, improved organization, the spread of See also:education or See also:mechanical inventions Modem have wrought the greater See also:change in the military art. conditions . War is first and foremost a See also:matter of See also:movement; and as such it has been considerably affected by the multiplication of See also:good roads, the introduction of See also:steam transport, and by the ease with which See also:draught animals can be collected .
In the second See also:place, war is a matter of supply; and the large See also:area of cultivation, the increase of live-stock, the vast See also:trade in See also:pro-visions, pouring the See also:food-stuffs of one See also:continent into another, have done much to lighten the inevitable difficulties of a See also:campaign
.
In the third place, war is a matter of destruction; and while the weapons of armies have become more perfect and more durable, the See also:modern substitutes for See also:gunpowder have added largely to their destructive capacity
.
Fourthly, war is not merely a See also:blind struggle between mobs of individuals, without guidance or coherence, but a conflict of well-organized masses, moving with a view to intelligent co-operation, acting under the impulse of a single will and directed against a definite See also:objective
.
These masses, however, are seldom so closely concentrated that the impulse which sets them in See also:motion can be promptly and easily communicated to each, nor can the right objective be selected without some knowledge of the enemy's strength and dispositions
.
Means of intercommunication, therefore, as well as methods of observation, are of great importance; and with the See also:telegraph, the See also:telephone, visual signalling, balloons, airships and improved See also:
The See also:idea of See also:forging generals and soldiers under the See also:hammer of war disappeared with the See also:advent of " the nation in arms." Military organization has become a See also:science, studied both by statesmen and soldiers
.
The lessons of history have not been neglected
.
Previous to 187o, in one See also:kingdom only was it recognized that See also:intellect and education See also:play a, more prominent See also:part in war than stamina and courage
.
Taught by the disasters of 1806, See also:Prussia set herself to discover the surest means of escaping humiliation for the future
.
The shrewdest of her sons undertook the task
.
The nature of war was analysed until the secrets of success and failure were laid See also:bare; and on these investigations a See also:system of organization and of training was built up which, not only from a military, but from a See also:political, and even an economical point of view, is the most striking product of the 19th century
.
The keynote of this system is that the best brains in the See also:state shall be at the service of the war See also:lord
.
None, therefore, but thoroughly competent soldiers are entrusted with the responsibility of command; and the education of the officer is as thorough, as systematic and as See also:uniform as the education of the lawyer, the diplomatist and the See also:doctor
.
In all ages the See also:power of intellect has asserted itself in war
.
It was not courage and experience only that made See also:Hannibal, See also: Other wars had shown the value of an educated general; these showed the value of an educated army . It is true that See also:Moltke, in See also:mental power and in knowledge, was in no See also:wise inferior to the great captains who preceded him; but the remarkable point of his campaigns is that so many capable generals had never before been gathered together under one See also:flag . No campaigns have been submitted to such searching See also:criticism . Never have mistakes been more sedulously sought for or more frankly exposed . And yet, compared with the mistakes of other campaigns, even with that of 1815, where hardly a See also:superior officer on either See also:side had not seen more battles than Moltke and his comrades had seen field-days, they were astonishingly few . It is not to be denied that the foes of Prussia were hardly worthy of her See also:steel . Yet it may be doubted whether either See also:Austria or See also:France ever put two finer armies into the field than the army of Bohemia in 1866 and the army of the See also:Rhine in 187o . Even their generals of divisions and brigades had more actual experience than those who led the German army See also:corps . Compared with the German See also:rank and See also:file, a great part of their non-commissioned officers and men were veterans, and veterans who had seen much service . Their See also:chief officers were practically See also:familiar with the methods of moving, supplying and manoeuvring large masses of troops; their marshals were valiant and successful soldiers . And yet the history of modern warfare records no defeats so See also:swift and so See also:complete as those of See also:Koniggratz and See also:Sedan . The great See also:host of Austria was shattered to fragments in seven weeks; the French Imperial army was destroyed in seven weeks and three days; and to all See also:intent and purpose the resistance they had offered was not much more effective than that of a respectable See also:militia . But both the See also:Austrian and the French armies were organized and 'trained under the old system . Courage, experience and professional See also:pride they possessed in abundance . See also:Man for man, in all virile qualities, neither officers nor men were inferior to their foes . But one thing their generals lacked, and that was education for war . Strategy was almost a sealed See also:book to them; organization a matter of secondary importance . It was no part of their See also:duty, they declared, to See also:train the See also:judgment of their subordinates; they were soldiers, and not pedagogues . Know-ledge of See also:foreign armies and their methods they considered useless; and of war prepared and conducted on " business principles " they had never even dreamt . The popular idea that war is a See also:mere matter of See also:brute force, redeemed only by valour and discipline, is responsible for a greater evil than the complacency of the See also:amateur . Statesmen It blinds both the See also:people and its representatives to and war . their bounden duties . War is something more than a mere outgrowth of politics . It is a political See also:act, initiated and controlled by the See also:government, and it is an act of which the issues are far more momentous than any other . No See also:branch of political science requires more careful study . It is not pretended that if military history were thoroughly studied all statesmen would become Moltkes, or that every See also:citizen would be competent to set squadrons in the field . War is above all a See also:practical art, and the application of theory to practice is not to be taught at a university or to be learned by those who have never rubbed shoulders with the men in the ranks . But if war were more generally and more thoroughly studied, the importance of organization, of training, of education and of readiness would be more generally appreciated; abuses would no longer be regarded with lazy tolerance; efficiency would be something more than a political catchword, and soldiers would be given ample opportunities of becoming masters of every detail of their profession . Nor is this all . A nation that understood something about war would hardly suffer the fantastic tricks which have been played so often by the best-meaning statesmen . And statesmen them-selves would realize that when war is afoot their interference is worse than useless; that preparation for See also:defence, whether by the multiplication of roads, the construction of See also:railways, of arsenals, See also:dockyards, fortresses, is not the smallest of their duties; and lastly, that so far as possible See also:diplomacy and strategy should keep step . Each one of these is of far greater importance than in the past . In the wars of the 18th century, See also:English cabinets and Dutch deputies could See also:direct strategical operations without bringing ruin on their respective countries . The armies of Austria in 1792-1795, controlled as they were by the Aulic See also:Councils, were more formidable in the field than those of the French See also:Republic . In the campaigns of 1854 and 1859 the plans of See also:Newcastle and Napoleon III. worked out to a successful issue; and if See also:Lincoln and See also:Stanton, his Secretary of War, imperilled the See also:Union in 1862, they saw the downfall of the See also:Southern Confederacy in 1865 . But in every See also:case amateur was pitted against amateur .
The Dutch deputies were hardly less incapable of planning or approving a See also:sound See also:plan of campaign than See also: If they were numerous, although the enemy may not have been skilful enough to take advantage of them, the outlook for the future under the same direction, but against a more practised enemy, is anything but See also:bright . As regards preparation for defence, history supplies us with numerous illustrations . The most conspicuous, perhaps, is the elaborate See also:series of fortifications which were constructed by See also:Vauban for the defence of France; =Prepaforraand there can be no question that Louis XIV., in defence. erecting this mighty barrier against invasion, gave See also:proof of statesmanlike foresight of no mean See also:order . An instance less familiar, perhaps, but even more creditable to the See also:brain which conceived it, was Wellington's preparation of See also:Portugal in 1809-1811 . Not only did the impregnable stronghold of Torres Vedras, covering See also:Lisbon, and securing for the See also:sea-power an open See also:door to the continent of See also:Europe, rise as if by magic from the See also:earth, but the whole See also:theatre of war was so dealt with that the defending army could operate wherever opportunity might offer . No less than twenty supply depots were established on different lines of the advance . Fortifications protected the See also:principal magazines . See also:Bridges were restored and roads improved . Waterways were opened up, and flotillas organized; and three See also:auxiliary bases were formed on the shores of the See also:Atlantic . Again, the famous " quadrilaterals " of See also:Lombardy and See also:Rumelia have more than fulfilled the purpose for which they were constructed; and both Austria and See also:Turkey owe much to the fortresses which so See also:long protected their vulnerable points . Nor has the neglect of preparation failed to exert" a powerful effect . Moltke has told us that the railway system of See also:Germany before 187o