Although the term in both Gr. ( poiesis ) and Lat. ( fictio )denotes a thing made , opponents off. ever since Plato have emphasized its status as falsehood, feigning, and lying. Plato himself accuses the poets of lacking the specialized knowledge necessary to make a product that can serve the community as an instrument of instruction ( Republic 595a-608b). In the Poetics , Aristotle responds to this indictment in part by arguing for the peculiar logic of f.
Setting aside meter as an accidental property of poiesis (Poetics 9.1, 9.9), Aristotle considers plot or action essential. The structure of fictional discourse differs from historical narrative (which also presents human action) in that the former discloses a causal rather than a merely temporal relation between events. Whereas the historian relates what has happened, the poet or fiction-writer reveals why by incorporating the causal elements of character and motivation into the representation of events. Whereas history records only the particularities of an action, f. embraces its universals, which Aristotle elsewhere maintains ( Posterior Analytics 86a5-10, 88a5) are the more knowable causes of particulars that in themselves are difficult if not impossible to know. F., in other words, hypothesizes what a certain type of character would probably do in a given set of circumstances (Vaihinger), and it is in this sense that f. is more philosophical than history ( Poetics 9.3).
After Aristotle, f. is often defined in terms of the characteristics it shares not only with history and philosophy but also with rhet., where it is associated with the qualitative questions ( status qualitatis ) investigated by legal analysis (Trimpi). Moreover, according to many ancient literary theorists, f. mingles truth and falsehood, where truth is either philosophical or historical. The ancient rhetorical trad, also contributes to this devel. by defining f. ( plasma, argumentum, fictio )as a kind of narration midway between the facts of history ( historia )and the falsehood of fable ( mythos, fabula )(cf. Cicero, De inventione 1.19.27; Ad Herennium 1.8.13; Sextus Empiricus, Against the Grammarians 263–64; Hermogenes, Progymnasmata 2.17). In this view, f., lacking historical truth, nevertheless differs from fable through its commitment to verisimilitude (q.v.) or “resemblance to the truth.” Whereas f.’s link to the truth enables it to instruct—to be utile —its link to the fabulous enables it to please—to be dulce (e.g. Horace, Ars poetica Plutarch, Moralia 15f–16c).
Both of these traditional notions about f. have their origins in Aristotle’s literary theory, but neither is Aristotelian strictly speaking. Although Aristotle himself considers the place of verisimilitude in rhet. argument, he does not confuse this psychological concept aimed at credibility with the logical concept of probability so important to his theory off. in the Poetics . And whereas Aristotle regards delight as one of the causes of learning ( Poetics 4.4–6; Rhetoric 1.11.23–24), he never isolates these two as the complementary ends of poetry (see Eden).
From Antiquity through the 18th c., however, literary theory both preserves f.’s double aim to please and instruct and upholds verisimilitude (often confused with probability) as one of f.’s defining qualities (Boccaccio, Geneologia deorum gentilium [ca. 1363], 14.9; Castelvetro, Poetica d’Aristotele vulgarizzata e sposta [1570], ch. 1; Corneille, “Discours de l’utilité et des parties du poème dramatique” [1660]). In his “Preface to Shakespeare” (1765), Dr. Johnson maintains that “The mind revolts from evident falsehood, and f. loses its force when it departs from the resemblance of reality.” Even while borrowing the particularity and consequent plausibility of history, however, f. also continues to assert its claim on the universality of philosophy or, in Johnson’s words, on “general nature.”
Since the 18th c., theorists have continued to discuss the fictionality of poetry in the contexts of history, philosophy, and rhet. (qq.v.), but the terms of the discussions vary widely. Didactic theories off. have steadily lost currency, however. In addition, modern theory has tended to emphasize the differences between f. and poetry, addressing the nature and function of the latter on the one hand, and indentifying f. with a particular genre (the novel) on the other. More recently, philosophers of lang, have begun to consider the special linguistic properties of f. Here too, however, its peculiar features as a speech act are qualified in some relation to the conditions governing true and false statements (Searle).
User Comments Add a comment…