had been See also:developed without regard to strategical considerations . Yet the fact remains that it was far better adapted both for offence and defence than those of Austria and France; and, at the same time, it can hardly be denied that the unprovided state of the great French fortresses exercised an evil influence on French strategy . Both Metz and See also:Strassburg were so far from forming strong pivots of manoeuvres, and thus aiding the operations of the field armies, that they required those armies for their See also:protection; and the See also:retreat on Metz, which removed See also:Bazaine's army from the direct road to See also:Paris and placed it out of See also:touch with its supports, was mainly due to the unfinished outworks and deficient armament of the virgin See also:city . Since 187o it has been recognized that preparation of the theatre of war is one of the first duties of a government . Every frontier of continental Europe is covered by a See also:chain of entrenched camps . The great arsenais are amply fortified and strongly garrisoned . Strategy has as much to say to new railways as trade; and the lines of communication, whether by See also:water or by See also:land, are adequately protected from all hostile enterprises . We now come to the importance of See also:close See also:concert between strategy and diplomacy . On the continent of Europe they can easily keep See also:pace, for the theatre of war is always within easy reach . But when the ocean intervenes between two hostile states it is undoubtedly difficult to time an See also:ultimatum so that a sufficient armed force shall be at hand to enforce it, and it has been said in high places that it is practically impossible . The expedition to See also:Copenhagen in 1807, when the British ultimatum was presented by an army of 27,000 men carried on 300 transports, would appear to See also:traverse this statement . But at the beginning of the 2oth century an army and a See also:fleet of such magnitude could neither be assembled nor despatched without the whole See also:world being cognizant . It is thus perfectly true that an appreciable See also:period of time must elapse between the breaking off of negotiations and the See also:appearance on the See also:scene of an invading army .
Events may See also: It will certainly be necessary to construct strong places, to secure the lines of communication, to establish ample magazines, to organize See also:local forces, to assemble a fleet of transports, and to keep a large See also:body of troops ready to embark at a moment's See also:notice . But there is no reason, except expense, that all this should not be done directly it becomes clear that war is probable, and that it should not be done without attracting public See also:attention . In this way strategy may easily keep pace with diplomacy; and all that is wanted is the exercise of See also:ordinary foresight, a careful study of the theatre of war, a knowledge of the enemy's resources and a resolute determination, despite some temporary inconvenience and the outcry of a thoughtless public, to give the enemy no chance of claiming first See also:blood . The Franco-German War supplies a striking example . Moltke's See also:original intention was to assemble the German armies on the western frontier . The French, he thought, inferior in See also:numbers and but See also:half prepared, would probably assemble as far back as the Moselle . But, as so often happens in war, the enemy did what he was least expected to do . Hastily leaving their garrisons, the French regiments rushed forward to the See also:Saar . The excitement in Germany was great; and even soldiers of repute, although the mobilization of the army was still unfinished, demanded that such troops as were available should be hurried forward to protect the See also:rich provinces which See also:lie between the Saar and Rhine . But the chief of the staff became as See also:deaf as he was silent . Not a single See also:company was despatched to reinforce the slender garrisons of the frontier towns; and those garrisons were ordered to retire, destroying railways and removing See also:rolling-stock, directly the enemy should See also:cross the boundary . Moltke's foresight had embraced every possible contingency .
The See also:action of the French, improbable as it was deemed, had still been provided against; and, in accordance with time-tables See also:drawn up long beforehand, the German army was disentrained on the Rhine instead of on the Saar
.
Ninety See also:miles of German territory were thus laid open to the enemy; but the temporary surrender of the border provinces, in the See also:opinion of the great strategist, was a very See also:minor evil compared with the disasters, military and political, that would have resulted from an See also:attempt to hold them
.
It is hardly necessary to observe that no civilian See also:minister,
however deeply he might have studied the art of war, could
be expected to solve for himself the strategic problems
Duties of which come before him
.
In See also:default of practical
the War knowledge, it would be as impossible for him to
Mlaister
.
decide where garrisons should be stationed, what fortifications were necessary, what roads should be constructed, or how the lines of communication should be protected, as to See also:frame a plan of campaign for the invasion of a hostile state
.
His foresight, his prevision of the accidents inevitable in war, would necessarily be far inferior to those of men who had spent their lives in applying strategical principles to See also:concrete cases; and it is exceedingly unlikely that he would be as prolific ofstrategical expedients as those familiar with their employment
.
Nevertheless, a minister of war cannot divest himself of his responsibility for the conduct of military operations
.
In the first place, he is directly responsible that plans of campaign to meet every possible contingency are worked out in time of peace
.
In the second place, he is directly responsible that the See also:advice on which he acts should be the best procurable
.
It is essential, therefore, that he should be capable of forming an See also:independent opinion on the merits of the military projects which may be submitted to him, and also on the merits of those who have to execute them
.
See also:Pitt knew enough of war and men to select See also:Wolfe for the command in See also:Canada
.
See also:Canning and Castlereagh, in spite of the opposition of the See also: The French See also:Directory had sufficient sense to accept Napoleon's project for the campaign of See also:Italy in 1796 . In the third place, strategy cannot move altogether untrammelled by politics and See also:finance . But political and See also:financial considerations may not See also:present themselves in quite the same See also:light to the soldier as to the statesman, and the latter is See also:bound to make certain that they have received due attention . If, however, modifications are necessary, they should be made before the plan of campaign is finally approved; and in any case the purely military considerations should be most carefully weighed . It should be remembered that an unfavourable political situation is best redeemed by a decisive victory, while a reverse will do more to shake confidence in the Government than even the temporary surrender of some portion of the See also:national domains . " Be sure before striking " and Reculer pour mieux sauter are both admirable See also:maxims; but their practical application requires a thorough appreciation of the true principles of war, and a very large degree of moral courage, both in the soldier who suggests and in the statesman who approves . If, however, the soldier and the statesman are supported by an enlightened public, sufficiently acquainted with war to realize that See also:patience is to be preferred to precipitation, that retreat, though inglorious, is not necessarily humiliating, their task is very considerably lightened . Nothing is more significant than a comparison between the Paris See also:press in 1870 and the American Confederate press in 1864 . In the one case, even after the disastrous results of the first encounters had proved the superior strength and readiness of the enemy, the French people, with all the See also:heat of presumptuous See also:ignorance, cried out for more battles, for an immediate offensive, for a desperate defence of the frontier provinces . So fierce was their clamour that both the generals and the government hesitated, until it was too See also:late, to advise the retreat of Bazaine's army; and when that army had been cut off at Metz, the pressure of public opinion was so great that the last reserve of France was despatched to Sedan on one of the maddest enterprises ever undertaken by a civilized state . In 1864, on the other hand, while Lee in See also:Virginia and See also:Johnston in the See also:west were retreating from position to position, and the huge hosts of the Union were gradually converging on the very See also:heart of the Confederacy, the Southern press, aware that every backward step made the Federal task more difficult, had nothing but praise for the caution which controlled the movements of their armies . But the Southern press, in three crowded years of conflict, had learned something of war . 
In 1866 and 187o the German press was so carefully muzzled that even had there been occasion it could have done nothing to See also:prejudice pubic opinion . Thus both the See also:sovereign and the generals were backed by the popular support that they so richly merited; but it may be remarked that the relations between the army and the government were characterized by a See also:harmony which has been seldom seen . The old king, in his dual capacity as See also:head of the state and commanderin-chief, had the last word to say, not only in the selection of the superior officers, but in approving every important operation . With an adviser like Moltke at his See also:elbow, it might appear that these were mere matters of See also:form . Moltke, however, assures us that the king was by no means a figurehead . Although most careful not to assert his authority in a way that would embarrass his chief of staff, and always ready to yield his own judgment to sound reasons, he expressed, nevertheless, a perfectly independent opinion on every proposal placed before him, and on very many occasions made most useful suggestions . And at the same time, while systematically refraining from all interference after military operations had once begun, he never permitted military considerations to override the demands of policy . In 1866, when it was manifestly of the first importance, from a military point of view, that the Prussian army should be concentrated in a position which would enable it to cross the border immediately war was declared, the political situation was so strained that it was even more important to prevent the enemy from setting See also:foot at any single point on Prussian territory . The army, in consequence, was dispersed instead of being concentrated, and the ultimate offensive became a difficult and hazardous operation . It is true that the king was an able and experienced soldier . Nevertheless, the wise See also:restraint he displayed in the course of two great campaigns, as well as the skill with which he adjusted conflicting factors, are an admirable example of judicious statesmanship . The duration of a campaign is largely affected by the deadly properties of modern firearms .
It is true that the losses in
See also:battle are relatively less that in the days of See also: Strong men collapsed inanimate . . . . I saw men cry like See also:children, others See also:fell prone without a sound; in most the need of water thrust forth all other instincts; the body demanded its rights . Water, water,' was the only intelligible cry that See also:broke from those moving phantoms . The enemy's See also:lead poured like See also:hail upon the wretched remnant of the brigade; yet they moved only slowly to the See also:rear, their heads See also:bent in utter weariness; their features distorted under the thick dust that had gathered on faces dripping with sweat . The strain was beyond endurance . The soldier was no longer a receptive being; he was oblivious of everything, great or small . His comrades or his superiors he no longer recognized; and yet he was the same man who but a See also:short time before had marched across the battlefield shouting his marching See also:chorus . A few active squadrons, and not a man would have escaped ! Only he who had seen men in such circumstances, and observed their bearing, knows the dreadful imprint that their features leave upon the memory . Madness is there, the madness that arises from bodily exhaustion combined with the most abject terror . . . . I do not shrink," he adds, "from confessing that the fire of See also:Mars-la-Tour affected my nerves for months." If such are the results of See also:ill-success, a whole army might he reduced to the See also:condition of the 38th Brigade in the firstmonth of the campaign, and it is thus perfectly clear that some small See also:mistake in conduct, some trifling deficiency in preparation, an ill-conceived order or a few See also:hours' delay in bringing up a reinforcement may have the most terrible consequences . The importance, See also:nay the See also:necessity, that the people, as a governing body, should keep as watchful an eye on its armed forces and the national defences as on diplomacy or legislation is fully realized naturally enough, only by those nations whose instincts of self-preservation, by reason of the configuration of their frontiers or their political situation, are strongly developed . Yet even to maritime empires, to Great Britain or indeed to the United States, an efficient army is of the first necessity . Their land frontiers are vulnerable . They may have to See also:deal with rebellion, and a navy is not all-powerful, even for the defence of coasts and See also:commerce . It can protect, but it cannot destroy . Without the help of an army, it can neither complete the ruin of the enemy's fleet nor prevent its resuscitation . Without the help of an army it can hardly force a hostile power to ask for terms . Exhaustion is the See also:object of its warfare; but exhaustion, unless accelerated by crushing blows, is an exceedingly slow process . In the See also:spring of 1861 the See also:blockade was established in American See also:waters along the coasts of the Southern Confederacy, and maintained with increasing stringency from See also:month to month . Yet it was not till the spring of 1865 that the See also:colours of the Union floated from the capitol of See also:Richmond, and it was the army which placed them there . A state, then, which should rely on See also:naval strength alone, could look forward to no other than a protracted war, and a protracted war between two great See also:powers is antagonistic to the interests of the civilized world . With the nations armed to the See also:teeth, and dominated to a greater or smaller extent by a militant spirit; with commerce and finance dependent for See also:health and See also:security on universal peace, foreign intervention is a mere question of time . Nor would public opinion, either in Great Britain or See also:America, be content with a purely defensive policy, even if such policy were practicable . Putting aside the tedium and the dangers of an interminable campaign, the national pride would never be brought to confess that it was incapable of the same resolute effort as much smaller communities . " An army, and a strong army," would be the general cry . Nor would such an army be difficult to create . Enormous numbers would not be needed . An army supported by an invincible navy possesses a strength which is out of all proportion to its See also:size . Even to those who rely on the big battalions and huge fortresses, the amphibious power of a great maritime state, if intelligently directed, may be a most formidable menace; while to the state itself it is an extraordinary security . The history of Great Britain is one long See also:illustration . Captain See also:Mahan points out that there are always dominant positions, outside the frontiers of a maritime state, which, in the interests of commerce, as well as of supremacy at sea, should never be allowed to pass into the See also:possession of a powerful See also:neighbour . Great Britain, always dependent for her prosperity on narrow seas, has long been familiar with the importance of the positions that command these waterways . In one respect at least her policy has been consistent .
She has spared no effort to secure such positions for herself, or, if that has been impracticable, at least to draw their teeth
.
See also:Gibraltar, See also:Malta, St See also:Lucia, See also:Aden, Egypt, Cyprus are conspicuous instances; but above all stands See also:Antwerp
.
In perhaps the most original passage of See also:Alison's monumental See also:work the See also:constant influence of Antwerp on the destinies of the United Kingdom is vividly portrayed
.
" Nature has framed the See also:Scheldt to be the See also:rival of the See also:Thames
.
Flowing through a See also:country excelling even the midland counties of See also:England, in See also:wealth and resources, adjoining cities equal to any in Europe in arts and commerce; the artery at once of See also:Flanders and See also: Timely diversions, by attracting a large portion of the enemy's fighting strength on the mainland, may give valuable aid to the armies of an ally . The Peninsular War is a conspicuous example . According to Napoleon, the necessity of maintaining his grip on Spain deprived him of 18o,000 good soldiers during the disastrous campaign of 1813; and those soldiers, who would have made See also:Dresden a decisive instead of a barren victory, were held fast by Wellington . Again, it was the See also:news of See also:Vittoria that made. it useless for the See also:emperor to propose terms of peace, and so See also:escape from the coils that strangled him at See also:Leipzig . Nor is the reinforcement supplied by a small army based upon the sea to be despised . In 1793 a British contingent under the See also:duke of See also:York formed part of the allied forces which, had the British government forborne to interfere, would in all See also:probability have captured Paris . Twenty-two years later, under wiser auspices, another contingent, although numbering no more than 30,000 men, took a decisive part in the war of nations, and the blunders of the older See also:generation were more than repaired at Waterloo . Nevertheless, the strength of the amphibious power has been more effectively displayed than in the campaign of 1815 . Intervention at the most See also:critical period of a war has produced greater results than the See also:provision of a contingent at the outset . In 1781 the disembarkation of a French army at See also:Yorktown, Virginia, rendered certain the independence of the United States; and in 1878, when the See also:Russian invaders were already in sight of See also:Constantinople, the arrival of the British fleet in the See also:Dardanelles, following the mobilization of an expeditionary force, at once arrested their further progress . Had the British See also:Cabinet of 1807 realized the preponderating strength which even a small army, if rightly used, draws from the command of the sea, the campaign of See also:Eylau would in all probability have been as disastrous to Napoleon as that of Leipzig . The presence of 20,000 men at the great battle would have surely turned the See also:scale in favour of the allies . Yet, although the men were available, although a few months later 27,000 were assembled in the Baltic for the See also:coercion of See also:Denmark, his See also:Majesty's ministers, forgetful of See also:Marlborough's glories, were so imbued with the idea that the British army was too insignificant to take part in a Continental war, that the opportunity was let slip . It is a sufficiently remarkable fact that the successive governments of that era, although they realized very clearly that the first duty of the army was to support the operations and complete the See also:triumph of the navy, never seemed to have grasped the principles which should have controlled its use when the command of the sea had been attained . The march of the Allies on Paris in 1793 was brought to a standstill because the British Cabinet considered that the contingent would be better employed in besieging See also:Dunkirk . After the failure of the expedition of her danger, it had been the fixed policy of Great Britain for centuries to prevent this formidable outwork from falling into the hands of her enemies, and the best days of her history are chiefly occupied with the struggle to ward off such a disaster." In ascribing, however, every great war in which Great Britain has been engaged to this cause alone he has gone too far . The security of India has been a See also:motive of equal strength . Nevertheless, it was to protect Antwerp from the French that Charles II. sided with the Dutch in 1670; that See also:Anne declared war on Louis YIV. in 1704; that See also:Chatham supported Prussia in 1742; that Pitt, fifty years later, took up arms against the Revolution . The trophies of the British army in the great war with France were characteristic of the amphibious power . The troops took Inter- more battleships than colours, and almost as many actions of naval arsenals as land fortresses . Many were the naval and blows they struck at the maritime strength of France mmtary and her allies; but had the expedition which landed operations, on the Isle of Walcheren in 1809 been as vigorously conducted as it was wisely conceived, it would have See also:hit Napoleon far harder than even the seizure of the Danish fleet at Copenhagen . The great dockyard that the emperor had constructed on the Scheldt held the See also:nucleus of a powerful fleet . Eight lineof-battle ships and ten frigates See also:lay in See also:mid-channel . Twenty vessels of different classes were on the slips, and in the magazines and storehouses had been accumulated sufficient material to equip all these and twenty more . The destruction of Antwerp—and for a full See also:week it was at Lord Chatham's See also:mercy—would have freed scores of British frigates to protect British commerce; Wellington, in his great campaign of 1813, could not have had to complain that, for the first time, the communication by sea of a British army was insecure; the Americans, in the war which broke out in 1812, would have been more vigorously opposed; and Napoleon, who, while Antwerp was his, never altogether abandoned See also:hope of overmastering Great Britain on her own See also:element, might, on his own See also:confession, have relinquished the useless struggle with the great sea power . The expedition failed, and failed disastrously . But for all that, fulfilling as it did the great See also:maxim that the naval strength of the enemy should be the first objective of the forces of the maritime power, both by land and sea, it was a strategical stroke of the highest order . The predominant part played by the army under Wellington in Spain and See also:Belgium has tended to obscure the principle that governed its employment in the war of 1793-1815 . The army, in the opinion of the country, was first and foremost the auxiliary of the fleet; and only when the naval strength of the enemy had been destroyed was it used in the ordinary manner, i.e. in the invasion of the hostile territory and in lending aid to the forces of confederate powers . Events proved that these principles were absolutely sound . It was not in the narrow seas alone that the army rendered good service to the navy . Depriving France of her colonies, occupying her ports in foreign waters, ousting her from commanding posts along the trade routes, it contributed not only to her exhaustion, but to the protection of British commerce and to the permanent establishment of maritime supremacy . Few of these operations are of sufficient magnitude to attract much notice from the ordinary historian, yet it is impossible to overrate their effect . To the possession of the dominant positions that were captured by the army, Great Britain, in no small degree, is indebted for the present security of her vast dominions . The keynote of the fierce struggle with the French Empire was the possession of India . Before he became First See also:Consul, Napoleon had realized that India was the See also:throne of See also:Asia; that whoever should sit on that throne, See also:master of the commerce of the East, of the richest and most natural See also:market for the products of the West, and of the hardiest and most en-lightened nations of the See also:golden hemisphere, would be master of more than half the globe .
But his prescience was not surer than the See also:instinct of the Britisl• people
.
Vague and shadowy
under See also:Sir See also: If> however, the decisive point is near the coast, as in the campaign of Eylau, the army of the maritime power, possessing its own See also:base, can render effective aid without embarrassment either to itself or its ally . But, under all other conditions, independent See also:opera- tions of a secondary nature are distinctly to be preferred . Such was clearly the opinion of the British ministries during the war with France . They recognized that by giving vitality and backbone to popular risings even a small army might create useful diversions . But their idea of a diversion was a series of isolated efforts, made at far-distant points; and even so late As 1813 they were oblivious of the self-evident facts that for a diversion to be really effective it must be made in such strength as to constitute a serious threat, and that it should be directed against some vital point . Fortunately for Europe, Wellington foresaw that the permanent occupation of Portugal, and the presence of a British army in close proximity to the southern frontier of France, would be a menace which it would be See also:im- possible for Napoleon to disregard . Yet with what difficulty he induced the government to adopt his views, and how See also:luke- warm was their support, is exposed in the many volumes of his despatches . In all history there are few more glaring instances of incompetent statesmanship than the proposal of the cabinet of 18r3, at the moment Wellington was contemplating the campaign that was to expel the French from Spain, and was asking for more men, more See also:money and more material, to detach a large force in the vague hope of exciting a revolution in southern Italy . Whether the improvement in communications, as well as the increase in the size of armies, have not greatly weakened the value of diversions on the mainland, it is difficult to say . Railways may enable the defender to concentrate his forces so rapidly that even the landing may be opposed, and with the enormous numbers at his command he may well be able to spare a considerable force from the main theatre . It is possible to conceive that a small army, even if it completed its embarka- tion, might find itself shut up in an entrenched position by a force little larger than itself . If, however, the diversion were made at a crisis of the campaign, the sudden appearance of a new army might be decisive of the war . Otherwise, the army would probably do more good if it refrained from landing and confined itself to threats . So long as it was hidden by the See also:horizon, it would be invested with the terrors of the unknown . The enemy's knowledge that at any moment a well-equipped force, supported by a powerful fleet, might suddenly descend upon some prosperous See also:port or important arsenal, would compel him to maintain large garrisons along the whole seaboard . The strength of these garrisons, in all probability, would be much larger in the aggregate than the force which menaced them, and the latter would thus exercise a far greater disintegrating effect on the enemy's armed strength than by adding a few thousand men to the hosts of its ally . On theatres of war which are only thinly populated or half civilized, a descent from the sea might easily produce a complete change in the situation . The occupation of Plevna, in close proximity to the Russian See also:line of communications and to the single See also:bridge across the See also:Danube, brought the Russian advance through See also:Bulgaria to a sudden stop, and relieved all pressure on Turkey proper . The deadlock which ensued is suggestive . Let us suppose that the invaders' line of communications had been a railway, and Plevna situated near the coast . Supplied from the sea, with unlimited facilities for reinforcement, See also:Osman's See also:ring of earthworks would have been absolutely impregnable; and had the ring been pushed so far inland as to secure scope for offensive action, the Russians; in all human probability, would never have crossed the Balkans . It is perfectly possible, then, that if an army lands within reach of a See also:precarious line of communications it may compel the enemy, although far superior in numbers, to renounce all enterprises against distant points . Railways in war are good servants, but See also:bad masters . In some respects they are far superior to a network of highroads . Two trains will supply the daily needs of roo,000 men several See also:hundred miles distant from their base . But Railways. the road-See also:bed is easily destroyed; the See also:convoy system is impracticable, and the See also:regular course of See also:traffic is susceptible to the slightest threat . So, when railways become the principal factors, as when an army finds itself dependent on a long and exposed line, a powerful aggressive See also:combination becomes a matter of the utmost difficulty . The whole attention of the commander will be given to the security of his supplies, and even if he is not thrown on the defensive by the enemy's activity, his See also:liberty of action will be exceedingly circumscribed . The relative values of the different kinds of communications have a most important bearing on the art of war . A great waterway, such as the See also:Nile, the See also:Mississippi, the Danube or the See also:Ganges, is safer and surer than a railway . But railways are far more numerous than navigable See also:rivers, and a series of parallel lines is thus a better means of supplying a large army . But neither railways nor waterways as lines of supply or of operation are The sea as to be compared with the sea . Before the war of 187o, a operation. for instance, a study of the French railway system enabled Moltke to forecast, with See also:absolute accuracy, the direction of Napoleon's advance, the See also:distribution of his forces, and the extent of front that they would occupy . In a war, therefore, between two Continental powers, the staff on either side would have no difficulty in determining the line of attack; the locality for concentration would be at once made clear; and as the carrying capacity of all railways is well known, the numbers that would be encountered at any one point along the front might be easily calculated . But if the enemy's army, supported by a powerful fleet, were to advance across See also:blue water, the case would be very different . Its movements would be veiled in the most complete secrecy .
It would be impossible to do more than guess at its objective
.
It might strike at any point along hundreds of miles of coast, or it might shift from one point to another, perhaps far distant, in absolute security; it cculd bewilder the enemy with feints, and cause him to disperse his forces over the whole seaboard
.
Surprise and freedom of movement are pre-eminently the weapons of the power that commands the sea
.
Witness the War of See also:Secession
.
McClellan, in 1862, by the adroit See also:transfer of 120,000 men down the reaches of Chesapeake to the Virginia Peninsula, had Richmond at his mercy
.
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